










Britain's second attempt to seek membership of the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1967 has widely been regarded as inevitable. This thesis
traces the development of Britain's policy towards the EEC from the accession
of the Labour Government in 1964 to the failure of the application for
membership in December 1967. Drawing primarily on official British records,
it takes as its premise that policy decisions must be reconstructed as they
appeared to participants at the time. It therefore places as central the roles and
attitudes of key ministers and officials. It seeks to elucidate three main
historical themes. First, by assessing the detailed progress of policy, it
examines Harold Wilson's own ambiguous attitude towards European
membership. Second, it considers how the British approached the Community,
analysing Cabinet's acceptance of the policy as well as the conduct of
Britain's diplomacy towards the members of the Six. Third, it places Britain's
turn to Europe within the context of wider decisions about Britain's foreign
and economic policies. It shows that Wilson's policy towards membership of
the EEC developed only gradually and under duress, as he initially hoped to
create a free trade area in Europe. Wilson did agree to study the implications
of membership early in 1966, yet the decisive turning point was the July 1966
sterling crisis. It offers a new interpretation of Britain's approach to the
Community, arguing that Wilson's attitude towards the tems of entry
emerged only gradually. Britain's diplomacy with the Six foundered on
Britain's economic weakness and the ability of General de Gaulle to
manipulate his European partners. Although this was a period of considerable
transformation in Britain's global orientation, British policy did not represent
a decisive break with the past. Decisions were taken reluctantly and












1	 Coping with the Community, October 1964— May 1965
	
27




3	 The Politics of Decision, March - October 1966
	
105
4	 Freewheeling with the General: The Formation and Conduct of
	
171
the Probe of the Six, November 1966— March 1967
5	 Finding a Role: Cabinet's Acceptance of the European
	
226
Application, March - April 1967











This thesis would not have been possible without the support of a number of
institutions and people. First, I wish to thank my two supervisors, Dr. James
Ellison and Professor Peter Hennessy, who have encouraged me throughout
my period of research. Peter's enthusiasm was responsible for embarking me
on the project in the first place and has remained a source of inspiration
throughout, but particular thanks are reserved for James, whose constant
support, encouragement and comments have been invaluable. I wish also to
thank the staff at the Institute of Contemporary British History, in particular
Dr. Harriet Jones, for much more than the desk space provided during a
difficult period of my third year. Other members of Queen Mary History
Department have been very supportive and I have gained tremendously from
my employment at both Queen Mary and King's College, London.
Thanks also go to the British Federation of Women Graduates Charitable
Foundation for funding much of my fourth year and to Queen Mary History
Department Stretton Fund for a research grant. I would also like to thank the
staff of various libraries and archives, mainly the Public Record Office in
Kew, the Modem Records Reading Room of the Bodleian Library, the British
Library and Queen Mary Library, but also the Bank of England Archive, the
Labour Party Archive, the LSE Archive and the Churchill College Archive
Centre. Particular thanks to Jane Reilly for granting me pennission to quote
from the papers of Sir Patrick Reilly. Several participants have also been kind
enough to allow me to interview them: thanks to the late Sir Patrick Reilly,
Lord Peter Shore and Sir Norman Statham and also to Sir Derek Mitchell,
Lord Eric Roll, Lord George Thomson and most particularly to Sir Michael
Palliser.
I would also like to thank all my friends for bearing with me throughout the
last five years. Special thanks to Kay Arthur, Grace Chapman, Sue Fisher,
Rebecca Gillieron, Liz Piper and Amanda Singh for support and distraction in
equal measure. My warmest thanks go to my family, my sister Marian and in
particular my parents, Harmer and Vivien, without whom this project would
never have been possible and who have supported me in all aspects of my life.
Finally thanks to Gavin, for many things: now it's my turn to do the cooking.
This thesis is dedicated to two people who have had a huge influence on the
course of my life. To my uncle, David Parr, whose death in the Falkiands
Conflict in 1982 sparked my desire to study British political history and to my
grandmother, Joy Parr, who died on 28 December 2000. Her courage and




































Confederation of British Industry
Common External Tariff
Department of Economic Affairs
European Coal and Steel Community
European Economic Community
European Economic Organisations Department, Foreign Office
European Economic Integration Department, Foreign Office
European Free Trade Association
European Launcher Development Organisation
Group of Ten
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
International Atomic Energy Authority
International Monetary Fund
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Multi-Lateral Force




National Research and Development Corporation
Organisation of European Co-operation and Development
Overseas Defence and Policy Committee
Supreme Allied Commander (Europe)
Trades Union Congress
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Western European Union
Western Organisations and Co-operation Department, Foreign
Office
Introduction
The sterling crisis of July 1966 has been seen as a turning point in British
post-war history. Faced with a choice between devaluing the pound and
deflating the economy, Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, chose
deflation. In so doing, he effectively ended the Labour government's
economic planning experiment, subordinating the policy goal of economic
growth and social expenditure to defence of the parity of the pound. Keith
Middlemas has written:
it could be seen from the standpoint of July 1966
that neither of the attempts to create economic
equilibrium through a revival of the post-war
network of obligations gave much hope that
Britain could support the greatly extended level
of welfare services embodied in Labour's 1964
manifesto on a declining industrial base.'
The crisis broke the trust of the unions and industry in the Labour
government's programme, undermining the 'tripartite consensus' upon which
the post-war settlement was based.
Labour Ministers would therefore either have to
draw support from their mass electorate against
the institutions, in a sort of populism rarely seen
in British politics since the early part of the
twentieth century; or side with one or more of
the institutions against another, in a form of
exclusion strategy, likely to undermine the
essentials of tripartism.2
July 1966 was more than a crisis of economic policy. It led directly to intense
questioning about Britain's world role and the responsibilities of the
'Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, vol 2: Threats to the Post- War
Settlement, 1961-74 (London: Macmillan. 1990), p.148
2 ibid., p.146
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government at home and it ended many of the aspirations of the British left.
As David Marquand has commented: 'At a great rally at the beginning of the
1964 election, Wilson called for men with fire in their bellies and humanity in
their hearts. Whatever might be said in the Government's defence in 1970, no-
one could seriously pretend that the fires were still alight' .
The political and economic predicament in the summer of 1966 did not
cause Labour to turn to Europe, but it brought the simmering proposals for a
possible membership bid to a decisive point. Before July 1966, the
government was making cautious advances to the Community, aware of the
likelihood of a second Gaullist bar to British accession. After it, Harold
Wilson harnessed himself firmly to the government's new direction, seeking
the unlikely goal of entry in the short-term. Sterling's plight changed the
character of the initiative. It enhanced the state of desperation with which the
British approached their European partners and determined the way in which
participants and observers viewed the attempt. July 1966 ended the
expectation that Britain could play a role on the international stage while
providing satisfactory growth and welfare at home. This was 'Labour's Suez'4
and in its aftermath, the British turned to Europe. The second attempt to
accede to the EEC built a widespread consensus amongst Britain's political
elite in favour of a future in Europe. With a majority in the House of
Commons on 10 May 1967 of 488 votes to 62, 'the second try assembled, for
the first time, a critical mass of support among the political class for the
David Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd-George to Kinnock (London:
Heinemann, 1991), p.159
Ben Pinilott, Harold Wilson (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p.428
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proposition that Britain should become a European country'. 5 Could it be then,
that Harold Wilson's application for membership marked the moment at which
the British laid to rest the traditional conceptions of Britain's international
foreign and economic policies and found instead a scaled-down, essentially
European, post-war role?
This thesis seeks to assess the formation and execution of British
national strategy at a time of unusual crisis and change in British policy-
making. It aims to contribute to three important historiographical questions.
First, why Wilson turned to Europe, particularly at a time when it seemed
impossible to achieve membership of the Community in the short run.
Secondly, how the British approached the Community after the humiliating
failure of Harold Macmillan's negotiations for membership of 1961-1963.
Thirdly, what was the place of European policy in wider policy: was there an
overarching strategy in the reorientation of Britain from a global to a European
power?
The first consideration is why Wilson apparently changed his mind on
Europe in 1966. Literature on Wilson paints an unerring picture of a
'complex... manipulative, secretive' character whose attitudes were
notoriously difficult to specify.6 There are currently virtually no accounts of
Wilson's policy development based on Whitehall documents. Two articles on
the second European initiative appeared in the late 1960s. Cynthia Frey
analysed the position of domestic interest groups to European membership.
She concluded that Wilson had never been doctrinaire about Europe and
Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London:
Macmillan, 1998), p.197
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sincerely wanted Community membership, confirmed by his concentration on
the political issues. 7 Francoise de ) Serre argued that Britain's decision
resulted from a lack of alternatives, as the government realised the weakness
of the Commonwealth and EFTA and began to disengage from a defence role
East of Suez. Problems with the balance of payments also had a role to play.8
Miriam Camps published a comprehensive work on developments in
the Community and in Britain between the veto of 1963 and the empty chair
crisis of 1965, when the French refused to participate in Community
institutions. She captured well Wilson's ambivalence in the first term of
office, explaining the growth of interest in eventual membership throughout
1965, but pointing out Wilson's uncertainty: 'It seems doubtful whether he has
yet formulated any very clear European objectives beyond the rather grudging
conclusion, perhaps best expressed in double negatives, that in the long term
the United Kingdom cannot afford not to become a member of a European
economic community'. 9 Camps' work was written before Britain applied for
membership a second time. It therefore only offers a partial explanation of
policy development. Uwe Kitzinger has also produced two books on the
second attempt to get into Europe. The Second Try is a useful collection of
sources and Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common
Market surveys domestic political opinion. 10 Kitzinger confirmed the
6 j W. Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992 (London: Macmillan. 1993), p.88
7 Cynthia W. Frey, 'Meaning Business: The British Application to Join the Common Market,
November 1966-October 1967', Journal Common Market Studies, vol.6, 1967-1968, pp.197-
230
S Francoise De Serre, 'La Position Brittanique', Revue Fran çaise de Science Politique, vol.
18, no. 2(1968), pp.886-898
9 Miriam Camps, European Unflcation in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1967), p.1 92
'°Uwe Kitzinger, The Second Try: Labour and the EEC (London: Pergamon Press, 1968);
Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1973)
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favourable view of Wilson presented by Frey, arguing that it was only the
1970 election defeat that prevented Wilson from collecting 'the prizes for
European statesmanship that several foundations lavished on Edward Heath at
the end of 1971	 Helen Wallace's unpublished PhD thesis, completed in
1975, also offers very full survey of the second initiative. Wallace focused on
the question of how the British approached membership. Based on interviews
with leading participants, Wallace also interpreted Wilson's policy
development in ambiguous terms:
quite early Wilson's initial aversion to
Community membership began to disappear.
Once this had happened a succession of events
during 1964-1966 began to persuade him of the
attractions of a new approach to Europe and
after the 1966 election a vague sympathy for a
new approach was transmuted into a firm
resolve, to which Wilson became increasingly
committed later in 1966. After this stage had
been reached the policy of seeking British
membership became clearly identified with a
Prime Ministerial initiative, rather than an issue
on which the Prime Minister happened to share
the view of certain of his colleagues.'2
The assumption behind the early work on Wilson's turn to Europe is a
sense of inevitability. Robert J. Lieber, in his study of domestic pressure
groups, commented that 'for the Labour government, the progression towards
Europe was a story of collapsing alternatives'.' 3 De la Serre shared this view,
arguing that Wilson's application for membership was the inexorable
consequence of the 'experience of power'. In opposition, Wilson had
Kitzinger, Diplomacy, ibid., p.293
12 Helen Wallace, The Domestic Policy Making Implications of the Labour Government's
Application for Membership of the EEC, 1964-1970 (Manchester University: Unpublished
PhD Thesis, May 1975), p.160
13 Robert Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elites and Pressure Groups
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p.261
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overestimated Britain's power in the world.' 4 As soon as Labour's political
perceptions caught up with the economic realities of Britain's position, the
administration was bound to turn to Europe. Wallace also argued that
'interdependence' was inescapable and necessary.' 5 Miriam Camps displays
the contemporary preoccupation with Dean Acheson's 1962 pronouncement
that Britain had 'lost an Empire and not yet found a role': 'by 1965 such a
statement would have been regarded as so obvious that it would probably have
passed unnoticed'.' 6 She also went on to interpret policy developments
through the lens of the unsatisfactory nature of the EFTA and Commonwealth
alternatives.'7
Contemporary accounts share an assumption with the literature of
Britain's decline from great power status, that the relative contraction of
Britain's economic power meant that there was an external reality to which
political perceptions would eventually adjust.' 8 In this interpretation, Europe
was the only course and one that did reflect a realisation of the 'realities' of
Britain's position. The sense of inevitability survives into contemporary
historiography. David Reynolds has argued 'Harold Wilson conducted
traditionalist globalist foreign policy against background of growing economic
weakness: going round in ever decreasing circles into the vortex of 1967-
1 968'.' There has been a related feeling of pointlessness attached to coverage
of the second application, owing to the likelihood that de Gaulle would veto.
"De La Serre, 'La Position', op.cit., p.890
IS Wallace, Domestic, op. cit., p.140
16 Camps, European, op cit., p.16!
17 ibid., pp.170-176, esp. p.175
18 F. S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973 (London: George
Allen and Unwm, 1974), p.347; Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the
World Role, 1900-1970 (London: Fontana Press, 1971), p.10
Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth
Centuiy (London: Longman, 1991), p.190
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Wolfram Kaiser has argued that Wilson's bid was a calculated attempt to
isolate de Gaulle in Europe, outflank Edward Heath domestically and to keep
the Labour Party united.2°
The only major historical survey of Wilson's policy that suggests a
more complex analysis is that offered by John Young in his overview of
Britain's policy since 1945. Young returns to the ambivalence suggested by
Wallace and Camps, but argues that Wilson intended to turn to Europe at some
point between 1964 and 1966. The Prime Minister cleverly hid his intentions
from his colleagues for domestic political reasons, edging the Cabinet
gradually towards acceptance of the application on the basis that there was no
viable alternative. 21 A collection of papers given at a conference in early 2000
is to be published on aspects of the second membership bid. This book, edited
by Oliver Daddow, follows the approach of several collections of essays on
the first application, examining themes of British European policy. 22 It does
not attempt to address the chronological development of policy, nor Wilson's
own policy changes. This thesis aims to reassess the sense of inevitability
running through the literature by reconstructing the government's perceptions
of national interest as they appeared at the time. It emphasises the pressures on
the Prime Minister and the gradual development of policy. It adds to Young's
interpretation, showing that although there were indications of a European
20 Wolfram Kaiser, 'Party Games: The British EEC Apphcations of 1961 and 1967', Roger
Broad and Virginia Preston (eds), Moored to the Continent: Britain and European Integration
(London: Institute of Historical Research, 2001), pp.70-72
21 Young, Britain, op.cit., pp.86-93, esp. p.88
Oliver Daddow (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain's Second
Application to Join the EEC (London: Frank Cass, forthcoming); for collections of essays on
the first application see Anne Deighton and Alan Milward (eds), Widening, Deepening and
Acceleration: The European Economic Community, 1957-63 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1999);
George Wilkes (ed.), Britain 's Failure to Enter the European Community 1961 -3 (London:
Frank Cass, 1997); R. T. Griffiths and Stewart Ward (eds), Courting the Common Market. The
First Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961-3 (London: Lothian, 1996)
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policy from early in 1965, these did not lead inextricably to the membership
initiative in October 1966. The July sterling crisis, although not causing the
government's shift of attitudes towards Europe, was central to the formation of
its membership bid.
The second historiographical theme is the question of how the British
approached the Community. This question emerged from study of the Foreign
Office files, in which the preoccupation of officials with strategy and
diplomacy is clear. Yet, it is also pertinent to historiography of Britain's
relations with the European Community. There are two main coincerns. First,
commentators such as Helen Wallace and Jacqueline Tratt have addressed the
issue of how the British political class coped with interdependence. Wallace
argues that in order to gain acceptance of European membership from the
Cabinet and public, the Wilson government obscured the true nature of
membership. The need to appeal to opinion in Brussels meant that ministers
could never reveal decisions until after their confirmation in the European
arena. This obfuscation was possible because decision-making was
concentrated in the hands of a small number of 'pro' European officials and
ministers, reflecting the growth of central control over policy.23 rratt adopts a
similar approach, arguing that ministers and officials exploited the 'formal and
informal' power-structures of the state to foist an unpopular decision on the
public.24 This approach suffers from several assumptions. As Wallace admits,
it sees the eventual acceptance of 'interdependence' as inevitable and so
interprets policy-makers as working to facilitate the end-goal of policy. 25 It
Wallace, Domestic, op cit., pp.345-348
24 Jacquelme Tratt, The Macmillan Government and Europe: A Study in the Process of Policy
Development (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.1 88-201
Wallace, Domestic, op.cit., p.347
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also relies on the knowledge of hindsight. The opposition to European
membership in the 1970s meant that Labour's decision in 1967 was seen as a
temporary lid on underlying hostility. The question was how did Wilson reign
in the opposition, rather than why the Cabinet agreed. This thesis adopts a
different methodological approach, seeking to outline the development of
tactics at the time. It argues that Wilson's tactics did have a role to play in
manoeuvring the Cabinet into a corner, but that ministers did thoroughly
discuss the implications of European membership. Disagreement arose less
because of the way in which the decision was taken, than because of the
intractable nature of the problems involved.
Secondly, historians have criticised Britain's diplomacy with the Six.
Beginning with the Free Trade Area negotiations between 1957-8, the British
over-estimated their bargaining power with the Six and underestimated the
importance to the Six of their Common Market plans. 26 Milward for one has
argued that the British had an enduringly political conception of the
Community, failing to understand the importance of the economic provisions
to each of the member states. 'The startling absence of genuine comparison
with any other European country in the many memoranda and analyses of
Britain's economic position gives the impression of a hermetically sealed
system with so little outward vision that no understanding of European
developments could be possible'.27 Wolfram Kaiser has intimated that
Britain's political diplomacy with the Six contributed to the failure of the
Brussels negotiations. Kaiser suggests that Macmillan knew the negotiations
would fail from the outset, but went through them anyway in order to appease
James Ellison, Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the European Community,
1955-58 (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.225-235
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American opinion. Europe was the bargaining counter enabling Macmillan to
secure Polaris missiles from President Kennedy. Consequently, there was no
tempting offer with which Macmillan could lure de Gaulle to agree to British
accession.28 Others have agreed that Macmillan's turn to Europe was part of a
Grand Design to sustain the British independent nuclear deterrent and
influence in the United States. In this interpretation, Britain's failure to get
into the Common Market resulted from a mixture of British delusion and
duplicity in hoping to deal with both the USA and the French at the same
time.29 This interpretation is grounded in the view that the British were
insufficiently European-minded, eager to satisfy the needs of traditional
diplomacy and the domestic political audience before European opinion.
Deighton writes: 'the conditionality of the negotiation package created a sense
of a reluctant applicant.., the first application was dogged by the
consequences of a decade of arrogant Conservative European policy'.30
Despite this, as Ludlow notes, British writers have largely exonerated
Macmillan from blame, interpreting the failure of Brussels as inevitable at the
hands of the anti-Atlanticist de Gaulle.3 ' This, Ludlow shows, is misplaced.
Based on a comprehensive reading of the Community's Council of Ministers
archive, Ludlow argues that the British fought and lost the battle for accession
not in Nassau and Rambouillet, but in Brussels. It was only because of the
27	 Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1992), p.431
Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration,
1945-1963 (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.174-203
In particular, Sunona Toschi, 'Washington —London - Paris: An Untenable Triangle',
Journal of European Integration History, vol. 1 (1995), pp.8 1-109, esp. p.1 09; Anne Deighton
and N. Piers Ludlow, 'A Conditional Application: British Management of the First Attempt to
Seek Membership of the EEC', Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Post-War Europe: National
Decision Makers and European Institutions, 1948-1963 (London: Macmillan. 1995), pp.1 16-
120
3° Deighton and Ludlow, 'Conditional', ibid., pp.12 1-122
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uncertainties and equivocations of the Brussels talks that de Gaulle was able to
legitimate his veto in 1963, avoiding an explicitly political breach by blaming
the breakdown on the impasse in the negotiations. 32 This interpretation places
as central the way in which the British conducted their diplomacy with the Six
as a unit. It was not just the demands Britain made - settling the 'conditions'
of membership before agreeing to accession - but also that the British failed to
react with sufficient flexibility during the negotiations. Thus, while the
Community understood Britain's need to make specific requests to satisfy a
domestic political audience, they had also developed a faith in their own body
of legislation: the acquis communautaire.33 In this way, the issue is less
Britain's defence of traditional interests, than the fact that the British failed to
gain diplomatic advantage despite the widespread support of the Five for their
membership. This thesis accordingly aims to assess the way in which British
officials and ministers understood the Community system and to show how
Britain dealt with the Six. It argues that the second application met many
criticisms of the first, minimising emphasis on the economic conditions of
membership and creating a convincing political case in favour of accession.
Nevertheless, Wilson and Brown continued to overestimate Britain's political
bargaining power with the Six. Unlike the first application, de Gaulle was in a
position of greater strength and cared less about international opinion, but was
able to avoid an expressly political veto because of the weaknesses of Britain's
economy.
31 N. Piers Ludlow, 'A Mismanaged Application: Britain and the EEC, 1961-1963', Deighton
and Milward (eds), Widening. op.cit., pp.271-287
32 N Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.206-212
ibid., pp.233-252
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The third theme is the place of European policy in the context of wider
foreign policy as Britain's role continued to shift from a global to a regional
perspective. Historians have disputed whether the turn to Europe was a
revolution in policy or a variation in tactics to achieve constant aims. David
Reynolds sees revolution in Wilson's transition: 'the revolution in financial
and defence priorities between 1967-1968 reflected a more fundamental
reorientation of Labour's priorities towards Europe'. 34 Others have suggested
of earlier turns to Europe that there was no revolution, rather, the British were
forced to adopt increasingly radical methods in order to sustain influence
internationally and in the USA. Ellison writes: 'the first application was not a
radical turning point in the development of British policy. It represented a shift
in tactics to secure traditional goals' .
These ideas relate closely to the historiography on Britain's retreat
from Empire. Recent commentary challenges the traditional view that political
perceptions shifted reluctantly to meet economic realities. Saki Dockrill,
Christopher and Gillian Staerck and Ursula Lehnikuhl have all argued that
while economic constraints set the boundaries for British policy, immediate
decisions were made for political or strategic reasons. 36 Politically, the British
wished to pull out of some areas in 'order to avoid the threat of nationalist
uprising. In other areas, as recent research shows, political interests dictated an
' Reynolds, Britannia, op cit., p.217
35 James Ellison, 'Accepting the Inevitable: Bntam and European Integration', Wolfram
Kaiser and Gillian Staerck (eds), Contracting Options: British Foreign Policy, 1955-64
(London: Macmillan, 2000), p.182
36 Saki Dockrill, 'The East of Suez decision', Paper Presented to Public Record Office,
International History Conference, 22 Oct. 1999; Chnstopher Staerck and Gillian Staerck, 'The
Realities behind Britain's Global Defence Strategy', Kaiser and Staerck (eds), Contracting,
ibid., pp.52-53 ; Ursula Lehnikuhl, 'Difficult Challenges: The Far East', ibid., pp.257-259
17
enhancement of Britain's imperial strategy.37 Jeffrey Pickering has argued that
the precise nature of Britain's withdrawal from the Far East was determined
by party political, domestic considerations. 38 This thesis does not contribute
explicitly to these debates, but does show greater complexity to the
management of Britain's reorientation from a global to a European power. The
importance here is the place of Europe in these broader shifts: were the
considerable changes to Britain's role between 1964 and 1967 a considered
and deliberate strategy? To return to the original question, was this a decisive
break with the past? This thesis argues that it was not: Europe and the end of
Empire were both, in their own ways, responses to the crisis generated in July
1966.
The primary methodological objective of this thesis is to reconstruct
the attitudes and policies of British policy-makers at the time. How did the
British assess their national interest and did policies succeed in meeting their
contemporary aims? This approach elevates the importance of the day-to-day
development of policy, implicitly contradicting the view, expressed in so
much of the survey literature, that the shifts in Britain's political overseas
strategy were the inevitable culmination of relative economic decline. 39 It also
places as central the roles of certain personalities, both ministerial and official,
in effecting change. To do this, this thesis has drawn extensively on Whitehall
sources in the Public Record Office, published memoirs and diaries, private
" Spencer Mawby, 'Arab Nationalism and Bntish Foreign Policy, 1945-1971', Paper
Presented to Institute of Historical Research, Contemporary British History Seminar, 23 Jan.
2002
Jeffrey Pickering, Britain s Wzthdrawalfrom East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment
(London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.150-171
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papers of officials and ministers, and the Bank of England archive. It has also
consulted the Labour Party archive and the elements of the press for the period
October 1964-December 1967. This thesis also draws on interviews with
several important participants.
By far the most substantial source has been the government archive at
the Public Record Office. The records of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister's
Office provide the most comprehensive evidence of the process of policy
development. Wilson's Cabinets have been noted for their verbosity. Peter
Hennessy has written: 'Wilson had a penchant for letting the Cabinet ramble,
encouraging all who wished to speak, doodling as they did so.. .and
interjecting a little commentary when they finished before catching the eye of
the next contributor.. . Wilson used prolixity as a weapon, allowing the Cabinet
to talk itself out'.40 Perhaps the best example of the use of prolixity was the
decision to apply for membership, taken between April and May 1967.
Minister of Transport Barbara Castle commented that 'the whole long drawn-
out nonsense has been ruthlessly stage-managed, under the cover of the
soothing phrase: it is of course for the Cabinet to decide' ,41 The result, as a
source, is a remarkably full record of ministerial opinion. The also very
comprehensive diary records of Richard Crossman, Barbara Castle and to a
lesser extent, Tony Benn, have supplemented Cabinet records.42
Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-19 73 (London: Oxford University Press,
1973); Northedge, Descent, op.cit.
40 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The O(fIce and its Holders since 1945 (London:
Penguin, 2000), p.289
Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-1976 (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.125, 27 Apr.
1967
" Richard Crossman was Minister of Housing and Local Government 1 964-August 1966 and
Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966-1968. Barbara
Castle was Minister for Overseas Development 1964-December 1965 and then Minister of
Transport. Tony Bean was moved from Post Master General into the Cabinet in July 1966 as
Minister of Technology.
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The development of Wilson's own policy towards the European
Communities is a particularly complex issue, as until the beginning of the
European initiative in October 1966, he was never at the forefront of policy-
making. He also allowed different people to believe alternate views of his
intentions. Peter Shore, Wilson's Parliamentary Private Secretary from 1965
to 1966 remained convinced of Wilson's insincerity in the approach to Europe,
but Sir Michael Palliser, Wilson's Private Secretary from 1966, was sure that
Wilson always intended to take Britain into Europe.43 It is therefore difficult to
pin his attitude with any real certainty, but the marginal comments he has
made on files in the PREM series provide as clear an indication as any.
Comments made to others, notably The Guardian editor Alastair
Hetherington, with whom Wilson appeared to speak relatively frankly, can
also provide the occasional insight.
Material from the Foreign Office has produced the broadest source of
information. The sheer quantity of files in the European Economic Integration
Department, renamed from the European Economic Organisations Department
early in 1967, is testimony to the Foreign Office's leadership in Whitehall on
European issues. This was a change from the late 1950s, when the Treasuiy
and the Board of Trade had directed European policy. Foreign Office
dominance of policy formulation, although not necessarily policy
development, provides a rich source for enquiry into the second theme of how
Britain approached the Community. Leading Foreign Office officials, such as
Sir Con O'Neill and John Robinson, worked on improving Britain's
' Lord Peter Shore, Interview with author, 7 Dec. 1998; Sii Michael Palliser, Interview with
author, 24 Aug. 1999
John W. Young, 'Bntish Officials and European Integration', Deighton (ed.), Building,
op.cit., p.87
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diplomacy towards the Community in order to get around de Gaulle's veto.
Their preoccupation raises interesting questions about the ways in which this
emerging generation of officials, pointed up in the literature by Hugo Young,
perceived Britain's power and place in the world. 45 To what extent was there a
genuine shift in thinking about Britain's role? Foreign Office assessments of
policy in the Community and in each of the member states also bear witness to
the improvement of Britain's network of contacts on the continent. These
assessments allow a level of understanding of events and policy in the Six, but
this thesis does not attempt to analyse the policies of the Six from their own
sources. However, it does illuminate the currents of opinion in the Six that
encouraged consolidation of the Community before enlargement.
This thesis has consulted the files of the economic departments in
Whitehall: principally the Treasury, Board of Trade, Department of Economic
Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture to a lesser extent. It does not attempt to
elucidate economic policy as a whole, but to place European membership in
the context of wider developments. Treasury and Board of Trade files
pertaining to Europe often contained interdepartmental correspondence. This
correspondence consisted largely of information on the Community sent from
the Foreign Office and dominated by Sir Con O'Neill. In itself, this is useful
evidence of the ascendancy of the Foreign Office and also of the existence of
cross-departmental network of officials working towards the goal of eventual
European membership. Yet, it does not easily distinguish a particular
departmental policy or attitude. Furthermore, despite the pro-European agenda
of the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
Young, Blessed, op.cit., pp.172-213
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George Brown, this thesis found little evidence in the DEA that European
membership was part of an attempt to modernise Britain economically. DEA
files comprised drafts and redrafis of papers on the 'economic implications' of
membership, useful in themselves, but hardly showing a department at the
forefront of strategy. Economic policy was most important during the July
1966 sterling crisis when economic and domestic political considerations had
clear bearing on the course of European policy. Thus, economic policy and the
domestic political environment have been extensively scrutinised at this point.
Private papers, Labour Party and Bank of England papers have
supplemented the government records. Private papers can clearly offer
additional clues as to the motivations of participants. In particular, the
unpublished memoir of Sir Patrick Reilly, Britain's Ambassador in Paris
during the period of the second application, is an excellent source. It traces the
development of French attitudes towards the application and offers views of
essential meetings between British and French ministers and of the attitudes
and personalities of Wilson and Brown. The Bank's records were useful for
the information provided into international liquidity negotiations, a neglected
aspect of Britain's policies towards sterling and crucial also in Britain's
relations with the French. The Bank archives also held papers apparently
unavailable in the Treasury, for example the minutes of meetings in 1967
between Treasury and Bank officials on devaluation of sterling. There was
little in the Labour Party archives for the period during which Labour was in
government, but these papers provided some background on Labour's policies
before taking office in October 1964. This thesis does not attempt a systematic
study of thought within the Labour movement. Such a study exists in Roger
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Broad's recently published book, Labour's European Dilemmas. 46 Newspaper
reports, parliamentary records and interviews have further augmented this
research, mainly in order to glean understanding of perceptions of Britain's
policy in the wider political environment. The published records of the United
States have been consulted to provide additional context.
Chapter One begins with an analysis of the way in which the incoming
Labour administration perceived Britain's influence and power and examines
the initial policy towards the EEC. It then assesses the attitudes of Whitehall
departments to the EEC, drawing also on evidence from the immediate post-
veto period. From 1965, there was a discernible shift in policy as the Foreign
Office attempted to instigate a more positive approach to the EEC, leading
ultimately to the bridge-building initiative in May 1965. Chapter One surveys
the development of this policy, arguing that although it addressed many of the
Foreign Office's concerns it cannot be seen as the first step in Wilson's turn to
European membership. Chapter Two appraises the impact of the Community's
empty chair crisis on British policy. It shows the interrelation between the
agricultural breakdown and the issue of the Community's political and defence
organisation and exposes the different reactions in Whitehall to the perceived
opportunity to achieve membership. January 1966 marked the moment at
which Wilson agreed to begin studies of eventual membership, but there were
still many inconsistencies in British policy.
Chapter Three examines the development of European policy from the
March 1966 election until early July 1966 when the French Prime Minister
Roger Broad, Labour's European Dilemmas: From Bevin to Blair (London: Palgrave, 2001)
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and Foreign 1i.er Georges Pompidou and Maurice Couve de Murville,
visited London. This period did mark an attempt by the British to embark on
some kind of approach to the Community, but the road into the EEC appeared
to be blocked. The chapter then considers the considerable impact of the July
sterling crisis on policy, examining the origins of the crisis, the impact on
domestic politics and the pressures therein created that increased the
likelihood of an early initiative. It scrutinises the important Chequers meeting
of 22 October, at which Wilson announced his intention to conduct a probe of
the countries of the Six to see if the conditions existed for membership. One
argument is that the British needed a new aspirational framework with which
to convince the public that the government was capable of restoring economic
growth.
Chapter Four examines the formation and conduct of the probe of the
countries of the Six. It evaluates the Cabinet's decision in favour of the probe
and addresses the question of whether and how ministers believed the
European initiative could bring success. It then analyses the creation of
strategy for and the content of each meeting, with more analysis of the
important visits to Paris and Bonn. It argues that politically, the British made
good advances on the tour and also managed to minimise the emphasis on the
prior settlement of the 'conditions' of membership. Yet, the probe showed
problems of a different nature, mainly the weakness of sterling and the risk
that British entry would upset the arrangements already made in the Six. The
Italians and Belgians made no secret of the fact that Britain would be unable to
negotiate changes to the CAP; nevertheless, both Wilson and Brown continued
to overestimate the political strength of Britain's position.
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Chapter Five considers the Cabinet's meetings at which the decision to
apply to Europe was made. It contemplates the treatment of the major
conditions of membership, investigates Wilson's tactics in dealing with his
ministerial colleagues and discusses the attitudes of different ministers. It
argues that ministers accepted the application in an atmosphere of resignation,
apprised of the case that there was no viable alternative but not convinced of
the political or economic arguments on their merits.
Chapter Six contemplates the progress of the application. It starts with
an analysis of de Gaulle's press conference on 16 May. It shows that the
General was able to use the argument that British membership would change
the nature of the Community to play on the Five's fears of disruption to the
existing Community. In this way, the French were able to gain diplomatic
advantage by postponing discussion of Britain's application until after the Six
had discussed enlargement in principle. It then analyses Wilson's visit to de
Gaulle in June 1967, arguing that Wilson believed he could woo the General,
based on the technological and political bonuses British membership would
bring. Wilson's strategy developed separately to that of the Foreign Secretary,
George Brown. Brown based his approach on appealing to the Five by playing
down the 'conditions' of membership, forcing a statement of Britain's
negotiating position through the Cabinet. Brown's speech to the Western
European Union on 4 July showed that the Five accepted the basic
reasonableness of Britain's case, but showed also that there would be no early
negotiations for membership. This chapter contends that de Gaulle was never
likely to admit Britain, but he was able to avoid an explicitly political veto
because of the Britain's economic weakness. It was only after the veto that the
25
British decided to accelerate the final withdrawal of military forces East of
Suez, illustrating the disjointed approach to foreign policy reorientation.
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1. Coping with the Community, October 1964 - May 1965
When the Labour administration took office in October 1964, Britain's policy
towards EEC membership was at something of an impasse. First, the
breakdown of the Brussels negotiations in 1963 had exposed the nature of
General de Gaulle's policy, making it clear that France would not admit
Britain. 1 Foreign-Secretary-to-be Patrick Gordon-Walker showed the
centrality of de Gaulle's veto to Britain's thinking in discussions with the
Italians in 1964: 'On the EEC I said we could not risk a second failure'.2
Second, the Labour Government was far from reconciled as to the economic
settlement under which Britain could accede to the EEC. Macmillan had
attempted and failed to change the provisions of the Treaty of Rome before
Britain agreed to join. 3 Labour's then leader Hugh Gaitskell had declared that
even Macmillan's negotiating demands were insufficient to preserve Britain's
essential interests. He established instead five conditions that would have to be
settled before Britain entered. These were safeguards for EFTA, the
Commonwealth and British agriculture and freedom for British economic and
foreign policy. 4 These conditions of membership were the basis of Labour's
policy as they took office in 1964. The conditions have been seen as the mask
behind which Harold Wilson played his European game, obscuring the
principle of membership underneath endless discussion of the terms under
'On the Brussels breakdown, Oliver Bange, The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de
Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict (London: Macmillan, 2000); Camps, Britain, op.cit., pp.472-
492; Ludlow, Dealing, op.cit, pp.200-230
2 Robe Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon- Walker Diaries (London: Historians' Press, 1991),
p.295, 4 Feb. 1964
On the Brussels negotiations, Ludlow, Dealing, op cit.; on the formation of Macmillan's
strategy, Deighton and Ludlow, 'Conditional Application', Deighton (ed.), Building, op.cit.,
pp. 107-123
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which Britain would enter. 5 Wilson did use this strategy, but the Labour
Government also genuinely aspired to fulfil the 'conditions' of membership.
Gordon-Walker told the Italians: 'we would be ready at some stage to discuss
the political problem, whether it would be possible for Britain to join the EEC
without severing links with the USA and Commonwealth countries'. 6 Seen as
such, the new Labour government's comprehension of what European
membership meant incorporates also their understanding of Britain's influence
and potential bargaining power as well as Britain's economic goals and the
success in achieving them. Any study of the development of Wilson's policy
towards the European Community must therefore start with a review of
Labour's intentions and expectations upon taking office in 1964.
Delusions of Grandeur? October 1964
It does seem evident that the new government overestimated the freedom with
which they would be able to plan the economy, although the choice not to
devalue and to adopt a 15% import surcharge instead was grounded in
pragmatism. There is less evidence to suggest that the government deluded
itself about the continuation of a global defence role. Although Labour
intended to sustain its military presence in the Far and Middle East and to
continue with the Polaris programme, decisions were based on strategic
concerns rather than unquestioned aspirations. EEC membership did not
feature as the government established its priorities.
Brian Bnvati, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Richard Cohen, 1996), pp.404-418
Young, Britain, op.cit, p.91
6 Pearce (ed.), Gordon-Walker Diaries, op cit., pp.295-296, 4 Feb. 1964
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Central to the Labour government's perceptions of what they could do
with power was the belief that they would be better at running the economy
than their Conservative predecessors had been. The Labour Party Research
Department had concluded in 1962 that 'the basic cause of the failure of the
British economy in the past decade has been the Government's over-reliance
on market forces. . .With this diagnosis, the Labour Party fundamentally
disagrees. The answer to our economic problems is to be found in more, not
less, government intervention'. 7 Economic planning was surely the natural
preserve of the Labour government, who in addition could expect better
relations with the unions in order to implement more effective wages policies.8
Wilson had galvanised expectations of the Party with his ability almost to
personif' the 'modernisation' of the country. 9 His call for a scientific and
technological revolution in 1963 was more than a strategy for economic
regeneration; it embodied the social changes of 1960s Britain in a shift from
an old hierarchy to a meritocratic society. While Alec Douglas-Home's
government was aristocratic and backward-looking, Wilson's was meritocratic
and young, able to harness the class-based amateurism that currently held back
change.'° As Tony Crosland put it:
A dogged resistance to change now blankets
every segment of our national life. A middle-
aged conservatism, parochial and complacent,
has settled over the country, and it is hard to find
a single sphere in which Britain is pre-eminently
in the forefront... No doubt we still lead the
world in certain traditional spheres, merchant
banking, classical scholarship, trooping the
Labour Party Archives [henceforward LPA], RD.377/December 1962, Alternatives to the
Common Market: Outline Report
Pnnlott, Wilson, op .czt , pp.276-278, 302-307, 348-349
ibid., pp.302-307
'°David Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1964 (London:
Macmillan, 1965), p.23, 3 1-33
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colour or sailing the Atlantic single-handed. But
wherever innovation is required, we see a
frightful paralysis of will.'1
The core of Labour's economic strategy would be an administrative reshuffle
that would shake-up the Treasury, challenging the financial constraints that it
was seen had denied the country steady economic growth.' 2 George Brown,
Wilson's principal challenger in the 1963 leadership contest, would lead the
new DEA, concentrating on the invigoration of the economy in a fresh
partnership between unions, industry and the state. The National Plan for
Economic Development, the brainchild of Wilson's Economic Adviser, the
Hungarian Oxford academic Thomas Balogh, was the heart of this strategy.
Based on indicative planning - setting targets for growth' 3 - the National Plan
wedded together the left-wing ideals of economic planning with right-wing
preferences for scientific and industrial regeneration. The National Plan was
the Labour government's binding goal.
It was this belief that Labour could do better that formed the basis of
the leadership's decision, two days into office, against devaluation of sterling
and against a severe deflation.' 4 Samuel Brittan, an economist in the DEA,
argued: 'the Prime Minister, with support from enough of his colleagues to
allow him to continue, persisted in believing in the face of accumulating
evidence that there was some mysterious kind of "direct physical intervention"
which could provide a third way to enable him to avoid both devaluation and
Tony Crosland, The Conservative Enemy, cited in ibid., p.33
12 George Brown, In My Way: The Political Memoirs of Lord George-Brown (London:
VictorGollancz, 1971), pp.95-109; Eric Roll, Where did we go wrong? From the Gold
Standard to Europe (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), pp.28-32
Samuel Brittan, Steering the Economy: The Role of the Treasury (London: Secker and
Warburg, 1969), p.277
14 Donald MacDougall, Don and Mandarin. Memoirs of an Economist (London: John Murray,
1987), p.153
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deflation'. 15 Failure to devalue or to deflate straight away, after discovering
that the balance of payments deficit was much higher than initially suspected,
(8OOm if the deficits on the capital and the current accounts were added
together) has been heavily criticised.' 6 The decision was understandable. The
new government did not want to court immediate disfavour with the
Americans, who regarded sterling as the first defence for the dollar and were
very anxious that the pound should not be devalued.' 7 Devaluation, it was
feared, could lead to a seize-up of international trade, as a third of the world's
trade was still conducted in sterling.' 8 The Commonwealth held their reserves
in sterling and to devalue would lessen the value of their savings, breaking
Britain's faith with them and so undermining Wilson's intention to strengthen
British-Commonwealth links. 19 There were also party political reasons.
Devaluation was a risk and to do it when Labour had not pledged to do so an
early admission of failure and a clear means to be labelled the 'party of
devaluation' 20
The government's belief in their freedom of action to run the economy
as they wished was also evident in their choice of alternatives. Wilson, Brown
and the Chancellor James Callaghan elected to impose a 15% import
surcharge on goods, excluding food, unmanufactured tobacco and basic raw
materials and so exempting major exports from the Commonwealth. 2 ' The
Bnttan, Steering, op.cit., p.188
16 ibid., pp.187-189; MacDougall. Don, op.cit., pp.152-3; Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., p.352
PRO PREMI3 109, Wilson to Johnson, 23 Oct. 1964; PRO CAB13O 202, MISCI 1' s, 17
Oct. 1964; Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power, 1964-70 (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1989), p.4!; C.J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: A Political History ofAnglo-
American Relations since 1945 (London and New York: Longman, 1992), pp.109-110
18 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964 -1970: A Personal Record (London:
Wiedenfeld and Nicolson. 1971), p.6
James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p.160
20 Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., p.351
21 PRO CAB 130 202, MISC1	 17 Oct. 1964
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surcharge made sound economic sense, as it would generate additional
revenue by bringing an extra charge at the point of entry. 22 The alternative of
quantitative restrictions was ruled out on the basis that it would have to be
selective and so would appear to hit hardest the pockets of Britain's creditors
in the USA and the EEC.23 Unfortunately, the surcharge was contrary to
Britain's obligations to her EFTA partners under the Stockholm Treaty.
Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade, did warn Wilson that EFTA
would object to the imposition of the surcharge and that failure to consult
EFTA in advance would be problematical. Anxious to get Labour's economic
policy working and also seeking a policy that could be presented as 'dynamic'
(the surcharge could be shown as removable and therefore temporary), Wilson
ignored Jay's objections.24
As preparation began for the EFTA Heads of Government meeting on
19-20 November, it became apparent that the government had overestimated
the ease with which they could impose economic instruments in isolation from
their European partners. EFTA reacted very badly, annoyed less by the
surcharge itself than by Wilson's failure to consult with them first.25 The
government had assumed that EFTA's reaction would not matter so much but
the ramifications spread far beyond EFTA. First, Wilson tried to make amends
by offering to accelerate Britain's tariff reductions with EFTA that had been
scheduled under the Stockholm Treaty. Britain would lower her barriers
against EFTA products without expecting reciprocation until the date arranged
ibid., PRO CAB 128 39, CC(64)2', 22 Oct. 1964
PRO CAB13O 202, MISC! 1' s, 17 Oct. 1964
24	 PREMI3 1240, Jay to Wilson, 22 Oct. 1964; PRO CAB 128 39, CC(64)2", 22 Oct
1964; Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune (London: Hutchinson, 1980), p.301; Broad,
European Dilemmas, op.cit., p.57
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previously in the Convention. 26 The French argued that unscheduled tariff
reductions would discriminate in favour of EFTA and against the EEC in
Britain's markets and that this would be contrary to agreements in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to avoid regional tariff blocs. If
Britain persisted, France would refuse to support Britain's borrowing of
sterling in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 27 Second, in the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Britain found her
negotiating hand weakened by the imposition of the surcharge, which could be
presented by others as a selfish act. Britain's policy in UNCTAD was to push
for a general reduction of tariffs world-wide, which served Britain's interests
but which was presented as a policy favouring the development of poorer
countries. The import surcharge, by barricading Britain against trade, exposed
chinks in Britain's negotiating hand. 28 The strength of reaction to the import
surcharge took the government by surprise. There had been no expectation that
EFTA would have the capacity to influence Britain's policy. For example, in
Cabinet discussion on the negative EFTA reaction, the comment was made
that Britain should 'remind them of the benefits by way of increased trade
with this country and that it was in their interests to await the opportunity for
further expansion of this trade which would arise as soon as the surcharge
were removed'. 29 Ministers' shock serves to reinforce the fact that on taking
office, the government had underestimated the constraints on their power and
25 PRO PREM13 1240, Wilson - Krag, 9 Nov. 1964; Geneva to FO, 10 Nov. 1964; PRO
CAB 134 1770, EEP(64) 12, EFTA and the Recent Economic Measures, Treasury, 27 Nov.
1964
26	 PREM13 1240, Jay to Wilson, 22 Oct. 1964
27	 CABI28 39, CC(64)8th, 12 Nov. 1964; CC(64)9th, 19 Nov. 1964; PREM13II24O,
Washington to FO, 7 Nov. 1964
PRO CAB134 1783, EER(64)75, EFTA Ministerial Meeting: Relations with Developing
Countries, Board of Trade, 5 Nov. 1964
PRO CAB 128 39, CC(64)9th, 19 Nov. 1964
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the growth of economic interdependence between Britain and the European
groupings.
Managing the economy successfully was also central to Labour's
foreign and defence policies. Contrary to what has been suspected, the
government did not have a 'delusion of grandeur' regarding their world role,
although they were indisputably less radical than some may have hoped whilst
in opposition. 3° Wilson did not want to withdraw from Britain's commitments
in the Far East, but in part his stress on a world defence role was a way of
augmenting Britain's influence in the USA. 31 He also wanted to continue to
construct the Polaris nuclear force, as agreed at the Nassau meeting between
Macmillan and Kennedy. Persisting with Polaris would mean Britain would
continue to count with the USA and the USA could be locked into the defence
of Europe. 32 In Britain's global defence role, stretching from Cyprus and
Malta in the Mediterranean, to a presence in Aden in the Persian Gulf, to bases
in Singapore and Malaysia in the Far East, the government accepted that
withdrawal was ultimately inevitable. Patrick Gordon-Walker's paper to the
Cabinet Committee on Overseas and Defence Planning (OPD) in late October
on Britain's presence in South East Asia argued that Britain must strike a
'delicate balance between the dangers of staying too long and the opposite
dangers of withdrawing too fast'. Politically, Britain must stay in South East
Asia in preserve political influence until a settlement neither too nationalist
nor too communist became attainable. In continental Malaysia, such a
settlement would involve British withdrawal: 'part of the price for such an
3°Reynolds, Britannia, op.cit., pp.226-227; Ponting, Breach, op cit., pp.41-42
Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., p.385; Wilson, Labour, op cit., p.39; PRO PREMI3 104, Wilson -
Rusk, 7 Dec. 1964
32 Hennessy, Prime Minister, op.cit, pp.200-201; PRO CAB128 39, CC(64)l 
1th, 26 Nov. 1964
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association will probably be our military withdrawal from the area'.33 Wilson
did also make clear to the Cabinet that Britain would be unable to sustain all
three defence roles in Europe under NATO, the role of nuclear power and a
world wide military presence: 'we could not continue all three indefinitely and
would need to consider this later'. 34 In this way, the government's strategy
was to sustain influence in the USA and the Commonwealth by discharging
military responsibilities in the Middle and Far East. Yet the prospect of
reductions and withdrawal was clearly recognised and acknowledged. The key
was how to manage the retreat without creating instability - Chinese influence
in Malaysia, for instance - or losing British influence in America.
The balance between staying too long and pulling out too fast was also
apparent in the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee's Long Term Policy
Study, a study designed to think radically and long term about Britain's future
role. The Study, conducted before Labour came to power, was deliberately
based on the assumption that it would not be possible to sustain all of Britain's
bases: 'The study group were instructed to assume that within the next decade
Britain had been deprived by one means or another of the bases at Singapore,
or Aden or both'. 35 In addition, it was clear that in order to sustain British
influence on the USA it would be necessary to increase Britain's political
influence in Europe: 'We believe that politically Europe must, if largely for
geographical reasons, remain our first priority'. 36 If there were to be
reductions, they would clearly be in the Far East and not in central Europe or
B PRO CAB 148 17, OPD(64) 10, Policy in South East Asia, Foreign Secretary, 11 Nov. 1964
PRO CAB128 39, CC(64)1 1th, 26 Nov. 1964
CAB148 10, DO(0)(S)(64)42, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee: Report of the
Long Term Study Group, 23 Oct. 1964
ibid.; see also CABI48 10, DO(0)(SX64)45, Regional Report: Europe, 23 Oct. 1964
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NATO. 37 The primacy of Europe was a recognition of the waning of Britain's
role East of Suez, yet officials remained cautious of the dangers of
accelerating the recall of troops. Sir Michael Palliser made this testy balance
clear:
On the one hand the Treasury was arguing that
we couldn't afford it... At the other end of the
scale are the United States. As the Cold War
developed and Russia became more and more of
an apparent threat, they did a U-turn and said
'for God's sake stay'. So did the Australians
and New Zealanders. The political arguments
were on the whole in favour of staying and this
did have an impact on policy towards Europe;
but the financial arguments went the other way
and this was also related to our desire to get the
US to help financially.38
The government's objective was thus to balance conflicting pressures,
securing Britain's influence in the USA and managing a dignified eventual
retreat from Britain's global role. Wilson understood that Britain's future role
would lie without a global defence: the key then lay not in the principle of
withdrawal, but in the tactics and the timing. How did EEC membership fit
into these wider observations?
The EEC and the MLF/ANF, October 1964 - January 1965
Britain's policy towards the European Community was of low priority
between October 1964 and January 1965. Labour's election manifesto claimed
Dockrill, 'The East of Suez decision', op.cit.; Staerck and Staerck, 'Realities', op cit., p.52;
Lehmkul, 'Difficult Challenges', op.cit., pp.273-275
38 Sir Michael Palhser, Interview with author, 5 Nov. 2001
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only that Britain would pursue 'closer relations with Europe'. 39 This non-
committal approach was not a complete reversal of the previous
administration's policy. Acknowledging de Gaulle's veto, the Conservative's
Election Manifesto declared also that a membership initiative was not
possible. Britain sought only 'closer relations' with Europe. 4° Yet, there was a
crucial difference between Conservative and Labour attitudes. The
Conservatives accepted that membership of the existing EEC should remain
the central goal of policy. It had proved difficult, however, to find ways of
keeping alive the stimulus to eventual entry without compromising current
policies.4 ' Wilson, on the other hand, provided little evidence that he had
seriously thought about EEC membership. He based his approach on the
assumption that it would be possible to change the nature of the Community.
He also maintained that the Community could collapse because of
developments in the EEC and NATO following the breakdown of the Brussels
negotiations.
Essentially, the EEC faced crisis because of de Gaulle's ambitions and
the way in which this impinged onto the question of Germany's access to
nuclear weaponry. Following the veto, de Gaulle 	 began to press for
an alternative organisation of a Europe free from Atlantic influence. 42 In the
period of uncertainty as to Europe's future political direction, the Americans
forwarded proposals for a Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) in NATO. The MLF
39 'Lets Go With Labour for the New Britain', (Labour Party, 1964), cited in F.W.S. Craig,
British General Election Manfestos 1 959-198 7 (Dartmouth. Parliamentary Research Services,
1990), pp.55-56
4°Butler and King, General Election, op.cit., p.131
Camps, European, op.cit., pp.125-136; PRO F0371 1733161WP19, SC(63)20, Policy
towards France, Foreign Office Steering Committee, 3 July 1963; PRO
F037l 171475/M10920 89, office meeting, 14 Jan. 1963
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would provide Europe with its own nuclear capability under the command of
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). It would have a
force of twenty-five surface ships, with eight Polaris missiles and a megaton
warhead each, each maimed by troops of three different nationalities.43
posed to the MLF because it would allow Germany equal access to nuclear
hardware, de Gaulle linked the problem of the next stage in the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) with the creation of a European political union. He
threatened in November 1964 that if the Six did not agree to cereal prices
much lower than the level the Germans wanted, that the French would pull out
of the EEC or out of NATO. Settlement of the cereals prices was a problem
of immense proportions for the German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. Low
prices could put him out of office; at the same time, failure to meet German
demands for nuclear sovereignty could encourage the growth of nationalism in
Germany.45
With these concerns in mind, Wilson gave a frank exposition of his
views on the European crisis and EEC membership to The Guardsan editor
Alastair Hetherington. According to Hetherington's record, Wilson said that
de Gaulle was serious when he declared he would pull out of NATO or out of
the EEC. Failure to create a Franco-German alliance because of the MLF
angered de Gaulle sufficiently to want to withdraw from NATO. Erhard was
in an impossible electoral position and could be forced into acquiescence on
the cereal price levels. Although, Wilson concluded, it would be extremely
42 Frédénc Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic
Alliance, translated by Susan Emanuel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp.91-94,
103-104
PRO CAB 148 40, OPD(0)(64)2, Multi-Lateral Force, Chairman, 23 Oct. 1964
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unfavourable if de Gaulle did pull out of NATO, his withdrawal from the EEC
could have positive consequences for the British:
He said that if de Gaulle did leave the Common
Market, then there would be a magnificent
opportunity for Britain. What would it be? A
free trade area, taking in the Five, as well as the
EFTA countries, and perhaps going beyond. He
looked forward to this with relish. He thought
that we could negotiate a free trade area on these
lines and that the others in Europe would be glad
of it'.46
Here then, were the tenets of Wilson's early position. He understood that some
kind of participation with the EEC was necessary, but wanted a settlement that
took account of Britain's international trading interests. Not only did he see
such a solution as desirable, but he genuinely seemed to believe that with the
French out of the equation, the British would be able to reorganise Europe
along new economic lines.
Wilson's attitude seemed to be guided by three principles: an
assumption of Britain's bargaining power politically with the EEC, an
adherence to Britain's global trading links and an understanding about the
political organisation of European defence. The latter feature was evident
during discussions about the MLF. Despite reluctance to participate in the
MLF, the Conservative government, seeing absolutely no alternative, agreed
to take part in talks as 'observers'. 47 For the USA, the MLF was designed to
meet the twin difficulties of the failure of Britain's attempts to take the
leadership of Europe and the increasingly assertive French attitude. At root,
Gustav Schmidt, 'Masterminding a New Western Europe: The Key Actors at Brussels in the
Superpower Conflict', Wilkes (ed.), Britain's Failure, op.cit., pp.75-76
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the problem was how to deal with the 'German question'. Germany's
economic potential meant that Germany could grow into Europe's most
powerful country, with implications for European security. Not only was the
resurgence of German nationalism a risk, particularly if Germany was tempted
to team up with de Gaulle, but also Germany could threaten the Soviet Union
and limit the prospects of détente.48 Encouraging Europe to defend itself was
for the US a way of meeting Germany's wishes for greater control over
NATO's nuclear strategy. Pressure in Germany for access to nuclear
'hardware' was an important element in public opinion and the failure to
address it could create nationalist pressure, or could encourage the Germans to
turn to the French. 49 Some in the US, such as Defence Secretary Robert
McNamara, wanted to use the MLF to cut the Europeans down to size by
eradicating any independent nuclear deterrents in Europe. 5° The 'European
clause' in the MLF suggested, with some ambivalence, that while the USA
would retain a veto on the use of the force, if a federal Europe did develop,
then Europe could have its own veto. 51 Crudely, the perspectives were an
'Atlantic' organisation centred on NATO or a European organisation based
around a federal Europe or around de Gaulle's Europe des Patries.
The MLF split the British administration. Britain's Ambassador in
Brussels Sir Con O'Neill considered that Britain had no alternative but to
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accept the MLF. The failure of the Brussels negotiations had led to a reduction
in British influence in Europe and increased the risk that France and Germany
would form a partnership and turn away from the Atlantic. O'Neill argued:
Seen from here, there is one argument in favour
of the MLF which transcends all others. Its
establishment could guarantee for a number of
years that the main defence interests, links and
responsibilities of Germany (and some other
members of the Community), continue to run
across the Atlantic and not to any nearer
terminus.52
O'Neill's main concern, shared by Britain's Ambassador in Bonn, Sir Frank
Roberts, was that Britain's exclusion from major developments in European
defence would simply compound Britain's exclusion from the economic
Community. Revealing a deep level of questioning as to Britain's political
influence and role, O'Neill concluded that as Europe developed and became
more self-confident, so British influence would correspondingly wane.
Exclusion would mean that Britain:
Shall begin to become excentric to Western
Europe in defence as we are already becoming
in the economic sphere... it seems to me
worthwhile, if it would avoid such a
development, for us to put up with even a very
great deal of strategic imperfection and
additional expense in which the MLF would
involve us.53
In the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, chaired by the Cabinet
Secretary Sir Burke Trend, O'Neill's ideas were not accepted for three main
reasons. First, the MILF was a costly option. It would involve developing more
weaponry and thus expense. The main problem was that the MLF would upset
52 PRO T312 1011, Despatch no.6, O'Neill to Foreign Secretary, 23 July 1964
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the balance of Britain's retreat from a global defence role, by forcing
manpower resources from the Far East to [Europe. 54 Secondly, by encouraging
weapons proliferation and by offering Germany access to nuclear hardware,
the MLF would jeopardise moves to détente. The Soviet Union could interpret
the MLF as hostile and could build up forces in response. Consequently, this
would compel Britain to increase its own defence expenditure in Europe, when
the aim of policy was to take advantage of a relaxation of East-West tensions
to cut down costs in Europe. 55 Thirdly, the MLF, by ridding Britain of her
status as an 'independent' nuclear power would reduce Bntain's influence in
the USA and would place the British on an equal footing with the Germans in
NATO. At the same time, American willingness to contemplate an eventual
'European' veto created the risk that the 'twin pillars' of the Atlantic Alliance
would one day drift apart.56
The incoming government was able to break the deadlock that had
arisen in Britain's approach to Europe's political organisation. Insensitivity to
EEC membership may have assisted Wilson's development of an alternative
proposal to the MLF: an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). Wilson's insistence
that Labour did not want an independent nuclear deterrent was another key
ingredient in the change of policy, as was Labour's claim to take the lead in
policies of non-proliferation. Wilson told Hetherington:
he went back to what he'd told me about the
idea he'd had in the bath during the election
campaign. It was that we should assign our
nuclear forces to NATO. We should assign them
in such a way that they were completely tied up
with NATO. In other words, we'd maintain that
part of the Nassau agreement which provided for




the continuing British nuclear effort with a
British force assigned to NATO. We would not,
however, continue the clause on which
Macmillan had been so insistent about the right
to withdraw our forces.57
The ANF differed from the MLF because it did not offer the prospect of an
ultimate European veto, but proclaimed the retention of an American veto.58
Rather than the creation of new forces, the ANF would involve a pooling of
existing forces, enabling Wilson to claim that the ANF was a bid against
nuclear proliferation. Britain would contribute her Polaris fleet and V-bombers
to a multilateral force, which allowed Wilson to say that he had fulfilled his
election pledge to rid Britain of the independent deterrent by renegotiating the
Nassau agreement. 59 American doubts about the project, faced with European
divisions of opinion as the French were also opposed to the MLF, helped to
allow the MLF to disappear.6°
The three principles guiding Wilson's approach were again evident
during his visits to de Gaulle and Erhard in January 1965. He was also anxious
not to antagonise the French President by over-emphasising the extent to
which British and French policies had collided over the EEC. Britain's
immediate aims were to make economic and technological links with the
French, the first step in the search for the economies of scale necessary to
expand the British economy. To maximise Britain's ultimate bargaining
position at a time of uncertainty, Wilson emphasised the degree of similarity
between French and British policies. He argued that the British, like the
' LSE, Hethenngton Papers, 7 16, Meeting with Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964
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French, would never accept a supranational Europe and preferred a Europe des
Patries. Furthermore, the Labour government agreed with de Gaulle that
Britain could not come into the Community and sustain links with the
Commonwealth. Labour's appreciation of this fact meant that a
misunderstanding, such as that between the British and the French over the
Free Trade Area negotiations under Reginald Maudling in 1957-1958 could
not reoccur:
The Labour government's policy had criticised
Maudling on grounds that it was based on a total
misunderstanding of what the European powers
were trying to achieve: he failed to appreciate
that Europe was uniting economically for non-
economic motives... He [Wilson] did not see
how the links with the Commonwealth could be
reconciled with the spirit of the Common
Market. Labour had opposed supranationality
and were not prepared to abandon to a
supranational authority control over foreign
policy and defence. Labour's view was therefore
closer to de Gaulle's own.61
To Erhard, Wilson's story differed, indicating his attempts to augment
Britain's bargaining position with each individual leader. He told Erhard that
membership of the Common Market was 'not in the realm of practical
politics', but that Labour regarded the EEC as the 'historic landmark of our
time'. He did not over-emphasise Britain's hostility to supranationalism;
stressing instead that Britain wanted to be closely associated with moves to
political union.62 Thus, Wilson's initial dealing with European leaders was
essentially pragmatic, grounded in the complex nuclear and agricultural
diplomacy of the winter of 1964-5. He was anxious not to create disharmony
60 Foreign Relations of the United States, [henceforward FR US] Western European Region
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with either partner. Politically, he wanted to prevent the development of an
expressly European political union. Economically, it seems clear he was
genuinely determined to preserve Britain's trading links with the
Commonwealth
Whitehall and EEC Membership
In January the Government's First Secretary and Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs George Brown, instigated studies of Britain's future
relations with Europe. Brown was a lifelong supporter of British membership
of the EEC. 63 The DEA's Permanent Under-Secretary Eric Roll was strongly
in favour of membership and had also been involved in the Brussels
negotiations. TM Sir Derek Mitchell, who went to the DEA in 1966, confirmed
the impression that the DEA thought of itself as a 'miniature Foreign Office
concentrating on Europe'.65 Studies of French sources also reveal a
department presenting itself as leading Britain's European venture. William
Nield, head of Economic Co-ordination (Overseas) had close links with the
French Commercial Counsellor Jean Wahi and told Wahi that Wilson wanted
the DEA, not the Foreign Office, to lead Britain's approach to the EEC. 66 Lord
Roll denied that the DEA was always working for a European initiative, but
stressed that the DEA's administrative innovation went beyond stealing a
march on the Treasury. The DEA he recalled, intended to develop an expertise
in Britain's external economic relations, creating a department of officials
62 PRO PREM13 306, Wilson - Erhard, 30 Jan. 1965
63 Brown, Memoirs, op.cit., pp.205-212
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specialising in the EEC, the GATT and other international organisations such
as the UNCTAD and the OECD. 67 Thus, the DEA would not only diminish the
stranglehold of the Treasury on Whitehall, it would also erode the influence of
the Foreign Office, encroaching via its marriage of economic and foreign
expertise into Britain's relations with the growing array of international
organ sations.
The forum Brown chose for the fresh approach to European policy was
the External Economic Policy Committee, chaired by the DEA's Deputy
Under-Secretary Douglas Allen and dominated by the economic
departments. 68 Brown's intention was to produce a study of the economic
implications of Britain's future membership, illustrating the importance
attached to the industrial efficiency expected to accrue via membership. 69 The
resulting paper, delivered in May, focused on the economic case for entry,
ignoring the political implications, to the surprise of other officials. 7° The
DEA wanted to expand on its links with the French in order to encourage
greater efficiency in Britain's economy. Economic planning derived from
French-led ideas for indicative planning. 7 ' Both the Labour Party and
Whitehall had held discussions with the French about the establishment of the
new government's economic machinery. 72 The development of economic links
with the French could be the mainstay of a general pan-European pooling of
economic ideas, enabling ties to be created between the national economies in
Laurence Badel, Commentary, Daddow (ed.), Wilson
67 Lord Enc Roll, Interview with author, 5 Dec. 2001
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EFTA and the EEC. Nield recommended that European co-operation was a
way to combat American dominance in emerging technological sectors by
encouraging an amalgamation of resources for research and development and
by providing a larger market. Aircraft and computers were particular
industries that suffered because of the inability to develop ideas as quickly as
the USA. Projects could be developed in these sectors and in armaments,
space, nuclear power and electronics. Nield also suggested thait the National
Research Development Corporation (NRDC), established to provide money
for research and development, could merge its efforts with similar institutions
in Europe. The French had already held discussions with the British NRDC to
see if they could set up an equivalent institution.73 The DEA aimed to create
'functional collaboration' between Britain and France and then with other
EEC and EFTA countries, acknowledging that British membership of the
Community was blocked by de Gaulle's attitude.74
Foreign Office thinking had been moving in different directions. First,
after the Brussels negotiations, there were within the Foreign Office a growing
number of officials with a strong knowledge of the workings of the European
Community. As Hugo Young has shown, Europe not Empire was increasingly
a realistic alternative to forge a shining diplomatic career. 75 The European
Economic Organisations Department,
was developing its own agenda of relations with the European
Community. With eventual membership regarded as the only possible course
for Britain, European Community relations took on an elevated importance.
72 Roll, Where, op.cit., p.30
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Europe could not be overlooked in the way that it had been in the mid-1950s.
Without membership, it was widely acknowledged, Britain would only ever by
a 'greater Sweden', unable to wield influence in the world.76
Second, as well as regarding European membership as the only
possible course for Britain, Foreign Office officials had also re-evaluated the
methods by which Britain would seek that entry. Stung by the Brussels failure,
officials realised that the institution with which they sought to work required a
different diplomatic approach. The consolidation of the Community
throughout 1963 and 1964, culminating with the cereals price agreement in
December 1964, only served to strengthen their conclusions.77 Principally,
officials advocated the abandonment of the approach tried under Macmillan of
seeking to make safeguards for Britain's essential interests prior to entering
the Community. This did not mean that Britain would 'roll over and die',
acquiescing wholesale to the Community's demands. Rather, the British
would seek to agree to the principle of membership and then work to
safeguard Britain's essential interests from the inside. 78 This was a crucial
distinction. The new method, termed the 'crash operation', would obviate the
need for a detailed and uncertain negotiation. Officials had recognised that
Britain stood a better chance of securing her demands from inside the
Community. Con O'Neill was the principle advocate of the new approach.
O'Neill demonstrated a refmed understanding of how the EEC worked and so
of how to wield Britain's influence inside it. He accepted the loss of
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76 PRO T312 1011, Despatch no.6, O'Neill to Foreign Secretary, 23 July 1964
ibid.
g PRO F0371 1773701M1093 25, SC(64)24, The UK and Europe, Foreign Office Steering
Committee, 6 Apr. 1964
48
sovereignty implied by membership, but understood also that the future
exercise of power depended on that acceptance:
We in Britain still, in general, underestimate the
extent to which the European Communities are
and always have been concerned with politics
and power.. .they aim, through union, to revive
their influence and power, not merely the
prosperity of their countries and their
peoples.. .Mao Tse Tung declared that power
grows out of the barrel of a gun. Professor
Halistein operates in a more sophisticated
environment; but he has always declared he is in
politics not business, and he may well believe
that power grows out of the regulation price of
Tilsit cheese or the price of a grain a hen needs
to lay one egg. I think it does.79
Third, the Foreign Office recognised that General de Gaulle's veto was a bar
to accession: Britain would be unable to join while he was in power. 8° Not
only this, but none of the Six would want to reconsider enlargement before the
end of their transitional period in 1970. The transitional period allowed for the
reduction of the internal customs barriers to zero in three stages, alongside the
harmonisation of the external tariff. Fundamentally, the Six all wanted to
complete these changes before reconsideration of the complex problem of
enlargement. Britain's intention during the Brussels negotiations had been to
join in with the Community's transitional period. Recognising the
impracticality of this, Bntain should seek to join after 1970, adopting the
Community's provisions in a truncated version of their own formula. 8 ' In the
interim, Britain should seek to make life difficult for the General. This could
be done by showing that Britain was a good European, able to accept the
PRO T312 1011, Despatch no.6, O'Neill to Foreign Secretary, 23 July 1964
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provisions of the Treaty of Rome and the 'rules' of the European Community.
In this way, it could be possible to undercut de Gaulle's veto, showing that it
was not Britain who excluded herself, but France who deliberately kept Britain
out.82
During the summer of 1964, officials from different departments,
chaired by the Treasury's David Pitblado, compiled a report that served to
emphasise the central importance of eventual EEC membership. All
departments supported this goal, agreeing with the political case that outside
the Community, Britain would diminish in influence and status. 83 Despite the
close involvement of the Board of Trade and in particular the Treasury with
this review, it was clear the Foreign Office were now the leading department
on Britain's relations with the European Community. Partly, this showed that
Foreign Office officials had adjusted to the changing realities of Britain's
power. It also reflected the growing political importance of the EEC to
Britain's immediate security interests. De Gaulle's policies towards the EEC
and the Atlantic Alliance stood in increasingly overt opposition to Britain's
own. Having failed to secure a French say in the direct running of NATO via
the tripartite suggestions in 1958; de Gaulle's attitude towards NATO and the
Alliance had become steadily more hostile. During 1964, his opposition to
proposals for some kind of European nuclear force within the Alliance led to
speculation that he intended to disrupt or withdraw from the Atlantic
Alliance.84
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As well as the political dangers of the developing EEC, the
consolidation of the CAP on terms favourable to the French threatened
Britain's international economic objectives. De Gaulle's ability to subject the
Five to French wishes in economic policy fuelled concerns of an inward-
looking EEC.85 France's farmers favoured high levels of agricultural
protection, cutting down imports from developing countries and encouraging
over-production by export subsidies. These policies were extremely harmful to
Britain's interests. Subsidies for exports to the developing world were a boost
to French exporters that the British could not match. 86 The consolidation of the
CAP also worried the Danes, who were heavily dependent on income from
agricultural exports and who increased pressure on Britain to provide for
agricultural trade amongst EFTA countries. 87 Barriers to third country exports
heightened the burden to Britain of cheap agricultural imports. In 1963 the
Macmillan Cabinet were forced to apply a ceiling to the quantity of cereal
imports they could accept. 88 In the Kennedy Round for tariff negotiations in
the GATT, French obstruction ensured that there was at the turn of 1964/1965
no prospect for an agricultural settlement that could hope to ease the problems
for Britain by general reductions in agricultural tariffs.
The challenge posed to Britain's interests by a French-dominated
European Community led to the development of policies towards the
European Community not concerned primarily with the immediate
achievement of membership. Rather, Britain had to work as best she could
PRO F0371 184288/W6 12, Palliser to Nicholls, 9 Feb. 1965
On the CAP, Gisela Hendriks, 'The Creation of the Common Agricultural Policy', Deighton
and Milward (eds), Widening, op.cu., p.148
PRO CAB134 1783, EER(64)79, European Integration: Austria, Foreign Office, 10 Nov.
1964
51
from her place outside the Community to soften the impact of French policies
and to undermine de Gaulle's ability to get his own way. Membership was of
course the ultimate goal of policy and without a commitment to eventual
membership the Foreign Office recognised that Britain's influence on the
continent could only ever be partial. 89 But, as the veto ruled out immediate
negotiations and as the Labour leadership's policy towards membership was
so ambivalent, the Foreign Office directed its efforts in the winter of 1964-5
towards a limitation of the damage de Gaulle could do to Britain and to the
Atlantic Alliance.
In January 1965, Sir Michael Palliser, recently returned from Dakar to
head the Foreign Office's Planning Staff, urged the Western Department to
spur the new Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, into action. Palliser's timing
partly reflected the institutional basis of the Foreign Office's Planning Staff;
an innovation designed to think long-term but not based in any department.
Palliser recognised the need for the Planning Staff to make a name for itself
and in this aim he was assisted by his concert of views with the head of the
Western Organisations and Co-operation Department, John Barnes. Barnes,
the son of a dissenting vicar, was in Palliser's words, 'awkward', but the
leading advocate of Britain's role of riding the European Community and the
Atlantic Alliance in 'double harness', ensuring the two units did not drift
apart. 9° Palliser also had in mind the change of Foreign Secretary. Patrick
Gordon-Walker was very much a 'Commonwealth man' and committed to the
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'five conditions', but Michael Stewart was a weaker individual with no
particular views on Europe. He was easily influenced in favour of EEC
membership by Foreign Office officials. 9' He was not the only one to be
swayed by Sir Michael. Lord Thomson, Minister of State in the Foreign
Office, also testified to the unusual influence Palliser had over the course of
British policy towards the European Community.92
Palliser's minute to Sir John Nich4ls, despatched on 9 February 1965,
was a turning point in Britain's policy development. Palliser's objective was to
push Britain's policy towards Europe back onto the political map. In the hiatus
created by the unravelling of plans for a European nuclear force in NATO, de
Gaulle was gaining ground in his objective of making the EEC into a 'closed
shop'.93 The threat posed by de Gaulle was exacerbated by the fact that he
faced no clear opposition within the EEC. In December 1964, the French and
Germans finally reached agreement over the level of cereal prices in the CAP.
For Erhard, the decision was enormously difficult as German farmers wanted
higher prices than those offered and German industrialists clamoured for a
clearer commitment by the EEC to the Kennedy Round and further tariff
reductions. Erhard's political future could swing on the agreement, but he was
persuaded to settle for prices much lower than the Germans would have
wanted.94 Of course, the need to make the agreement in the name of EEC
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'Dealing with de Gaulle: Anglo-American Relations and the Second Application', Daddow
(ed.), Wilson, op.cit.
' Michael Stewart, Life and Labour (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), p.144
92 Lord Thomson of Monifieth, Interview with author, 12 Dec. 2001
PRO F0371 1842881W6 12, Palliser to Nicholls, 9 Feb. 1965
PRO FO371 1773731M1087 20(1), Dixon to FO, tel.275, 27 Oct. 1964; M1087 281, Keeble
Memorandum, 16 Dec. 1964; PRO PREM13 27, Roberts to FO, tel.1220, 1 Dec. 1964;
Roberts to FO, tel.1202, 1208,27 Nov. 1964
53
development was paramount, but de Gaulle had also exerted pressure by
promising further political development of the EEC.95
Without an Atlanticist vision for the EEC's political organisation once
the MLF/ANF became unworkable, the risk was that the Germans, facing also
domestic pressure for greater German involvement in nuclear strategy in
NATO, would be tempted to team up with de Gaulle in politics and defence.
Admittedly, it was unlikely that the Germans would throw in the Atlanticist
towel and turn to Gaullist ideas of nationalism. 96 In late 1965, State Secretary
George Ball said of this prospect: 'I often get frustrated in this job, but I don't
yet think the Europeans are that dumb'. 97 Two factors conspired to make the
Foreign Office edgy on the dangers. First, there was a general distrust of
Gennany, not of her nationalist tendencies, but of the reliability of the
politicians and more specifically their ability to resist nationalist pressure.
Franz-Joseph Strauss, the Defence Minister, was often cited in this instance.98
Second, de Gaulle's pressure operated in the realm of public opinion. The
British feared that if de Gaulle's vision for a 'European Europe' were left
unchallenged, pressure would build in public opinion for the Germans to
acquiesce in this vision. Thus, Britain's task was to keep alive the Atlantic
alternative, ensuring that the French were not the only European powers with a
solution for eventual German reunification and German desire for a greater
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say in nuclear strategy. 99 Such an approach would limit de Gaulle's room for
manoeuvre and ensure that the Atlantic impulse remained. The Economist
summed up the approach:
If he [President Johnson] changed his mind and
pressed the Germans to choose between the US
and France, they would no doubt choose the US.
But if he does not, then it will become evident
that between the concrete reality of the Common
Market and the aspiration to Atlantic
partnership; and between the intransigence of
President de Gaulle and the readiness for
accommodation of Johnson, Germany will
prefer to go ahead with a European union and
leave the Atlantic Alliance in its present state.100
But was a desire to undermine de Gaulle enough of a motive for
European policy? Central to Palliser's analysis was a further goal and this was
the preservation of Britain's own influence within the Atlantic 'double-
harness'. At this stage, there was little indication from the British side that the
Americans wanted anything from Britain or saw Britain as useful in their own
battle with the obstructive French.'° 1 On the contrary, Palliser identified an
isolationist tendency within the United States after the assassination of
President Kennedy and the coming to power of the all-American Lyndon
Johnson: 'the average American is at present bored and irritated by Europeans
of all kinds'.' 02 The US needed to be encouraged to keep looking towards the
EEC as the European states had stymied between them American plans for a
nuclear solution in Europe.
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Furthermore, Wilson and Johnson's first meeting in December 1964
had met with ambivalent success. Johnson reproached the British Prime
Minister for his treatment of the MLF.'°3 British-American relations were at a
low and the British recognised that failure to take action in Europe would sink
Britain's standing further. Over time, the US would be tempted to take the
Germans, with all their industrial potential, as the Americans' primary partner
in Europe. 104 In effect then, Britain had to take a more forthcoming approach
to the EEC in order to preserve the traditional bases of Britain's power.
Opposition to the MLF stemmed from Britain's desire to sustain its Polaris
programme and to remain an independent nuclear power and thus to remain
one notch above the Europeans (particularly the Germans) in NATO strategy
and policy making. 105 Only with the nuclear dimension would Britain sustain
its seat at the top table and continue to 'punch above its weight' in the forums
of the world. And only with eventual membership of the EEC could Britain
justify its continued power status as Britain's global influence eroded. Without
membership, Britain's relative decline would be starkly illustrated while the
EEC continued to grow in strength. 107 Without membership, the traditional
make-up of transatlantic relations - Britain linking the giants of Europe and
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America - would diminish and with it Britain's elevated position. The power
dynamic thus remained central to Britain's thinking about EEC membership.
Palliser did not directly address the question of EEC membership. His
primary aim was an interim measure to continue to undermine de Gaulle and
exert Britain's influence in Europe. The secondary, longer-term aim was to
convince ministers to start thinking about their position towards the EEC.
There was no need for an initiative to achieve membership in the short-term,
but the ability to say that Britain would come in when the circumstances were
right was essential. As Palliser wrote: 'in practice, none of this is likely to
make much impact on our partners unless they are seen to be the outcome of a
genuine reappraisal by the British government of Britain's role within Europe
and the Atlantic Alliance' P108
The Board of Trade and the Treasury, in the 1950s the leading
departments towards Britain's relations with the EEC, were now of
subordinate influence in policy formulation. The Treasury's declining
influence has already been noted as the issue of European membership became
increasingly politicised. Sterling had also not featured in the Brussels
negotiations. The eclipse of the Overseas Finance Division in the Treasury
reorganisation in 1962 meant that the Treasury's trenchant defence of its
international sterling interests was also less strong.'°9 Left to concentrate on
economic problems at home, the Treasury's involvement was then
complicated by the creation of the DEA in 1964. The DEA took for itself the
responsibilities of medium-term planning and of policy implementation;
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leaving the Treasury's Economic Section, in 1964 under Sir Alec Cairncross
with general studies of domestic and international economic problems.
Cairncross' diaries illustrate his hostility to these changes. In particular, he
resented the DEA and the appointment of Robert Nield to advise the
Chancellor: 'The question for me is whether the Economic Section is already
dead. Donald [MacDougall - Director General of the DEAl and Robert
between them effectively end the post-war experiment'. 110 Control of sterling
policy thus became the Economic Section's primary weapon in asserting its
own influence. Because of the problems of the balance of payments, it was
sterling that dominated the Treasury's concern throughout the period of the
second application.
The Overseas Finance Department in 1962 had been streamlined into
an overarching finance department, within which the Overseas Western
European and Commercial section was responsible for relations with the
European Community. Headed by John Owen, the department had expressed
doubt about the strength of the political case for membership, but had
nevertheless fallen in with the conclusions of the Pitblado Report. 111 During
the Brussels negotiations, Treasury officials had also optimistically felt that
membership of the Community would encourage the Six to lend Britain
money in order to tide over the balance of payments difficulties. The Six,
under the Basic agreements of 1961, would see more logic in shoring up the
pound. Their interest in the strength of Britain's economy would be
heightened after Britain's accession. In addition, the City of London felt that
"°Alec Cairncross, The Wilson Years: A Treasury Diary, 1963-1969 (London: The
Historians' Press, 1997), p.'7, 19 Oct. 1964
' PRO T312 1011, Barnes to Owen, 23 June 1964
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Britain would be able to take advantage of the opportunities presented in
banking and insurance in the larger European market."2
However, the consolidation of the EEC had made these assumptions
less solid. After 1962, the Six agreed a new method of agricultural financing
calculated on units of gold, as well as advances in the liberalisation of capital
movements within the Six. Combined with the persistent deficit on the British
balance of payments, the Six could prove reluctant to accept a weak economy
into their system and the Treasury was unsure as to whether to take the risk.
Effectively, after the completion of the 1963 CAP agreements, devaluation
was ruled out as a tool of policy in the EEC, as the pegging of food prices to
gold would mean that if a currency were devalued, food prices would
correspondingly increase and cause inflation. The Six agreed instead that a
member state in balance of payments difficulties could call on Article 108 of
the Treaty of Rome, asking for assistance from the other members in order to
avoid devaluation. The Pitbiado Report recognised that if Britain entered with
a weak economy, the Six would be reluctant to invoke Article 108. The
speculation that Britain would be unable to devalue once in the EEC could
encourage devaluation in advance of accession. The freeing of capital
movements within the Six could also create problems for a delicate economy,
as capital could be encouraged out into stronger areas within the EEC.
Liberalisation of portfolio investment also meant that capital could also be
encouraged from Britain via the EEC into non-Sterling Area countries such as
the USA. 113 So, while the long-term advantages of Britain's membership were
112 Catherine R. Schenk, 'The UK, the Sterling Area and the EEC', Deighton and Milward
(eds), Widening, op.cit., pp.124-127, 133-134
3 PROT312 1O11,PitbladoReport, 11 Sept. 1964
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potentially enormous, Britain's ability to realise them in the short-term was far
from certain.
Preparing reports for the EEP Committee, John Owen recognised the
fundamental dilemma for Britain's economic and sterling policy. First, with
the balance of payments and economic prospects so uncertain, it was unlikely
that Britain would be able to enter. A significant improvement in Britain's
economic livelihood was a pre-requisite. Furthermore, once inside the EEC,
Britain would be unable to implement the kind of economic controls, such as
import restrictions, favoured by Wilson. Knowledge of the change in Britain's
economic policy could encourage speculation against sterling in advance. In
this way, Britain's economic fragility acted as a significant brake on Britain's
advance towards the EEC.
Second, the development of the EEC itself led to greater financial and
monetary co-operation between the Six. Owen concluded that the management
of a reserve currency probably was incompatible with the obligations of
Community membership as the Community would ultimately seek to move to
monetary union and a common currency. Not only this, but the Six were
taking a single stance in international monetary negotiations. In the on-going
attempts to solve the problems of world liquidity, Britain was much more on
the side of the United States than the EEC. Inside the Six, Britain would be
forced to team up with the Europeans, some of whom favoured solutions that
effectively meant an end to Britain's sterling area. Thus, Owen saw that entry
into the EEC really did force a choice. Britain could not use the EEC to shore
up her position as banker for the sterling area as management of the reserves
would be incompatible with the obligations of membership. In addition, Owen
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was uncertain that Britain could use the EEC to bolster Britain's strong pound
policy, fearing that accession would precipitate devaluation." 4 This was
reflective of the general uncertainty in the Treasury about Britain's ability to
hold the rate and to instil economic recovery. In April, for instance, the
Treasury had prepared contingency plans for devaluation in case the Budget
speech precipitated adverse opinion."5
In the Board of Trade, the Commercial Relations and Export Division
were responsible for Britain's policy towards the EEC. The Under-Secretary
in charge of Europe was Eric Phillips, a man remembered by the Foreign
Office's Norman Statham as particularly effective in pushing Britain's policy
towards the Community." 6 Phillips' department was eager to pursue EEC
membership as a long-term policy for four main reasons. First, it was
undeniable that Britain's trade was redirecting away from the Commonwealth
and towards Western Europe. In 1953, for instance, 41% of Britain's exports
had gone to the Commonwealth and 42% of Britain's imports had come from
there; while only 27.2% of Britain's exports went to Western Europe and
23.6% of imports derived from Western Europe. By 1964, 29.4% of Britain's
exports went to the Commonwealth, compared to 37.7% to Western Europe;
while 3 1.1% of Britain's imports came from the Commonwealth, contrasted
with 32.2% from Western Europe." 7 With this in mind, the British had to fmd
some way of making themselves as competitive as the European countries.
CAB 134 1772, EEP(65)24, Financial and Monetary Implications of Membership of
the EEC, Treasury, 6 Apr. 1965
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Secondly, the Board of Trade recognised the benefits of increased
competition that would accrue from European membership. The economies of
scale and the reduction of tariffs between industrialised countries would spur
Britain's industry into greater efficiency. This was less the benefit of tariff
reduction per Se, than a recognition that without membership, Bntain stood at
a disadvantage to her main European competitors. Britain could not afford to
be outside the dynamic and sophisticated market of the EEC. 118 Tariff
reductions in the Kennedy Round could help provide access to the larger
market, but would not serve as an alternative, mainly because of the lack of
political force that Britain had without membership.
This was the third consideration. Sir Richard Powell, the Permanent
Under Secretary, commented that in the Kennedy Round, Britain had no
influence next to the combined might of the USA and the EEC. As the world
tended to split into regional tariff units, Britain risked being left alone with no
trading partners and no political weight." 9 Thus, despite the large stake that
Britain had in the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round, the British
found difficulties in securing global reduction of tariffs. In agriculture, the
EEC was insisting on its montant de soutien formula in which tariff cuts
would be conditional on the level of domestic support offered to farmers. The
USA for its part was reluctant to make concessions in chemicals because of
the American Selling Price (ASP) system.' 2° Britain's lack of influence was
also evident in global trading forums such as the newly created UNCTAD
forum in GATT. Faced with the difficulty of having to accept low cost
118 PRO BT241 1319, Phillips toNicoll, 13 May 1965
CABI34 1472, CCP(65)8, Report of the Kennedy Round, November 1964-February
1965, Richard Powell, 23 Feb. 1965
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agricultural imports when the European countries protected their markets with
the CAP levy, the British sought general multilateralisation of tariffs
throughout the world. General multilateralisation would lessen the value of the
Commonwealth preference in the British market, but would spread the burden
of low cost imports.' 21 However, general multilateralisation was meeting
resistance from the EEC, the USA and from the Commonwealth
themselves. 122
Fourthly, and vitally, Phillips shared general fears that without
membership, Britain would be unable to sustain her existing trading
relations. 123 The EEC's Yaound Convention, replacing Part IV of the Treaty
of Rome, demanded that the associate countries market their produce at world
prices. This reduced their price competitiveness, but the EEC offered access to
a larger market than Britain's. Nigeria's association talks with the EEC
surpassed the fears during the Brussels negotiations that association was
another form of colonialism. Accordingly, the African Commonwealth could
follow Nigeria's example. 124 Similarly, EFTA could be encouraged to turn to
the EEC and Austria had already begun association negotiations. The impact
of the CAP on Denmark's exports also led to Danish interest in EEC
membership. Pressure in EFTA consequently increased for greater access to
Britain's markets, or for institutional and agricultural arrangements going
121 PRO CAB 134 1783, EER(64)56, Association of the Commonwealth with the EEC,
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beyond the industrial free trade remit. 125 EEC membership would both
facilitate increased industrial competition, and would enhance Britain's
political standing in order to continue with the general aim of reducing trading
barriers throughout the globe.
In the Ministry of Agriculture, there was a conflict between the
international and the domestic implications of EEC membership. In December
1963, the Six had agreed pricing and support arrangements for all the major
commodities except cereals. John Kelsey, Assistant Secretary in the External
Relations Division, argued that membership would raise prices in Britain,
forcing domestic inflation and distortion of the agricultural industry. It was
likely that cereals would be very highly priced, ensuring better returns for
large-scale agrarian farming in the south and east of the country. The lack of
support arrangements for pigs and eggs ran the risk of their prices plummeting
and dairy, livestock and horticulture were also likely to experience lower
prices.' 26 However, two factors meant that it could prove in the British
interests to accede to the EEC. First, the National Plan aimed to increase home
production in cereals and to reduce imports by 1 .5m tons. Under current
bilateral arrangements with Britain's main suppliers, the USA, Argentina,
Canada and Australia, the UK imported 9m tons per year.127
Second and related to the first, the high prices and protectionism in the
EEC increased the pressure on the British to import cheap goods that could no
longer find a market in the EEC. This pressure had led Britain to impose a
floor on the import price to introduce an element of protection into Britain's
'	 CAB 134 1772, EEP(65)16, European Integration, EFTA Ministerial Meeting,
Foreign Office, 22 Feb. 1965
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own market. The floor would also reduce the cost of deficiency payments to
the Exchequer as farmers would require less support.' 28 The EEC's
negotiating position in the Kennedy Round was also problematical, as the
Ministry of Agriculture wanted to share the burden for third country imports
and so wanted to reduce prices and increase access in Western Europe.'29
Britain's objective in the Kennedy Round was therefore to seek multilateral
arrangements of access for third countries into developed markets, diluting
regional tariff blocs into a world settlement. 13° The difficulties in pressing for
multilateral reductions because of the EEC's opposition, added to the fact that
Britain's domestic interest rested with an increase in domestic production and
reduction of imports led to a change in policy. In October, the Ministry of
Agriculture decided in the Kennedy Round to seek a system of international
reference prices to calculate the levels of support. This would bring Britain
more into line with EEC objectives, but would retain some control over the
minimum and maximum price levels. 131 These pressures meant that the
Ministry of Agriculture did see benefit in accession to the EEC, as
membership would stimulate UK production and reduce cereal imports from
outside the Community by one half.132
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Bridge-building: A Study of Policy Development
The bridge-building initiative, finally delivered in May 1965 to seek links
between EFTA and the EEC, had its genesis in Palliser's memorandum of 9
February 1965. Stewart despatched two memos to the Prime Minister in
February and March to argue the political case for acting to prevent the
development of political union and for thinking about eventual membership:
'at present the link is like a telephone that has gone dead at both ends. Let us
at least be sure that our end is capable of functioning if and when the other end
is repaired'.' 33 Following a visit to Erhard in March, Wilson showed interest
in the policy, pushing 'bridge-building' through the Cabinet. The government
did address the question of eventual membership:
the ultimate solution seems only feasible in
terms it is still difficult to envisage - a solution
based on the inclusion of the UK and other
EFTA countries (some of the latter as
associates) - in a Community based on the
Treaty of Rome but developing and adapting
policies acceptable to us.134
Bringing the reluctant Cabinet to accept a European policy that would serve to
keep the Foreign Office's European ambitions alive was a considerable
achievement and lends credence to the view that Wilson intended a
membership initiative from early in the first term. 135 However, the impression
of policy development is not one of a confident Prime Minister, leading from
the front, determined to gain recognition of European policy while hiding the
true nature of that policy from his colleagues. Rather, Wilson reacted to
133 PRO PREM13 306, Stewart to Wilson, PM165 26, 12 Feb. 1965
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Foreign Office pressure and needed considerable inducement to do so. The
impression he gives is one of indecision and ambivalence, recognising the
need to address European membership but profoundly uncertain as to what
that decision would mean. This was more than just an unwillingness to address
the problems with his Cabinet colleagues. Policy towards the Commonwealth
and his views on supranationality combined to ensure that the Prime Minister
was extremely reluctant to take Britain into the EEC.
Wilson did have to face a Cabinet that was predominantly sceptical
about entry into the EEC. In 1962, Hugh Gaitskell, then leader, had famously
outlined the 'five conditions' that would have to be satisfied before
membership would occur. These were the freedom of sovereignty over
economic and foreign policy, protection for Commonwealth and EFTA trade
and protection for Britain's agriculture. In this way, the Labour party had
never repudiated Britain's involvement in European unity, but had established
that Britain's special interests had to be settled prior to entry.' 36 The
'conditions' were widely seen to be un-negotiable and so as forming a bar to
the political principle of membership.' 37 Framing the debate in this way
ensured that the question was not only about whether Britain should join
Europe, but also about Britain's ability to negotiate a suitable settlement and
so about Britain's influence and power. Douglas Jay, for instance, makes clear
in his memoirs that he was opposed to Britain's accession on the terms that
eventually became available and portrays Britain's policy as leading up to the
day at which the 'thousand years of history' would eventually be abandoned:
136 Brivati, Gaitskell, op.cit., pp.404-418
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to see no value and to take no pride in a nation
which has preserved democratic Government
unbroken by violent upheavals for 300 years,
which has increasingly upheld human rights and
civil liberties, and which has pioneered the
struggle for greater social justice - to ignore all
this and much else is to abandon rational
judgement.'38
Yet, it was not so clear in 1965 where Britain's policy was heading.
Jay readily co-operated in the bridge-building initiative, supporting closer
links between the EFTA and the EEC in order to stimulate trade and to
mitigate the effects of the imposition of the common external tariff.' 39 Asked
to produce a paper on the economic implications of European membership,
Jay showed his faith in Commonwealth trade. He argued that the loss of the
Commonwealth preference and the turning of the terms of trade towards the
Europeans would deal a blow to Britain's balance of payments as Britain
would replace cheap Commonwealth imports with more expensive ones from
the EEC. Consequently, Britain's living costs would rise, pushing up the price
of wages and so the cost of Britain's exports.' 4° Jay's paper was never
circulated to ministers, as there was recognition that if Jay's views gained
currency, all of Britain's objectives of garnering influence in the EEC would
be lost.'41
Wilson's response to the Foreign Office initiative was not just an
attempt to balance the opposing interests of his Cabinet team. He accepted the
importance of providing a counter to the development of the EEC's political
Jay, Change, op.cit., p.348
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organisation, commenting that Britain should support Dutch efforts to prevent
a European political union. He also emphasised the importance of economic
planning, the preservation of the balance of payments and above all,
Commonwealth trade:
what is the 'right sort of Europe'? Unless it was
genuinely outward looking and not autarkic, it
must be inimical to Atlantic and Commonwealth
links. The real test is agricultural policy, which
in its present form is autarkic and would deal a
death-blow to Commonwealth trade.'42
The hegemonic overtones of autarky and the strength of language aboi.it the
Commonwealth indicate a personal hostility to the institution of the EEC and
also the genuine favour to the Commonwealth alternative.' 43 The risk to the
balance of payments was well supported by official studies and added a
practical concern against a short-term turn to Europe. Further to this, Wilison
had told de Gaulle in January that Britain opposed supranationality and
supported the French vision of a Europe des Patries.' It does not therefore
seem possible to view Wilson's bridge-building policy as an automatic first
step on the path to the initiative that would follow. In essence, bridge-building
was a tactical move to achieve four aims: to counterbalance French influence
by appealing to the Germans, to mitigate the effects of completion of the
Community's customs union, to appease a current of hostility in EFTA and to
raise the prospect of eventual membership in the Cabinet.
First, Wilson's interest in a European initiative appeared to grow out of
a meeting with the German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard in early March. The
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French challenge was dangerous if the French could persuade public opinion
in Germany and Europe that only they offered a real prospect of ultimate
German reunification and German involvement in European nuclear strategy.
Wilson stressed that Britain did support steps to German reunification,
assuaging German fears that the Labour government would prioritise relations
with the Soviet Union. 145 A mutual ambition to lower tariffs in Europe was
another way of sustaining German support for an 'outward looking' Europe.
Erhard's problem was that he had been hemmed into accepting agricultural
prices for the CAP lower than the German farmers wanted. At the same time,
German industrialists supported freer trade throughout Europe, wanting access
in particular to Scandinavian markets.' 46 With the French also obstructing
progress in the Kennedy Round, Erhard was not delivering on economic
policy concerning the EEC. In addition, as Ludlow has shown, the Germans
were increasingly determined to stand up to the French over agricultural
financing arrangements for the CAP.'47
Agricultural financing was a complex problem. The Treaty of Rome
laid down a system of financing the agricultural fund that would hand over the
receipts of duties on goods included in the customs union and levies on
agricultural goods in the CAP into a central fund owned by the European
Commission. 148 The levy system worked as the level of the levy changed in
inverse proportion to the cost of the product: a cheap product accrued a high
charge at the border, a more expensive product a lower charge. This was the
' The Economist, 'Nearer to Germany', 13 Mar. 1965
'46 Tho Rhemsch and Hubert Zimmermann, 'Adenauer Chooses De Gaulle: The West
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way of ensuring steady prices of imported agricultural goods and of course
offered protection to Europe's farmers. A fund owned by the Commission was
the only way of ensuring against 'trade deflection', a central problem in the
development of the EEC. The difficulty was who would collect the duty on
goods. Goods bound for Germany, for instance often passed through the Dutch
port of Rotterdam. A fund belonging to the Community overcame this and so
enabled the internal duty free zone to be implemented.149
The problem, from the Germans' point of view, was the way in which
the level of payments into the fund would be calculated. The French wanted a
financial system based on the quantity of agricultural imports from third
countries: EEC states importing a high proportion of agricultural goods from
outside the EEC would pay more into the agricultural fund. A system based on
imports in this way did have to be implemented after the end of the
Community's transitional period in 1970, but safeguards could be built in to
ensure that those countries reliant on agricultural imports did not have to pay a
disproportionate amount. The agricultural importers were Germany and Italy.
The Germans wanted to cap their payments into the Fund by ensuring that part
of their contribution would be calculated on a fixed-key system agreed in
advance. The Germans' diplomacy towards the French had hardened in an
attempt to prevent the French getting their own way over the CAP.' 5° As part
of this strategy, it would appear as if Erhard was interested in bringing Britain
'47 N. Piers Ludlow, 'Challengmg French Leadership in the Community: Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the Empty Chair Crisis', Contemporary European History, vol.8, no.2,
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to support German aims for 'parallelism'. Parallelism would ensure
simultaneous development of the CAP and the industrial customs union, as
well as progress in the Kennedy Round: in other words, to ensure dividends
for Germany's industrial interests.
Erhard and Wilson were therefore able to reach a certain concert of
views. Wilson wanted to demonstrate Britain's interest in the EEC in order to
sustain Britain's influence on the continent and to keep alive the political
alternative to a French-led Europe. Political union between the Six had first
been discussed in 1961, but had faltered because of French hostility to
supranationality and because the Dutch and Belgians were unwilling to adopt
it without Britain.' 5 ' De Gaulle had promised to move to political union if the
Five facilitated the settlement of the next stage of the CAP and the Six had
been discussing political union proposals forwarded by the Italians in
January.' 52 Erhard's own proposals for political union between the Six
included links with EFTA and an agreement with the British would strengthen
the likelihood of this goal, while for Wilson it would work to show the French
that they could not subject their five partners at whim.' 53 Accordingly, the two
men agreed to investigate the possibility of seeking additional tariff reductions
after the end of the Kennedy Round and to work to ensure the full promised
cut of 20%. Erhard also suggested an exchange of ambassadors between the
EEC and EFTA and a committee to ensure the policies of each group did not
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diverge too radically. 154 The meeting stimulated Wilson's interest in bridge-
building.
The visit also possibly led Wilson to believe that bridge-building was
sufficient as an end in itself. After a meeting of the Socialist International at
Chequers in April, at which support for bridge-building was expressed, he
suggested the 'Munchmeyer Plan', named after a German industrialist, for the
EEC to join EFTA as one unit.' 55 Such a proposal was clearly unrealisable, as
had been witnessed by the free trade area talks under Reginald Maudling,
when Britain had attempted and failed to complement the European customs
union with a wider free trade area. 156 Despite the apparent impossibility of the
idea, Wilson returned to it at the EFTA Prime Minister's meeting in May at
which the bridge-building initiative was launched. He declared that
Munchmeyer should not be rejected out of hand. Maudling's attempts to
negotiate a free trade area around the EEC in the late 1950s had failed because
they had: 'ignored the strength of European feeling within the Six. . .therefore
the members of the Six... had regarded those negotiations as a piece of
perfidious sabotage'.' 57 Thus, although Wilson and Erhard's political
objectives converged, it would seem clear that Wilson had no intention at this
stage of accepting the economic provisions of the EEC and may have thought
himself better placed to negotiate a more favourable alternative.
The second motive behind bridge-building was to continue to meet the
challenge of the EEC's tariff reductions. Progress in the Community meant
that the Community was likely to have completed its internal customs union
' ibid.
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ahead of schedule in the next two years. Tariff reductions between the EFTA
countries would also be completed in the next two years, creating a clear tariff
division in Europe.' 58 British policy had always been to keep EFTA's internal
tariff reductions in step with those of the EEC, to sustain the stimulus to
investment of industries established within the EFTA countries.' 59 Failure to
keep pace with the EEC's success could jeopardise British and EFTA
economies. Accordingly, a major part of the bridge-building plan was to
reduce to zero the tariffs between the EEC and EFTA over a five-year
transitional period, effectively creating by default a free trade area around the
customs union.
Again, the best explanation of Wilson's own thinking on this project
was found in Hetherington's papers:
The main project was to bring about a removal
of tariffs between the EEC and EFTA between
1967 and 1972... They would seek to eliminate
the tariff barriers between the Common Market
and the EFTA countries progressively between
1967 and 1972, starting from the point that both
the Common Market and EFTA would have
reached nil tariffs internally by 1967.160
Wilson clearly did think that a free trade area around the customs union was
possible, explaining his earlier enthusiasm for the Munchmeyer Plan:
I [Hetherington] asked whether he thought the
prospects of success were about 50-50 or more
or less. He indicated that 50-50 was probably
about right. He said it was nevertheless very
important that the British had taken this
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initiative and that it was being accepted. Things
were moving in Europe and moving in the right
direction, the difference from what we were
trying to do now and what Maudling had tried to
do was that Maudling's initiative was seen by
the EEC people as a wrecking manoeuvre. It
made them very suspicious. This time even the
French were perhaps going to be quite
friendly.'6'
Wilson identified that the main problem would be in reducing the tariffs for
agriculture. This would obviously recall all the problems of trade deflection
and origin rules dealt with in the Free Trade Area talks.' 62 Cheap produce
would enter the Free Trade Area countries and could then be resold at higher
prices in the EEC.' 63 Failure to include agriculture if advances were made on
industrial goods would be difficult for EFTA countries. Austria and
Switzerland had already objected to the differing prices of agricultural goods
in the EFTA states for products such as biscuits, sugar fondants and
chocolate.' For Wilson, the main problem was that of Commonwealth trade
and the need to retain the principle of cheap food prices in Britain: 'he thought
that there would have to be some special provisions on agriculture. The British
certainly were not going to accept a position in which they had to push up by
80% what they were paying for Commonwealth food'.'65
There were also further difficulties which Wilson did not mention.
Wilson was pleased with the idea of the tariff reductions by 1972:
he said that the position before his initiative had
been like a rugby scrum on a wet day at Cardiff
Arms Park. The heavyweight forwards on both
sides were down in the scrum, hacking away at
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each other and not caring much what happened
to the ball. In these sort of circumstances, one
could completely change the shape of the game
by nipping round on the blind side of the scrum
and getting away with the ball. He hoped he'd
done this.'66
But the plan was no more than an idea, and the Vienna meeting did no more
than agree to put proposals to the EEC. Practically, the Board of Trade was
opposed to the intra-European tariff reductions for four main reasons. First,
the problems of origin already mentioned. Secondly, concentrating on intra-
European trade could jeopardise progress in the Kennedy Round tariff
negotiations. The French in particular could use the British initiative to show
Britain's lack of interest in the Kennedy Round in order to block progress
themselves.' 67 Thirdly, the United States could create problems for Britain if
they thought that Britain prioritised European arrangements. This could make
it difficult for Britain to secure reductions in the Kennedy Round.' 68 Fourthly,
the Board of Trade also felt that an initiative such as this wouJid weaken
Britain's negotiating hand. Britain's tariffs on the whole were higher than
those of other EFTA countries and of the Six. This gave Britain a negotiating
advantage that would be given away by showing clear willingness to reduce to
zero in five years.'69
There were further reasons for Wilson's desire to nip out of the scrum
with the ball. The third factor in the bridge-building initiative was to mitigate
the growing problems in EFTA. EFTA's difficulties stemmed partly from the
LSE, Hethenngton Papers, 9 5, Meeting with Wilson, 5 May 1965
167 PRO CAB 134 1773, EEP(65)52, Post-Kennedy Round tariff negotiations between EFTA
and the EEC, Board of Trade, 9 June 1965
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consolidation of the EEC. As the EEC became increasingly powerful, EFTA's
limitations were exposed, and EFTA countries began to look to the EEC as an
alternative. Austria had already begun association talks and the British realised
it unlikely that Austria would be permitted dual membership of both
institutions. 170 The Scandinavian Governments, particularly Denmark, were
pressuring to strengthen EFTA in order to meet the competition to their
agricultural exports by the export subsidies provided to Community members
under the CAP. The Danes also advocated harmonisation in commercial
measures such as government aids and eliminating restrictive business
practices.'71
These proposals demonstrated EFTA's concern that Britain was no
longer looking to fulfil its undertaking in the Stockholm Treaty to seek wider
European integration. 172 In addition to the challenge of the EEC, Britain's
imposition of the import surcharge had weakened Britain's standing in EFTA
and had increased the resolve of the other EFTA countries to demand action.
Bridge-building was designed to divide and rule. In return for discussion of
bridge-building, which the Swiss, Swedes and Austrians thought could not
work, Britain agreed to look at the Danish proposals, which the British did not
want. Scandinavian suggestions would then become embroiled in internal
delay, as the Austrians did not support the agricultural proposals and the
Swedes would not benefit from tariff harmonisation.' 73 Bridge-building
169	 CABI34 1773, EEP(65)31, Steering Brief, 24 May 1965; BT241 1361, Brown to
Philips, 2 June 1965
170	 CAB 134 1773, EEP(65)26, Austnan Negotiations with the EEC, Board of Trade and
Foreign Office, 23 Apr. 1965
171 PRO PREM 13 307, Text of Norwegian, Danish and Swedish Proposals for a new mandate
for the EFTA Council, 15 May 1965
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would, as Trend put it, strengthen EFTA 'by default', showing Britain's
interest in wider European unity and staving off pressure for other reform.'74
Fourth and finally, the bridge-building initiative did provide the
opportunity to raise the prospect of eventual EEC membership at ministerial
level. Wilson did this only under pressure from officials, in particular from the
influential Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend, who urged Wilson to decide where
he stood on the central issue of European membership. 175 At a ministerial
meeting in March, ministers discussed ways of furthering technological and
economic links between the EEC and EFTA, but Brown and Stewart argued
strongly that Britain must address the question of membership. In response,
Wilson did agree that 'doubts had been raised about the advisability of
remaining outside the major developments in the EEC' and suggested that
Brown and Jay conduct studies of the implications of membership.'76
In May, at a second meeting of the ad-hoc Cabinet Committee,
comprising Wilson, the Chancellor Callaghan, the main supporters of
membership Brown and Stewart, as well as the principal opponents, Jay and
Minister of Agriculture Fred Peart, Wilson advanced his thinking about
membership. He stated that Britain would have little choice but entry into a
Community 'based on the Treaty of Rome, but developing and adapting
policies acceptable to us' 	 He made a similar statement to the full Cabinet
three days later: 'We must therefore maintain our efforts to promote closer
political and economic unity in Europe in a form in which we could play an
174 PRO PREM13 307, Trend to Wilson, 11 May 1965
175 On Trend's views and the Wilson-Trend relationship, Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London:
HarperCollrns, 1990), pp.214-217; PRO PREM13 306, Trend to Wilson, 24 Mar. 1965
176 PRO CAB 130 227, MISC48 1's, 25 Mar. 1965
177 PRO CAB13O 227, MJSC48 2, Linking EFTA and the EEC, Prime Minister, 7 May 1965;
MISC48	 10 May 1965
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integral part. It was difficult to envisage the ultimate solution to this
problem'. 178 For Stewart, Britain's commitment to eventual membership was
much stronger:
we should make it clear that provided our
essential (but unspecified) interests were
safeguarded, we should ultimately wish to join a
wider European market, together with any other
members of EFTA who wished to accompany us
and that such a policy would be complementary
to, and not incompatible with, our membership
of the Commonwealth and our relationship with
the USA.179
One un-named 'pro-European minister' (presumably George Brown) was able
to represent the policy as a step towards eventual membership of the
Communities: telling The Guardian: 'Wilson is dipping his toe in the water to
see how cold it is. If it were me I would plunge in and swim'.180
There can be no doubt then that Wilson accepted the need to raise the
prospect of eventual membership of the EEC and that he also supported the
Foreign Office's objectives of preventing the growth of political union on the
continent from which Britain was excluded. Economically, however, there is
no sign that the Prime Minister was reconciled to a transfonnation of
economic policy in order to secure these political goals. In fact, he seemed to
want to create a free trade area between EFTA and the EEC, a variation on the
notion that the EEC should join EFTA as one unit. That Wilson believed this
solution to be possible surely indicates how little the Prime Minister had
thought seriously about British membership of the EEC. It is therefore difficult
PRO CAB 128 39, CC(65)3Oth, 13 May 1965
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79
to see the bridge-building initiative as a first step on the road to Wilson's
ultimate European venture. As The Times noted, 'As long as Britain fails to
make her full intentions towards Europe clear by offering to sign the Treaty of
Rome, she will not be able to please any European countly, whether in the
Common Market or in EFTA; and she will go on drifting herself'.181
Furthermore, bridge-building had only limited success. The Vienna meeting of
EFTA Prime Ministers suggested a 'trawling operation' to seek ways in which
Wilson's plans could be executed. Initial reactions from the Six were muted.
The Germans commented that there was no sign of their proposal for an
exchange of ambassadors between EFTA and the EEC. 182 No formal reply was
ever received from the Six. Instead, the Six divided over the issue of
agricultural financing and paralysis broke out in the Community. The Six's
crisis then openly raised the question of whether Britain would join the EEC: a
development that forced Wilson to rethink his attitude towards the central
issue of membership.
'' The Times, No Nearer to Europe, Leader Comment, 25 May 1965
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2. Britain and the Empty Chair Crisis, June 1965 - March
1966
On 1 July 1965, a breach in the Community between the French and the other
five members overshadowed Britain's faltering attempt to build bridges to the
Community. Following two weeks of discussions as to the methods of
financing the CAP, the French delegation pulled out of the Community's
Council of Ministers. Appearing initially to be no more than a temporary
breakdown, the deadlock escalated into a six-month paralysis as the French
refused to participate in Conmiunity institutions. 1 The empty chair crisis was
eventually resolved on 31 January 1966 at Luxembourg, as the Six agreed to
recommence discussions on the agricultural and economic issues left
unresolved in June.2
Historical attention has so far focused on the origins of the rift,
emphasising the importance of this first major row between the French and the
Germans since the inception of the Community. Contemporary writers
interpreted the deadlock in terms of de Gaulle's deliberate challenge to the
Community's supranational provisions. In this analysis, the French intended to
provoke a split because of de Gaulle's adherence to ideals of French national
independence. The French deliberately picked on the Commission's proposal
that the proceeds of agricultural levies and industrial customs duties should
belong to the Commission. That the Commission should have its 'own
resources' - a budget that would also augment the role of the European
'Camps, European, op.cit., pp.58-80
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Parliament - was seen by the French as an unacceptable acceleration of the
centralising, bureaucratic forces in the Comnuinaty.3
An alternative view using archives of Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands challenges the notion that the French intended to instigate the
rupture. Rather, French actions were forced by the deliberate hardening of
German, Italian and Dutch positions against French leadership. French threats
to pull out of the Community from the winter of 1964-1965 and the refusal of
the French to deliver on political union angered the Germans and the Italians.
Piqued by de Gaulle's repeated failure to deliver on political union and
parallel development on commercial policy each of the three independently
resolved to call de Gaulle's bluff. 4 After the end of the Community's
transitional period in 1970, member states' cotntributions to the agricultural
fund were to be calculated based on the net agricultural imports from third
countries. The Commission's proposals, supported by the Germans and the
Italians, aimed to break the link between agricultural imports and finance,
hoping to water down the eventual introduction of a funding system based on
the quantity of imports. The Commission retained the principle of a formula
using levy proceeds and tariff revenue from goods included in the industrial
customs union, but aimed to agree a fixed contribution in advance. 5 For the
Germans and Italians, both net importers, breaking the link would enable a
reduction of their contributions to the agricultural fund. Faced with this
challenge, the French had very little option but to withdraw.6
2 N. Piers Ludlow, 'The Eclipse of the Extremes: Demythologising the Luxembourg
Compromise', Loth (ed.), Crises, op cii, pp.247-265
Camps, European, op.cit., pp.81 -91, 58-70; Lambert, 'Constitutional Cnsis', op. cit., p.207




For the British, the persistence of the crisis demanded a clarification of
their position towards the EEC. The problem was two-fold. First, the crisis
required a British rethink of their attitude towards EEC membership. 7 It was
no longer sufficient to hide behind the assertion that accession was 'not in the
realm of practical politics' as Wilson had told Erhard in January. 8 The British
had to be ready lest the opportunity for membership did arise. This possibility
exposed the divisions in the British administration as to what kind of
Community they wanted to join. The Foreign Office wanted to side with the
Five against the French and seek a supranational Community. 9 The DEA and
Harold Wilson - who in November 1964 had envisaged the creation of an
industrial free trade area in Europe if the EEC collapsed 10 - favoured an end to
supranationality. Teaming up with the French would make it easier for the
British to join by removing one of the central objections to membership.11
Camps has argued that once the political nature of the crisis was evident, the
British should have reacted to strengthen the hand of the Five against settling
on French terms.12
The second problem for the British was the relationship between the
EEC deadlock and the wider crisis in NATO. This has been a neglected aspect
of the historiography. De Gaulle's apparent repudiation of supranationality
and assertion of French national strength has been seen as expression of the
same principles as those guiding his attitude towards NATO. Camps
interpreted de Gaulle's challenge to the EEC as a response to the failure of his
Camps, European, op.cit., pp.176-185
8 PRO PREM13 306, Wilson - Erhard, 30 Jan. 1965
Camps, European, op cit., pp.178-179
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vision for a political Europe.' 3 She writes 'by 1965, independence and
freedom of action for France had become more important objectives for
General de Gaulle than a European Europe'.' 4 Recent archival research
suggests a different approach. Bozo argues that from early in 1965, de Gaulle
moved towards explicit pursuit of a 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'. A
'European Europe' shifted the international problem from one of European-
Atlantic relations, such as the MLF/ANF debate, to one of détente. 15 Here, de
Gaulle was on sounder ground. De Gaulle's argument that NATO had not
promoted a softening of East-West tensions had resonance in wider public
opinion and he could therefore hope to build support for his actions. In Bozo's
analysis, the precise role of the EEC crisis is not clear. Bozo accepts that de
Gaulle rejected supranationality' 6, but study of the process of the crisis does
not suggest that the empty chair was an essential part of de Gaulle's vision for
Europe. In fact, the EEC crisis was unwelcome for the General. It was
domestically extremely unpopular, reflected in the Presidential elections in
December. The prospect that the EEC could collapse also raised the danger of
an independent and resurgent Germany on France's border. It was telling that
ultimately de Gaulle allowed settlement of the empty chair crisis in order to
concentrate on NATO, unable to build public support for simultaneous actions
against both.'7
The resonance of the EEC crisis for the future of NATO caused
concern in the British Foreign Office. Fear that the Community could collapse
ibid., p.35, 117-188
"ibid., p.35
Bozo, Two Strategies, op.cit., pp.144-147
' 6 ibid., p.144
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led the European Economic Organisations Department to argue in favour of a
British initiative to strengthen the Five against the French. British membership
of the EEC was an integral part of this equation, but it was subordinate to the
broader strategic dilemma. In this way, Britain's response must be assessed
not only in terms of attitudes towards supranationality, but also perceptions of
détente and of the problem of Germany. Harold Wilson did agree to advance
Britain's study of EEC membership, but the settlement of the Six's crisis on
31 January 1966 removed the immediate opportunity for a move.
Britain's initial response to the crisis in July was one of 'sympathetic
inactivity'.' 8 A spat in the European Community was of far less importance to
the Prime Minister than the sterling crisis, lasting between July and August
1965 and the turmoil in Rhodesia, enduring throughout the autumn and winter
of 1965. In July, a run on sterling reopened the question of devaluation, now
favoured by George Brown. Wilson, tied to the Americans by a clear
agreement that Britain would maintain the parity of sterling in return for
continued assistance for Britain's defence role in the Far East, refused to
devalue and the government instead implemented a deflation. The core of the
deflation was a voluntary prices and incomes policy, designed as a compact
between government and unions to hold wage inflation and to keep prices
level. 19 In Rhodesia, Ian Smith's white minority government refused to accept
black majority rule and declared independence from the UK. Wilson's
18 Camps, European, op cit., p.160; PRO CABI28 39, C(65)36th, 8 July 1965
19 See Pinilott, Wilson, op.cit., pp.382-388; Pouting, Breach, op.cil.,pp.42-54; PRO
PREM 13 255, Note by John Stevens, 22 July 1965; PREM13 251, Wilson - Stewart - Bruce,
26 July 1965; PREM13 256, Trend— Bundy, 30 July 1965
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attempts to deal with Smith dominated the government's foreign policy.20 Yet
the Six's crisis was significant enough to be taken to Cabinet. Stewart declared
that Britain should stand aside and allow the Six time to settle their own
differences. Importantly, the British did not want to be seen as the saboteur of
the Community: in the atmosphere of NATO fragility it was essential not to be
blamed for endangering the Community's survival. Furthermore, continuation
of the Community was paramount to Britain's security interests. The collapse
of the Community would lead to 'troubled waters for the Russians and even
the Chinese to fish in' and would compromise Britain's trading policies by
ending the Kennedy Round. If the crisis persisted, Stewart warned that Britain
might be called upon to take some kind of initiative towards the EEC.21
It would seem that de Gaulle, seeing the Five impressively resolute in
the defence of their agricultural interests and finding public opinion opposed
to the paralysis of the Community, decided to escalate the crisis into the wider
sphere of politics and defence. 22 His press conference on 9 September attacked
the basis of supranationality and defended the supremacy of the nation state.23
From this date, indications began to appear that he intended to take the French
right out of NATO. The Times reported on 10 September that de Gaulle had
threatened to leave NATO in 1969. He demanded revision of the Treaty of
20 See Wilson, Labour, op cit., pp.131, 144 and 125-141 for an account of the problems of
July - September 1965; Philip Ziegler, The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx
(London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1993), pp.21 8-242 on Rhodesia and Wilson's foreign
?olicy
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Deadlock in Agricultural Financing in the Community and its Implications for Bntain's
policy, EEOD, 13 July 1965
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Rome as his price for continuing with the Common Market. 24 These tactics
raised the stakes, drawing the crisis out of the initial focus on agriculture and
back into the realm of political union. Consistent with his tactics throughout
1965, use of arguments in the political and defence sphere gave de Gaulle a
wider field over which to play and posed problems of the first magnitude for
the Europeans. In this way, his press conference appears as more than simply
an exposition of the 'true nature' of the crisis. 25 Barnes noted: 'by threatening
his partners, he softens up their resistance to his next threat to NATO and
vice-versa. If he continues with these tactics, I doubt if we can rely on the Five
standing up to him on both fronts'. 26 De Gaulle could, by threatening to pull
out of NATO, hope that the Five would agree to agricultural arrangements in
order to stop him from doing so: limiting the damage by giving him what he
wanted in the EEC. Alternatively, the disruption in NATO could pull apart the
Five's will to preserve the EEC intact, encouraging the channels of opinion in
each country who were attracted to de Gaulle's brand of nationalism. As
Spaak made clear to the British, genuine support for the French in Belgium
could make it difficult for Belgian politicians to stay in the Atlantic Alliance.27
France's shift in position worked. The fear of wider crisis introduced a
new note of caution into the Five's own approach. The Italians, whose support
had been essential in precipitating the crisis in the first place, began to back
down.28 Similarly, the Luxembourgers and the Belgians declared their
24 The Times, General de Gaulle Threatens to Leave NATO, 10 Sept. 1965; FR US, Western
European Region 1964-1968, vol.xiii, doc.100, Leddy to Read, 19 Aug. 1965, p.239; PRO
T312 1015, Reilly to Stewart, 23 Nov. 1965
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determination to defend the Rome Treaty, but their unity of purpose created a
new will to find a solution with the French at the Council meeting in
October. 29 Emilio Colombo, the Italian Finance Minister chairing the Council
Meeting, declared that the Five were ready to reach agreement on agricultural
financing.30
The Germans, however, remained firm in the Council meeting of the
Five in October, insisting on their minimum demands of a ceiling to German
national contributions in the agricultural fund and parallel development in the
Kennedy Round. 31 French posturing and German firmness led to direct
requests from the Five, the French and the USA, for [British participation.
Germany's strong stance upset the balance of the Community and led to
doubts both of the Germans' reliability and of their potential strength. On the
one hand, the State Department in the USA feared that the Germans would be
unable alone to resist de Gaulle's offers of political union and would be forced
to acquiesce to French terms on defence. Partly, this was because the French
appeared to offer access to nuclear weaponry and German reunification - an
essential goal for the German nation - but also French tactics worked in the
realm of public opinion. It could prove difficult for Erhard to resist French
offers if there seemed to be no alternative for German interests. 32 On the other
hand, the Five were alarmed at the implications of Germany's strong stance,
Spaak reiterating his doubts about guaranteeing Belgian Atlanticism if
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Belgium had to accept German dominance in the Community. 33 Only Britain
could strengthen the morale of the Five by showing they had a strong ally
willing to support them and to step into the breach should the Community
break up. Britain's involvement would also help public opinion, by showing
that there was a viable alternative to a French-dominated EEC. Both the State
Department and Spaak approached the British to suggest Britain show her
hand in favour of the seulement of the crisis on the Five's terms.34
De Gaulle, presumably aware of the forces operating on public opinion
and keen to limit the perception of France as the only state keeping Britain out
of the Community, responded by inviting Britain to join the EEC. De Gaulle
declared that 'Britain was evolving in the direction of Europe and if this took a
more precise form it would be considered sympathetically by France'.35
Indications that the French wanted Britain in were difficult for Wilson. He had
not yet declared his hand in favour of membership and Edward Heath, who
supported EEC membership, had just become leader of the Conservative
Party. At a public lunch in Paris on 22 November, Heath had said that
Conservative policy would facilitate Britain's entry into the EEC. The
Conservatives would accept the Treaty of Rome and would begin to make
adjustments in Britain, such as moving to a levy system for agriculture, to
facilitate this. Europe would have to play a part in the Atlantic Alliance and
this should be done on the basis of Anglo-French links. 36 De Gaulle's
suggestion that the British could come into the EEC created problems for the
33 FR US, Western European Region 1964-1968, vol.xiii, doe. 107, Spaak - Rusk, 21 Oct.
1965; doc.110, Cleveland to Rusk, 16 Nov. 1965
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government as to repudiate him directly enabled the Conservatives to take
advantage in appearing to have a more credible policy towards the EEC. To
agree with him, however, could make it seem as if the British were teaming up
with the French in the organisation of European defence. Thus, de Gaulle put
the ball back in Britain's court: if Britain wanted to intervene in the EEC's
crisis, British policy would have to be much more clearly defined.
The introduction of supranationality as the major concern in the crisis
exposed the splits in the British establishment as to what kind of Europe
Britain wanted to join. The DEA saw opportunities in the crisis. Eric Roll
wrote to the Foreign Office's Permanent Under Secretary Paul Gore-Booth in
October to argue that the French would 'win' the crisis. Britain's position
should be to wait until the problems were settled and then to offer to team up
with the French in a new Community based on the erosion of the
supranationality. It was less that the DEA hated supranationality than that Roll
saw that the end of supranationality would remove one of the major objections
amongst Britain's political elite to membership. After France had won, it
would be easier to take Britain into Europe. 37 Roll's minute bore the hallmark
of Brown's enthusiasm for Community membership and reflected the DEA's
preference of an Anglo-French economic and political condominium leading
the Community, forging links in planning and technological research. A union
against supranationality was also Harold Wilson's preference. He told
Geoffrey de Frietas, the head of Britain's delegation to the Council of Europe:
'we ought to avoid appearing to take sides in the EEC dispute. Nor should we
36	 T312 1015, Paris to FO, tel.792, 24 Nov. 1965
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say anything about supranationality, which in any case, we oppose'. 38 The
DEA could therefore expect their interpretation to find favour with the Prime
Minister.
The Foreign Office disagreed with the DEA's analysis and were
careful to bypass interdepartmental discussion when Stewart wrote to Wilson
in December to urge a more proactive policy towards the crisis. 39 The main
difference was their assessment of the risk de Gaulle and the French posed to
Britain's interests in the Kennedy Round, but more importantly in the Atlantic
Alliance. It was unlikely that France would 'win' the crisis and eradicate
supranationality. If this happened the Community would have collapsed and
so the European balance would lie in ruins. Even if France did 'win' and the
Community remained intact, the objectionable features of the Community now
favoured by the French, such as the CAP, would still exist and would still
form obstacles to the acceptance of membership by Britain's political elite. In
addition, the Foreign Office did not want to encourage de Gaulle and to
support him in his struggle against the Five. On the contrary, de Gaulle's
policies towards NATO meant that he had to be restrained and the Five
supported to prevent him from getting his own way.
As Palliser had enunciated in February 1965, Britain had to work to
limit de Gaulle's options, to prevent him from using the EEC crisis to exert
gains in his objectives in the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, British
willingness to join the Community would strengthen the hand of the Five
against the French, shoring up the alternatives to a Gaullist-led Third Force
Europe and ensuring that the Five did not acquiesce to the General. As well as
38 PRO PREM13 309, Wilson - De Frietas, 16 Sept. 1965
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aiming to curb the influence of de Gaulle, the Foreign Office wanted to ensure
that the EEC did not break up. The collapse of the Community would destroy
the impulse to stability that kept the Western European countries bound
together. In particular, French nationalism could prove contagious in
Germany. Alternatively, after de Gaulle's departure or death, in a Community
shorn of its supranational elements, the Germans would be certain to
dominate.40
In making this assessment, the Foreign Office made public its
conclusion that Britain must come down on the side of supranationality.
Partly, declaring support for the Five and so for supranationality was a
reflection of the Foreign Office's goal to work against de Gaulle's objectives.
Only if Britain appeared to offer something different from de Gaulle could the
British hope to make an impact on the will of the Five. 4' It also reflected a
shifting interpretation of Germany, a reoognition that in the DEA's version,
even an Anglo-French directorate of the European Community would
ultimately be unable to contain the strength of a reunified Germany. This
sentiment was echoed by Stewart's paper in August, advocating a softer
approach towards the Germans in order to bring Germany to support Britain's
initiative in pressing for a Non-Proliferation Treaty after the disarmament
conference in Geneva.42 At a time when it seemed possible to unlock the
tangle of the Cold War, moving towards détente with the Soviet Union and so
towards possible German reunification, Britain's participation in the EEC was
an essential counterweight to renewed German strength. In what would
4° ibid.; F0371 182400/M10836 37G, SC(65)27, Bntain's Policy Towards Developments in
the Community, 20 Sept. 1965; Ethson, 'Britain's Place', op cit.
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amount to a real reversal of Britain's policy to date, Stewart advocated that
Britain declare acceptance of the Treaty of Rome, showing that Britain was
willing to adapt to the conditions and provisions of the European
Community.43
But did Stewart see this dramatic reversal of Britain's tactics as a real
opportunity to achieve membership of the European Community? Here there
are further considerations that need to be taken into account. It seems
undeniable that some kind of development of Britain's policy was necessary to
meet the demands of the crisis. Britain's objectives had not changed since the
bridge-building policy, but the government was now forced, by the external
shifts, to run faster and faster to stand still. In order to rein in de Gaulle's
options and to sustain Britain's influence on the continent and in the USA,
who had pressured Britain to move, Britain had to show itself to support the
continuation of the supranational development favoured by the Five. If the
Five could not reach accommodation with de Gaulle, whose actions nobody
could readily predict, then Britain had to be primed with a firm response. As
Gore-Booth put it in January: 'in no case would a negative response be
appropriate'. If the Community broke up, Britain could step in and
reconfigure the Community, gaining better terms from the Five and leaving a
chair open for the French to return. The very knowledge that Britain would
support them against the French would give extra courage to the Five to
continue to resist de Gaulle. In effect, de Gaulle knew that if he demanded too
much, the Five could pressure very hard, a move supported by public opinion,
to bring Britain into the EEC. Conversely, without any checks via public
42 PRO CAB 129 122, C(65)1 19, Policy Towards Germany, Foreign Secretary, 5 Aug. 1965
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opinion, de Gaulle would be much more likely to extract a high price from his
partners. Public support could grow for the Gaullist alternative; or the Five,
because of the lack of options, could settle for peace with the French. A
British reaction was therefore highly appropriate and only Britain was in a
position to act. As Stewart commented to Wilson: 'it is a turning point: we
must do what we can to make a French victory less likely'.45
Achieving membership was extremely unlikely. In any case, the rules
of the Rome Treaty insisted on a unanimous decision to admit a new member,
so unless France really had left the Community, it would not be possible to
join.46 As to whether or not the British wanted to go so far as to push France
out, the Foreign Office were divided. Con O'Neill, now head of the European
Economic Organisations Department, welcomed the opportunity to precipitate
France's departure. He commented:
for my part if I were able to push France out of
the Community it is a responsibility I would
willingly accept. If by making a European
declaration of intent we stiffen the Five and help
them to resist French terms to the point where
France might fail to get her way and so
encourage the Five to turn to us, we could hardly
be said to have been responsible for pushing her
out. If as is unlikely, France fmds herself a year
hence outside the Community it will surely be
not we or the Five who have driven her out, but
her own policy.47
O'Neill's judgement reflected the organisation of a department whose primary
aim was to get Britain into the Community to the exclusion of other goals; and
whose motivation was to stymie the actions of de Gaulle who had so brutally
PRO T3 12 1016, Possible Approach from the Five, Gore-Booth, 25 Jan. 1966
PRO PREM13 904, Stewart to Wilson, 10 Dec. 1965
PRO T3 12 1016, Possible Approach from the Five, Gore-Booth, 25 Jan. 1966
F0371 182378/M10810 102, O'Neill to Barnes, 14 Oct. 1965
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excluded Britain. Theoretically, his thinking made sense. British support could
encourage the Five to resist the French to the extent that de Gaulle,
exasperated, would pull out of the Community and Britain would come in.
Practically, O'Neill himself recognised that this was unlikely to happen.48
None of the Six seriously wanted to jeopardise the economic arrangements of
the Community.49 In the last resort, de Gaulle would not leave the EEC.
O'Neill was motivated partly by Miriam Camps, who had suggested the policy
in the first place. 5° He also wanted to take the opportunity to press for an
advance of Britain's membership policy. On the other hand, the Head of the
Western Department, John Barnes, was much more cautious in his approach.
Barnes was wary of using the crisis to further Britain's objectives towards
membership in case this should serve to jeopardise Britain's policy in NATO.
Tactically, Britain's policy towards de Gaulle's obstructionism in NATO was
to continue as if nothing was happening in order to minimise the impact of de
Gaulle's policies. 5 ' Again, this policy operated in the domain of public
opinion. Antagonising de Gaulle would provide him with the justification he
needed to take France out of NATO, enabling him to tell his people that
France was not leaving, but had been pushed out. Barnes argued:
I wonder if it would be a good thing for us to be
responsible for pushing France out of the
Community, even if we were thereby helped to
enter it. Not only would this be inconsistent with
our declared support for the Community and
desire not to make capital out of its troubles, it
would also be inconsistent with our policy
towards NATO where we are trying to avoid
ibid.
F0371 1824001M10836 37G, SC(65)27, Bntish Policy towards Developments in the
EEC, Foreign Office Steering Committee, 20 Sept. 1965
50 PRO T31211015, Camps to O'Neill, 10 Oct. 1965
Ellison, 'Dealing', Daddow (ed.), Wilson, op.cit.
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precipitating a crisis with France and even more
to avoid driving France out of NATO.52
The EEC crisis was therefore seen as an opportunity for the British to further
policy towards eventual membership of the EEC. It was indeed essential to
make some kind of gesture: standing still would relegate Britain to the
sidelines while the Six decided their future in tenns likely to be detrimental to
Britain's interests. While O'Neill saw the opportunity to act, Barnes queried
the wisdom of pushing too hard for fear of sparking off a deeper crisis in the
Alliance that Britain and the USA were desperate to avoid. Nevertheless,
Britain's policy continued to shift slowly towards a membership strategy.
The problem for the Foreign Office was that in order to develop a
convincing policy of influencing the Five, they wanted to make a declaration
of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome. Such a statement represented a much
greater commitment to membership than the government were currently
willing to acknowledge. 53 Membership therefore had to play a central part in
thinking about the British response to the crisis and in any case, bringing the
government to a more forthcoming membership policy was a desirable goal in
itself. It was therefore tempting to play up the centrality of the role Britain
could play in order to convince the Prime Minister to take any action. The
Planning Staff, led at this point by John Thomson, supported O'Neill's
suggestions. 54 Burke Trend and Philip Rogers in the Cabinet Office also
considered that Britain should do something to show her hand in favour of the
Five. Given the fact that ministers had not even begun to consider the
economic implications of membership, it would not be possible to make the
52 PRO F0371 1823781M10810 102, Barnes to O'Neill, 14 Oct. 1965
" PRO CAB 164 10, Rogers to Trend, 5 Jan. 1966
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declaration that O'Neill and Stewart suggested. Instead, Rogers proposed that
Britain let it be known on the continent that studies had begun on the subject
of membership. 55 These considerations prompted Michael Stewart to decide to
take the Foreign Office's policy suggestions straight to the Prime Minister in
December.
Wilson's response showed his reservations, not with the principle of
the policy, but with the methods of going about it. He commented:
there is a lot here I find hard to swallow. Why
should we find the acceptance of French
conditions 'dangerous' since they reject
supranationality, play down the Commission and
oppose majority voting? These ought to help us
and also minimise the dangers of an exclusively
European foreign policy and ultimately
European deterrent. On agriculture and the
Commonwealth there seems to be no analysis to
the cost to our balance of payments. All the
figures I have seen would seem to be ruinous to
our already vulnerable balance of payments. It is
still a recipe for high prices therefore high wages
and high industrial costs. On planning I am sure
that had we been in the EEC last year we would
have had to accept full deflation - as Italy were
forced by the EEC to do.56
Wilson's linking of supranationality and the idea of an 'exclusively European
foreign policy' go some way to explaining the way in which the government
viewed its defence policy towards the Europe and thus its attitude to EEC
membership. As the above quote shows, the Prime Minister conceived of
Britain's participation in a supranational Community as a step away from
Britain's Atlantic relations. Membership of a supranational Europe would
encourage development in a federal direction and at the same time would
PRO F0371 1823781M10810 102, Thomson memorandum, 13 Oct. 1965
PRO CAB 164 10, Rogers to Trend, 5 Jan. 1966
PRO PREM13 904, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 10 Dec. 1965
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eschew Britain's traditional conception of a Europe organised around Anglo-
French leadership. This would weaken Britain's links with the USA.
Yet, officials no longer saw it like this, interpreting Britain's
participation in the European Community as an essential pre-requisite of
continued UK influence in the USA and as a means of keeping Europe
'outward looking' in defence. These ideas were linked to a conception of
Germany and also to Britain's policy towards détente. Oliver Wright, Wilson's
Private Secretary, commented that 'it seems to me utterly lunatic to base a
European policy on sucking up to the Germans and doing down the French'.57
'Sucking up to the Germans' would annoy the Soviet Union and so would
jeopardise Britain's traditional attempts at securing détente, in turn relegating
Britain's power position further. The Minister of Housing Richard Crossman
equated France's interests with Britain's as de Gaulle was working towards
détente and in the short-term wanted to keep Germany divided and away from
nuclear hardware. As well as concerns for détente, Crossman's objection to
'sucking up to the Germans' was also more visceral. Giving the Germans what
they wanted had never worked: 'two souls live in every German breast. . . every
time in the past when we have been felt by the Germans to be appeasing their
worst instincts out of a desire to get their help, they have responded not with
gratitude but with contempt. This was the lesson of Munich'.58
The views of Wright and Crossman explain the extent to which
Foreign Office thinking had shifted. For Crossman, Britain's influence could
be exercised from the outside, by pursuing détente with the USSR and stability
in Europe through links with France. It seems likely that Wilson shared this
PREM13 905, Wnght to Wilson, 1 Feb. 1966
PRO T312 1016, Crossman to Wilson, 1 Feb. 1966
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view, seeing Britain's influence as deriving from her position outside the
Community and understanding that this position helped to keep the 'twin
pillars' of the Atlantic world together. The Foreign Office, however, thought
that Britain had to be inside the EEC in order to exercise this influence and in
order to keep Europe facing towards the Atlantic. Barnes developed this
thought later in the year:
European co-operative defence arrangements are
perfectly compatible with Atlantic co-operation
in defence. We do not however have to choose
between Europe and America. The interests of
the two in the fundamental questions of defence
are too close for that. But our existing influence
with USA can be complemented and increased
by exercising influence in Europe, so that we
share in the general European influence on the
US. We must be careful not to try to represent
ourselves as acting as a link between the rest of
Europe and North America, as this would irritate
the French and the other Europeans.59
As well as differences in conception of Britain's political and defence
relations, Wilson also expressed reservations because of Britain's economic
interests. His handling of the dangers to the Commonwealth indicated that his
attitude had shifted from his earlier visions of 'a death-blow to
Commonwealth trade'. 6° Rather than the cost to the Commonwealth, Wilson
expressed the problem as the balance of payments impact to Britain of higher
priced food imports. The Rhodesian problem had perhaps taken its toll on
Wilson's adhesion to the political centrality of the Commonwealth, but his
attitude also reflects a step away from his economic intentions to privilege
Commonwealth trade. Following repeated evidence that the Commonwealth
were not interested and that prioritising the Commonwealth ran counter to
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Britain's efforts in GATT, Wilson does seem to have accepted that an
economic regeneration of the Commonwealth would not be possible.6'
Criticising the balance of payments also reflected Wilson's recognition of the
additional burden of seeking membership while Britain was economically
weak. The kind of interim economic controls favoured by Wilson to mitigate
the balance of payments by restricting capital flows and imports would be
impossible under the Treaty of Rome. 62 As the EEC also ruled out currency
devaluation, Britain would effectively be left with liftle option but deflation to
mitigate sterling weakness. These short-term economic problems would create
unwelcome links between a membership initiative and the fate of the parity of
the pound.
Furthermore, Wilson objected to making a declaration of intent to
accept the Treaty of Rome. No action was taken in December. The Prime
Minister's economic objections led to realisation in the Foreign Office that
their optimum policy was impossible. Any move towards membership would
have at the very least to involve a thorough review of the economic aspects of
policy. 63 But as the Six advanced towards reconciliation at Council Meetings
late in January, the realisation that the opportunity could slip led Stewart to
meet Wilson on 19 January and to attempt to convince him to act. Wilson
agreed, but insisted that a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome
was impossible because of the 'political repercussions that would ensue'.
F0371 190514/W6 10, Barnes comment, 16 Dec. 1966
60	 PREM1 3 306, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 3 Mar. 1965
61 CAB 134 1746, ED(ER)(65)32, Meeting Commonwealth Trade Officials, President of the
Board of Trade, 29 Nov. 1965
62	 T312 1015, Caimcross to Atkinson, 19 Oct. 1965
63 PRO F0371 188327, Laskey to O'Neill and O'Neill comments, 5 Jan. 1966; PRO
CAB 164 10, Rogers to Trend, 5 Jan. 1966
"PRO PREMI3 905, Stewart to Wilson, PMJ66 3, 21 Jan. 1966, reporting meeting of Wilson
on 19 Jan. 1966
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Fundamentally, a declaration of intent would suggest Britain's readiness to
adopt all of the economic provisions of the EEC, including the CAP. Here
were the grounds for contention to which Wilson's ministers would be certain
to object: not the principle of Britain's involvement with the EEC, but the
terms under which this would occur. It would be impossible for Wilson to
declare acceptance of the terms before discussing this issue with ministers.
Instead, Wilson suggested a tour by a 'prominent person', without specif'ing
who, of the countries of the Six to show Britain's continued interest in the
prospect of membership and to take soundings on the kind of conditions
Britain would be able to negotiate.65
He also suggested that officials began studies of the economic
implications of membership. Under Eric Roll, a group of interested officials
had already agreed to begin studies of possible membership. This appeared to
be an independent official initiative, as they promised to keep the studies
entirely secret from ministers: 'officials would neither report to ministers that
they were working on questions connected with our future relations with
Europe, nor inform them how that work was progressing'. For the Foreign
Office, Wilson's decision was just enough. Stewart was dubious about the
benefits of a tour by a prominent person, as unless the person had 'something
new' to say, there would be no point touring Europe to reiterate Britain's
objections to membership.67 But, it would be possible to let it be known in the
European Community that the Prime Minister had endorsed studies of
65 ibid.
PRO F0371 188328fM10810 37, Meeting in Roll's Room, 26 Jan. 1966;
F0371 188328/MiOSlO 39, Wilson to Stewart, 2 Feb. 1966; Young, Blessed, op.cit., p.186
67	 PREM13 905, Stewart to Wilson, 26 Jan. 1966
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membership. 68 This could be enough to encourage the Five in their resistance
to the French, as well as to ensure Britain was not forgotten in the EEC.
Wilson's decision in January 1966 to endorse secret studies of
membership can be seen as a turning point in his policy. It is the first cast-iron
indication that he intended to take on the economic implications of
membership and so to advance towards a membership strategy. This was in
contrast to his policy in May 1965, when although he had shown himself
sympathetic to the Foreign Office's political goals, he had not been willing to
address the economic aspects of a membership policy. Indeed, he may have
felt that 'bridge-building' could prove an adequate substitute, asserting
Britain's political influence and bringing, alongside the Kennedy Round,
further tariff reductions. The empty chair crisis shattered these aspirations and
as de Gaulle turned a crisis over agriculture into a major debate over the
Community's political future and the nature of Atlantic defence, so Britain
was drawn in. Britain's foreign policy objectives remained consistent: to
narrow de Gaulle's options and to provide alternatives to settling for a Europe
organised along Gaullist lines and crucially, to increase Britain's waning
influence both in Europe and in the USA. Wilson appeared to be convinced by
the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office that Britain did have a role to
play in saving Europe from itself. The timing of his response in relation to
Foreign Office pressure certainly seems compelling.
However, domestic political concerns remained extremely important to
him. He may have wanted to formulate policy in order to head off pressure
PRO CAB 164 10, Rogers to Trend, 4 Jan. 1966
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from the pro-European George Brown. 69 He certainly wanted a strategy with
which to outflank Heath. Interestingly, he continued to present the policy as
one thought of by himself. Just after the meeting with Stewart on 19 January,
he told Hetherington that 'he was thinking of stirring things up a bit'. During
another 'long bath' several days ago, he had decided to 'make an offer to the
Common Market'. His motive was to 'corner Heath': to outflank the
Conservative Prime Minister who had so openly approached the French and
declared Conservative support for the Treaty of Rome.7°
Despite this domestic political aspect, Britain's reaction to the empty
chair crisis was diplomatically sensible. It may tnot have been quite what the
EEOD wanted, but as Camps notes, the British had moved towards the Five
without [doing] 'anything mischievous'. 71 The expectation of Britain's
eventual membership had again been raised. 72 But, as the Six settled their
differences at Luxembourg on 31 January 1966, Britain's ability to influence
in the European Community diminished. Consequently, Stewart moved to stall
Wilson's wish for a tour by a 'prominent person'. The Six, he noted, were now
'mending their fences' and would regard as unwelcome any advance from the
British: 'a move now would look as if we had missed the bus and were
looking to see where it had gone'.73 With the settlement of the next stage in
the CAP and of the EEC's offers in the Kennedy Round still to decide, the Six
would be very busy with their own affairs.74
On the forthcoming election, Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., p.396; PRO PREM13 904, Brown to
Wilson, 18 Jan. 1966
° LSE, Hetherington Papers, 11 4, Meeting with Wilson, 20 Jan. 1966
71 Camps, European, op cit., p.182
72 ibid., p.185
PRO PREM13 905, Stewart to Wilson, 3 Feb. 1966
Ludlow, 'Eclipse', op.cit., pp. 252-263
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So, as Britain mobilised, expectations raised., the Six retreated to the
time-consuming business of Brussels. Furthermore, exactly how Wilson
intended to execute his membership strategy was completely undecided. While
Wilson had accepted the need to exert Britain's influence in Europe and to
prevent there the growth of a political unit from which Britain was excluded,
he had far from accepted the Foreign Office's conclusions that Britain must
plunge into a supranational Community. National sovereignty, Britain's role
vis-à-vis Germany and Britain's policy towards détente still stood as obstacles
in the Prime Minister's conception that involvement in a supranational
Community would lead to an 'exclusively European foreign policy'. His
attachment to the Commonwealth, although waning, still remained and the
balance of payments had moved to form a central economic counter-argument
to a membership bid. Thus, although January 1966 was a turning point, it was
not a straight path from here to October 1966, when the European initiative
began.
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3. The Politics of Decision, March - October 1966
As the March 1966 election approached, Wilson publicly shifted forward
Labour's position towards the European Community. In a distinct advance
from the 1964 election manifesto, he stated that Britain would be ready to
enter Europe 'if safeguards for our interests can be negotiated' . For electoral
reasons, he continued to use the 'conditions' of membership as a means of
demonstrating Labour's superiority over the Conservatives in dealing with
Britain's national interest. Wilson did not in fact reiterate the 'conditions'
Labour would seek, but argued that 'Tory terms' would lead to an
unacceptable increase in the import bill and disruption of Commonwealth
trade, adding that Britain would never accept supranational control over
foreign and defence policies. 2 In addition, he was able to play on recent
French suggestions that Britain might be able to join the Community to make
the pro-European leader Edward Heath look weak, while dismissing France's
claims, a goal consistent with foreign strategy.3
Behind the scenes, Wilson shifted the personnel around him to
facilitate any potential initiative towards the Community. The most significant
move was that of the Planning Staff's Michael Palliser to replace Wright as
the Prime Minister's Private Secretary. Not only was Palliser a firm supporter
of Britain's membership of the Community, he was also married to the
'Young, Britain, op.cit., pp.90-91; Camps, European, op.cit., pp.! 85-191; Young, Blessed,
op.cit., p.186; Wilson, Labour, op.cit., p.218; Castle, Diaries, op.cit., p.6!
2	 PREM 13 905, text of speech delivered to Central Hall, Bristol, 18 Mar. 1966
See Young, Britain, op.cit., p.90; Young, Blessed, op.cit., p.1 86; on France's offer, PRO
PREM13 905, Reilly to FO, tel.152, 21 Feb.1966; PRO F0371 188331 M10810 106, FO to
Missions, Guidance tel. 101, 17 Mar. 1966; on making Heath look like a Gaullist, PRO
PREM 13 1043, Wilson to Stewart, 15 Mar. 1966; on Foreign Office attitude towards the
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daughter of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul Henri Spaak. As Palliser
remembered: '[I told Wilson that] "I am a tremendous believer of entry into
Europe and I would not want you to take me on under a
misapprehension".. .He laughed and said, "you'll see, we won't have any
problems on that front". And of course, nor we did'.4 At ministerial level,
George Thomson was moved to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
working inside the Foreign Office but outside the Cabinet, with special remit
for European affairs. 5 However, in the face of de Gaulle's veto, exactly how
Britain could get into the Common Market was still unclear.
Thus, from March to early July, the government explored different
approaches to EEC membership. In July, the collapse of the government's
economic policy radically changed the government's outlook. Pressures
resulting from the economic and domestic political crisis finally forced the
decision towards which Harold Wilson had been ambivalently edging. July
1966 was a turning point: policies after the crisis were of a different nature and
the sense of failure pervaded Cabinet's acquiescence to Wilson's shift. At
Chequers in October, Wilson announced his intention to embark on a tour of
the countries of the Six to determine whether the conditions existed for
membership. The Cabinet's lack of options following the failure of the Plan
meant that the decision was not a decisive and deliberate attempt to break with
the past.
French offer, F0371 1883301M10810 79, Possible Approach by France, Con O'Neill,
undated, March 1966
Sir Michael Palliser, Interview with author, 24 Aug. 1999
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How To Get Into the Common Market
Hope of making an early move towards the EEC was stifled in the spring of
1966. Eric Roll's report, begun in the January secret studies, ruled out a
membership initiative in the short-term. This was not through lack of support
for the principle of EEC membership. On the contrary, the report, organised
through the DEA but involving all the key departments, believed that the UK
had no choice but to accept EEC membership in the long-term. Membership
was the only way of sustaining Britain's position as a key actor on the
international stage:
the reasons for joining the Community can
equally well be expressed as the disadvantages
of exclusion from. . . a larger aggregation of
economic, political and military power and
potential than the UK possesses. . .There would
be a level at which the British economy would
be viable, provided that our external
commitments and internal consumption were
related to our economic capacity. But the
adoption of such a course by a country which,
unlike Sweden or Switzerland, has not opted for
a role of international neutrality would clearly
relegate the UK to a position of secondary
influence in world affairs... [this] would
constitute a radical change in thinking of and
circumstances to which the British people have
become accustomed and to be a break with the
role that the country has tried to perform
hitherto.6
Whitehall's unwillingness to endorse a short-term move resulted
principally from the Treasury. The Chancellor's adviser Robert Neild, the
Head of Overseas Finance (Western European) John Owen and Ambassador to
6	 EW24 53, Future Relations with Europe, Roll Report, 30 Mar. 1966; this was
forwarded to ministers m May as PRO CAB134 2705, E(66)2, Future Relations with Europe,
5 May 1966, along with the covering note
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EFTA Frank Figgures all recommended that Britain do nothing until at least
the end of 1967, and possibly for up to five years. 7 Their concern was the cost
to the balance of payments of membership. The problem was that the Six,
better apprised of Britain's financial difficulties because of the frequent calls
for assistance to support sterling, could insist on a sterling devaluation before
Britain was permitted to enter. The £900m of debt accumulated since 1964
added to the problem, as the government would have to be able to demonstrate
exactly how it intended to generate enough growth to pay back its arrears.8
Sterling's position as a reserve currency could also force Britain to
choose between a world and a European role. Once inside the Community,
Britain would be unable to use devaluation as a tool of policy to correct any
payments deficit. The alternative of import restrictions would mean, because
of Britain's commitment to trade with the Community countries, imposition of
controls against the Commonwealth and EFTA. Choosing Europe would force
Britain to break with long-standing trading policies. Furthermore, Britain
could have to turn to Europe for assistance to prop up the pound and the
Europeans would be likely to insist on more objectionable conditions than did
the USA.9 Britain's economic position also gave strong arguments to the
French for keeping Britain out in the short term as they could show that
Britain's economy was too weak to cope with the economic rigours of
membership. Thus, the negotiations could hinge on Britain's economic
potency and so it would be prudent to wait until the economy was stronger.1°
PRO T312 1018, Owen to Ftggures, 30 Mar. 1966; Neild comments, 4 Apr. 1966; PRO
EW24 53, Figgures to O'Neill, 17 Mar. 1966
8 PRO EW24 53, Figgures to O'Neill, 17 Mar. 1966
ibid.; PRO EW24 53, Roll Report, 30 Mar. 1966
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Although the Foreign Office wanted to push for acceptance of EEC
membership in principle, tactically they agreed that the government should not
attempt a second European initiative at least until the end of 1967. There were
two main reasons for delay. First, after the empty chair crisis, the Community
wanted time to resolve its internal difficulties. The Six had to settle the next
stage of the CAP, over which the empty chair crisis had broken. A
membership bid from Britain would inhibit the Six's progress. The Six were
all anxious to conclude agreement on the divisive issue of agricultural
financing in order that the Community's transitional period could be
completed." The Italians in particular, who sought to add 'southern' European
agricultural produce to the CAP, thought de Gaufle could use a British
membership bid as an excuse for delay. 12 The British did not want to
jeopardise the Community's progress; nor did they want to issue a bid that
would only be ill-received. Secondly, the Foreign Office did not want a
membership bid to divert attention and time away from the more serious crisis
in NATO. 13 On 9 March, de Gaulle told Johnson of his intention to extricate
France from the Allied Command Structure of NATO and to expel American
troops from French soil. 14 Although de Gaulle's actioms strengthened the case
for Britain's ultimate accession to the Community, the Foreign Office were
wary that an initiative could involve Britain in dangerous bargaining with the
General, providing de Gaulle ample opportunity for extracting concessions
from the UK or from the Five.
PRO T312 1018, cover note, 24 Mar. 1966; see also PRO F0371 188334/M10810 154, UK
Membership of the EEC, Roberts to FO, 29 Apr. 1966
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Michael Stewart made clear that France's policy towards NATO
enhanced the imperative that Britain must eventually join Europe. He told the
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee that France's withdrawal 'creates a
gap which other countries and public opinion in France would like to see filled
by stronger UK influence in Europe'. 15 The problem was the increase in
German influence in the European sphere of NATO following the withdrawal
of the French: 'if France is taken out of the pooi the German fish looms
proportionately larger'.' 6 French nationalism could prove contagious in
Germany, leading to the collapse of the Western security system. In any
Franco-German partnership shorn of its impulse to greater European
integration, Germany would eventually come to dominate. 17 The risk to the
security system was less the diplomatic actions of de Gaulle or the response of
the Germans: as there was little serious doubt that Erhard would rationally
choose to follow the French out of the Alliance. 18 Britain had to guard against
the increase in German influence and to ensure also that the USA did not come
to attach greater weight to Germany's demands and insist on a solution to the
German question that allowed German access to nuclear hardware. As Nichols
pointed out 'if we play our cards properly, there is no reason why the
Americans should go too far in leaning towards Germany at our expense. We
must permanently guard against lapses, like the MLF'.19
In addition, de Gaulle's withdrawal had serious implications for
sustaining the legitimacy of the Atlantic Alliance as the best means of working
PRO CAB 148 25, OPD(66)18th, 5 Apr. 1966
16 PRO F0371 190534/W6 3, Barnes comment on Thomson to Barnes, 18 Apr. 1966; Ellison
'Dealmg', op.cit.
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Foreign Policy, Foreign Office, 25 Mar. 1966
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towards East-West détente. By offering the first new vision of détente
following the relaxation of tension after the Cuban missile crisis, de Gaulle
could encourage questioning in public and political opinion as to the purpose
of the Atlantic world. 2° His alternative was rapprochement between France
and Russia, apparently allowing German reunification through a 'Europe from
the Atlantic to the Urals' 21 French actions could encourage latent doubts as to
the purpose of the American security guarantee, which could in turn limit the
options of Europe's politicians. 22 In particular, opinion in Belgium thought
that the General genuinely could offer a path towards détente, with Spaak
telling Palliser that the Belgians did not want to be left alone with the Germans
in Europe.23 In this environment, American pressure for Britain to play a role
in the advancement of European unity increased. Only Britain could help to
keep alive the European impulse within the wider Atlantic system, by
encouraging the Five to believe that there was a viable alternative to de
Gaulle. Johnson urged Wilson: 'Our best hope of peace and stability lies in the
inclusion of Germany in a larger European unity, in which any latent
nationalistic drives can be submerged. I am sure that you and your country
hold the key to this possibility and that you can play a role of great leadership
in Europe'.24
At the same time, the Foreign Office feared that a British initiative
could drive a wedge in NATO and could provide de Gaulle with valuable
19 PRO F0371 190534/W6 3, Nichols comments on Thomson to Barnes, 14 Apr. 1966
20 ri Bozo, 'Détente versus Alliance: France, the Umted States and the Politics of the
Harmel Report, 1964-1968', Contemporary European History, vol.7, no.3 (1998), pp.345-8
21 ibid., p.345;
For example, PRO CABI48 25, OPD(66)15th, 9 Mar. 1966 and 16th, 17 Mar. 1966
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ammunition in the pursuit of his policies. 25 The priority for the British Foreign
Office and for the US was to ensure the continued functioning of NATO.
Thus, President Johnson rejected calls from the State Department for the
pursuit of directly anti-Gaullist policies. 26 Rather, the US response should be
'calm and bland'; aiming to show de Gaulle that NATO could cany on
without the French and attempting also to bring home to French public and
political opinion the implications of de Gaulle's policies. 27 By sustaining the
legitimacy of the Atlantic security system and showing that de Gaulle was the
main obstruction to European peace, the British and Americans could hope to
undermine support for de Gaulle within France and so hasten his departure
from office.28
Britain's ultimate accession to the EEC was a crucial part of this
strategy. But an immediate initiative could give de Gaulle grounds to argue
that Britain and America wanted to push France out of NATO and the EEC, so
providing justification for his policies. As Stewart put it:
in general, we must make it clear that we are not
drumming France out of NATO. If France
breaks with NATO, it is her own choice and not
ours. The damage to French interests is being
done by General de Gaulle. We must be careful
not to use threats which could rally French
opinion behind the General... Our line should be
sorrow rather than anger, confidence rather than
panic.29
That the French did employ these arguments is clear in Gerard Bossuat, 'Dc Gaulle Ct la
seconde candidature britannique aux Communautés Européennes, 1966-1969', Loth (ed.),
Crises, op.cit., pp.5 16-517
Elhson, 'Dealing', op.cit., see also FRUS, Western European Region 1964-1968, vol. xiii,
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It was also possible that de Gaulle could link NATO and the EEC in order to
attempt to extract political concessions from the British. 30 This was a
particular risk as Brown and Wilson had both shown signs of wanting to
negotiate with de Gaulle, Wilson later suggesting a summit meeting between
himself and the General to discuss Europe tmder the guise of discussing
NATO. 3 ' The Foreign Office warned:
It is not inconceivable that General de Gaulle
might be disposed to show greater understanding
for our need for special safeguards, in joining
the EEC, if he thought that we could be
persuaded to acquiesce in his policies towards
NATO; but we could not have it both ways: if
we were to fall in with him on this issue we
could expect a correspondingly cool reaction
from the Five and there would in any case be no
certainty that France would stipport us in the
end. General de Gaulle may link in his mind our
attitude towards NATO with his attitude to our
membership of the EEC. But for us to take sides
with him against the Five abottt the economic
and political future of Europe would certainly be
to put at risk not only our relations with the USA
and our other NATO allies, but also our longer
term relationship with Europe as a whole.32
The short-term need for caution, added to the problem of de Gaulle's
veto, led to considerable difficulty in determiRing how Britain was going to
get into the Common Market. Brown and Thomson recommended a holding
operation. Thomson was despatched on a fact-finding mission to the countries
of the Six to ascertain the terms Britain would be likely to be able to negotiate
CAB148 25, OPD(66)15th, 9 Mar. 1966 and 16th, 17 Mar. 1966; PRO CAB148 69,
OPD(66)9, The International Consequences of General de Gaulle's Foreign Policy, Foreign
Office, 25 Mar. 1966
PRO BT241 1323, Stewart to Wilson, 4 May 1966
32 PRO CAB 148 69, OPD(66)9, The International Consequences of General de Gaulle's
Foreign Policy, Foreign Office, 25 Mar. 1966
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in any membership settlement. 33 For Thomson the mission was a clear first
step in Labour's attempt to get into the EEC: 'it was definitely a very strong
signal that the lessons of our first eighteen months in office were such that
instead of believing that we could coast along with EFTA, that we wanted to
reopen the whole business of Britain becoming a full member... that was the
remit that I had'. 34 The aim of the mission was to demonstrate interest in
Britain's ultimate accession, illustrated also by Brown's speech in Stockholm
in May, when he stated that the 'political will' for membership existed in
Britain. 35 Wilson and Brown also discussed the possibility of making a
declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome. Brown wanted to do so in
order to forge ahead with an initiative, but Wilson warned of the political
difficulties of such a strategy. Announcing in advance that Britain accepted
everything would, Wilson felt, prove intolerable to ministers who still
expected Britain's policy to be based on the protection of Britain's 'essential
interests'. 36 Ministers at the Europe Committee did reject Brown and
Thomson's recommendation for a declaration. 37 There was also the prospect
of weakening Britain's bargaining power prior to any negotiation. While it
was still uncertain whether Britain would make an initiative, there was no
point in declaring surrender to the Six: 'how could it pay us to nail this flag to
the mast before knowing in practice whether the ship will ever be put out to
sea?'38
PRO CAB 134 2705, E(66)3, Relations with Europe: The Next Step, First Secretary and
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Discussion of the conditions of membership was also difficult and was
made more so by the consolidation of the CAP between the Six on 12 May.
The settlement meant that Britain would be unlikely to be able to negotiate
substantial changes to the agricultural conditions of accession and Erhard
made quite clear to Wilson the impossibility of reopening disputes already
settled. 39 Agricultural financing, the issue over which the empty chair crisis
had broken, was too difficult to unpick for the sake of the British. The May
negotiations had provisionally agreed the system of agricultural financing
favoured by the French. Payments into the agricultural fund would be
calculated based on the quantity of agricultural imports from third countries
and would therefore punish the Germans and Italians who imported much
more from outside the EEC than did the French, Dutch or Belgians. The
Italians had acquiesced because they finally secured the inclusion of
agricultural produce important to their producers, namely oranges, rice and
olive oil, into the EEC common market. The Germans had attained agreement
that the Six would submit an agricultural offer to the Kennedy Round trade
talks. In addition, the Six had bargained hard to negotiate a fixed-key system
for part of the payments into the agricultural fund. The quantities agreed were
slightly more favourable to the importers than those originally envisaged
under the Treaty of Rome.4°
For Britain, the arrangements would create additional difficulties in
accepting the CAP, as the burden of levy payments falling on Britain, who
imported heavily from third countries, would be extremely high.4 ' This could
be expected to strengthen domestic opposition to Britain's accession,
PRO PREM13 933, Plenary session, 4pm, 23 May 1966
4°PRO F0371 1883791M10840 53, Marjoribanks despatch 9, 17 May 1966
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particularly to a declaration of support for the Treaty in advance. Brown
recommended that ministers were debarred from discussing the 'conditions' of
membership.42 If positions hardened too early against the terms Britain would
be likely to get, this would create problems for Britain's current position. Any
firm announcement that Britain would not be able to accept the terms would
jeopardise the Foreign Office's attempts to show interest in eventual
membership and so would undermine current attempts to enhance Britain's
position on the continent.
The government was also unsure as to whether or not to adopt the
Foreign Office's tactics of trying to find a way into Europe through the
support of the Five, or whether it could be possible to negotiate a deal with the
French. Clearly, the advantage of the Foreign Office's tactic was that the Five
did support Britain's membership for political reasons and this support was
strengthened following France's actions against NATO. 43 When Erhard visited
London in May, he and Wilson found a commonality of interests in meeting
the Gaullist threat to the legitimacy of the Atlantic path to détente and German
reunification. Erhard recognised that the French could never deliver German
reunification unless Germany remained under French and Russian
hegemony. Anglo-German rapprochement within an enlarged, strengthened
EEC could offer a viable image of a Europe able to take the lead in the pursuit
of détente and able to provide a framework for German reunification. Erhard
commented 'when de Gaulle developed his visionary notion of European
41 BT241 1323, Marjonbanks to O'Neill, 13 Apr. 1966; O'Neill to Roll, 12 May 1966
42	 PREMI3 933, Plenary session, 4pm, 23 May 1966; PRO FO371 1883391M10810 290,
comments by O'Neill, 17 June 1966
' PRO F0371 190534/W6 3, Thomson to Barnes, 13 Apr. 1966
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unity, Erhard always replied it was best to begin by bringing the EEC and
EFTA closer together'.45
Wilson responded that Britain was moving towards the EEC and
intended to probe the possibilities of membership. 46 A precursor to the
'watershed' in Anglo-German relations noted between Labour and the German
SPD after November 1966, de Gaulle's actions enabled a degree of
rapprochement over Britain's membership of the EEC, détente and
reunification. Erhard said that he would start to examine the British case for
membership with the Five and to ensure 'friendly responses' to Britain's
overtures to eventual entry. 48 Later in July, the Foreign Minister Gerhard
Schroeder suggested on German radio that there should be a 'systematic
study' of the problems involved in getting Britain into Europe, in order to
create a plan for British accession before negotiations began. 49 There was,
therefore, the will in Germany to try to help to get the British in.
The rapprochement was genuine, but was designed to meet a specific
crisis and could do little more than paper over the deeper cracks in the Anglo-
German relationship created in part by long-standing disagreement over
nuclear issues. Dispute over Germany's access to nuclear hardware meant that
the two countries could not together form the ground for a lasting détente.
From Britain's point of view, the American attitude, providing German access
to nuclear weaponry, ran the risk of creating an American-German
partnership, which, by building Germany up would in fact stifle the potential
PRO PREM13 933, Erhard— Wilson, 23 May 1966; see also PRO F0371 1905341W6 3,
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of detente. 50 In Germany, the opportunity for access to nuclear weaponry was
a powerful test case in the international community's treatment of Germany's
sovereignty and status. These tensions were evident as Stewart and Schroeder
agreed not to talk about hardware, Schroeder noting that Germany sought an
integrated collective weapons system over and above a consultation solution.
Stewart responded that Britain could not agree any solution that made détente
less likely, as the Russians opposed any form of German access to nuclear
weapons.5'
The tensions in the British-German nuclear relationship came further
to light in alternative membership strategies. Brown proposed to create a
European defence force, based on partnership with the Germans and
Americans. The force could prove so popular to European opinion, that de
Gaulle could be compelled to give way on British entry. Wilson dismissed this
plan.52 Not only would it require Britain to allow German access to nuclear
hardware, Wilson also felt that Johnson would not 'lift a finger' to support
such a British-inspired bid. Despite the increased opportunities for Britain's
influence created by the French actions, Britain could not afford to overplay
her hand, acting without explicit US approval. In a telling aside on the state of
Anglo-American relations, following Wilson's indications to Johnson that he
would have to disassociate from American policies if the US bombed Hanoi
and Haiphong, Wilson stressed that Johnson's only interest was Vietnam.53
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Furthermore, the root of the problem in getting into the Community via
the Five was that it would probably not work. There was no real prospect that
the Germans would stand up to the French and force a breach in Franco-
German relations for the sake of getting Britain into the Community. 54 The
economic interest vested in the Community was much too high for Germany
to break the Community up. Nor would Britain seek a second Community
crisis, with all the risks for European security and economic prosperity already
emphasised during the empty chair crisis. Siding with the Five was a tactic for
the long-term, building support for British entry that would ultimately
overwhelm Gaullist opposition. If Britain wanted to get in now, as First
Secretary George Brown realised, the only way was to hope to 'outflank' the
French President, General de Gaulle.55
Not only was a deal with the French the only sure-fire way into the
Community in the short term, but in many ways Wilson and Brown saw
themselves as natural partners of the French in Europe. Following suggestions
from Hervé Alphand, Secretary-General at the Quai, Wilson wanted a bilateral
summit meeting between himself and the General to talk over Britain's wish to
get into the Common Market. 56 Part of the attraction of a head-to-head was
Wilson's diplomatic vanity and his sense that he could negotiate success
where others had failed, although Stewart vetoed the suggested meeting on the
grounds that it would be counter-productive to confuse the two issues of
NATO and the EEC.57 The Prime Minister's wish to team up with de Gaulle
was also because of their shared desire to avoid submission to a supranational
PRO PREM 13 906, Palliser to Wilson, 31 May I 966
PREMI3 906, Brown to Wilson, 23 June 1966
PRO BT241 1323, Stewart to Wilson, 4 May 1966
57ibid.
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institution. Wilson's inclination was to oppose supranationality and to draw
links with the French hostility to closer 'federal' integration.58
It was the sense that a deal with the French was the only possible way
into the Community that encouraged Brown and Wilson to see the planned
visit of the French President and Foreign Minister, Georges Pompidou and
Maurice Couve de Murville, as an opportunity to advance Britain's European
strategy. Brown and Wilson wanted the French to invite Britain to bilateral
talks on Britain's policy to the EEC. 59 The French had suggested the meeting
as the NATO crisis broke. As Bossuat has shown, French strategy was not
anti-British or anti-American, but rather saw the 'European Europe' as a
genuine alternative.60 If Britain was willing to accept the French vision and
repudiate Atlantic links, then Britain could come into the European
Community. With the ambivalence in Britain's own position towards the
French clear from personal relationships, for example between Bill Nield and
Jean Wah161 , or Thomas Balogh and the Economic Counsellor at the Quai,
Olivier Wormser,62 the French may have seen a possible opportunity for an
Anglo-French partnership.
The importance of Britain's relationship with the USA meant that
neither Brown nor Wilson would have contemplated going this far 63 , but they
still believed they could reach some kind of understanding with the French.
British strategy centred on tiying to get the French to admit they would not
impose a 'political veto' on British membership should Britain apply. Using
58 PRO PREM13 905, Trend to Wilson, 6 May 1966
PREM13 907, Brown to Wilson, 29 June 1966
60 Bossuat, 'Dc Gaulle', op cit., p.526; Bozo, Two Strategies, op.cit., pp.175-176
61 Badel, Commentary, op.cit.
62 Lord Roll, Interview with author, 5 Dec. 2001
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the euphemism of a 'Rambouillet-Nassau situation' to invoke the experience
of the 1963 veto, Wilson and Brown wanted an assurance from the French that
Britain's Atlantic ties would not lead to the French barring British accession.M
With the French sensitive to public opinion following their withdrawal from
NATO, it could have been a good time to elicit such an assurance.65
Officials' recollections of the visit of Couve and Pompidou indicate
just what a major failure the meeting was. Pompidou and Couve denied that
there would be a further 'RambouilletlNassau' misunderstanding; a pledge
that Brown took to mean there would be no second 'political veto' on British
accession. Further light is shed on Brown's attitude by Barbara Castle. In the
heat of the July sterling crisis, Brown told Castle, Crossman and Benn: 'We've
got to go somewhere. We can't manage alone. That is what Pompidou said to
us: 'Devalue as we did and you're in'.67
Others did not take Pompidou's statement that Britain would have to
devalue before membership in good faith. On the contrary, the meeting was
widely seen as a humiliating failure. Roll remembered that while the British
team had 'a voluminous folder of briefs, not one of the French had a single
sheet of paper in front of him'. 68 Caimcross commented in passing: 'There
was a general agreement that Europe was now out, since Pompidou's visit'.69
Alan Campbell in the Foreign Office's Western Department agreed that 'there
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is very little we can do with the French while de Gaulle remains in power and
while our own economic difficulties persist'. 7° Patrick Reilly recalled that the
meeting 'went very badly on both sides' and that the British offended the
French and misunderstood Pompidou's comments about the pound: 'the
subject of sterling was extremely sensitive and Pompidou when questioned
may not have chosen his words with sufficient care'.71
Reilly remembered that the French were not hostile to sterling and did
not deliberately seek to cause harm to the pound. Instead, he saw the French as
setting out to damage the dollar, but 'if sterling suffered in the process they
did not much care'. 72 Bossuat disagrees, suggesting that it was perfectly clear
the injury a few ill-chosen remarks could make. 73 Britain's approach to the
EEC thus appeared to be in something of an impasse. Getting in via the Five
could only have ambivalent success; but a deal with the French, the only
assured path into the Community, had been shown in the minds of everyone
except Brown, and possibly Wilson, to be blocked. Moreover, the question of
membership was now unequivocally linked to the problem of sterling.
Pompidou had appeared to suggest that if Britain would abandon her
traditional strong pound policy and devalue then France would open the door
to the Common Market.
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The Politics of Economic Crisis
In the spring of 1966, a strike by Britain's seamen led to a decline in exporting
power and loss of confidence in sterling in the international money markets.
Despite the optimism of the Chancellor and the Prime Minister at the start of
July, by 11 July, Brown, Callaghan and Wilson were locked into debate as to
how to manage the disastrous loss of reserves. 74 To shore up the pound, the
Bank spent the equivalent of $400m between 1 and 21 July, the same as the
previous two months together. 75 The crisis brought to the fore the political
tensions within the administration as to how to govern Britain, revealing a
deeper and in some ways insoluble debate as to the nation's direction and
future role. The three major issues were devaluation, European membership
and East of Suez.76
Wilson's decision to turn to Europe in October was rooted in the
consequences of the economic crisis. Despite the long-term pressure for
Britain to demonstrate interest in eventual European membership, pressure
upon which the government had already acted, the July crisis determined the
nature and the timing of the October decision. Interpretations of the reasons
for Wilson's turn to Europe have implicitly accepted this. The need to save the
party, save the government, outflank Edward Heath and the widespread
acknowledgement that Britain had no choice were not starkly apparent until
PREM13 853, Wilson - Callaghan - Brown, 1 July 1966; Wilson - Brown -
Callaghan, 11 July 1966; PRO EW28 17, comments by Brown, 11 July 1966
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the July crisis. 77 But the decision to advance towards the EEC did not
represent full acceptance of the collapse of Britain's options. The move was
grounded in the traditional foundations of the defence of the parity of sterling,
an attempt to recreate the aspirational framework for Labour's economic
policy that would hold together the bases of the government's power.
Interpretation of Labour's economic policy often centres on why they
failed to devalue the pound. 78 In short, deflation has been regarded as the
wrong choice in the summer of 1966 and the reasons behind the choice
overlooked. But the eventual devaluation of sterling was never inevitable and
Wilson had determined to avoid it. This determination was partly the result of
Wilson's memory of the devaluation of 1949. The Governor of the Bank of
England, Leslie O'Brien, appointed after the March election, had recently
reminded Wilson that devaluation could be seen as the 'socialist government's
recipe' for dealing with economic crisis. 79 But the decision was also much
more than this, as a minute from Trend to Wilson on the eve of the deflation
clearly shows. The government did not want to jeopardise long-standing
relations with the holders of sterling: 'most important, it would amount to
breaking faith with all sorts of people who are content to hold sterling,
particularly in the Commonwealth. Nobody would trust us again, and from
this point of view, devaluation would be a strange remedy for a situation
which, basically, is a question of confidence'. 8° Devaluation would also
" Bossuat, 'De Gaulle', op. cit., pp.514-515; Kaiser, 'British EEC Applications', op.cit.,
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require a stringent deflation and so could prove to be the worst of all worlds:
'like chopping off your head to cure a headache'.8'
If Britain devalued and deflated, Britain would lose industrial growth
at home and would throw away her influence and standing in the
Commonwealth and the United States. This concern was linked to Britain's
wider global defence interests. Cutting the value of the Commonwealth's
financial assets would lead to economic instability in the areas Britain hoped
to defend and it could lead to a seize up of international trade as two-thirds of
the world's trade was conducted in sterling. The previous Governor of the
Bank of England, Lord Cromer, had argued that the problem of sterling was
now much more closely linked to that of international liquidity and so to the
American desire to preserve the parity: 'because the viability of the sterling
system is now of more pressing importance to the stability of the entire
international monetary structure than before, devaluation would touch off
crisis in the USA dollar and payments system'. 82 Furthermore, Trend and
Wilson's desire to avoid devaluation at this time was because of the French
position towards Britain and towards the reserve currencies of sterling and the
dollar. As Trend put it, devaluation would 'provoke competitive devaluations
of other currencies, or retaliation. Those hostile to us, especially France,
would retaliate by political as well as economic means'. 83 Exposure of
Britain's economic weakness internationally would place the British in a
position of political vulnerability.
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Avoiding political weakness was particularly important in view of the
French challenge to Britain's security interests in NATO and to the integrity of
reserve currencies in international liquidity talks. Devaluation could hand the
French victory in their will to instrument a 'European' Europe and in their
attempt to replace reserve currencies with an alternative system based on gold.
Since early 1965, the French had begun to buy up gold, placing greater
pressure on both major reserve currencies. 84 The reasoning behind French
policy was that there was too much liquidity as both the US and the British
could afford to run major trade deficits which in turn placed inflationary
pressure on France's economy, while the US avoided unpleasant measures
such as raising interest rates.85 That the French purchases of gold did squeeze
the dollar and sterling was undeniable, as the US Treasury Secretary Joe
Fowler told Callaghan: 'we would be taking in gold this year if it weren't for
the French' 86
The opposing perspectives on the role of reserve currencies were being
played out in talks on the future of international liquidity in the IMF and the
Group of Ten (Gb). The British were seeking some kind of easement for their
position as holder of the sterling balances. Wilson's suggestion early in July
for a study of the 'Two Sterlings', to insulate the trading role of sterling from
the reserve role, indicates that the Prime Minister wanted to deal with the
problem of the sterling holdings before thinking about changing the parity.87
Nor was the Bank entirely opposed in principle to the possibility of a deal with
the Europeans, for example a low-interest gold loan, with which to pay off the
54 B0E 0V53 31, Hubback Reports on General de Gaulle's Press Conference, 9 Feb. 1965
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sterling balances. Cromer had argued the previous year that Britain should
move closer to the Europeans: 'it could be argued... that the Europeans might
themselves become better acquainted with the problems and responsibilities of
running an international cunency, that the liberal views of the UK would not
be without influence in Europe once we had detached ourselves from the
US'. 88 In the summer of 1966, the Governor of the German Bundesbank, Karl
Emminger, had suggested funding for the sterling balances, a suggestion the
British were keen to encourage but which the German Ministry of Finance
opposed. 89 Nevertheless, the main thrust of the British position was to sustain
balance between the world-wide system of payments favoured by the US and
the European perspective. The French wanted to insist on a veto for the EEC
within the GlO in order to reduce the influence of the IMF and were
obstructing a move to the second stage of contingency plans for an alternative
reserve unit. 9° Devaluation of sterling, as Trend indicated, would play straight
into the French hands. 91 Deflation, by contrast, would sustain control over the
timing of the demise of Britain's international position.
Wilson's assessment that this was not the time to devalue had serious
domestic ramifications as it brought him into direct conflict with the
government's second most powerftil minister. In the rivalry between Brown
and Wilson, EEC membership had a large part to play. Brown wanted to cut
free from international obligations, enter Europe and devalue in order to save
Labour's economic goals. He wrote to the Prime Minister in June:
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22 July 1966
BOE OV44 151, Cromer to Armstrong, 19 Oct. 1965
89 B0E OV53 49, Report of Callaghan talks with Erhard, July 1966; Sir Derek Mitchell,
Interview with author, 6 Dec. 2001
9° BOE 0V53 47, Report of the Gb, 8 Feb. 1966, 21 Mar. 1966; 25-26 July 1966
127
A vigorous and speeded up policy towards
Europe could provide the means by which we
might work our way out of this box.. .any such
arrangements would be veiy likely to involve a
change in parity but by agreement and as part of
much longer positive policies designed to
provide a major move forwards in our broad
economic and foreign relations.. .It would open
a route which would not only enable us to play
our part in Europe and the world and turn what
must otherwise look like a series of negative
policies into a positive strategy.92
Behind Brown's support for European membership was his belief that Britain
would be able to play a role of leadership in Europe and through this, stand up
to the might of the USA. In his memoirs, he recorded:
although we in Europe were part of the NATO
alliance, it wasn't really an alliance of fourteen
powers - it was thirteen little chaps who
couldn't say boo to a goose, the goose being, of
course, America. As a result. . .1 have always
seen the question of European integration as not
primaril' a question of extending the Common
Market.
It also reflected his perception of Wilson's 'deal' with Johnson that
Britain would accept American help in return for staying on the parity and
keeping a defence role in the Far East. He told Castle: 'he is too deeply
committed to Johnson. God knows what he has said to him. Back in 1964 he
stopped me going to Washington. He went himself. What did he pledge? I
don't know: that we wouldn't devalue and full support in the Far East? But
both of those have got to go'. 94 Behind this annoyance was surely the sense
that Brown would be able to run the country better than Wilson, a throwback
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92	
PREM13 853, Brown to Wilson, 24 June 1966
Brown, Memoirs, op cit., pp.207-208
Castle, Diaries, op.cit., p.76, 18 July 1966
128
to the personal rivalry between the two men manifested in the 1963 leadership
contest.95 Contrary to the accusations levelled at him ever since by the
Treasury, Brown did see that the option of devaluation would also require a
deflation to ensure that the benefits of devaluation in terms of competitive
power were not lost. In his initial letter to Wilson he stressed also the need to
deflate.96 His preference for devaluation was because, combined with a turn to
Europe, it could be presented as a major change in Britain's orientation and
role. This, he saw, would mean that 'negative' deflationary policies, which
would end Britain's goals under the National Man, could be explained to the
public as part of a general transformation of Britain's position in the world.
The cutbacks that the public, unions and business would have to bear would
thus have an overriding purpose in a process of readjustment to a new role.
Britain inside Europe would not, however, mean a complete transformation.
Brown's resignation letter at the end of July showed that he saw European
membership as a platform for the exercise of a global role:
It is my firm conviction that what the Cabinet
has now accepted [deflation] - af it works - can
only lead Britain back to industrial stagnation
and therefore to economic disaster. In addition,
it means that all the aims which we have so
proudly put to the Nation must be disowned.
And I do not believe it will just be a
postponement. We carmot build a new Britain,
getting rid of our inherited social evils and
create a modem, industrial society by engaging
in such a massive deflation cf our economy.
Nor, or course, could we play anything
approaching an honourable part in the biggest
struggle of all in the world today, that against
poverty and hunger over such a large part of it.
Just a year ago, in a similar situation, I gave you
my view. I can only repeat it now as I have done
in all our meetings. We should have started with
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a firm purpose: cut free from our limiting
inhibitions: and then done whatever was
necessary in that context. Put to our people in
that way it would have been defensible,
justifiable and responded to.97
The Chancellor James Callaghan, who as Pimlott has pointed out, now
swung the balance between the opposing views of Brown and Wilson, was not
in favour of devaluation. 98 Pressure from officials and from the Bank to find a
solution coupled with fear that ministers would never support a deflationary
package stringent enough to work led Callaghan to question the govermnent's
commitment to the parity on 10 and 11 JulyY9 Callaghan's doubts caused
Wilson to fear that the combined might of the Chancellor and First Secretary
could spark off pressure for devaluation that would destabilise his careful
balancing act. To stave off the risk, Wilson first promised Callaghan an
alliance against Brown, then Brown an alliance against Callaghan. The result,
on 13 July, was to defer a decision on devaluation until after Wilson got back
from Washington at the end of July. In the meantime, the government would
announce a rise in the Bank Rate and an immediate cut of £lOOm from
overseas defence expenditure, £50m from East of Suez and £50m from
Germany.'°°
Later that evening, Trend consulted Sir Paul Gore-Booth as to the
implications of a sudden cut in overseas expenditure. Gore-Booth's note of the
meeting confirms that the main motivation for the immediacy of the decision
PREM5 483, Brown to Wilson, 20 July 1966
Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., p.414
Cairncross, Diaiy, op cit, p.146, 12 July 1966; PRO CAB128 41, CC(66)35th, 12 July 1966;
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(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1975), p.568, 12 July 1966
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was political. Wilson needed to hold central government together and buy
time:
BT [Trend] told us that within the last hour a
proposal had come from 'certain ministers' that
the next day the PM should announce that he
proposed to make economies of £lOOm in the
next year on the government's expenditure
abroad. Many questions. Was it really necessary
to decide this today and announce it tomorrow?
M. Halls [Wilson's Private Secretary] politically
it was, yes, but was it financially? WA
[Armstrong] (less certainly) 'yes'. I urged that it
was no good doing this unless at least
comparable economies were announced in
internal
The Foreign Office's case against was obvious. It would be impossible
to make the reductions without complete withdrawal either from East of Suez
or from Germany, requiring a major change and destroying the balance of
foreign policy. 102 Michael Stewart seriously discussed with Gore-Booth the
possibility of his resignation:
The Foreign Secretary invited me to stay behind
and asked whether he should consider
resignation. He had tried to contact the Prime
Minister who had declined to see him the
previous night; drastic proposals had been made
gravely affecting foreign relations without his
being consulted before they came to full
Cabinet.'03
In Cabinet on 14 July, Stewart strenuously resisted the immediate
announcement of such a cut. Crossman remembered:
Everybody was critical. Roy [Jenkins - Home
Secretary] wanted in addition to this cut a
specific commitment to a wage and prices
'°' Bodleian Library, Sir Paul Gore-Booth Papers, MS Gore-Booth 92, FoLs. 101-117,
envelope 6, note by Gore-Booth, 13 July 1966
102
103 ibid., note by Gore-Booth, 14 July 1966
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freeze. Dick Marsh [Minister of Power] said that
would be fine if anybody knew what a wage and
prices freeze really meant and whether it was
practical. Barbara wanted the cut in foreign
expenditure even though it would include
overseas development, whereas Tony
Greenwood [Colonial Secretary] was fighting
against it. But the big confrontation came
between the Chancellor and the Foreign
Secretary, who obviously hadn't been consulted
until the night before. Michael Stewart said he
couldn't possible cut £lOQm without either
withdrawing totally from Germany or totally
from East of Suez. Clearly this couldn't be done
as a sudden emergency plan for helping out the
balance of payments. 1 4
Stewart's resistance meant that the announcement of the defence savings was
left until late in Wilson's speech to the Commons, but nevertheless the pledge
was still there to make a 'substantial reduction' in overseas expenditure.'°5
Wilson's management of the crisis unbalanced not only domestic economic
policy, but also the practice of Britain's foreign relations. If Wilson can be
criticised, it should not be because he wanted to defend the parity, but the way
in which he ensured that Cabinet accepted his policy preference. Essentially,
although Wilson held together the current broad lines of Britain's policy -
East of Suez and the parity - he did so only at the expense of the relations with
his principal colleagues. The destabilisation of the Cabinet team was one
major factor in his subsequent turn to the EEC.
The Cabinet accepted on 19 July a stringent deflation that put an end to
the pretence of growth under the National Plan and threatened to end Britain's
defence commitments in the Far East or in Germany. Their acquiescence was
'°4 Crossman, Diaries, vol. 1, op cit., pp.569-570, 14 July 1966; Castle, Diaries, op.cit., p.73,
14 July 1966
105 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, vol.73 1, col.1734, 14 July 1966; The
Times, 'Stem Action to Cut Spendmg: Interun Budget Coming after Bank Rate nse', p.', 15
July 1966
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secured first because they had no choice. The fact that Wilson had denied
discussion of devaluation prior to the crisis meant that there were no
accessible studies of the devaluation option. A Treasury study of devaluation
in March 1966 had, on discovery by the Prime Minister, been burnt. 106 The
crisis was dealt with over a period of three weeks, which was clearly
insufficient time to implement plans and papers for a controlled devaluation
and deflation. It was these concerns that led Trend to admonish Wilson: 'But
add something here about our intention, once we have got through our present
troubles, to bring Ministers more fully into consultation on economic and
financial policy, in order that the Cabinet shall not again be asked to deal with
a crisis at intolerably short notice'.107
The second reason for the Cabinet's acceptance was that Brown could
not command enough support for devaluation because nobody wanted Brown
to take over as leader. While Jenkins, Crosland, Benn, Crossman and Castle all
favoured devaluation, the latter three from the left of the party were natural
allies of Wilson and neither Jenkins nor Crosland would support Brown in a
leadership challenge.'° 8 The rest of the Cabinet upheld Wilson's desire to
retain the parity, agreeing with Trend's judgement that devaluation might not
work. What was needed instead s '&is a domestic deflation, to prove to
international confidence that Britain was ready to put its own house in
order.'°9 The ramifications of the sterling crisis, both in policy and political
108	 PREM13 852, Mitchell to Wilson, 29 Mar. 1966; Ziegler, Authorised Life, op.cit.,
p.253
l07 PRO PREM13 854, Trend to Wilson, 19 July 1966; Hennessy, Prime Minister, op.cit.,
:)p.3o8-3o9
08 Castle, Diaries op.cit., 18 July p.75; Crossman, Diaries, yoU, op.cit., p.574; Tony Benn,
Out of the Wilderness: Diaries, 1963-1967 (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p.1 60, 18 July
108	 CAB 128 46, CC(66)37th, 19 July 1966; Castle, Diaries, op.cit., p.76; Crossman,
Diaries, vol.1, op.cit., p576, 19 July 1966
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terms, created the conditions within which Wilson took his decision to turn to
Europe.
Wilson's Tilt to Europe: Pressures for Decision
On 22 October, in a ministerial meeting at Chequers, Wilson announced his
intention to conduct a tour of the countries of the Six to see if the conditions
existed for membership of the EEC. 11 ° This intention was debated by the
Cabinet on 1 and 3 November, and announced in the House of Commons on
10 November. 111 It was the first stage in Britain's second application for EEC
membership. Three sets of influences combined to convince Wilson to take the
decision in October. These were pressures from the USA, from George Brown
and from the collapse of confidence in the economy following the demise of
the National Plan.
First, following the crisis, Wilson prepared for a visit to Washington
during which he hoped to gain additional help for sterling in the international
liquidity talks or for Britain's defence role in the Far East. In Washington, a
current of opinion was building to convince the British to take a more
forthcoming line towards the EEC in view of France's actions in NATO and in
the Gb. In July 1966, the American Secretary of State for Economic Affairs,
Solomon and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
Stoessel, wrote to the Secretary of State for European Affairs, George Ball, to
advocate 'a Presidential push on Wilson toward UK membership of the
Common Market'. The benefits of a membership initiative were: 'in the short
CAB 134 2705, E(66)3', 22 Oct. 1966
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run, an unequivocal British willingness to join the EEC would significantly
strengthen the Five in dealing with Gaullist France and indirectly help the
Fourteen hold NATO together, whatever the French do'. Britain's interest in
the EEC would be the best way of exposing French intransigence in Europe.112
Solomon and Stoessel were ambivalent as to whether a membership
initiative would prove the best way of pursuing these goals. There were
substantial short-term disadvantages in Britain trying to get into the EEC. De
Gaulle was unlikely to let Britain in and the French arguments as to the
dangers for the EEC of having to support sterling would have a 'debilitating
effect' on the Five's political will to push for British entry. If Britain had to
devalue upon membership, there would be a corresponding adverse effect,
possibly of $500-850m per year, on the US balance of payments. With the
Kennedy Round incomplete, a premature initiative could also provide the
French the pretext for torpedoing the tariff negotiations." 3 Nevertheless, some
sort of strong indication of Britain's interest in eventual membership was
thought to be appropriate to help meet the French threat. Recent research
shows that Johnson agreed to pressurise Wilson during Wilson's visit to show
his hand in favour of eventual membership of the EEC. 114 Before the visit,
Britain's delegation in Washington reported that: 'All administration leaders
cherished the vision of a Europe with British leadership. No special course
" PRO CABI28 41, CC(66)53d, 1 Nov. 1966; 54th, Nov. 1966; Hansard, House of
Commons Debates, 5th series, vol.735, cols.1539-1549, 10 Nov. 1966
"2 FRUS Western European Region 1964-1968, vol.xiii., doc.188, Solomon and Stoessel to
Ball, 19 July 1966; Ellison, 'Dealing', op cit.
" ibid.
"4 Ellison, 'Britain's Place', op.cit.
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would be urged on the Prime Minister, but the President would like to hear
that we were quietly positioning ourselves for eventual entry'
Wilson's aim for the Washington visit was to extract concessions from
the USA, knowing that the US wanted Britain to stay on the parity, in the Far
East and to join the EEC. 'Clearly the White House is hoping that the Prime
Minister's conclusion will be that we can, in fact, stand with them both in
Europe and East of Suez. This hope is our best political card'." 6 Thus, the
government's strategy regarding the EEC was to emphasise that Britain
wanted to join, but was prohibited from doing so because of General de
Gaulle's obstruction.' 17 Membership would force Britain to adopt Gaullist
policies inside a 'fortress Europe'. To prevent this eventuality, the US would
have to provide support for the continuation of Britain's world role.' 18 This
strategy did not appear to reap dividends. Johnson offered to buy British ships
and Rolls Royce Spey jet engines to the value of $23m and $ lOOm
respectively over a period of supply." 9 Johnson's fulsome praise for Wilson,
comparing his dealing with the economy with the spirit of Churchill, together
with the President's statement that 'the dollar and the sterling should link
arms' helped to create confidence in British policies. 120 But Joe Fowler, the
Treasury Secretary, resisted any Anglo-American bilateral deal in the
international liquidity talks. A deal could appear as an Anglo-Saxon
conspiracy when the GlO had fmally agreed to take the issue to the wider
" PRO PREM13 1262, Washington to FO, tel.2173, 27 July 1966
116 ibid.
"7 PRO PREM 13 1262, Barnes to Gore-Booth, Steering Brief for Visit to Washington, 22
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forum of the IrvlF.' 2 ' Wilson's suggestion of US help in Malaysia did not bring
any further assistance. Overall, using France as the whipping boy for Britain's
ambiguous attitude did not work as a tactic in eliciting US aid.'22
The apparent failure of Britain's strategy was indicative of the general
loosening of the British-American relationship. Wilson and Johnson did not
personally get on, but the problems went deeper. Vietnam was a major cause
of the weakening ties, Johnson preoccupied with America's war and furious
that Wilson would not help. 123 Unable to breach left-wing pressure, Wilson
had also publicly disassociated Britain from the bombing of the oil
installations in Hanoi and Haiphong. 124 Britain's persistent economic
problems also diminished Britain's ability to play the kind of global role the
US wanted. Powerful members of the US administration increasingly argued
that if the UK could not rectify her economic problems, letting the pound go
and allowing Britain to cut back her overseas role would not be the
catastrophe often predicted.'25
Furthermore, Britain's attitude towards Community membership did
nothing to help to rectify the German question. The promise to cut £lOOm
from defence expenditure led to excessive pressure in Britain to make savings
from Britain's troop capacity in Germany, which acted as a significant drain
on the foreign exchange. If Britain were likely to pull troops out of Germany,
then Johnson would find it difficult to convince Congress and public opinion
121 PRO PREM13 855, Wilson - Johnson - Fowler, 29 July 1966
PRO PREM13 1083, Wilson - Johnson, 29 July 1966; Bartlett, Special Relationship,
o.cit., p.1 13
Ellis, 'Not so Special', op.cit., esp. p.193
124 On the Vietnam problem in Anglo-American relations, Wilson, Labour, op.cit., p.264;
Cairncross, Diary, op.cit., p.72, 25 July 1966; Bartlett, Special Relationship, op.czt., pp.1 14-
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to keep American troops in Europe. With France having withdrawn troops
from Germany following the NATO crisis, Americans feared that the defence
of central Europe could disintegrate.' 26 In addition, Britain's strategy for a
solution to Germany's desire for greater access to nuclear weaponry differed
from that of the Americans. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara wanted to
rid Britain of the independent nuclear deterrent, but Wilson and Healey aimed
to keep the deterrent and prevent German access to hardware.'27
What the British wanted was progress towards a Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG) in NATO, in which Germany would share in nuclear
consultation, but would not have access to nuclear hardware. Johnson had
stressed that progress towards the NPG depended very much on finding a way
to meet Germany's needs: a 'coherent German policy'.' 28 The problem for
Britain was, therefore, how to have a 'coherent German policy' while
economic pressure dictated British disengagement from conventional defence
in Europe and while Britain allowed France to circumscribe British policy
towards the EEC. It is possible that in this environment, a membership
initiative towards the EEC could help to augment Britain's bargaining position
with the USA and with Germany. Officials had recommended since 1964 that
Britain's political interest in membership would be one way of strengthening
the case for defence savings in central Europe: 'if Britain could join the EEC,
'FRUS, International Monetary and Trade Policy 1964-1968, vol. viii., doc. 100, Bator to
Johnson, 6 July 1966; Ziegler, Authorised Lfè, op.cit., p.254; Bartlett, Special Relationship,
op.cit., pp.1 16-7
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British chances of obtaining a sympathetic hearing over her troop
commitments could be substantially improved' P129
This problem was thrown into sharper relief during August, as the
Chancellor acted on Wilson's promise of savings in defence expenditure to
demand a speeding of Britain's attempts to find offset savings in Germany. He
insisted that if no savings could be made, Britain should make early troop
withdrawals.' 3° Defence Secretary Denis Healey was adamant that no savings
should be made with such rapidity, and Michael Stewart was also alarmed at
the political repercussions of a threat to withdraw Britain's troops from the
Rhine if Germany could not come up with more cash.' 3 ' In a compromise, as
George Brown took over at the Foreign Office, ministers agreed to present
Britain's demands through NATO.' 32 Britain's decision came at a bad time for
Germany, as Erhard also faced budgetary difficulties and was politically
hemmed in as the Social Democrat Party gained in popularity.'33
Johnson warned Wilson in no uncertain terms of the dangers of an
'unravelling' of NATO if Britain carried out the reductions. He insisted that
any solution to the problem of defence expenditure in Germany must avoid
'any actions that might tend to make the Germans feel as if they were not full
members of the team'. 134 Rather than an approach through NATO, Johnson
wanted tripartite talks between the British, Americans and Germans.' 35 Not
only would tripartite discussions slow up the process of seeking savings, but
Johnson's intervention was 'very embarrassing' as the British had already
129	 CAB148 10, DO(0)(SX64)42, Report of the Long Term Study Group, 23 Oct. 1964
'°	 CAB 148 25, OPD(66)35th, 10 Aug. 1966
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prepared paper for NATO. 136 Wilson was forced to retreat, OPD accepting that
the government had to back-pedal on its timetable for reductions and lower the
tone of potential withdrawal.137
Britain's economic difficulty therefore upset the balance of Britain's
relations with the US and with Germany. Wilson's announcement of Britain's
European initiative went some way to restore it, at least temporarily. Johnson
responded in November by telling Wilson that 'your presence in Germany is
as important to us as your presence in the Far East'. He offered $35m
(l2.5m) in advance orders to tide Wilson over a stalling in the tripartite talks
for offset savings from the Germans.' 38 The EEC membership initiative
bought the support from the US that the Washington visit had failed to secure.
The weakening of the Anglo-American relationship meant that Wilson had to
go further to secure US support. In turn, this illustrates that the shift towards
the EEC was grounded in a traditional conception of Britain's foreign relations
as oriented towards the Atlantic.'39
The second set of pressures compelling Wilson's decision comprised
the very widespread dissatisfaction with the deflationary package from the
Party, the unions and business and from George Brown. Union distress at the
voluntary restraint on prices and wages from July 1965 had already led to
strikes, most notably the National Union of Seamen. Wilson's handling of the
135 PRO PREM13 935, Johnson to Wilson, 28 Aug. 1966; Johnson to Wilson, 1 Sept. 1966
136	 PREM13 935, Rogers to Wilson, 26 Aug. 1966; see also PRO CAB 128/ CC(66)44th,
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seamen's strike, describing the strike as perpetrated by 'a tightly knit group of
politically motivated men', although successful, had been seen as heavy-
handed. 14° Frank Cousins, Minister of Technology and previously General
Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union, had resigned from the
government. His departure weakened the relations between government and
unions and highlighted restrictions over prices and incomes as the culprit.'41
The 1966 deflation imposed a six-month prices and wages freeze on top of the
year of voluntary restraint. The 1'UC Economic Committee initially refused to
back the measures and only agreed after Brown and Wilson outlined how
much worse it would be if they refused. 142 After the principle of union support
had been established, the Cabinet decided to enforce statutory control over the
freeze, giving the government legislative right to refuse pay claims.' 43 This
made it even more difficult for the unions to accept. As Caimcross put it: 'The
poor TUC are being forced to accept one humiliation after another. . .It is
fascinating to see the TUC persuade itself on the say-so of the PM that
devaluation would increase unemployment to 1 .5m. (in fact in the interview
with the TUC the PM started off at three-quarters of a million and as the TUC
leaders laid more and more stress on the impossibility of the proposals, he
stepped up his estimate.)" Industry and business were also dissatisfied.
Leaders of the CBI pressed on Wilson their anger at the way in which they felt
they had been treated, arguing that the sudden nature of the statutory clause
confirmed their worst fears. The Labour government had no respect for private
"°i Childs, Britain since 1945 A Political History (London: Metheun, 1975), pp.1 82-3
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industry and they did not see why they should support the government's
efforts.'45
The prices and incomes legislation also led to discontent amongst the
party. After the deflation, Brown attempted to resign, but was persuaded to
stay in the government late in the evening on 20 July.' 46 His near-defection
illustrated the potential of a parliamentary revolt, as Brown fuelled the anger
of the right of the party. Benn estimated that if Brown went, the government
would not be able to command a majority in the House.' 47 The left were
similarly distressed, with forty-seven MPs tabling a motion, 'Never Again', to
demand withdrawal from Britain's world role and running down of sterling's
position as a reserve currency.' 48 Left-winger Eric Heifer, at this stage in
favour of Britain's membership of the EEC, argued that the government could
not sanction deflationary unemployment if there were no defence cuts
overseas. 149 The Conservatives led a resolution of no confidence in the
government's ability to manage the economy, drawing attention to the failure
of the National Plan.' 5° This motion was defeated with a majority of seventy-
nine, but the capacity for dissent was clear. After the Cabinet's decision to
impose the statutory section of prices and incomes, Part IV, these issues were
reawakened. Part IV was tabled as an amendment to the existing Bill,
currently in the Standing Committee stage of its passage through the House.
Heath demanded that the Bill be brought back for discussion in the whole
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house, a motion defeated with a majority of fifty-two, substantially less than
the government's overall majority.151
Early in August, Wilson moved Brown to the Foreign Office,
switching Michael Stewart to manage the DEA. Brown needed an outlet for
his energies after the failure of the National Plan and the Foreign Office, a
post Brown secretly wanted, would suit Brown's interests well. There is no
evidence that Wilson offered him the post of Foreign Secretary in order to
keep him in the government on the evening of 20 July. The most
comprehensive account suggests that Brown agreed to stay after he realised
that Wilson would in fact let him go.' 52 Moving Brown to the Foreign Office
had more to do with Wilson's need to stem the influence of Callaghan in the
Treasury, as Callaghan now stood as the main rival to Wilson's leadership.'53
Wilson told assembled ministers at Cabinet: 'what I have done this time is to
surround myself with friends and isolate Callaghan' 	 But it is inconceivable
that Wilson moved Brown to the Foreign Office without realising that at the
very least this would increase pressure for a European initiative. Brown was
the only minister who had argued hitherto that Britain should try to 'outflank'
General de Gaulle and seek to get into Europe in the short tenm' 55 Wilson's
decision must therefore have indicated his willingness to endorse a shift in
European policy. Managing his ministers, Wilson's priority in the paranoia
' Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th senes, vol.733, cols.605-620, 3 Aug. 1966;
Crossman, Diaries, vol.1, op.cit., p.602, 3 Aug. 1966
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generated by the July crisis, 156 was thus the primary influence in a move that
had major implications for Britain's policy stance.
Brown's impact at the Foreign Office was immediate. Before the
reshuffle, both Brown and Stewart had urged Wilson for a meeting, possibly a
discussion at Chequers, to take stock of official studies on membership.157
Certainly, the Foreign Office was anxious that momentum towards an
initiative, building since March, should not die out. 158 But officials displayed
trepidation as to Brown's intentions. Gore-Booth's recollections, with thinly
veiled sarcasm, indicate the mandarins' view of their new Foreign Secretary:
'I... warmly welcom[ed] Mr. Brown personally and [said] that everybody
would be greatly heartened by his assurance that the Foreign Office under his
leadership would effectively control foreign policy' •159 Sir Patrick Reilly,
Ambassador in Paris, was less cautious in his wording: 'I knew at once with
complete certainty that this change would be disastrous for us: and so it
proved'.'60
Officials' caution resulted from Brown's rather more direct approach
to diplomatic relations than current foreign strategy advised. The European
Economic Organisations Department considered de Gaulle's attitude to
constitute an 'absolute bar' to entry. Strategy was to demonstrate Britain's
interest in joining through a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome.
In the interim, the EEOD recommended that Britain should continue bilateral
discussions with members of the Six to elucidate further the areas of difficulty
'Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., pp.421-422; Crossman, Diaries, vol.1, op.cit., pp.581-3, 24 July
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Britain would face upon entry. Bilateral discussions would form the
groundwork of finally getting into the Community via a 'short cut'. A few,
essentially technical issues, such as the weighting of Britain's majority vote,
would be settled in advance. Then, during a transitional period or periods of a
pre-arranged length, Britain would adapt to the provisions of the Treaty.
Gradual assimilation of the Community's regulations would absorb the shock
of entry to capital movements or the cost of the price of food. As a member,
the transitional period system would also provide Britain an equal voice in the
Council of Ministers on any future decisions. 16 ' The strategy would ensure
Britain's membership of the Community over a period of time, preparing the
ground for entry until the political circumstances were amenable to accession.
It did not involve taking an immediate initiative to try to get round the General
and seek entry into the Community in the short term.
The EEOD's paper was not wholly representative of Foreign Office
views. Reilly thought that opinion in France was in favour of British entry. If
the British could convince the French that they accepted the economic
conditions of membership, then it could be possible to build up a 'head of
steam' towards membership, which the elderly General could prove unable to
resist. 162 Michael Palliser, Wilson's Private Secretary, had a slightly different
perspective. While there was no chance of getting into the Community while
de Gaulle was in power, a membership initiative was a way of maintaining
pressure on de Gaulle:
We probably ought to spend the intervening
period making life thoroughly difficult for the
'60 Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, Uncatalogued Memoir, Paris 1966
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General by explaining to all and sundry how
thoroughly willing we are to go in and thereby
forcing de Gaulle into much more explicit
reasons for keeping us out... We can both keep
up a certain momentum in our relations with
Europe and prepare for a post-de Gaulle
situation where our entry - together with that of
Denmark, Norway etc. - can become possible
within the reasonably near future, and perhaps
even before the next general election.163
Brown maintained that the only way to find a way into the Common
Market was to take on de Gaulle. He challenged O'Neill - the author of the
report - over his view that de Gaulle's attitude constituted an 'absolute bar' to
entry. Where O'Neill had written, 'we will have to rely on time and
circumstances, which are the most effective agents of change', Brown
responded 'this is jolly negative! What nonsense - what are we here for?"
Brown also felt that the Foreign Office was unnecessarily anti-de Gaulle. A
Foreign Office official let Wilson know Brown's view:
we have allowed ourselves to take a too starkly
anti-French line and have become slightly
obsessed with the hostile personality of de
Gaulle to the extent of tacitly giving him even
more of a right of veto over our policies than he
in fact possesses. This is not to disregard the
real problems that France's attitude (and those
of the General) present, or to deny his
substantial nuisance value, but Mr. Brown feels
we may perhaps be overdoing it!65
Brown even told the French Ambassador, Geoffrey de Courcel, that the
Foreign Office hated de Gaulle! Brown also disagreed with the Foreign
Office's assessments that Britain would not be able to make adjustments to the
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Rome Treaty: 'he found this disturbingly negative and defeatist about the
French attitude.. .he thinks we could get better terms'. 167 Brown did fall in
with Foreign Office tactics, advocating further probes and a declaration of
intent, but unable to accept an unchallenged veto from the French, wanted to
pressure harder for an initiative to seek membership in the short term.'68
The third set of pressures urging Wilson to choose Europe, closely
related to the dissatisfaction of the different interest groups, were the political
consequences of implementing the deflation. There was a personal element to
this difficulty for the Prime Minister, his credibility diminished and fearing
that there had been an attempted Cabinet coup during his absence in Moscow.
Callaghan was Wilson's only credible leadership rival and Treasury influence
increased with the deflation.' 69 Economically, the simple fact was that a
balance of payments surplus could only be reached at the expense of economic
growth.' 7° To protect sterling, the Treasury thought it vital to hold fast to the
deflation, but political pressure quickly mounted to ease the downturn of
activity by adopting selective reflation. 17 ' When it became apparent, early in
October, that unemployment would rise to above 2%, Wilson immediately
turned to consider possible reflationary measures.172
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The Group on Planning for Selective Reflation, chaired by William
Nield of the Cabinet Office, set out a programme of discriminatory planning
for growth. Resources should be streamlined, encouraged into sectors of the
economy maximising Britain's productive potential. Efforts would be
concentrated on promoting exports and investment, rather than on a more
general reflation of consumer demand and should focus on regional
development areas. 173 Selective reflation could be justified to the public as
harnessing the spare capacity created by the July measures to ensure measured
growth, rather than a return to stop-go. While Stewart at the DEA was strongly
in favour of reflation as the only means of securing industrial confidence in
Britain's future growth, the Treasury held out against any relaxation.' 74 Not
only did Wilson have to toe the line between political pressure and economic
success, he was also very anxious to avoid a severe downturn and serious
unemployment.' 75 The tension between making the deflation work and
demonstrating to economic interest groups and public and political opinion
exactly how the economy was going to grow created acute problems.
The problem of a downturn was particularly serious in the realm of
private and industrial investment. There were three related problems: the
practical impact on the economy of the loss of investment, the centrality of the
future confidence in the economy and the relationship between government
and private industry. In September, both the Chancellor and the First Secretary
argued that the effect of the deflation on the psychology of business
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confidence, as well as the practical impact on investment in industry, had been
underestimated.' 76 ICI, for example, the chemical firm with the largest
investment programme, had promised severe cutbacks for the oncoming year
as the freezing of prices had led to a decline in profits.' 77 Investment
predictions showed a dramatic decline. Fixed investment in manufactured
industry had declined by 4% between 1965 and 1966 and was predicted to
decline by a further 9% in 1967. Investment in the distributive and service
trades, including shipping, was to fall by 15% in 1966-1967. These concerns
were widespread: the risk of a downturn was the headline in The Times as
ministers prepared to go to Chequers for discussions on the EEC.'78
The Board of Trade and the DEA put a large part of the decline down
to the confidence in the future prospects for the economy, which could
therefore be rapidly rectified: 'in part this [the decline in investment] may
reflect not only intentions in regard to investment but a loss of confidence in
the ability of the economy to regain its resilience and prospects further
ahead'.' 79 The CBI published a report urging that some action be taken to
mitigate the decline in private investment. John Davies, the Director General
of the CBI, mentioned the absence of any move towards Europe as part of the
reason why business confidence had been so undermined.' 80 The government
was acutely conscious of the relationship with private industry, with Wilson
particularly fearful that ICI's investment decisions were based on 'political'
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considerations. 18 ' Wilson was also highly anxious as to the state of the
economy overall, frantically writing to his Chancellor to suggest schemes to
tighten control of capital flows out of Hong Kong and Kuwait. 182 Without
investment, there could be no future growth. Without a framework for growth,
all of the government's economic policies would lie in ruins.
It is distinctly possible then that European membership, known to be
favoured by the CBI, was seen as a possible remedy, offering a framework for
future business confidence in the economy that had originally been intended
by the National Plan. Trend recognised that to counteract the slump in
business confidence the government needed 'appropriate propaganda of the
psychological warfare type'. 183 Wilson told Hetherington afterwards that 'the
prospect of entry at an early date could stimulate investment soon in
expectation of the expanded market'. 184 The deflation, which aimed to hold
down demand and growth, put an end to the government's growth targets
under the National Plan. The Plan had been the binding goal of the
government, wedding together the aspirations of the left and the right of the
Party and providing Labour's answer to the persistent crises of stop-go. The
death of the Plan left the government with literally no direction. The new
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Michael Stewart, wrote to Wilson
late in October to warn that:
the events of the past year which necessitated
the July measures require in consequence a
revision of the whole basis of the plan and
therefore bring into question the proposal to
publish a review of progress this year... To put
it crudely, there is no progress to report in terms
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of the original National Plan targets... It is true
that the importance of the pian lay as much in
the action programme, which was designed to
lay the foundation for long term growth, as in
the detailed figures which it contained. And
there is a good deal of progress we could report
on the action. But a document published now
which would be concerned with exposing the
extent to which the growth assumption has had
to be reduced could be embarrassing, one which
dodged this issue would not be credible and
would lead to ridicule. Moreover, the object of
publishing something this year would, as I see it,
be to maintain continuing public acceptance of
the concept of planning. This would, however,
depend on our ability to show when and how we
hope to resume growth. I think it would be
giving too much of a hostage to fortune to
attempt this until we have completed our
discussions of the problems involved and have
taken the strategic policy decisions required.'85
Stewart's paper was more than just a restatement that the targets of the
National Plan could not now be reached. Rather, Stewart questioned the whole
concept of planning as a credible framework for the government's economic
policy. The deflation had killed not only the Plan, but also the public's
willingness to believe in a Plan. There was little alternative but European
membership to fill the aspirational hole left by the failure of the Plan, restoring
confidence in the economy and providing the framework for future economic
growth.
The National Plan had been one part of Wilson's appeal to the party
and nation in 1964. The other was his stress on science and technology, on
creating a new meritocratic society and economy based on endeavour,
efficiency and the harnessing of 'new' industries. Focus on the technological
revolution now shifted to a European stage. Italian proposals for European
' PRO PREM13 827, Stewart to Wilson, 17 Oct. 1966
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political development presented to NATO in June suggested a ten-year plan to
bring Europe to the levels of technological development experienced in the
US.' 86 Developing these ideas would be one way of sustaining European
activity in NATO following the French withdrawal. It could also provide
Britain with a potential lever in attempting to seek membership of the EEC.
An Economist article, which Wilson claimed had influenced him in
favour of membership, argued that the European Parliament agreed that the
creation of a technological community was one 'sound and solid' reason for
British membership. British expertise in science and technology would add a
welcome angle to Europe's own projects, and the European Parliament had
recommended that Britain should be invited to take part in a small number of
important technological projects. In particular, space and data-processing were
areas where Europe found it difficult to stand up to the USA. The French
could be attracted to methods to prevent the 'brain drain' to the USA, fearing
that Europe would become an 'industrial province'.' 87 Palliser certainly
encouraged the Prime Minister to think positively about the potential
opportunity created by Britain's technological strength in comparison to the
Europeans'. He commented on this article:
what none of our people seem to want to do is
use our technological superiority as a lever to
get what we want, they're always too afraid the
wily Europeans are going to pinch our know-
how and leave us naked. Surely we can do better
than that.'88
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That Wilson was attracted to the idea of using Britain's technological
strength as a lever to get into the EEC was evident from his later comments:
'hint that if they want anything they'll get nowt through NATO and must
support our entry into the EEC when we'll really talk business'.' 89 As well as
an argument in favour of British accession, the technological community idea
also served a useful domestic purpose, reviving Wilson's earlier stress on a
scientific and technological revolution. Technological innovation was an
important feature of the government's discussions with the TUC on the
European initiative in November. In particular industries such as aircraft, cars,
computers, electronics, chemicals, plastics, synthetic fibres and consumer
durables could be expected to benefit. Membership would be the
psychological stimulus for management to become more efficient. The
increase in capital investment would enable an expansion in research and
development of new ideas. Within the Community, Britain would also be able
to specialise in areas in which material and human resources were favourable,
so improving competitiveness.' 90 Through membership, confidence and
expectation in the economy would be revived.
The Chequers meeting, 22 October 1966
Wilson's turn to Europe has been interpreted as a result of his lack of
alternatives.' 91 Brown and Stewart's paper to the Chequers meeting on 22
October confirmed that the government had no choice but Europe. In a now
familiar argument, the two ministers asserted that Britain's economy would be
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viable at a lower level of activity, but that this would relegate the UK to a
position of secondary influence in world affairs:
If we were content that the balance of
international power were managed mainly by
others and if we were prepared to give up the
idea of protecting our numerous overseas
interests or of promoting our ideas on world
political developments, this would not
necessarily be an unacceptable position. It
would, however, constitute a radical change in
thinking to which the British people have been
accustomed and be a break with the role that this
country has tried to perform hitherto.'92
Failure to join the EEC would diminish Britain's influence with the US, in the
Community and in NATO, effectively handing over Britain's European and
Atlantic responsibilities to the Germans.
Closely tied to Britain's political influence were the long-term
economic implications of exclusion from such a powerful grouping. At the
very least, the Commonwealth and EFTA countries would begin to seek closer
relations with the stronger Community market.' 93 Politically, Britain's
Commonwealth ties were becoming less compelling, as Wilson had
discovered during the September 1966 Commonwealth Conference. Unable to
contain anger at the UDI in Rhodesia, the black African nations had come
close to precipitating the collapse of the Commonwealth, the Zambian Prime
Minister 1'AUrh calling Wilson a 'racialist'.' 94 For EFTA, the consequences
of exclusion from the CAP would force Denmark at least to turn to the EEC
without Britain. Business and industry would also suffer a serious
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psychological set-back at the prospect of permanent exclusion from Europe's
fastest-growing markets and would either move or seek compensation. In the
long-term, Britain would be left 'swimming increasingly alone against
contrary economic tides'.'95
In addition to the long-term compulsion, in the short-term Brown and
Stewart argued that Britain had to keep on demonstrating interest in European
membership in order to sustain existing European policy. Failure to advance
Britain's rhetoric, stating that Britain was ready to enter the Community if the
'essential interests' could be satisfied, would in fact lead to retreat. To keep on
repeating the same policy without convincingly showing Britain's intent to
enter would undermine the confidence of Britain's supporters amongst the Six
and would make it look as if Britain were not serious. Again, Britain had to
keep running faster and faster to stand still. As the Six developed, so Britain's
attitude had to advance in order to retain British influence over the thinking of
the Six.196
Discussion of Britain's economy dominated the Chequers meeting.
Yet, there was a division of opinion as to the relationship between a turn to
membership and Britain's economic health. William Armstrong, Permanent
Under Secretary in the Treasury, argued that the expectation of membership
could force Britain to devalue. Britain's balance of payments was heavily
dependent on exchange controls of capital movements, of a kind contrary to
the Treaty of Rome. If the economy was weak at the time of entry, the
expectation that Britain would lift exchange controls - or the end of the
transitional period at which Britain would have to lift the controls - capital
CAB 134 2705, E(66)1 1, Britam and Europe, First Secretary and Foreign Secretary,
18 Oct. 1966
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would 'tend to anticipate' the outflow of funds. Speculators, envisaging a flow
of capital out of the country on the lifting of controls, would sell sterling in
anticipation, precipitating devaluation.' 97 Britain's prospects for membership
therefore rested on the recovery of the economy.
The Treasury's view coincided with that expressed by the politically
appointed economic advisers Thomas Balogh and Nicholas Kaldor. In the
interdepartmental official Committee set up to deal with the implications of
membership, Balogh and Kaldor had maintained that the economy was so
weak that an attempt to enter the Community was not possible for at least five
years. Capital and labour would be drawn out of Britain into more prosperous
areas in Europe, leaving Britain an 'industrial slum'.' 98 Part of Balogh and
Kaldor's motivation had been to show the government the need to devalue. As
O'Neill had commented during a meeting of the Official Committee, rather
than drawing the conclusion that Britain should abstain from European
membership, was it not more the case that 'present economic policies are
wrong?" 99 The advisers' submission to the Chequers meeting argued that
Britain's economy could cope only if 'we could find ways of improving the
balance of payments prospects in a dramatic manner'. 20° l'his was a slightly
different concern to Armstrong, whose main interest was ensuring, in the light
of the pressure for reflation, that the stringent measures worked.
The Treasury's advice conflicted with that of officials within the DEA.
Derek Mitchell at the DEA, the chair of the Economic Official Sub-
1%
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Committee, declared himself 'fed up to the back teeth of the whole sodding lot
of them'.20 ' Mitchell submitted his own minority report to the Official
Committee, arguing that the economy did not prevent Britain from starting
negotiations for membership. The advisers concentrated only on the negative
aspects of membership, failing to address what would happen if Britain stayed
out.202 The key for Mitchell was the long-term advantages of membership.
Over the long-term, European membership would prove beneficial because of
the economies of scale and the stimulus to competition. It would not in itself
foster growth, but it would accelerate the trends towards reorganisation that
were happening anyway. 'Exposure to the pressures and opportunities of a
European market is likely to accelerate throughout British industry trends
which are already at work - a trend towards greater product specialisation and
in many (although not all) industries towards the emergence of larger units'.
The economies of scale were particularly important to the technological
industries: 'The UK market is too limited to sustain economic production in
these products.. .Distribution and marketing on a substantially increased scale
would also offer increasing competitive advantage'. 203 In the short-term, a
policy of seeking European membership could provide the elusive quality of
confidence to industrialists and speculators. Creating confidence was central to
the arguments used in the Chequers meeting. 204 Because industrialists sought
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membership, the expectation of membership would help in encouraging
investment to Britain and to stay in Britain:
The issue was largely one of confidence which
could alter rapidly and in that connection it was
particularly important to have in mind the extent
to which an indication of our willingness to
enter the Communities through undertaking
more far-reaching discussions might be expected
to lead to a revival of business confidence and
hence of investment, the level of which was at
present one of the most serious weaknesses in
our economy.205
The treatment of agriculture also indicated the central importance of
the economic and industrial considerations. The official report reiterated the
Ministry of Agriculture's concerns that membership would distort agricultural
production, favouring cereals to the detriment of daiiy, livestock and
horticulture. High prices and higher import costs would raise the cost of living
by 10-14%. In addition, the Six's ratification of the May settlements as to the
next stage of the CAP confirmed that Britain would have to hand over to the
agricultural fund 90% of the proceeds from agricultural levies. The net cost to
the balance of payments would therefore be between £175-250m per year.206
The DEA in the Economic Sub-Committee had led the charge that agriculture
constituted only 4% of the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The effect
on industry was therefore by far the most important consideration. If industry
stood to benefit from membership, then the economy as a whole would be able
to carry the balance of payments effects of entry. 207 This point was made at the
Chequers meeting: 'if we entered the Community from a position of economic
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strength, the increase of industrial productivity which might be expected to
follow, should more than offset the consequences of accepting the CAP' 208
Sovereignty and the constitutional principle of supranationality were
also discussed. Officials, under the lead of Sir George Coldstream in the Lord
Chancellor's Department, revealed a pragmatism and flexibility of approach
that was left undisputed by ministers. Coldstream argued that in practice,
neither the Council of Ministers nor the Commission had ever sought to
overrule a member country on any important issue and a number of the
Commission's decisions had been successfully defied. The Commission in
reality did not initiate legislation without the firm approval of the member
states in advance. Majority voting had been held back by the attitude of
France, but officials felt that once inside the Community, Britain would be
likely always to hold a blocking minority at least. While it might be attractive
to appeal to France by promising to obstruct supranational development, it
would be counterproductive to seek actively to reduce the powers of the
Commission before entry. A rigid opposition to 'supranationality' was likely
to prevent British accession. Suggesting amendments to the Treaty of Rome to
bring the Treaty into line with the pragmatic day-to-day workings of the
Community would only instil hostility, doubt about Britain's intentions and
ultimately impede membership. Once inside the Community, Britain would be
in a better position to secure her objectives:
we should do better to rely on some of the
present members of the Community who shared
our general approach, together with some of the
members of EFTA who might be expected to
join the Community with us, to provide a
reasonable assurance that we should command
208 PRO CAB13O 298, MISCl26(66)l't, 22 Oct. 1966
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sufficient support to give effect to our views
about the way in which the EEC should
operate. 209
Although officials did not deny that membership would affect the sovereignty
of Parliament because of Community legislation, ministers were influenced by
the constriction of Britain's influence outside the Community. Some ministers
expressed doubts about the wisdom of submitting Ito an institution in which
national legislation could be overridden. But the main point was that:
it was, however, strongly argued that current
practice in the Communities, and political
realities, made it unreasonable to think that we
should be overruled in the communáties in any
matter affecting our maj or interests, as in respect
of economic controls, the major constrains upon
our position arose from the extent to which we
were politically, militarily and financially
interdependent with major western powers.21°
In this way, it is evident that ministers were ready to address the issues
of the limits to their power in a way that had not been apparent during the first
term in office. The collapse of the government's economic objectives under
the National Plan must have been central to this shift in thinking. In real
contrast to his attitude during 1965 and early 1966, Wilson was now willing to
address the economic changes membership would bring. Each of the five
'conditions' of membership was shown to be of a lesser importance than
hitherto. Protecting EFTA's interests was not as important as EFTA wanted to
join the EEC and would seek to do so anyway if Britain did not take the lead.
Austria's negotiations with the EEC showed that the problem of 196 1-3, when
EFTA's neutrality stood in the way of EFTA's accession to the EEC, was no
209 ibid.
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longer an issue. 21 ' The transformation of trade with the Commonwealth raised
greater dissent, as some ministers were wary of the balance of payments cost
of a loss of the Commonwealth preference. But the developing countries were
seeking association with the EEC and Australia, New Zealand and Canada
were strong nations in their own right, whose trading interests were shifting.
Canada was becoming increasingly associated with the USA and Australia
with Japan, although New Zealand was still dependent on Britain's market.
Wilson hedged the question of the Commonwealth, arguing that the settlement
for the Commonwealth depended on the extent to which Britain would accept
the CAP.212
On the CAP, Wilson insisted that changes would be sought. Britain
would require transitional periods in order to adjust to the different prices and
would also need 'accommodation' for the distortion to production. 213 In a clear
indication of the effect of the economic crisis, Wilson showed that
preservation of economic sovereignty was no longer a stumbling block.
Britain's freedom of economic action was circumscribed anyway by activities
beyond Britain's control. 'Experience and enquiry now suggested that our
external financial and economic obligations already limited our freedom to
plan the economy as much as, or more than, membership of the Community
seemed likely to do in practice'. 214 Freedom to fulfil Britain's foreign policy
was technically less of a problem. De Gaulle, Wilson argued, did not find
himself much constrained by the EEC. There was also the question of whether






veto because of pressure within France arid within the Five for British
accession. Others disagreed; feeling that opinion would in no way determine
the actions of the General. On the whole, however, there was a strong
sentiment that de Gaulle's possible attitude should not dictate what Britain did
or did not do. The probability that de Gaulle would obstruct Britain could not
hinder the government's taking the decision in principle to approach the
EEC.215
The government was also faced with a choice of tactics in its approach
to the EEC. Brown and Stewart recommended making an immediate
declaration that Britain could accept the Treaty of Rome, continuing with
bilateral discussions in order to establish the main areas of difficulty and
possible solutions. 216 Brown wanted an initiative now, leading to a decision in
mid-1967, negotiations in 1968 and entry in 1969.217 Brown was in fact so
keen for a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty that just before the
Chequers meeting he had effectively suggested his resignation. If Britain's
policy was not advanced in this way, Brown threatened that the Foreign Office
would refuse to associate with further probing of the Community, completely
undermining the government's European policy. 218 Wilson was reluctant to
declare acceptance of the Treaty because a firm declaration implied a greater
commitment to the Treaty's economic provisions than the Prime Minister was
currently willing to concede. His approach depended on the possibility that
Britain could negotiate safeguards for agriculture, transitional periods for the
movement of capital and provisions for New Zealand's trade. To announce in
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advance that Britain accepted the Treaty could undermine Britain's bargaining
power219; but it would certainly prove difficult with ministers who were not
reconciled to accepting that the 'conditions' of membership should be
overturned. 220 In addition, Wilson indicated that stating now that Britain
accepted the Treaty could prove disastrous for the economy. 'if made
prematurely, [an announcement] would have more immediate serious
consequences for our economic position by suggesting that we intended at an
early stage to abandon the economic controls which were at present necessary
to maintain it' 221 Expectation of the removal of controls on capital restrictions
would precipitate devaluation.
It was widely regarded that immediate negotiations for membership
were impossible. Not only was de Gaulle's attitude likely to prove obstructive,
but as Trend had pointed out, negotiations could prove 'embarrassing' by
revealing the strength of the economic arguments, both at home and abroad,
against immediate accession. As a result Trend suggested taking up Gerhard
Schroeder's proposal for a detailed study of the problems of accession
between Britain and 'like-minded' members of the EEC. 222 The proposal of a
'probe' of the countries of the Six, to be conducted by Brown and Wilson, was
Wilson's own. It had been his preference when European policy was first
raised in January 1966 and according to Palliser, Wilson suggested the idea to
Brown during the day at Chequers. Brown was disappointed, as it fell short of
his proposal for a declaration, but was forced to accept because the probe
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suggestion at least committed the Prime Minister to a European initiative.223
The probe would, as Wilson put it, enable 'informal consultations with the Six
individually', to 'state what our major difficulties were, and seek to ascertain
how far they would be met, and whether there would be any conditions in
regard to, for example, our relations with the USA'. On the central issue of the
Treaty of Rome, Wilson conceded that 'if asked whether we could accept the
Treaty, the reply might be that provided that we received satisfaction on the
points on which we still saw difficulty, adherence to the Treaty would not in
itself be a sticking point'. 224 While the probe was ongoing, officials would
study possible alternatives to membership, namely 'going it alone' and staying
out of any grouping, or teaming up in a North Atlantic association.
The advantages for Wilson of the tactical choice of the tour were
mainly party political. Wilson emphasised that the tour of the Six implied no
prior commitment to the principle of membership, it was simply a fact-finding
mission to see if the conditions existed for Britain to enter the EEC. Alongside
study of the alternatives to membership, the Prime Minister gave the
impression that he was as yet uncommitted to EEC entry, enforced by his
comments that whilst in Europe, he would act as the foil to Brown's ardent
enthusiasm. 225 The tour bought time, advancmg Britain's commitment by
associating the Prime Minister with the initiative, but postponing the moment
of decision as to whether or not Britain could accept the conditions on offer. It
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was, however, unlikely that Wilson would choose to retreat following the tour.
As Castle noted, 'Harold is edging his way step by step towards his goal'.226
In addition, the tour differed from Trend's suggestion in one crucial
aspect. Trend wanted a study only with the interested and sympathetic
members of the Six, creating a blueprint for accession over the longer term.
Wilson and Brown's probe would directly confront de Gaulle. Wilson seems
to have absorbed, through necessity perhaps and encouraged by Palliser's
view of the strength of the technological card, some of Brown's optimism and
desire to challenge the General. In response to Schroeder's proposal for a joint
study, Wilson suggested that perhaps the government should try to take some
credit for proposing EEC-EFTA links a year before.227 Receiving an
obstructive response from officials, Wilson, with the tones of Brown,
commented: 'this seems very negative. Why go on letting the General exercise
a veto all the way?' 228 Wilson wanted to take on the General. His comment
that the tour intended to uncover whether there would be a political price for
entry, essentially whether the French would demand the end of Britain's links
with the USA, was an indication of the lurking possibility that Wilson could
negotiate a deal with the General.229 Crossman certainly thought that Wilson
believed himself capable of success where everyone else had failed. In
conversation that night, Crossman urged Wilson to leave the tour to the
professional diplomats:
"I am a professional", he replied. "I am a
professional, Dick". He said it in a strange voice
that made me realise that he already regards
himself as an expert on foreign affairs and a
226 Castle, Diaries, op cit., p.92, 3 Nov. 1966
PRO PREMI3 908, Roberts to FO, tel.1443, 13 Oct. 1966
PRO PREM13 908, Wilson comments on Fenn to Palliser, 13 Oct 1966
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statesman able to achieve what no professional
diplomat can achieve.230
Furthermore, the tour would associate the Prime Minister personally with the
European initiative, ensuring it would be difficult to turn back. As Crossman
acknowledged:
In order to overtrump George Brown, Harold
had in fact conceded him far more than he'd
asked for. All George and Michael Stewart came
to Chequers asking for was a declaration of
intent to sign the Treaty of Rome. But now
Harold had conceded a tour round Europe by
George and himself which was bound to commit
us far further towards entry than any paper
declaration of intent.23'
The government had no alternative, but the turn to Europe cannot be
seen as a deliberate attempt to reorient Britain's power. Wilson's actions were
securely founded in the traditional desire to preserve the parity of sterling.
Creating confidence in the economy could help to uphold this objective by
providing the framework for future growth. In addition, while the EEOD had
some radical ideas about Britain's future foreign policy role, the Chequers
meeting was followed by a decision against a dramatic reorientation in
Britain's defence commitments overseas.
In the Foreign Office, there was a far greater acceptance that European
membership was the vehicle by which Britain could find a new role, a
framework for effecting radical change in Britain's external relations. Con
O'Neill argued:
230 Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., p.87, 22 Oct. 1966
' ibid., p.85, 22 Oct. 1966
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For the last twenty years this country has been
adrift. On the whole it has been a period of
decline in our international standing and power.
We do not know where we are going and have
begun to lose confidence in ourselves. Perhaps a
point has been reached where the acceptance of
a new goal and a new commitment could give
the country as a whole a focus around which to
crystallise its hopes and energies. Entry into
Europe might provide the stimulus and the target
we require.232
Within the Cabinet, it is undeniable that there was a much greater questioning
about Britain's power in the world and recognition that European entry was
the only way of preserving the existing bases of Britain's power.
Acknowledgement of decline was therefore much more widespread.233
Ministers' discussion at Chequers illustrated their preoccupation, as they
discussed Britain's future role and direction:
Whatever happens, we need to cut back our
overseas commitments and withdraw our troops
from the Far East and the Middle East. 'Again,
take devaluation. . .This is also a pre-condition of
our recovery whether we are inside or outside
the Market'.234
However, O'Neill's sentiment was not widely shared and was not presented to
ministers at Chequers. Trend argued that it would be difficult to replace the
'not inconsiderable benefits of prestige' deriving from Britain's position at the
centre of the Commonwealth.235
Moreover, the decision to turn to Europe was followed by a decision to
delay complete withdrawal from any of the military overseas theatres. Since
232	 F0371 1883471M10810 475, O'Neill to Thomson, 21 Oct. 1966; Young, Blessed,
cit., pp.189-191
3 Young, Britain, op.cit., p.95
Crossman, Diaries, vol.2. op.czt., p.83; PRO CAB134 2705, E(66)3, 22 Oct. 1966
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July, the Treasury had been pressuring hard for the implementation of savings
from overseas expenditure in order to sustain the parity of sterling. Callaghan
urged Healey in the strongest terms for cuts well beyond the February defence
review projections of a ceiling to defence expenditure of £2000m. By 1969-
1970 he wanted savings of an additional £150m.236 Healey's response
indicates his shock at the vigour of Callaghan's demands and the impossibility
of carrying it out at speed:
What you are asking me to consider is a
reduction of up to £200m a year on the figure
approved earlier this year by ministers. There is
no hope whatever of tackling this by for
example, closing the odd dockyard. What is
involved is a complete new defence review with
major implications for our foreign and defence
policy, also maybe for the aircraft industry.237
Healey was not in favour of retrenchment 238, but Brown's arrival at the
Foreign Office provided a minister in an overseas portfolio who was not afraid
to address the case for pulling out of the Persian Gulf and the Far East. He
told officials that complete withdrawal was the only possibility and later
expressed the same opinion to Healey.239 Political pressure from Brown to
solve Britain's economic crisis in this way was unwelcome for Wilson, who
already faced continual criticism from the left, in and out of Cabinet, over
Britain's 'imperial' role. 24° Wilson did not want to reopen the defence review
PRO F0371 190820, Callaghan to Healey, 11 Aug. 1966
PRO F0371 190820, Healey to Callaghan, 16 Aug. 1966; see also
F0371 190820 ZD13 230, Arthur to Maclehose, 18 Aug. 1966
238 Healey, Time, op.cit., pp.299-300; see also F0371 190821 ZD13 53G. Arthur to Gore-
Booth, 6 Oct. 1966
239 F0371 190820 ZDI3 23G, Fenn to Burrows, 20 Aug. 1966; PRO
FO371 190820 ZD13 23G. Maclehose to Arthur, 19 Sept. 1966
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completely, Trend intervening to defer further discussion on how to carry out
the reductions until after the Chequers meeting on Europe.241
Duly, Wilson met with a restricted selection of ministers - Wilson,
Brown, Stewart, Callaghan, Healey, Crossman and the Commonwealth
Secretary Herbert Bowden - in the evening of 22 October at Chequers.
Despite the views of Brown and Callaghan, with Crossman also in favour of
complete withdrawal from the Far East, the meeting concluded against
retrenchment. Healey set out the political case against too quick withdrawal,
recommending instead cuts of one third of the forces in Europe and one-half
in the Far East. There could be a 10% cut in Singapore and Malaysia, reducing
the army from 165 000 to 150 000 because of the ending of Confrontation. By
1970-1971, Britain could hope to save an additional £200m on the existing
projections. The cuts would be difficult, but preferable to complete
withdrawal from one major theatre. In this way, Britain's commitments could
be sustained: 'the cuts would inevitably involve a number of decisions which
would cause serious embarrassment of the government. . .these difficulties,
would, however, be far less than those which would raise from our seeking to
withdraw altogether from a major theatre'. 242 Both Brown and Crossman
disagreed. Brown accepted that the study should begin on this basis, but
wished to reserve his position until the results of the study were available.
Crossman argued that the cuts would mean that Britain would prove unable to
carry out her commitments anyway. Yet the argument for preservation of
Britain's commitments held sway:
241 PRO F0371 190821 ZD13 54G, Burrows to Gore-Booth, 30 Sept. 1966
242 PRO CAB13O 301, MISC129(66)1, 22 Oct. 1966; Crossman, Diaries, voL2, op cit.,
pp.85-87; Healey, Time, op.cit., pp.299-300, Wilson, Labour, op cit., p.297
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we must not, moreover, ignore the importance to
our vital interests both of maintaining our
relationship with our allies and of contributing
to world wide stability, and it might in creating
circumstances be more important to those
interests and to our security to accept the
economic deprivations entailed in maintaining
the level of defence expenditure postulated in
the defence review rather than to make heavy
reductions.243
Thus, economic difficulties did not lead to an immediate retreat from
Britain's political commitments, although the possibility of complete
withdrawal was clearly very real. What this shows is the fragmented nature of
Wilson's policy reorientation. The July crisis forced a rethink on EEC
membership, but it was a rethink designed to hold together the established
bases of policy. A solution such as Brown's would have amounted to a radical
reappraisal of Britain's priorities by devaluing the pound, turning to Europe
and casting free from Britain's defence commitments and so from the
'special' relationship with the USA. Wilson rejected this approach. Instead, he
chose to sustain the parity of the pound. The prospect of EEC membership
partly assisted this goal. Sustaining the parity also enabled Wilson to avoid a
precipitate withdrawal from the Far East and so avoid the immediate rancour
of American opinion. In this way, the aftermath of July 1966 was a bid for
stasis: managing the crisis without a radical transformation of Britain's
conventional outlook. Although the government had no alternative, the turn to
the EEC was not a break with the past.
243 PRO CAB13O 301, MISC129(66)1, 22 Oct. 1966
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4. Free-wheeling with the General': The Formation and
Conduct of the Probe of the Six, November 1966 - March
1967
Contrary to the criticisms levelled against Wilson, the European probe was no
gimmick. His colleagues have led the charge that the Prime Minister was not
serious in his intent to enter the Community. George Wigg, Paymaster General
and adviser on security affairs, commented that Wilson wanted an initiative
that 'looked and sounded like business'. 2 Peter Shore, Wilson's Parliamentary
Private Secretary, believed at the time that Wilson only embarked on the bid to
show George Brown that membership was impossible. 3 Recent commentary
has suggested that failure was certain, but that the bid for accession facilitated
other policy objectives, such as outfianking Edward Heath and isolating the
French in Europe.4 As the preparation for and conduct of the probe clearly
illustrates, Wilson's European venture was a genuine attempt to seek
membership of the Communities. The Prime Minister's problem was that in
order to build support for the initiative abroad, he had to lessen the emphasis
on the 'conditions' of membership at home. In fact, Wilson dealt with both
problems with skill, leading an initiative that was flexible and conducive to
European opinion, but which gradually brought the Cabinet to accept there
was no choice but membership.
'Young, Britain op cit., p.96
2 George Wigg, George Wsgg (London: Michael Joseph, 1972), p.339
Peter Shore, Separate Ways: Britain and Europe (London: Duckworth, 2000), p.41; Lord
Shore, Conversation with Peter Hennessy and Helen Parr, 7 December 1998
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Preparation for the Probe, November - December 1966
Both the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Transport agreed
that the Cabinet was 'ruthlessly stage managed' in order to secure a 'yes' vote
to a second European application. 5 Jay argued that if Wilson had directly
proposed an application for membership in November, opinion in the Cabinet
would have held sway against. Because of this, Wilson bided his time, using
the probe to effect a major reversal of policy while not admitting that policy
had changed. 6 Cabinet opposition to an initiative was indeed strong. Seven
ministers appeared opposed to a European initiative in any circumstances.
Leading the opponents was Jay himself, so adverse that he allegedly took
comfiakes with him on continental trips.7 Joining him was the Minister of
Power Richard Marsh, whose memoirs record mainly his hostility to Wilson
and the Minister of Transport Barbara Castle, her left-wing heritage leading
her against the liberalising capitalism of the Common Market. 8 Also hostile,
although it is less clear how strongly, were the Minister of Agriculture Fred
Peart, Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden, Scottish Secretary William
Ross and Minister of Housing Anthony Greenwood.9
Three powerful ministers occupied a negative middle ground, based
mainly on the notion that this was the wrong time for an initiative. Healey,
who Jay records as a strong opponent, thought that de Gaulle would veto or
4 Kaiser, 'British EEC Applications', op.cit., pp.67-72
Castle, Diaries, op.cit., p.92, 3 Nov. 1966; Jay, Change, op.cit., pp.366-189; for another
supporter of this view, Douglas Evans, While Britain Slept: The Selling of the Common
Market (London: Victor Gollancz, 1975), pp.1 1-12, 68
6 Jay ibid., pp.366-7
7 Young, Blessed, op.cit., comment on photo inset, p.272
8 Richard Marsh, Off the Rails: An Autobiography (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1978),
p.96-98; for an example of Castle's views, Castle, Diaries, op.cit.,p.126, 30 Apr. 1967
Jay, Change, op.cit., pp.365-6
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use an application to obstmct progress in the Kennedy Round of tariff
negotiations, essential to Britain's future industrial strength.'° Callaghan
initially expressed opposition, influenced by his Treasury officials, because an
initiative could precipitate devaluation and because officials feared the
conditions demanded by the Six would be too stringent for the Cabinet to
accept. 11 Both Callaghan and former Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart
favoured a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome, as it implied
delaying an immediate move for negotiations.' 2 Seven ministers were firmly
in favour. These were Brown and Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, the Lords
Gardiner and Longford as well as Minister for Overseas Development Arthur
Bottomley. Education Secretary Tony Crosland and Minister without Portfolio
Douglas Houghton also supported the move. A further three, Minister of
Labour Ray Gunter, Crossman and Minister of Technology Tony Benn,
attracted to the possibility of a technological community in Europe, were
wavering in favour.' 3 The balance of opinion was therefore extremely fme.
Wilson did attempt to shift the Cabinet towards acceptance of the
probe by stressing that this was not a change in policy. He did not set out a
political case for membership, concentrating instead on the terms under which
Britain would go in and the procedure to be adopted. The only positive
argument in favour of the principle of British membership was that of the
economies of scale, the benefits 'derived from membership of a much larger
market'.' 4 Substantial doubt in the Cabinet led Wilson and Brown deliberately
to set against each other the tactical options of a probe and a declaration of
'° PRO CABI28 41, CC(66)53, 1 Nov. 1966; Jay, Change, op.cit., p.366, 381
'PRO PREM13 909, Callaghan to Wilson, 31 Oct 1966
12 Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., p.! 05, 3 Nov. 1966
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intent. All ministers agreed that Britain should continue to demonstrate
sincerity of interest towards Europe in order to sustain influence. The tour
would postpone a decision in principle, while a declaration of intent appeared
to over-commit Britain to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Promising a
meeting of the EFTA Heads of Government indicated that the government
would pnoritise safeguards for the interests of Britain's European partners. An
agreement to study potential alternatives to membership, such as the plan for
an Atlantic Free Trade Area and 'Going it Alone' implied that different
courses of action had not been completely ruled out. The Cabinet also
considered when and how to consult the Commonwealth. This further watered
down the sense that Cabinet was taking a firm decision in favour of a
European application.15
On the final day of Cabinet discussion, ministers debated the issues
about which Britain would require further clarification. Wilson and Brown
would emphasise on the tour that the CAP would distort British agricultural
production and lead to a rise in prices and living costs. Acceptance of the
agricultural financing arrangements would pose an intolerable burden on
Britain's balance of payments and would need review. Liberalisation of capital
movements would also require safeguards, and Britain's ability to carry out
regional policies that priontised the development areas would have to be
ensured. Certain Commonwealth countries would have to seek association and
arrangements would be required in particular for New Zealand trade.'6
Agreement for the Commonwealth should be no worse than that reached
CAB 128 41, CC(66)53M, 1 Nov. 1966
' PRO CAB 128 41, CC(66)54th, 3 Nov. 1966
16	 CAB129 127, CC(66)149, Europe, Foreign Secretary, 7 Nov. 1966
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during the Brussels negotiations in 19613.17 Wilson expressly stated that only
after exploratory discussions would the Cabinet have to choose whether terms
that might reasonably be obtained in negotiations were adequate to justif'
joining the Community. 18 The Times also conveyed the impression that
although the government 'means business', no decisions would be taken until
after the tour was complete.19
One point suggests that ministers needed further stimulus than
Wilson's carefully considered tactics and also indicates a deeper agenda
forcing acceptance of the European move studiously ignored in Jay's account.
Callaghan argued that Britain needed to approach Europe in order to 'give
hope to private business and to end the crisis of confidence in industry which
is preventing the growth of essential private capital investment which we need
to get over the winter slump'. 2° Not only was reflation of the economy a
central cause of both the left and of Douglas Jay, but the need to stimulate
confidence in the economy came at a time of critical importance for the
government's policy in Rhodesia. Mandatory sanctions, adopted to squeeze
out Ian Smith's illegal white minority government, would impose 'grave
stresses and strains on sterling'. Callaghan concluded that 'if we are going to
face those problems in Rhodesia without any effort to enter Europe, I can't
give any guarantee about the future of the pound'. 2 ' Castle's support for the
probe was partly based on this consideration. 22 Furthermore, Callaghan's
interjection also showed that in order to support Commonwealth policies,
CAB 129 127, CC(66)150, Commonwealth Consultations, Commonwealth Secretary,
7 Nov. 1966
' PRO CABI28 41, CC(66)55th, 9 Nov. 1966
19 The Times, 'New Year Steps to Get into Europe: Wilson and Brown missions direct to
heads ofthe Six',p.l, llNov. 1966
20 Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op cit., p.117, 9 Nov. 1966
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Britain had no choice but to move towards Europe to strengthen its economic
and political base. Having no alternative, the bottom line argument according
to Trend23 , underlay the Cabinet's reluctant support for Wilson's initiative.
The other main doubt about the government's tour was the attitude of
General de Gaulle. Unlike 1961, it was widely recognised that de Gaulle was
opposed to Britain's membership of the EEC.24 The premise of the initiative
was that while it was abundantly clear that de Gaulle did not want to let
Britain into the Community, nor did he want to issue a second veto. His
priority was France's policy towards NATO, Reilly believing he had settled
the empty chair crisis in order to concentrate on NATO. Public opinion would
be unwilling to support simultaneous obstructionism in the EEC and in NATO
and therefore, in order to secure his objectives towards the Atlantic Alliance,
de Gaulle could be persuaded to allow Britain into the EEC. Facing
Presidential elections in December and Parliamentary elections in April, de
Gaulle could be particularly unwilling to make public his opposition to British
candidature.25
Eventual British membership was still a popular cause in France.
Members of de Gaulle's own government, such as Pompidou and the Finance
Minister Michel Debra found it difficult to reconcile de Gaulle's vision of a
'European Europe' with France's ability to cope with a reunified Germany.26
Britain's initiative could encourage and stimulate doubt about de Gaulle's
policies, undermining those policies and building support for British
21 ibid.
ibid.; Castle, Diaries, op.cit.,p.93, 9 Nov. 1966
PRO PREMI3 909, Trend to Wilson, 27 Oct. 1966
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accession. It could be possible that drawing attention to the limitations in de
Gaulle's 'European Europe' would precipitate de Gaulle's departure from
office. The British could also hope to narrow the field over which de Gaulle
could play, perhaps reigning in his future actions against NATO. Dc Gaulle's
age further meant that Britain's accession was not an impossible dream. As
one journalist put it: 'The baked meats of de Gaulle's funeral will coldly
furnish forth Britain's European marriage tables, and we shall all dance on an
obstinate old man's grave'.27
The mainstay of Britain's approach was to undermine the pretexts for
the 1963 veto. In 1963, de Gaulle had been able to state with justification that
Britain was not ready to accept the Treaty of Rome. If Britain could show
acceptance of the Treaty and the conditions of membership, de Gaulle would
be robbed of the legitimacy for his exclusion of Britain from Europe. 28 He
would then be forced to deliver a political veto. A political veto could be
expected to bring odium from the Five and from international opinion.
Illustrating Britain's acceptance of the Treaty and the conditions of
membership was also, importantly, the only way of securing the Five's
support for British accession. 29 The consolidation of the Community meant
that the Five were unwilling to reconsider the economic principles upon which
it was based.
The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary displayed a different
interpretation of these tactics. Brown genuinely believed that it if Britain's
case was sound then the Five and Britain would be able to exert enough
PRO PREM13 897, Palliser to Wright, 21 Oct. 1966
27 New Statesman, Francis Hope, 'Could De Gaulle be Right?', p.34, 13 Jan. 1967
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pressure to convince de Gaulle to give way. 3° This he made clear in
preliminary discussions with the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns before
the tour formally began:
de Gaulle's position was different to 1963, as
now more French opinion was in favour of
British entry and de Gaulle could not take
France out of the Community. The Germans,
faced with a choice of France and the US would
have to choose the US and if against this
background the Five showed a completely solid
front the French government would have to give
way.31
In talks with the Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani, Brown displayed
his belief that for political reasons, the Community should compel the French
to admit Britain in the short term. Britain would turn away from Europe if
rebuffed, with serious consequences for the continent. Only Britain could
bring the technological expertise the Community needed:
the six must understand that we are not making
sacrifices. We could organise affairs in a
different way. He personally thought that that
would be the wrong way. Nevertheless, it could
be done and would have considerable
consequences for the continent. He was not
ready to risk a second refusal. The UK was a
European power but not a mainland continental
power. He had no intention of trying to get
members of the six to gang up against each
other, he wanted to get in and believed it was in
the general interests that the UK should do so.
He believed that the contribution that Europe
could make to the world would be enormously
greater if we were in and Fanfani must
understand that it was in the mutual interest of
the UK and Italy that we should be in.32
ibid.
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Brown's remarks were irritating to Fanfani. O'Neill intervened to
stress that Britain would go as far as possible to accept the provisions of the
Treaty and that the British would not play the Five off against the French.
Afterwards, the Italians suggested that Brown was setting 'too hot a pace'. 33 It
would not be possible to force the French to admit Britain in the short term,
mainly because after de Gaulle's departure, the British would be more readily
able to accede. Fanfarn indicated that: 'if it came to the crunch, they would
guess that they would decide the Six should stick together without the UK, in
the hope that the UK could come in later. The Five would be encouraged to
adopt this line by de Gaulle's age'. 34 Brown's belief that Britain could get in
through the support of the Five was seriously misguided, indicative of his
overwhelmingly political conception of the Community. Discussing with
Fanfani, Brown had shown no sensitivity towards the importance of the
economic provisions of the Community or to the Community's spirit.35
The extent of Brown's misjudgement was evident as a change in
government in Germany in November brought to power the 'Grand Coalition'
headed by the Christian Democrat Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger and Social
Democrat Foreign Secretary Willy Brandt. Kiesinger was much more in
favour of a Franco-German rapprochement than Erhard had been, backed by
the Defence Secretary &cuiei jc( Strauss, who was thought to have dangerous
nationalist tendencies.36 A combination of Kiesinger's political priorities and
de Gaulle's tactical exploitation of the newness of the government conspired
to lead Kiesinger to assure the General that he would not pressurise de Gaulle
PRO FCO3O 62, Shuckburgh to O'Neill, 9 Jan. 1967
PRO PREM13 1475, Brown - Fanfani, 3 Jan. 1967
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to admit Britain.37 John Robinson reported that 'Kiesinger had made plain to
de Gaulle that he needed French support and the price would be German
acquiescence to France's policy on Britain's entry'.38
Patrick Reilly's memoirs shed further light on Brown's attitude and
mentality. Meeting de Gaulle in Paris before the probe began, the General was
impressed by Brown's political case in favour of accession, presumably
fuelling the Foreign Secretary's belief in his ability to negotiate Britain's path
into Europe. 39 Yet, the records reveal no shift in de Gaulle's attitude, as he
said that Britain's extra-European links made her unsuitable for membership
and reiterated that: 'The French did not know and they did not see, how it
could be possible for Britain to come in'.4o Following the meeting with de
Gaulle, Brown and Reilly clashed as Brown accused Reilly of failing to order
him a car at the correct time. Reilly remembered that:
I heard padding steps and Brown came in, with
the devil upon him, small, hunched and evil
looking. For what seemed an age he abused me.
When he was transformed by his devil, the force
of his personality and his natural sensitivity
combined to give him an extraordinary ability to
say the things most likely to hurt his victim, and
with devastating effect. Thus he was able to hit
me where it hurt most. For I had always prided
myself on not being in any way puffed up by my
status as Ambassador, on knowing that my
enjoyment of my honours and privileges must be
brief and transient. I remember that he said to
me with scathing contempt 'you call yourself
Her Majesty's Ambassador. Your job is simply
to see that my car is available when I want it. I
do everything that is important here'.. .1 kept my
Katharina Bohiner, 'Germany and the Second British Application to the EEC, 1966-67',
Daddow (ed.), Wilson, op. cit.
" PRO FCO3O 186, Bonn to FO, tel.50, 9 Jan. 1967; PRO PREM13 1475, Bonn to FO, tel.47,
9 Jan. 1967; PRO FCO3O 186, Galsworthy to Statham, 6 Jan. 1967
38 PRO FCO3O 186, Brussels to FO, tel.14, 19 Jan. 1967; see also Young, Britain, op cit., p.98
39 Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, Uncatalogued Memoir, Paris 1966
4°PRO PREMI3 1475, Brown— De Gaulle, 16 Dec. 1966
180
temper and said nothing... I was overcome by
the horror of the situation, of the unspeakably
evil devil in front of me, treating me, his loyal
servant and host, in this loathsome way. Over
nineteen years later the horror is still with me.
Except for Rachel's [Reilly's wife's] death, this
was the worst thing that ever happened to me'.41
Reilly's vivid recollection does point to a deeper problem Brown found with
his Foreign Office staff. His assertion that 'I do everything that is important
here' indicated his belief in the conspiracy of the diplomatic world against the
Foreign Secretary with little formal education, perpetuating his belief in the
'defeatism' of officials about de Gaulle. 42 The effect of the collapse in
relations between Brown and the Embassy was to isolate Brown completely
from any advice that the European initiative could not work, as he ordered that
there should be no reports showing that de Gaulle would not let Britain in.43
Wilson's approach was altogether more ambivalent and complex. He
plainly did base his strategy around a deal between himself and General de
Gaulle. He explained to Hethenngton: 'He would ignore everything [else], he
would deal direct with de Gaulle. It would be the crucial part of the European
negotiation'. Wilson's thinking was based on the premise that the EEC was a
political issue. He also displayed a belief, evident in 1965, that Labour's
difference from the Conservatives meant the Labour government was more
likely to succeed. The Conservatives had become too preoccupied with
economic detail: 'It must be dealt with as a political question... Wilson said
41 Bodleian Libraiy, Reilly Papers, Uncatalogued Memoir, George Brown folio
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that he must not on any account get involved in questions of canned meat or
grain levies'. 45 Economic negotiation presumably raised numerous points on
which de Gaulle could justifiably obstruct; the grander political issues were
more straightforward.
As well as his perception that he had a fundamentally different outlook
to his Conservative predecessors, Wilson also saw mutual interests between
the French and the British in the Community's political organisation. Nassau
and the MLF, he argued, had been as unwelcome to the Labour government as
they were to de Gaulle. Like de Gaulle, 'he had absolutely refused to look at
hardware solutions for Gennany'. 46 Similarly, he maintained that his decision
to tell de Gaulle in advance of Britain's purchase of American Fl 11 planes
had obviated the misunderstandings that clouded Nassau and Rambouillet. It
would further be possible for the British and French to make links in
helicopter production and in the computer industry. In fact, the French
computer industry had been swamped by the US: 'The French computer
industry had not only been raped but was now aborted. He was going to see
whether we could make a new arrangement'.47
The Prime Minister drew links between French and British interests in
preventing a supranational Community. The Fouchet Plan, Wilson contended,
went too far in building a political union, but 'he intended to talk to de Gaulle
about a political Community based on a modified Fouchet Plan'.48 As the two
stable and secure governments in Europe, the French and the British had an
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Community was abundantly clear; as he dismissed Britain's position towards
the Treaty of Rome in one sentence: 'He would be making a public speech [in
Strasbourg], accepting the Treaty of Rome and that sort of thing'. 49 Despite
this political outlook and reliance on his diplomatic skills at negotiating with
de Gaulle, Wilson's approach was in many ways more realistic than Brown's.
Wilson noted also that 'he would do all he could to win de Gaulle round, but
the prospects were not too bright'. 50 He reiterated the unlikelihood of success
to President Johnson: 'De Gaulle has not changed one iota in his general view
of the world or of our own relation with yourselves'. 51 Furthermore, the
Germans were unreliable, as Brandt had made a 'squalid deal' with Kiesinger,
securing support for Germany's signature to the NPT while agreeing to
strengthen the Paris-Bonn axis. 52 With these concerns in mind, Wilson also
began to prepare for the long haul to entry in which the British would build
support over the longer term, waiting for a time at which de Gaulle departed
from the political scene. Before the tour had even begun, Wilson declared that
Britain would 'not take no for an answer'.53
Thus, Wilson's approach was multi-layered. Consistently hedging his
bets, Wilson understood, unlike Brown, that the only way into the Community
was via the French. This view illustrated his enduringly political conception of
the EEC, a perception increasingly at odds with the opinion of leading
officials such as O'Neill. It also showed his belief that the Labour government
was intrinsically different to the Conservatives and that their different
49 LSE, Hetherington Papers, 13 25, Meeting with Wilson, 12 Jan. 1967. Hetherington adds
that 'I think he said'.
5°ibid.
PRO PREM13 910, Wilson to Johnson, 11 Nov. 1966
52 LSE, Hetherington Papers, 13 25, Meeting with Wilson, 12 Jan. 1967; PRO PREM13 1475,
Wilson - Bruce, 10 Jan. 1967
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approach could unlock the door to the Community. At the same time, he
endorsed the strategy of 'accepting the Treaty of Rome and that sort of thing',
a strategy that existed alongside and was not incompatible with doing a deal
with the General. All at once, Wilson had a main line of attack and a safety
net. This was both narrow-minded, as it placed himself centre-stage, and
optimistic, although in this he really had little choice. But, it cannot be said, as
one commentator has, that he 'was fully aware' the initiative would fail. 54 It
was not that simple. On one level he did know it, but on another, it was less
than relevant as he believed he could find a way around the General.
The Probe in Italy, France and Belgium, January - February 1967
Wilson and Brown's tour of the countries of the Six has generally been seen as
slightly absurd. Pimlott for instance describes that 'in the official photographs,
de Gaulle towered sombrely over the two modestly proportioned British
leaders, as if symbolising the difference in world stature'. 55 Brown's
behaviour contributed to this impression, as he allegedly addressed de Gaulle
as 'Charlie'. 56 Appreciation of the long-term aspect of foreign strategy and the
developments made on the probe suggest that within its own rather limited
objectives the tour was more successful than has hitherto been realised. It did,
however, raise new problems.
comments on this PRO FCO3O 186, Hancock to O'Neill, 11 Jan. 1967
54 iser 'British EEC Applications', op.cit., p.68
Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., p.439
Young, Blessed Plot, op.cit., p.1 92; Pimlott, Wilson, op.cit., p.439
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Rome, deemed a less controversial starting point than Paris, was the
first stop on Wilson and Brown's European tour. 57 Wilson began by
establishing the political case for Britain's accession. 58 Wilson's ambivalence
towards the Community had sparked doubt in Europe as to the sincerity of his
objectives59 and so a principle aim was to show that British objectives were
sincere. Meeting with the Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro and delegations,
Wilson argued:
We didn't want a repeat of 1963 - we were
determined to enter if, as we hoped, our essential
British and Commonwealth interests could be
safeguarded; we meant business. The House of
Commons debate on 16 and 117 November was
principally remarkable for the wide agreement,
from all political parties, that membership of the
Communities was a desirable objective and that
the decision the government had taken was the
right one.. .The government had a wide measure
of support in Parliament and the country at
large. . . and all the EFTA countries welcomed
Britain's move as an important step in
determining the solution to the question of
economic integration.60
Determined to counteract de Gaulle s claim to speak for Europe in
seeking détente, Wilson's view of enlargement was to embrace the changes to
the Community that British and EFTA membership would bring. The Foreign
Office advised that during bilateral contact with Eastern European countries,
the Western nations should aim to show that there was no conflict between the
two objectives of European unity and East-West détente. Strengthening
Western Europe through enlargement would enable the Community to
Young, Britain, op.cit., p.96
For Wilson's account of the Rome talks, Wilson, Labour, op.cit., pp.328-333
Couve had commented that he did not know what the Prime Minister's views were, see
PRO CAB 134 2705, E(66)l 1, Britain and Europe, First Secretary and Foreign Secretary, 21
Oct. 1966
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exercise its full influence to this effect.6 ' Wilson argued: 'the present series of
discussions could be of the most far-reaching and historical importance for
Europe... we should thereby have begun a major step towards enabling
Europe to play an even fuller role in the world'.62
The French and the British could be seen as fighting over the principle
of whether or not to enlarge the Community, Wilson arguing that in contrast to
the French conception, British accession would change and strengthen the
EEC. This aspect of Wilson's approach was part of Britain's response to the
French challenge to the Atlantic security system. It aimed, as Palliser had
noted in October63 , to show that de Gaulle's vision of a 'European Europe'
was not the best way of dealing with German reunification and ultimate
détente. As The Times reported:
The original aim of the Six was to create a tight
little bulwark against communism, a basis for
economic expansion and a means of absorbing
West Germany into a larger entity. The opening
up of Eastern Europe requires bridges not
bulwarks. President de Gaulle has reasserted the
validity of the nation state and has found some
echo in West Germany. Economically,
politically and geographically, the Six no longer
form a natural unit.M
Mindful also of the pressure amongst the Five for the Community's
political development, Wilson stressed that the British wanted involvement in
European 'political unity'. On the core issue of supranationality, the Italians,
Dutch, Belgians and Luxembourgers had pressured for greater commitment to
balance Franco-German dominance. Saragat, the Italian Foreign Minister, in
60	 PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 16 Jan. 1967, 10am
61 PRO CAB 134 2812, EUR(0)(66)42, Pohtical Implications, Foreign Office, 21 Jan. 1967
62	 PREMI3 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 16 Jan. 1967 10am
63 PRO PREMI3 897, Palliser to Wright, 21 Oct. 1966
The Times, 'Another Knock on the Door', p.1 1, 16 Jan. 1967
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response to recent indications of a Gaullist revival of interest in political
union, had forwarded proposals to institutionalise political discussion in the
Community that would confirm commitment to supranationality. 65 Wilson was
unwilling to come down on either side of the supranationality debate.
Preferring the French pronouncements on the reduction of supranationality,
Wilson's inclination had been to attempt to use supranationality as a lure for
an Anglo-French connection. In view of the certainty that such a position
would undermine the support of the Five, Wilson accepted a considerable
watering-down of his position. Eschewing 'political union' for the more
neutral 'political unity', Wilson aimed to toe a middle-ground on
supranational commitment:
The twentieth century would go down in history
as an age in which man had the vision to create a
new unity, greater for building on diversity of
nation states, so that national characteristics
would be enriched by their association in a
wider outward-looking unity.67
Enlargement, with the resultant 'economies of scale' through access to
an expanded market went hand in hand with Wilson's commitment to building
a technological community in Europe as a counterweight to American
dominance. The enlarged economic and technological base of the Community
stood as evidence of the expansion of Europe's political strength:
We should have the potential afforded by a
Community of nearly 300m people in Europe,
bigger than the American Community, with all
65 ibid.; PRO CAB 134 2812, EIJR(0)(66)42, Political Implications, Foreign Office, 21 Jan.
1967
PRO PREM13 910, Wilson comments on Paris to FO, tel.873, 18 Nov. 1966
67 PRO PREMI3 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 16 Jan. 1967, 10am; see PRO
CAB 134 2812, EUR(0)(66)27, Majority Voting and the Powers of the Commission, Foreign
Office, 13 Dec. 1966; PRO CAB 134 2812, EUR(0)(66)42, Political Implications, Foreign
Office, 21 Jan. 1967
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that that meant as regards economic
development and technological potential.68
Technology clearly had a domestic dimension. The 'white-heat of the
technological revolution' had been Wilson's clarion call to unite the party in
1963, embodying the modernising rhetoric of the Labour Party. Focus now on
technology could hope to revive those visions and to give Labour's application
a different tone to that of the Conservatives' •69
It also did reflect defence policies. Aircraft was the major industry in
which European efforts were dwarfed by American production and the
development of a European market, spurred by existing Anglo-French aircraft
projects, could be one way of appealing to de Gaulle. 7° For computers and
advanced technological industries, there was ultimate advantage in
participating in the enlarged European market. Yet, Wilson was anxious not to
embark on specific proposals for a technological community, partly because
Britain's technological industries were more highly developed than were those
in the Six. Without the promise of access to the wider market, sharing
knowledge would be detrimental to Britain's economic interests.71
Furthermore, Wilson wanted to use technology as bait to get Britain into the
EEC, promising the Six access to British know-how only if they agreed to
admit Britain. The British also felt that the key to matching US domination
was not technology alone, but industrial efficiency. European industry was
divided into too many small units and so the problem was how to create larger
PRO PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 16 Jan. 1967 10am
Kaiser, 'British EEC Applications', op.cit., p.65
70 PRO CAB 134 2814, EUR(0)(67)1 3, Military Implications, Defence Secretary, 17 Jan.
1967
PRO CAB 134 2814, EUR(0)(67)5, A European Technological Community, Secretaries, 12
Jan. 1967
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units that could undertake substantial research and development programmes.
Stimulus to the creation of larger units would only be created through
enlarging the market.72
In Rome, Wilson deliberately played down technology as the Italian
proposals for political union included suggestions for joint European
collaboration. Specific ideas could embroil Wilson in lengthy discussions as to
these proposals and so side-line focus on the membership initiative, or be used
as pretext for delay by the French. 73 Aside from technology, Wilson hoped to
separate his initiative from the Conservative bid by stressing that Labour
would only go into Europe from a position of economic strength: 'we do not
wish to weaken the Community; but believe that widening it would strengthen
it. The government's decision, unlike 1961, was not being made from a
position of economic weakness, but one of strength.. .In 1967 we would be in
surplus' .
As in 1961, the real evidence of Britain's commitment as a good
European would come in the 'conditions' of membership. Already, there was
ample indication from the Six that lessening emphasis on the prior settlement
of conditions was the only way of convincing European opinion that Britain
was in earnest and of encouraging support for the application amongst the
Five.75 The advance in Britain's position since 1961 was in the clear statement
that Britain could accept all of the Treaty of Rome. Wilson's commitment to
the Treaty was equivocal. He told Moro only that Britain was 'prepared to
72	 PREM 13 1850, Trend to Wilson, 1 Nov. 1966
PRO CAB134 2814, EUR(0)(67)5, A European Technological Community, Secretaries, 12
Jan 1967
PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 16 Jan. 1967, 10am
PREM13 910, Reilly to FO, 1 Dec. 1966; also PRO PREM13 910, Reilly to FO,
tel.856, 14 Nov. 1966; PRO PREM13 909, Brown - Luns, 2 Nov. 1966; PRO PREM13 909,
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accept the Treaty of Rome subject to the necessary adjustments consequent
upon the accession of a new member, and provided that we received
satisfaction on the points of difficulty we saw'.
Brown argued that while British membership would require no
amendment to the Treaty itself, it would be necessary to work out a protocol
of accession. The protocol, an idea suggested by Heath in 1961, indicated that
the government continued to envisage guaranteed safeguards or changes in
advance of membership. In particular, Brown established that the current
system of agricultural finance, confirmed during 1966, would pose an unfair
burden.76 Britain imported £970m of leviable produce compared to Germany,
the next biggest importer, who brought in £640m. Combined with the higher
food prices in the Community, Britain would face an intolerable balance of
payments bill upon entry. Neither minister considered an open-ended
renegotiation to be a sufficient safeguard. 77 As well as agricultural
arrangements, the government envisaged a special deal for New Zealand, who
was peculiarly dependent on the British market for exports of lamb and dairy
produce.78 Britain would also face problems with the rise in the cost of living
resulting from the higher price of food imports and with the distortion of
domestic agriculture. Wilson also discussed the problems of adopting the
Community's regime of liberalised capital exports. Liberalisation could cause
Brown - Schroeder - Lahr, 3 Nov. 1966; also PRO FCO3O 186, Roberts to FO, tel. 157, 23
Jan. 1967; Roberts to FO, tel.155, 23 Jan. 1967
76 For details of the agreements see PRO F037 1188379/Mi 0840 53, Marjoribanks despatch
9, 17 May 1966; F0371 18838 1/M10840 120, Marjonbanks despatch 13, 4 Aug. 1966
PRO PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro, 16 Jan. 1967, 4pm
78 PRO PREMI3 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 17 Jan. 1967, 10am
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an outflow of portfolio investment from Britain via the Community to third
countries.79
Wilson's political arguments had demonstrable impact. Both Fanfani
and Moro declared themselves impressed by the sincerity of the British
approach. 8° Yet the talks illustrated the enormous gulf between the British and
Italian views of the CAP. In July 1966, the Six had finally agreed marketing
arrangements and price levels for sugar, fats, oils, beef, veal, milk arid rice, as
well as extending the marketing system for fruit and vegetables. 81 Italian
satisfaction with the deal was marked, as Moro, Fanfani and Ortona stressed
the importance to Italy of the 'battle of the oranges' to ensure a fair hearing for
horticultural produce. 82 Italy did not benefit wholly from the CAP. Changing
Italian consumption patterns through increased urban dwelling meant that Italy
was fast becoming a net agricultural importer, especially of meat and dairy,
shouldering Italy with a high percentage of payments into the agricultural
fund.83 Heightened competition meant that total agricultural income in Italy
had declined and production had shifted. As was predicted in Britain, efficient
large-scale producers benefited from higher prices while local livestock
farmers lost out. In contrast to the British attitude, the Italians maintained
that disadvantages in agriculture could be compensated in other ways. For
example, Britain's contribution to the Guarantee Fund of CAP would be offset
by savings to the Exchequer because of the phasing out of deficiency
payments financed directly by the government. Fanfani stressed that it was
79ibzd.
80 ibid.; PRO PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 16 Jan. 1967, 10am
s PRO F0371 1883811M10840 120, Marjoribanlcs despatch 13, 4 Aug. 1966
82 PRO PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 17 Jan. 1967, 10am
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necessary to think in terms of 'a new equilibrium in the economy as a whole'
and the 'overall balance of advantage in terms of resources'. Their attitude
indicated the 'cross-sectoral' nature of the Community's bargain, that losses in
one sector would be compensated by gains in another.
With this in mind, the Italian delegation stated quite bluntly that it
would not be possible to make special arrangements for Britain: 'it would be
wrong to upset the present balance of interest of the six (which had been
achieved only after considerable negotiation) in order to accommodate the
UK's entry'. 85 Their caution was because they thought that Britain would have
to put up with the agricultural disadvantages as Italy had done and also that it
would be impossible to reopen the Six's hard fought disputes. These
arguments were difficult to overcome, implying as the Foreign Office
suspected, that Britain would not be able to make real provision for Britain's
interests in advance of membership. The question is therefore whether
Britain's leaders fuiiy accepted that Britain would be unable to negotiate
safeguards. Brown, as has already been shown, did demonstrate insensitivity
towards the economic interests of the Five, blinded by the political conception
of British entry into the Community to strengthen Europe between the
superpowers. Wilson's attitude is harder to pinpoint, but the evidence above
would suggest that he was less interested in the economic aspects of
membership. Nevertheless, Wilson did tell Cabinet ministers that the Italians
had shown no serious abrogation would be possible.86
The second visit of the tour, to Paris, was the one where, ostensibly,
the initiative would be won or lost. As Wilson told the Cabinet, 'well, Paris
85 PRO PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro and delegations, 17 Jan. 1967, 10am
PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)2", 19 Jan. 1967
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will show'. 87 The Foreign Office steering brief indicated that the objective of
the probe in Paris was to build support for the longer term and to make it
difficult for de Gaulle to veto: 'avoid giving the General any chance to
represent plausibly to the Five and to French public opinion that the UK could
not be regarded as an acceptable candidate for entry because she cannot yet
subscribe to the basic rules of the club'. 88 The case has also been made that
Wilson's diplomatic vanity and Walter Mitty 'Mr. Fix-It' mentality led him
into believing he could succeed where all other leaders had failed: 'if only I
can deal with this man, I can fix it', as Gore-Booth put it. 89 With this in mind,
there existed a certain institutional inertia as to the prospect of a deal with the
General, which could weil have encouraged Wilson's vanity. Michael Palliser
recalled:
I think I always made it clear to Wilson that I
was very sceptical of his being able to get
General de Gaulle to change his mind. But I do
not think that I would ever have told him that
there was no hope of success. He was.. .an
inveterate optimist, with great confidence in his
own ability to influence others, even as obstinate
as he knew the General to be. To have told him
categorically that he was completely wrong in
his judgement would not have led him to change
it; but it would have affected the closeness of
our own relationship, which would not have
been helpful either to him or to me.9°
Evidence of this relationship at work can be found in Palliser's advice
to the Prime Minister as to the political strategy to be adopted in discussion
with the General. Palliser began by stressing that de Gaulle was totally
Castle, Diaries, op.cit.,p.107, 19 Jan. 1967
PRO CAB 134 2813, EUR(OX67) 12, Steering Brief for Pans, Foreign Office, 16 Jan. 1967
On diplomatic vanity, Crossman, Diaries. op.cit., , p.87, 22 Oct. 1966; on Walter Mitty,
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opposed to British membership of the EEC. The only way of getting in was
either to go in stripped of Britain's international position, or to demonstrate
convincingly that the political disadvantages of keeping Britain out were more
serious than the annoyance of admitting the UK. To this end, Palliser
recommended flattering de Gaulle: 'you may fmd it of value to appeal to de
Gaulle's sense of history and his monumental vanity. He has no doubt that he
is the greatest Frenchman since Napoleon. . .To be fair, he is probably right,
and wants to go down in history accordingly'. Palliser's strategy was then to
convince de Gaulle that he would undennine French and European power by
keeping Britain out, as in the long-term, Europe could not prosper without
Britain:
You should speak to him about the account he
will render to history - he risks going astray: by
vetoing the attempt not only to bring France and
Britain together more intimately but also to
create a really dynamic economic, industrial and
no doubt eventually political - European power
complex, he irrevocably split the old continent
and condemned the countries in it to a
permanently declining world status, as compared
to current (US and USSR) and future (China and
Japan) giants of the world... You need explicit
recognition that you and he are talking together
as two world statesmen whose primary concern
is to argue how, in the longer term, European
power and influence are most effectively and
constructively to be projected onto the world
scene. The alternative to agreement between you
- an essential element in which must be
acceptance of Britain within the Community - is
a growing division and thereby inevitably the
permanence of second class status for the
countries of Europe - including France.91
PRO PREM13 1475, Palliser to Wilson, 6 Jan. 1967
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That Palliser envisaged the appeal of these arguments to more than de
Gaulle's 'monumental sense of vanity' is distinctly plausible. Wilson was
evidently taken with these suggestions. The Prime Minister wrote:
France and Britain are politically stable. If we
give a pledge, we can deliver. Unlike Germany
(also Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Italy). In a sense, more stable than the US,
who are more subject to Congressional
pressures. The General and I can sign a Treaty
and carry it. LBJ couldn't be certain, (he
couldn't pull out of Vietnam if he wanted to).
Another bond - can help to unite and develop
Africa. Technology widening from aircraft.
Though using US for late 60s generally for our
main aircraft (forced there by the improvidence
of our predecessors), we shall be indissolubly
(sic) tied to joint French aircraft interdependence
in the 1970s. Nuclear - Nassau we opposed as
he did. Killed the MLF on coming into office.
Opposed to any collective pooling involving
hardware solution.92
In this way, Wilson's preconceptions about the Community and belief that it
could be possible to find a way around de Gaulle were bolstered by the
encouragement of his Private Secretary. For his part, Palliser had to fmd
arguments that were appealing to Wilson, enabling Palliser to sustain a high
degree of influence on the Prime Minister.
Wilson's political arguments did in fact seem to impress the General.
Wilson started by emphasising Britain's commitment to the Treaty of Rome,
provided certain problems could be satisfactorily met. He added to the
statement made in Italy, emphasising that once a member, Britain would
'carry out the obligations' of membership and continue to press for
Community development. In particular, British ideas for technological co-
92	 PREM13 1475, Palliser to Wilson and Wilson's comments, 6 Jan. 1967
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operation would serve to strengthen the Community. Britain's new-found
enthusiasm could partly be explained by the Community's own evolution,
flowering into an institution now better suited to Britain's interests:
[the government] were impressed by the way in
which there had been a growing spirit of realism
in the actual operation of the Community and
much more desire to treat it as a living and
growing organism - reflecting needs and
interests of its members - rather than the
fonnulistic (sic) and rigid institution which some
hoped it would become and Britain feared ut
would become.93
The government's enthusiasm for membership owed also to domestic stability.
Wilson argued that the Labour Party could well be in power for the next ten or
fifteen years and that Britain's trade surplus was historically high and showed
the improving state of the British economy since the July deflation. At the
time of ently, Britain's economy would be strong and 'the pound sterling
should be standing no less firm and high than it was on that day'.94
Having set out the case for Britain's genuine will to enter, Wilson
moved onto Pallliser's political arguments, concentrating chiefly on the
technological benefits of British accession. To illustrate independence from
the Americans, Wilson showed that the Labour government bad resisted the
take-over of Britain's computer industry by the US. Britain and France could
expand their co-operation in new technologies, particularly aircraft. In this
way, the two countries could build up European strength in order to work for
peace in Europe:
The task of the great European powers, of
France and of Britain, was not to be mere
messenger boys between the two great powers.
PRO PREMI3 1476, Wilson - Dc Gaulle, 24 Jan. 1967, lOam
ibid
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They had a bigger role to play - and other
nations wished them to play it - than merely
waiting in the ante-rooms while the two great
powers settled everything direct between
themselves. That was why France and Britain
had to make effective their enormous potential
industrial strength by giving that strength a
chance to operate on a European and not a
national scale, or a series of national scales.
Only if France and Britain did this could they
exert all that went with industrial strength and
independence in terms of Europe's influence in
world affairs.95
The following day, Wilson wound up the political case by arguing that this
could be the last chance for Britain to enter the Community. 96 This position
was in line with Palliser's points about the legacy de Gaulle would leave to
history, but it also suggested the potential consequences of a Gaullist veto.
International opinion would not support de Gaulle if he irrevocably shattered
the prospects of European development.
De Gaulle's response indicated Wilson convinced him of Britain's
sincerity and determination to enter. 97 One of de Gaulle's delegation, who had
spoken to a Dutch source just after the first meeting, reported that de Gaulle
had declared himself 'impressed'. 98 Wilson's political approach, de Gaulle
told Wilson, stood in real contrast to the attitude of the previous government,
who had spoken about economic warfare and hoped the Common Market
would fail. He appreciated also Wilson's remarks about independence,
commenting that since the war, the British had wanted to retain special ties
with the US to the exclusion of all else: 'Churchill had made it clear that unity
ibid.
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was airight for the Europeans but not for the British'. 99 Couve de Murville,
who had formerly maintained that Britain's position on agriculture prevented
her accession, said that 'political questions overshadowed economic areas'.'°°
De Gaulle then stated that he:
had the impression that England now wished to
moor itself alongside the continent and was
prepared in principle to pledge itself to rule
which would involve it in definite links with the
Community. His impression was that England
was ready to detach a bit from the US, enabling
it to become a European country.'°'
In 1963, de Gaulle had maintained that Britain had taken 'the first
steps down the path which one day, perhaps, will lead it to make fast to the
continent'. 102 That 1967 could be the day of Britain's arrival was met with real
delight in the Foreign Office. O'Neill reported that he was 'to some extent
elated' and that he regarded de Gaulle's comment as the most significant result
of the Paris visit, a sentiment with which Wilson indicated agreement.103
Brown was willing to go further in his assessment of the impact of the visit,
confirming his conviction that Britain and the Five could force the French to
submit. Writing in personal terms to Brandt, Brown also showed his faith in
his relations with the German Foreign Secretary:
De Gaulle has accepted our attitude has
changed, we mean business and are now about
as European as everyone else. This has not made
him any more anxious to have us in, but he
realises that it does make it much more difficult
PRO PREM 13 1476, Wilson - Dc Gaulle, 24 Jan. 1967, 10am; Wilson, Labour, op cit.,
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to keep us out and that the old French arguments
will not suffice... The old arguments about US
connections and defence were not pressed... It is
significant that de Gaulle should have shown
signs of moving to his second line of defence
[sterling] at this first confrontation. I remain
convinced, as I have often told you that,
provided we all show a solid front, he will
acquiesce in the end.'°4
Wilson was more dispassionate in response. He did accept that he had
made some headway - 'de Gaulle is scratching his head and trying to figure
out how far he can trust you"°5 - but Palliser commented that de Gaulle did
not accept a change in British attitude. The French leader could not fully
believe Wilson's claims of independence from the USA.'°6 Nor did Palliser
presume that de Gaulle was in retreat. Palliser wrote on Brown's note: 'The
general has not, in his own view, moved to a second line of defence - he is
indulging in a diversionary manoeuvre on our flanks'.107
De Gaulle's reaction to Wilson's political arguments was far from
whole-hearted. Reasonably enough, de Gaulle suspected that Wilson's
explanation of independence from the USA differed radically from France's.
Economic unity in Europe, de Gaulle stressed, would count for nothing unless
Europe achieved 'total independence that he sought from the United States'.'°8
Wilson used Labour's opposition to the Nassau agreement to illustrate
Labour's distance from America. Just because Britain purchased American
Polaris, it did not mean that Britain was an American satellite: it was the same
as the French buying aircraft from the US for refuelling the force de frappe.
104	 PREM13 1476, Brown to Brandt, tel.297, 26 Jan. 1967





By the mid-1970s, the major aircraft in Britain would le the Anglo-French
plane. 109 It was still the case that Britain was more tied to the US than were the
French in the sharing of nuclear information and intelligence, as well as in
NATO and international financial policies." 0 It would not be possible for a
British Prime Minister seriously to pretend otherwise, without a genuinely
radical overhaul of the bases of British foreign policy. In addition, de Gaulle
appeared unconvinced by Wilson's technological arguments, appreciating the
need for Anglo-French co-operation, but arguing that co-operation could take
place whether or not Britain was a member of the EEC. Wilson's counter-
argument that it was necessary to be part of the same market in order to reap
the full benefits of technological co-operation did not invoke any comment.111
Nor did Britain's rendering of the agricultural pitfalls go far enough to
cut the ground from under de Gaulle's feet. Wilson established, in a change of
tone, that 'perhaps the CAP was not as problematical as first thought'. There
was cautious optimism, for instance, in the fact that the tendency of world
prices was to rise, so perhaps closing the gap with Community prices.'12
Convergence of interests was potentially envisaged between the British and
the French on the question of cereal prices. Realising that the French wanted
lower cereal prices than the Germans, Wilson argued that the stimulation to
production in Britain through higher prices would increase Britain's cereals
yield from 1 3m to 20m tons. Such a huge increase would directly compete
with French produce in the markets of the enlarged Community." 3 It would be
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more efficient to reduce cereal prices and to encourage livestock and dairy
farming in Britain.
Although de Gaulle was reported to be impressed that Britain produced
13m tons of cereals, he did not appear moved by this argument. 114 As Healey
commented, 'perhaps he was bored'. 115 Britain's principal difficulty in
accepting the CAP was the issue of levy payments into the agricultural fund.
In a flagrant indication that Brown was confident of getting into the
Community and securing safeguards, Brown told Brandt he believed
agriculture was negotiable.' 16 Both Brown and Wilson argued that the burden
imposed on Britain by the payment of levies would be inequitable. Wilson
suggested also that the accession of a new member would upset the balance of
receipts into the fund and so would require renegotiation anyway." 7 That
Britain would require safeguards before accession gave de Gaulle the leeway
to reissue the alternatives to membership proposed the previous July. He
suggested Britain study either creating 'something entirely new' or associating
with the Community.'18
This argument, that Britain would require 'something new and
different', went right to the heart of the Anglo-French battle over the future
shape of Western Europe and thus Europe as a whole. De Gaulle argued that
enlargement would 'profoundly change the practical application of the Treaty'
as the Community grew from six to up to thirteen.' 9 Wilson saw that this
argument partly reflected de Gaulle's desire to continue to dominate the
PREM13 1476, Wilson— de Gaulle, 25 Jan.4.I5pm
115 Jay, Change, op.cit., p.371
	
116	 PREM13 1476, Brown to Brandt, tel.297, 26 Jan. 1967
PREM13 1476, Wilson— De Gaulle and delegations, 25 Jan. 1967, 4.25pm; Wilson,
Brown - Pompidou, de Murville, 25 Jan. 3pm Wilson - de Gaulle, 25 Jan. 1967, 4.l5pm
	
8	 PREM13 1477, Paris to FO, tel. 146,7 Feb. 1967
201
Common Market: 'He [Wilson] said that de Gaulle appeared to be trying to
say to him, as things were today he could count on sitting in the grandfather
rocking chair in command of the Common Market'.' 2° Wilson continued with
somewhat vulgar imagery, illustrative of his conception of the power relations
in the Community: 'Harold said that from de Gaulle's point of view this would
bring in people who would have runny noses and wet pants and would have to
be trained. It would upset what had already been built'.'2'
The argument about enlargement also reflected the competing Cold
War visions of the Gaullist 'European Europe' and the Atlanticist Western
organisation. 122 Further indication of how Britain's view of an enlarged
Community could counter-act the Gaullist idea came in discussion between
two Foreign Office officials during April. Christopher Lush in the Western
Department commented that enlargement could act counter to the ideas of
détente by appearing to consolidate Western European capitalism against
Eastern European conimunism. 123 Enlargement could thus enforce the very
divide in Europe that détente policy aimed to blur. But enlargement could also
be used to show Europe as a bridge to the East, rather than as a fortress against
it: 'our own ideas for détente - based on an enlarged Community in which the
EFTA neutrals have a part to play - may be less mystical than [de Gaulle's]
but it is not unreasonable to hope that they may have more appeal not only for
the Five but also for the Russians'. 124 Containing Gennany within the
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framework of the Atlantic Alliance would both allay the Five's and Soviet
fears of German dominance.
In practical terms, 'something new and different' was the central
argument used by de Gaulle to show the Five that Britain could want to reopen
the agreements already reached in the Community and thus could unravel the
basis of the Six's hard-fought solidarity.' 25 Sudden multiplication of
Community members would raise difficult issues, such as the degree of
majority voting used in the Council of Ministers. Reopening such disputes
would be entirely unattractive to the Five. 126 All the Five were anxious to
sustain progress to economic union. British and EFTA accession fostered
doubts as to the enlarged Community's commitment to its original goals.'27
Couve was able to tell the Dutch, for instance, that Britain wanted to change
fundamentally the agricultural system.' 28 The Belgian Prime Minister
indicated that he did not want to abolish	 the existing settlements. The
Head of the Belgian European Integration Department feared that if Britain
entered, the Belgians, who had calculated that per capita they paid the most
into the agricultural fund, would be forced to increase their subscription.'29
The battle for British accession went wider than agricultural questions: it was
whether or not enlargement in principle was acceptable for the Community of
the Six.
De Gaulle's 'second line of defence' - sterling - was in many ways
harder to refute than his initial arguments about agriculture.' 30 Sterling, which
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had not featured during the Brussels negotiations' 31 , was pushed centre-stage
because Britain's balance of payments weakness provided an easy target for
France's broader political attack on the reserve role of both sterling and the
dollar. The French had been deliberately buying up gold in order to put
pressure on both reserve currencies. De Gaulle was able to use Britain's
problems with sterling to tap into German fears about Britain's potential use of
Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 108 provided assistance for a
member of the Community in balance of payments difficulties. Its aim was to
avoid devaluation in the EEC, as devaluation would disrupt the pricing
systems agreed between the Six. If Britain entered with a poor balance, she
could demand help from Article 108, so forcing Germany, as the
Community's wealthiest member, to bankroll Britain's world commitments.'32
Use of the Article also raised questions as to whether or not a country owning
a reserve currency could become a member of the Community. The Article
had been written up at time of non-convertibility and had not had a reserve
currency in mind. Again, the British could insist on help to finance the
holdings of sterling, using Community money to manage or to run down the
sterling balances.' At a time of such uncertainty as to Britain's future
economic strength, allowing Britain access to Article 108 suggested a serious
risk to the Community's system.
France's arguments about sterling were extremely difficult for the
British to refute. It was important to avoid reopening the serious Cabinet splits
over devaluation. Wilson also had regard to the potential effects in the markets
Schenk, 'The UK, the Sterling Area and the EEC', op cit., pp.123-137
132	 FCO3O 187, German Ministry of Finance Note on Monetaiy Implications, 31 Jan.
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and wanted to avoid any impression that the French thought Britain should
devalue. He told the Cabinet that Pompidou had said it was the right decision
to avoid devaluation the previous summer.' 34 Desperate to refute any
indication that the British economy was weak, Wilson's main argument in
Paris was to emphasise that Britain would only enter with the strong balance
of payments that would result from the deflationary measures.'35
Britain's position as a reserve currency was complicated by the current
discussions in the IMF and the GlO as to the future of world liquidity. The
Treasury was looking for a way to alleviate the difficulties of managing the
sterling balances and recognised that support for a 'European solution' could
encourage the EEC's willingness to admit Britain.' 36 The British did not
actually want to run down the sterling balances, as holders of sterling would
object. Still less did they want to be forced by the French into hasty choices
between a world and a European role. In the international liquidity talks,
Britain tended to side with the US instead of the Europeans: 'in general, we
prefer to think in world terms'. 137 Wilson's strategy was to emphasise that the
assets of sterling holdings exceeded the liabilities. At the same time, he
wanted to pay lip-service to French ideas. The Debra and Rueff plans aimed to
pay off the holders of sterling through raising loans and were not acceptable to
Britain as they envisaged the end of sterling's reserve role.' The French did
not appear swayed by Wilson's tentative suggestion that Britain could study
French ideas. Pompidou said that sterling's position at the centre of an
'"See discussion with the Dutch, PRO PREM13 1477, Wilson - Zijlastra and delegations, 27
Feb. 1967, 4pm
PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)3', 26 Jan. 1967
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international system meant that Britain had heavy extra-European
commitments that would not be compatible with the Six.' 39 German doubts
about Article 108 meant that the French were on sound ground in resisting
British accession on this issue. Reilly advised that Britain would have to spell
out more clearly exactly how Britain intended to 'discuss sterling' in a
European context.'4°
Despite sterling, the Paris visit was a success. Commentary in the press
stressed that de Gaulle had accepted that Britain 'means business'.' 4 ' To the
Cabinet, Wilson established that de Gaulle was not in favour of British
accession and did not want to disturb the 'cosy little enclave' of the
The impression gained by other ministers was that this was a turning point for
Wilson. As Crossman reported: 'George and Harold both thought that they had
begun the major job of charming the General.. .It's my impression that
whereas George is unchanged, Harold comes back from Paris for the first time
determined the enter the Market'.' Castle added: 'George and Harold were
clearly pleased with themselves.. .They both glowed with self-satisfaction'.'
That Wilson was taken with his role as European statesman was
evident during the visit to Brussels. Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign
Minister, had suggested a compromise over political union that interested
members of the Six could team up with Britain to reach agreement on political
issues. At this time, the Six were preparing for a summit in Rome at which to
discuss political union and discussions with the British could proceed in
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parallel with this. 145 The Belgians were particularly concerned as to the
political future of Europe, wanting to move to political union, but anxious also
to secure Britain's involvement. The reason for the Belgians' concern was
their particular interest in avoiding a Franco-German split or French defection.
They saw the Community as an essential balance between France, Germany
and ultimately Britain. The collapse of the Community if France left could
lead Germany to nationalism and expose Belgium to her much more powerful
neighbour.' 46 The British were anxious not to become embroiled in detailed
discussions that could deflect attention from the purpose of the probe and so
aimed to head off Harmel's suggestions without appearing ungrateful.'47
Wilson stepped up his European rhetoric to meet this goal, stating that Britain
would be interested in the future development of the Community:
he liked to regard the Communities as having
built a railway line towards their objective on
which had been set a train. An extension of the
Conmiunity meant more coaches and a more
powerful engine. It did not mean disturbing
either the track which had been laid down or
altering the signals.'48
In order to flesh out possible ways in which Britain could work for a
'European solution' to the sterling balances, Wilson also made a statement that
surely stretched the Cabinet's 9 November agreement to its limits. A
'European solution' remained a wild-card option, as it repudiated the need for
American support and also because it was not at all clear that the EEC would
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' ibid.
'	 PREM 13 1476, Wilson - Van Den Boeynants and delegations, 31 Jan. 1967, after
dinner; Wilson, Labour, op cit., pp.341-2
CAB 134 2813, EUR(0)(67) 16, Harmel's Proposal on Non-Divergence of Policies
between the UK and the Community, Foreign Office, 27 Jan. 1967; PRO PREM13 1476,
Wilson - Van Den Boeynants and delegations, 1 Feb. 1967, 6pm
148	 PREM13 1476, Wilson - Van Den Boeynants and delegations, 1 Feb. 1967, 9.3Oain
207
be interested. 149 But ideas for a single currency had been discussed in the
Treasury at the Chancellor's suggestion. His economic adviser Nicholas
Kaldor indicated support for a single currency as the only way of solving the
problems of the sterling balances in a European context. 150 Wilson stated to
the Belgians:
A single currency would not be ruled out by the
British government. Indeed it could be more
acceptable to Britain than to certain present
members of the Community. It was possible that
a way could be found of combining a single
European currency with funding the sterling
balances. This could put an end to their future
for the rest of the twentieth century.'5'
The Belgian Prime Minister Van Den Boeynants' reaction was lukewarm,
commenting that the Six would have to call in the experts.'52
Adopting a more 'pro-European' tone could not replace real evidence
of Britain's economic compatibility with Community system. On the crucial
test-bed of the 'conditions' of membership, Wilson and Brown were able to
appear a little more forthcoming. Brown argued that, like the Treaty, the CAP
was not an obstacle in itself and that Britain only wanted to secure safeguards
in the manner that the Six had in negotiating the Treaty in the first place.'53
For payments into the agricultural fund, Brown insisted on safeguards in
advance of membership. The problem for the Belgians, as had also been
illustrated by the Italian visit, was that the consolidation of the Community's
economic union meant the Five were reluctant to grant concessions.
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Community members had all made sacrifices and fought hard to settle the
agricultural details of the CAP.
What Britain failed to appreciate, Harmel indicated, was the cross-
sectoral nature of the Community's appeal. Advantages in other industrial
sectors would offset the disadvantage to British agriculture.' 54 In addition, the
work done on the CAP over the years meant that the CAP embodied a
Community philosophy involving Community preferences, free movement of
goods and Community responsibility for marketing surplus agricultural
produce. 'He thought it would be hard to fit new ideas into a framework '/hich
had already been so frilly elaborated'.' 55 Harmel also thought that the
calculations that Britain's balance of payments would suffer a loss of £1175-
250m per year were excessive. The sum was based on the continuaticm of
present trends and so did not take into account the changes to trade imposed
by Community membership itself. Renaat Van Elsiande, the Belgian Minaster
for European Affairs, argued that surely given the abolition of deficiency
grants in Britain, Britain would gain as well as lose from the CAP.'56
Whilst in Brussels, Wilson and Brown also talked with the European
Commission. Unlike the first negotiations, when the Commission had felt that
enlargement would be too early, the Community had met many of its
difficulties concerning agriculture. The member states did not want to reopen
the enormous political disputes, but the Commission was in favour of
enlargement in principle.' 57 Robert Marjolin, the French Vice-President and
Sicco Mansholt, the leading figure behind the CAP, both agreed with the





principle that the Community should be enlarged beyond its Six-power status.
Marjolin felt that the alternative of a free trade area would prove a worse
option.' 58 Some Commissioners, however, continued to be wary about the
changes to the Community that enlargement was bound to bring.
Enlarging the Community could dilute the current institutions. Jean
Rey, the Belgian Vice-President who would shortly take over from Halistein
as President, stated that there would be considerable problems in immediate
negotiation and stressed the importance of the continuation of majority voting.
Marjolin added there was a risk that once the floodgates to enlargement
opened, the Community would transform into an institution more like the
intergovernmental Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. 159 Mansholt showed real will to begin to tackle the problems of
British accession, largely for political reasons, but also because the principles
of the CAP were in place.' 6° His vast knowledge of the CAP did mean that he
was anxious to preserve it, but he had recognised that the existing
arrangements for levy payments were suitable only for the Community of Six.
Provided Britain was disposed to accept the principles of the system, Mansholt
indicated that Britain should participate in the 1969 renegotiation, whether or
not Britain was a member.' 6 ' Commentary in the press indicated that while
Mansholt supported a short negotiation of two or three months, Rey was much
more reluctant, preferring to see accession over three years.' 62 The impression
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of the meeting with the Commissioners was that the existing arrangements of
the Six remained of higher priority than immediate enlargement. Despite
Brown and Wilson's exhortation that a second rebuff would make it
impossible to reapply, the Commissioners, particularly Rey, stressed that it
would be difficult to begin negotiations straight away.'63
The Probe in Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, February
1967
Wilson and Brown were met in Bonn by an atmosphere of some hostility)TM
Unfortunate timing meant that Wilson had just concluded an unsuccessful
peace mission with the Soviet Premier Kosygin.' 65 Having failed to mediate a
truce in Vietnam, Wilson had also discussed a potential non-proliferation
treaty (NPT) with the Soviet leader, believing the Russians to be keen to
embark on a deal. Anglo-Soviet rapprochement over non-proliferation
awakened traditional fears in Germany of their exclusion from the making of a
treaty that enshrined their subordinate nuclear status. Brown had mistakenly
suggested that Britain might recognise the Oder-Neisse line as the frontier
between Germany and Poland, implying support for the permanent division of
Germany.'66
To add to the malcontent atmosphere, tripartite talks on offset
payments were proceeding badly. The German Minister of Defence, Fanz Jee
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Strauss, had indicated that he would recommend to the German Cabinet that
no further offset payments should be made after the termination of the current
agreement in 1967. Any offset payments in 1968 should be very small.' 67 The
British had subsequently decided to continue to plan for the withdrawal of two
brigades and four RAF squadrons after the 1 July, aithough they recognised
the need to gain assurance from NATO and the WEU.' 68 The Western
Department recommended that Britain should avoid talk of offset during the
probe.' 69 London also knew that Kiesinger had no intention of standing up to
the French, having assured de Gaulle in January he would not press the
General on this point and having agreed to Franco-German talks following the
British tour. London's objectives were to make sure the Germans continued to
state publicly that British membership was in Germany's national interest.170
These were limited aims, yet essential in ensuring the continued
public impression that all leaders supported Britain's initiative except the
General.
If there was a point of failure on the probe, then it was in Bonn and not
in Paris. Overwhelmingly, the reason for the failure to garner more ardent
German support was Kiesinger's political attitude towards the French and
tactical attitude towards de Gaulle. Brown believed that staunch German
support could force de Gaulle to give way.' 7 ' Some in the German
administration, most notably Roif Lahr, Minister of State in the Auswartiges
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Amt appeared to support this view.' 72 Von Stempel, Head of the European
Integration Department, who worked closely with Lahr, suggested the
Germans could threaten to withhold funding for the CAP after 1970 if the
French refused to admit Britain.' 73 Brown's belief was based on his perceived
understanding with Willy Brandt, the Social Democrat Foreign Secretary.
Brandt remembered Brown told him: 'Willy, you must get us in, so that we
can take the lead'.' 74 Brown's arrogant attitude was confirmed in an earlier
letter to Brandt, in which he had shown his belief that Britain could get in and
that 'agriculture is negotiable'.175
Brown's belief that Brandt could help was based partly on both
leaders left-wing leanings. There was also a deeper coalition of opinion
between Brown and Brandt, based on Brandt's support for 'Ostpolitik', a
policy of greater openness towards the East. In concert with British policy and
for the first time since the division of Germany, Brandt envisaged steps to
détente without prior agreement on reunification.' 76 This position could
potentially shift the absolute deadlock between Russia and Germany, the
former insisting on the 'two Germanies', the latter demanding reunification.
That the change in German thinking was highly beneficial to Britain's long-
term aims in seeking an easement in East-West tension had been noted in the
Foreign Office.' 77 Brown seemed to equate Brandt's vision for East-West
rapprochement with his own. As Brown argued in discussions in Bonn, British
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membership of the EEC would be the best way of overcoming German doubts
as to non-proliferation:
Britain could best encourage those who were
worried on this count by entering the EEC. If
Britain did so, people's belief in the ability of
Europe to stand up for itself would be
strengthened. That was why our present
initiative was so important and could not be
allowed to fail or to suffer long delay.'78
Tactically, Wilson wanted to guard against pushing the Germans too
hard to stand up to the French. Wilson explained that Kiesinger's tactics with
the General were 'softly, softly catchee General' h79 A Franco-German breach
was certainly not in Britain's interests, as the Foreign Office warned.'8°
Pushing too hard could also jeopardise any support; as after all, why should
the Germans court bad faith with the French if the British stood to one side
and tried to woo the General?' 81 Perhaps the best expression of the balance
Wilson sought came in a telegram from the British Ambassador in Bonn, Sir
Frank Roberts. While Kiesinger reportedly said he wanted to 'keep the door
open' for British entry, Brandt and Strauss had urged that they should 'force
the door open'. 182 Nobody seriously wanted to break the Community up to
achieve British membership, but while keeping the door open would wait for
'time and circumstance' to play its inevitable role, forcing it open would hope
to hasten the day of British entry.
In addition, Anglo-German concert over reunification and détente was
too large a prize to jeopardise over the question of British entry in the short-
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term. 183 The potential for playing one issue off another was absolutely clear.
Kiesinger seemed to try to exert from Britain an assurance that they
'understood the anxieties of the non-nuclear powers' in the creation of a non-
proliferation treaty, likening it to Wilson's desire for him to 'do all in their
power to bring about Britain's entry to the EEC'.' 84 In addition, hard
bargaining over offset could be undermined if Britain were compelled to make
concessions in order to get into Europe.'85
The reason for the German reluctance to pressure the French was in
part that there was very little economic stimulus for them to do so. German
industry undoubtedly supported British and EFTA accession into the EEC and
had done since the beginning of discussions on European integration. 186 Yet
the BDI would not force the government to break with the French, as its
President, Fritz Berg, argued that the continued development of the Common
Market was more important than enlargement in the short term. In particular,
industry wanted to see the fusion of the executives of the three Communities
in order to move towards a common energy policy.' 87 Wilson did threaten
during the talks that there could arise a spirit of competitiveness between the
tradmg units of the EEC and EFTA if Britain's bid failed: 'he would not use
the term trade war'. Brandt's response was to talk about fusion and the
forthcoming Rome Summit between the Six at which political union would be
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discussed. 188 Community development seemed to take priority in German
thinking, particularly as de Gaulle had suggested that the Rome summit could
be used to address fusion.189
Germany's attitude towards British concerns about agriculture was also
relevant. Lahr in fact disputed the British figures, arguing that Britain's
calculations of a balance of payments cost of £175-250m from levy payments
was actually the total cost of the burden including the rise in import prices.'90
The British considered that the German Ministry of Agriculture had not fully
appreciated that the British saw the problem as the cost to the balance of
payments rather than balancing the budget in Britain.' 91 The Ministry of
Finance was also concerned that Britain could be too weak to cope with
membership without heavily drawing on Article 108.192 The economic reasons
to push hard for British accession in the short-term were not compelling.
In the main, the German reluctance to stand up to de Gaulle resulted
from political considerations. Kiesinger was personally in favour of Franco-
German rapprochement, coming from the Adenauer wing of the party.193
Added to this was the sense that every German leader had to go through a
'honeymoon' period with the French, before the deeper points of conflict
began to intrude.' 94 Kiesinger's political priorities led to a tactical reluctance
to apply direct pressure to the French for fear ofjeopardising wider goals. The
discussions between the French and Germans in January seemed also to have
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contributed to the sense that they did not wish to annoy the General. Kiesinger
argued:
Revived Franco-German friendship was a tender
plant which had to be treated with great care, not
only because of the importance of their
relationship to the two countries themselves, but
also because these relations were of importance
to the whole of Europe... How could the
Germans exert an influence in Paris? He did not
believe that they could impress General de
Gaulle by attempting to bring pressure to bear
on him, for they knew his personality and how
strongly he felt about certain things. Nor did he
think that it would be good for Germany to exert
much pressure so soon after overcoming the
unpleasantness which had existed between
France and Germany. . .The more Germany
could fulfil the hopes which the French placed in
improved co-operation with her, the better
would be the chance of her arguments
succeeding.195
Tactical reluctance was not confined to the pro-French Kiesinger.
Brandt, who was more in favour of British membership, also advised against
making an application at the present time. He did not think that it could be
possible to make headway with de Gaulle and advised Britain to wait until the
Germans had talked to the French: 'he doubted whether it was wise to have
multilateral discussions on British entry at this stage before some further
progress had been made in various bilateral talks'.' 96 The statement reveals
that Brown's view of Brandt as a co-conspirator in Britain's attempt to get in,
was completely misjudged. It also suggests that Wilson's interpretation that
Brandt made a deal with Kiesinger for domestic stability may also have been
over-optimistic. Brandt appeared to share Kiesinger's concerns about pushing
de Gaulle too fast.
217
Wilson and Brown did, however, seem to make headway in forcing a
more positive attitude from the Germans. Wilson's explanation of the long-
term political benefits of British entry was fulsome, outlining the development
of the European Community in terms of 'strength, unity and independence' as
a vision for the future. 197 Both leaders did play down the 'conditions' of
membership, stressing that the importance lay in the political arguments.198
Wilson indicated that the negotiations would be short, confined to four or five
major issues in order to get away from the economic horse-trading of the
Brussels negotiations. He also used threat tactics, suggesting that if Britain
was rebuffed, public opinion would start to turn away from Europe and the
great opportunity for the extension of East-West détente would be lost.199
Kiesinger's press briefmg did say that Germany would work for British entry:
we will make efforts objectively and in our own
interests to bring Britain into the Common
Market because her entry would be a useful
contribution to the existing Community. We
have committed ourselves to this and have
agreed to exercise some influence on the French.
The talks have had a good result and our
position has been strengthened by knowledge
about the British arguments.20°
Brandt was keener than Kiesinger and had been swayed by the
prospect that Britain would turn away from Europe. According to the British
records, when Kiesinger and Brandt reported to the German Cabinet,
Kiesinger said that they would now seek to 'dissipate French reservations'.
Brandt, however, said that the Germans must give active support, as 'failure
PREM 13 1477, Wilson, Brown - Kiesmger, Brandt, 15 Feb. 1967, 10am
PREM13 1477, Wilson, Brown— Kiesmger, Brandt, 16 Feb. 1967, 10am
PREM13 1477, Wilson— Kiesinger and delegations, 15 Feb. 1967, 3.3Opm
198 ibid.
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would cause great dismay to the European-minded young generation in
Britain'. 20 ' British action turned also to putting pressure on the German
opposition parties to keep up the influence on Kiesinger in the Bundestag.202
But Wilson had not been able to convince Kiesinger forcibly to hold the door
open. Moreover, both Kiesinger and Brandt had actively counselled delay.
Prior to the probe, Wilson had told the Cabinet that Germany would welcome
British accession, but doubted whether they would be prepared to press their
support against France. He stated that 'we should be in a better position to
judge in the light of this and other visits whether or not we should seek to join
the Community and if so what the timing of our approach should be'. 203 It is
perhaps telling that he did not report back to the Cabinet on the results of the
visit.
Wilson was still determined to advance towards some kind of
membership bid. The Prime Minister told Hetherington he was thinking of
holding multilateral discussions between Britain and the Six when the probe
had ended. These discussions would deal with four or five major issues and
would allow time for opinion in Britain to evolve towards accepting
membership. 2°4 He did not seem to be thinking in terms of an immediate
membership bid, suggesting that there was no need to hurry and that Britain's
balance of payments would be stronger later in the year.205 In the Netherlands,
Wilson and Brown tested the water mainly to see what kind of application
would be acceptable to opinion in the Six. The Dutch were plainly in favour of
200	 PREM13 1477, Bonn to FO, tel.315, 16 Feb. 1967
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British accession for political reasons and had firmly supported Britain during
the Brussels negotiations and in the 1961-2 talks on political union. As the
Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns said:
Since the last war the Netherlands government
had been absolutely committed to the idea of
greater cohesion and unity within Europe and
finally to the concept of a united Europe. Great
Britain could and should play a very great role.
This was not only because of the values which
Great Britain could contribute to the expanded
community, the Netherlands government saw in
our accession the possibility of further
harmonised development and close co-operation
with North America.206
Luns and the caretaker President of the Dutch Council of Ministers,
Professor Jelle Zijlastra, did not agree that Wilson should press for multilateral
discussions. Rather, Zijiastra suggested that Britain should issue an
unconditional application, agreeing to accept all the provisions under
transitional periods. Attaching preconditions to membership would lead to
'new stumbling blocks' and delay. It was also preferable, Luns emphasised, to
make some kind of application now so as not to lose the momentum created by
the probe. A further option of more bilateral talks would allow Britain's
detractors to argue that the British were unsure exactly what they wanted. The
Dutch did suggest that Britain should seek solution to acceptance of the CAP
by participation in the 1969 agricultural review. If Britain were a member by
1969, then Britain could influence the final settlement.207
The central issue for Luns was to avoid either procrastination or a
definite 'no' from the French. In order to achieve this symmetry, it would be
necessary for Britain to issue an application uncluttered enough to show that
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Britain accepted Community terms. Wilson argued that it would be impossible
domestically to make an unconditional application:
if the advice meant that Britain should put in an
entirely unconditional application it would not
be accepted by the British Parliament unless it
was backed by a clear understanding of what
would happen in relation to British and
Commonwealth interests, what would be
covered in the negotiations and what would be
left for later settlement, and so on.208
On the central issue of how to proceed with the bid, Wilson therefore appeared
to arrive at an impasse. His preference of multilateral talks would provide
opportunity for the French to argue that Britain was not serious. The Dutch
alternative of an unconditional application, conversely, would prove
impossible for domestic opinion to accept.
The Dutch did make suggestions, that Wilson found useful, as to how
to deal with sterling. Wilson argued that the balance of payments was now
strong and so there would be no need for the Six to worry about having to
support sterling under Article 108. Britain's balance of payments difficulties
had been rectified by the July deflation. Moreover, the level of the sterling
balances was constant. The Basle agreements and the IMF provided additional
support if sterling was under pressure and Britain's total assets were greater
than liabilities. Zijiastra suggested it could be useful to draw a distinction
between sterling as a reserve currency and the balance of payments. Britain
should undertake that they would not call on Article 108 in the event of
fluctuations in the sterlmg balances. The problem was that the Six did not




want to be held responsible for paying off holders of sterling in the event of
significant sales of the currency.
Wilson readily agreed, keen to establish that there was a difference
between the sterling balances and the balance of payments. Such a solution
would also ensure that sterling was handled primarily in the international
forum of the IMF. Van Lennep, Treasurer General in the Ministry of Finance,
argued that it was less the problem that Britain might call on the Six to help
with the sterling balances, as Article 108 had not envisaged baling out reserve
currencies. Rather, the problem was that Britain might be forced to adopt
deflationary policies in the absence of alternative policy instruments. He
agreed that an undertaking that the Six would not have to underwrite sterling
would be useful.209
The Dutch suggestions led Wilson to a reconsideration of his
procedural options. The fact that Dutch advice caused him to reappraise is
testimony to the underlying realism of his approach, although it also confirms
that he had initially overestimated the settlement that he could negotiate.
Again, Wilson claimed to have been thinking about the Common Market in
his bath:
he said he was now doubtful about multilateral
talks. He thought they might have to take a
straight decision on making a direct application
and signing the Rome Treaty. This was the
Dutch advice. He seemed much less confident
then before of being able to get a further
elucidation of the three major problems [CAP,
New Zealand, capital movements] as seen from
our side before having to take his decision.21°
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Wilson's realisation that he would not be able to get the safeguards he had
initially envisaged also sheds light on the Prime Minister's attitude towards
the 'conditions' of membership, particularly to the CAP. Hetherington's
recollections show that Wilson himself was propelled reluctantly towards
acceptance of the provisions of the EEC. He continued to cling to the
possibility that if Britain were unable to protect her 'essential interests' during
negotiations, then Britain could recoil at the end:
He said that even if we took the decision to
apply and to sign the Treaty we could still pull
back at the very end, but he obviously did not
view this possibility with much pleasure. The
implication of the way he said it was that it
could be a kind of desperate last resort if, after
signing and starting to go in, we found that the
conditions on the crucial issues were still
wrong.21'
Thus, the initial equivocation that Wilson had shown towards the
Common Market was still evident. He did not want to take Britain into the
EEC without safeguards, but the discoveries on the probe showed how narrow
Britain's options were. Although the notion of pulling out at the last minute
was later a sop to ministerial opinion, his comments to Hetherington suggest
that Wilson allowed himself to believe that there would always be a way out.
In the ever-ambivalent boundaries of the Prime Minister's thinking,
understanding that the path into the EEC was one-way was consistent with a
persistent belief that he would, if necessary, be able to put Britain into reverse.
In Luxembourg, Wilson experimented with different ways of
circumventing the potential problem of the CAP. A shift from his reiteration
that Britain would need safeguards, Wilson put forward his 'personal opinion'
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that Britain would be able to accept the philosophy that agricultural levies
should be owned by the Commission. What Britain sought was not
fundamental change but 'special safeguards', in the way that Germany had
been granted a ceiling for its contribution to the fund:
We were after all talking in terms of a marriage
between the Community and Britain. You might
prefer the girl you were marrying to have blue
rather than grey eyes but you could not insist on
her changing the colour of her eyes before you
married her.2l2
On this basis, the Luxembourg Prime Minister Werner indicated that solution
should be possible. The important factor for the Luxembourgers was that
Britain would be able to accept the solution envisaged for the CAP in the final
stage of the Community's transition.213
Overall, the probe was a success. First, it built political support for
Britain in Europe and encouraged Wilson to erode gradually the stress on
Britain's desire to make safeguards in advance of membership. He came back
from Europe, as Pimlott had noted, a convert to the cause of membership.214
Yet, the probe drew attention to greater problems involved in the British bid.
The first of these was sterling. Making the application at a time of balance of
payments weakness facilitated French arguments that Britain was
economically too weak to join and that British weakness was symptomatic of
Britain's extra-European interests. French political concerns fed into the
Five's fears that Britain would not be able to cope with membership, in
211 ibid
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particular German anxiety that Britain would use European money to run
down the sterling balances or finance the payments deficit.
Secondly, the probe revealed that none of the Five would be prepared
to stand up to the French to force British membership. This was a particularly
acute problem in Germany, where the balance of political power had recently
shifted in favour of the pro-French supporters and ensured that de Gaulle
would not face odious political pressure if he refused to let Britain in. But the
problem went deeper than this. Community development and in particular the
difficult and lengthy settlement of the agricultural negotiations meant that
none of the Five were willing to unpick agreements they had fought hard to
achieve. The CAP, as the Belgians and Italians made clear and as had been
revealed earlier during discussion of the Kennedy Round, embodied the whole
philosophy of the Community's economic management. This meant that
Britain would not be able to secure safeguards in advance of membership. For
all the Six, the preservation and development of the existing system was too
important to make substantial changes. Everyone had had to accept
unwelcome consequences for the benefits of membership and so too would
Britain. Wilson had come to understand reluctantly that substantial safeguards
would prove unnegotiable. Still aspiring to a solution that left an escape-route
open, the Prime Minister turned to the unenviable task of reconciling the
opposing requirements of Britain's European and domestic interests.
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5. Finding a Role? Cabinet's Acceptance of the European
Application, March - April 1967
As the probe drew to a close, Harold Wilson decided the time was right to
bring the Cabinet to acceptance of an application for membership of the EEC.
Significantly, the initial decision to make the application was Wilson's alone
and did not involve collaboration with his Foreign Secretary. In fact, Brown,
partly influenced by strong indications from German sources that Britain
should delay making an overt initiative, counselled further bilateral
discussions. 1 Brown, Con O'Neill and William Nield in the Cabinet Office all
felt that it would be impossible to gain Cabinet acceptance for the conditions
necessary to make a convincing application. 2 Rather than launch the bid in this
way, Brown suggested that to sustain the momentum gained by the tour, the
Cabinet should take a decision in principle to accept the Treaty and then
conduct further discussions.3
The state of play in the Cabinet was the primary consideration for
Wilson, as a rare letter to Trend, obtained by the Foreign Office, reveals. The
critical difference between Wilson and Brown was Wilson's belief that the
Cabinet could be brought to support the application on the terms that would be
necessary. The application would be simple, but not unconditional. The
'conditions' would be dealt with in a statement to the House that would leave
unclear the exact nature of the end settlement, implying that safeguards would
be negotiated without promising so. Wilson did not discuss the precise terms
l PRO FCO3O 188, O'Neill to Gore-Booth, 28 Feb. 1967; Roberts to O'Neill, 9 Mar. 1967;
PRO FCO3O 189, Galsworthy to Statham, 14 Mar. 1967
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that Britain could or could not accept. Of the prospect of a French veto,
Wilson commented simply that 'our general view has been that a rebuff would
be very difficult for them'. 4 During the eight Cabinet meetings to follow,
ministers gradually played out the political and economic rationale behind
Wilson's turn to Europe.
Negotiating Objectives
Within the Foreign Office, plans were ongoing to create a negotiating strategy
different from that used by Macmillan, designed to accord to a much greater
extent to the Community's methods. The brain behind the strategy was John
Robinson, regarded as the driving force in the Foreign Office's European
policy.5 Drawing on ideas developed after the 1963 veto, Robinson suggested
the radical proposition that Britain should not seek safeguards in advance of
membership. Rather, the British should get into the Community and work to
safeguard Britain's interests from the inside. Maximising Britain's influence
from within displayed an ability to accept the principle of membership without
niggling over the details and was appreciative of the flexible, cross-sectoral
trading now commonplace in the Community. In this analysis, demanding
safeguards in one sector would have serious repercussions in another.
Robinson argued, for instance, that insistence on cheap cereal prices in Britain
would force the Community to subsidise their exports to Britain and so would
2 PRO PREM13 1477, Nield to Palliser, 23 Feb. 1967
PRO FCO3O 82, Brown - Mulley, 24 Feb. 1967
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increase their call for Britain's large contribution to the agricultural fund. 6 As
Con O'Neill put it:
The experience of many years.. .taught us. . .that
the power of any country outside the
Community to influence its decisions and
actions is extremely limited. The experience of
the members of the Community themselves
since 1958 should have taught us that their own
power to protect their interests from within the
Community is sufficient.7
The Cabinet never debated Robinson's paper, but Wilson had read it
and it was later circulated as the point of departure in the EURO Committee.8
The innovation in Robinson's thinking was to set out the case for accession to
the Community via one single transitional period covering all sectors.
Robinson advocated a one-year standstill period followed by a four-year
transition. The standstill year was necessary in order to give twelve months
notice of withdrawal from the Stockholm Convention to allow those EFTA
countries unable to associate time to adjust to the reintroduction of tariffs. His
idea of a single period covering all sectors was important, and relates also to
his increased emphasis on cross-sectoral bargaining.
A single transitional period would overcome the fundamental problem
of 'trade deflection' which had been an issue between the Six and the British
since the Free Trade Area negotiations in 1 9579 If Britain adopted the internal
customs tariff at a quicker rate than the common external tariff, Britain would
benefit from free trade in manufacture with the Community while retaining
6	 PREM13 1479, Negotiating Objectives, Robinson paper, 20 Mar. 1967; PRO
FCO3O 100, comments by Brown, 29 Mar. 1967
Hannay, (ed.) Britain 's Entry into the European Community: Report on the
Negotiations of 1970-1972 by Sir Con O'Neill (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p.356
8	 PREM13 1479, Palliser and Wilson comments on Robmson paper, 7 Apr. 1967
9 Ellison, Threatening, op.cit., pp.187-197
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free imports of food from the Commonwealth. Cheap Commonwealth imports
could pass through Britain on the way to the Community and so undercut
Community producers in European markets. In addition, the Community's
agricultural exports to the UK, particularly those of the Dutch and the French
who could expect to penetrate the UK markets in the absence of cheap
competition, would be significantly disadvantaged.' 0 The question was
complicated further because of the substantial agricultural production of
Denmark and the Republic of Ireland. The Six did not want to face Danish and
Irish competition unless Britain's market was simultaneously opened to help
absorb it. Asking for one transitional period would strengthen Britain's case
for breathing space to adopt the Community's agricultural provisions, as the
Community itself wanted at least five years to open its borders to Britain's
coal exports.1'
Importantly, the idea of a single transitional period reiterated the
political principle that Britain could and would accept all the provisions of the
Treaty of Rome. Robinson's ideas were very different to any that had been
publicly discussed and serve to illustrate the gulf between informed Foreign
Office opinion and the wider political environment. As Wilson's earlier
comments to Hetherington suggest, he did not himself want to accept all the
provisions of the Treaty of Rome and hoped to leave open the possibility of
last minute retreat.' 2 Nevertheless, as he embarked upon the series of Cabinet
meetings, Wilson knew the broad shape of the settlement he would have to
convince the Cabinet to accept in order to deliver a convincing bid.
'° Ludlow, Dealing, op.cit., p.185
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Capital Movements and Regional Policy, 21 March and 6 April
The experience Wilson had gained of the European Community on the probe
gave him the credibility to take the lead in the Cabinet. Wilson began with an
accurate description of the issues dealt with during the tour. He illustrated that
the three main problems were the CAP levy system, capital movements,
particularly portfolio investment, New Zealand and the Commonwealth Sugar
Agreement. Other difficulties, he argued, had been shown as less important
than originally thought. Regional polic vould not pose difficulties, as the Six
were all able to pursue these. There was nothing in the Treaty of Rome to rule
out economic planning. Sterling and Article 108 could constitute a stumbling
block, although the Dutch had made the useful suggestion that Britain could
undertake not to use the article. He admitted de Gaulle did not want Britain in
and that the Five would be unwilling to push for a breach with the French for
the sake of British accession. 13 The Cabinet turned to discuss the conditions of
membership, beginning with capital movements and regional policy.
The problem for the UK in accepting the Community's provisions for
capital movements resulted mainly from the current weakness of sterling. The
Community's third directive on capital movements in 1966 sought complete
liberalisation of capital between member states. Since 1964, however, the
government had adopted stringent controls on capital movements in order to
protect the parity of the pound, including the recent voluntary programme to
restrain the export of capital to the sterling area. 14 It would be impossible to
sustain this upon entry to the Community, as it would be politically difficult to
LSE, Hetherington Papers, 13 21, Meeting with Wilson, 21 Mar. 1967
PRO CAB128 42, CC(67)l4th, 21 Mar. 1967
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discriminate against the sterling area countries in favour of the Community.
Outside the sterling area, neither direct nor portfolio investment was allowed
in official exchange. Direct investment had to be fmanced by borrowing
abroad and portfolio investment was only permitted in investment currency.'5
Direct investment outflows would be offset by inflows, but portfolio
investment could lead to a massive outflow to the USA, as British investors
would be able to hold foreign currency securities outside the Community.
Capital could rapidly flow out of the UK calling into question the exchange
value of the pound.'6
In principle, the Treasury clearly accepted the implications of
European membership and also acknowledged that Community provisions
could be used to safeguard the potential outflow of portfolio funds. The Dutch
had had a similar problem regarding portfolio investment and had
recommended the use of Article 70(2) of the Treaty to provide safeguards
against the outflow. If the provisions were phased in over a transitional period,
Britain could avoid the shock of sudden change. Callaghan told the Cabinet
that membership would help to preserve the parity of sterling by providing a
stimulus to industrial competitiveness and would make the UK more attractive
to US investment. The economies of scale provided by a larger market could
also provide a spur to industrial efficiency.' 7 The Treasury's acceptance of the
principle of European membership resulted from their longer-term aims
towards global relaxation of restrictions.' 8 Since dejure convertibility in 1958,
the Treasury had been working to multilateralise trade and payments with the
CAB128 42, CC(67)17th, 6 Apr. 1967
CAB 134 2812, EUR(OX66)38, Capital Movements, Treasury, 5 Jan. 1967
16 ibid.
' 7 PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)17th, 6 Apr. 1967
231
European countries and by 1960 considered that its closest economic
relationship was with continental Europe, not the sterling area countries.'9
London's highly developed capital market could expect to take advantage of
access to the Six's monetary and insurance sectors and it was hoped that the
City would become the leading financial centre in the Community.2°
For the Cabinet, it was also clear that acceptance of the application
resulted in part from agreement with the economic rationale behind Callaghan
and Wilson's statements. Wilson argued that discussion in Europe had shown
that it would not be difficult to safeguard the government's practice of
regional policies as all members of the Six adopted regional discrimination in
some form. Jay countered that the removal of exchange controls would
weaken the government's capacity to enforce regional provision, as the
government would not be able to control where investment took place. This
would mean effectively handing over to the markets the government's control
of the distribution of employment and prosperity. Wilson responded that
without membership, Britain would not be able to have regional policies:
our investment in development areas depended
on our growth of the economy and there was
reason to think that entry would lead to an
incentive for industry to increase investment and
thus increase the growth of the economy.2'
The argument that membership would encourage growth and facilitate
regional policies and by implication, welfare policies, was a vital one.
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Ministers such as Crossman, disappointed by the failure of Labour's
alternative of the National Plan, voiced support for this case:
Once it's known we are going into the Common
Market the industrialists who are holding back
now will put in an extra 20 or 30 % of
investment. That will get the growth rate up. It's
the lift we require to restore growth that will
help the development areas more than any
artificial scheme a British govermnent could
think up.22
Even Barbara Castle, more fervently opposed to membership, admitted
that the collapse of the 'socialist' economic plan left the government with no
real alternative. She indicated her appreciation of the need to adopt credible
policies in order to stay in office, showing the force of Stewart's argument in
October that the public had lost faith in planning as a framework for growth.
She consoled herself that she could work for smaller aims within the European
framework:
Yet the more disappointed I am over our policies
in other fields, the more satisfaction I get from
fighting for the right policies in my own. And
the more painful becomes the thought of giving
up my job to return to the sterilities of the back
benches.23
The collapse of the government's economic alternative of the National Plan
led the Cabinet to resigned acceptance of EEC membership. Crossman
indicated that opinion firmly against an initiative rested only with Douglas
Jay. Peart, Castle and Healey were no longer committed against an attempt to
get in.24
Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit.. p.303, 6 Apr. 1967
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The CAP, 18 April
In the Brussels negotiations, the British had initially hoped to avoid the
main ramifications of the CAP. When agriculture was discussed in February
1962, Heath asked for a transitional period of 12-15 years and suggested that
the Treasury could continue to supplement grants to farmers. 25 Combined with
Britain's demands for exceptions to the common external tariff for
Commonwealth trade, Britain's commitment to the nascent CAP seemed
minimal.
Robinson's system of transitional periods intended to deal with the
problem of the adoption of the CAP. His new idea was to phase in the
agricultural changes at the same time as the industrial ones. The single
transitional period met head on the problem of trade deflection and origin
rules, made more pressing by the completion of the customs union in July
1967. For example, the Dutch would receive the duty imposed on imports
entering the Community bound for Germany through the Dutch port of
Rotterdam, but the goods would proceed free of duty to Germany. 26 The
opportunity for re-export and the potential for flooding the Community market
with third country produce, or exporting produce made with cheap imports of
raw materials were clear. In July 1966, the Six confirmed the May agreements
to pay 90% of the variable levies charged on third country agricultural imports
directly into the Community's agricultural fund. 27 The agreement confirmed
the principle of 'own resources', providing the Community with an annual
24 Crossman, Diaries. vol.2, op cit., p.285, 21 Mar. 1967
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budget. 'Own resources' removed the incentive for trade deflection, thus
consolidating the principle of the internal customs union. Robinson envisaged
acceptance of the CAP in its entirety. The sooner Britain adopted the
Community's tariffs, levies and provisions for farmers, the earlier the British
would be able to secure voting rights in the Council of Ministers and thus full
political weight in the Community.28
The Ministry of Agriculture had also accepted the principle of the
CAP, subject to particular safeguards. Yet, the safeguards requested
undermined Robinson's proposals and so raised questions about Whitehall's
commitment to the EEC system. The Ministry of Agriculture's main concern
was that adoption of the CAP would cause distortion in British farming. In
December 1964, the Six had agreed prices for cereals considerably higher than
Britain's own levels. Projections for 1966-67 revealed that Britain's wheat
price would face a hike of just over £10 per ton and barley at just under £6 per
ton. The rise in cereal prices, the Ministry predicted, would lead to an
unmanageable distortion in domestic production. Higher cereal prices would
encourage farmers to concentrate production in larger units in more lucrative
agrarian pursuits in the south and east of the country, increasing cereal
production from its projected 1 8m tons in 1973 to 20m tons. Dairy and hill
farmers alongside pig and poultry farmers made up a much higher proportion
of total farm sales - 50% compared to cereals' 12%. Based principally in the
north and west, Scotland and Wales, these farmers would suffer a comparative
loss of profits, face unemployment and the practice of such farming would fall
28 PRO PREM13 1479, Negotiating Objectives, Robinson, 20 Mar. 1967
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into decline. 29 Britain's domestic beef price was set to rise, although price
levels for milk, potatoes, sheepmeat and some fruit and vegetables would drop
slightly.30
The National Farmers' Union also wanted to preserve the existing
system of an annual review procedure which gave the NFU a say in pricing
and production quotas. In the wider political environment it was the question
of prices that posed the most sensitive problems. 31 The cost of food was set to
rise by between 10-14% and the cost of living by 3%•32 Presented in terms of
the cost to the 'pocket of the ordinary housewife', price rises were a weapon
employed by both left and right wing opponents of membership.
Internationally, it was difficult to sustain Britain's trading preferences,
connected to policies of domestic support, without the political influence
bought by membership. In the Kennedy Round, for example, the Six and the
USA wanted to raise the world's wheat prices above the level current in
Britain and wanted to export surpluses produced in developed countries as
food aid to the developing world. 33 For Britain, export surpluses would
encourage more imports, straining the balance of payments further. Standing
alone was increasingly unsustainable and Britain's attempts to mitigate its
difficulties by the generalisation of preferences were thwarted by the might of
the Six and the USA.
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The Ministry of Agriculture wanted to seek from the Community
assurances for four specific problems involved in Britain's adoption of the
CAP: the winter production of liquid milk, arrangements for pigs and eggs,
continuation of hill farm subsidies and an annual review procedure similar to
that employed in Britain. 34 Milk was a problem because of the CAP agreement
for dairy produce, which set the price for butter and cheese at the same level
for that of liquid milk. In the UK, liquid milk received a guaranteed price,
whereas butter and cheese were sold at world prices. This encouraged the
production of liquid milk throughout the year, ensuring supply in the winter
when it was more expensive to produce. The Ministry of Agriculture's fear
was that the levelling of prices and the undermining of the collective
marketing system of the Milk Marketing Boards would encourage local dairies
to sell cheese and butter rather than liquid milk. This could leave the
'housewife' short of milk in the winter and would create 'social and political
problems'. The Ministry of Agriculture accordingly suggested retention of the
role of Milk Marketing Boards and arrangements to ensure the continuation of
higher prices for milk than butter and cheese.35
For pigmeat and eggs, the Ministry of Agriculture wanted to adopt
support buying in order to boost their prices and thus their profitability. The
problem was the general distortion of agricultural production favouring cereal
farmers over hill farmers. Pig and poultry farmers would stand to lose also
because of the increased cost of cereal feed owing to the cereal price rises.
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Intervention arrangements, for which talks were underway in the Community,
could meet Britain's needs.36
The most serious problem was that of agricultural levy payments. The
settlement in July 1966 of the exact quantities confirmed just how much
Britain would have to contribute. Later calculations indicated that Britain
would be charged £180m in levy payments and a further £30m on the fixed
percentage contribution, while net receipts would only be £45m, leading to a
net contribution of £192.5m.37 Britain's contribution was calculated at 35% of
the total contributions, higher than Germany, the next largest contributor,
whose payment would be 20%, despite Germany's higher GNP. The Cabinet
were told that Britain's payments into the Fund would add to the total balance
of payments cost, calculated at between £175-250m annually. 38 Admitting
now that Britain would shoulder this burden could encourage an anticipatory
outflow of capital and so reopen the fundamental question as to whether or not
Britain was economically strong enough to seek entry. Privately, the Foreign
Office felt that Britain would have no choice but to accept the levy payments,
hoping to modify them once inside the Community. Robinson encouraged the
Prime Minister to think of the Six's agricultural review as a solution: 'We
assumed that it would be our objective to be in the Community in time to take
part in negotiating the new financial arrangements to apply after 1969'.
The Minister of Agriculture, Fred Peart, established that it was not in
Britain's interests to join the CAP because of the distortion to agriculture and
ibid.
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the reduction in farmers' security. Higher prices would add to the cost of
living and the cost to the balance of payments would be serious. Peart
demanded at least a seven year transitional period and argued that Britain must
seek commodity arrangements for milk and sugar. It would also be necessary
to find ways of relieving the balance of payments and to sustain the current
system of an annual review. 40 Wilson stemmed much discussion on the
specific provisions. He argued that Britain would have to insist on more than
transitional periods to alleviate the inequitable burden of levy payments and
the balance of payments cost of membership.41
Wilson's insistence on more than transitional periods for agriculture
illustrated his contradictory attitude expressed to Hetherington after the Dutch
probe. His personal opinion, as he had formerly told Robinson, was that he
had 'never accepted that transitional periods were enough for levy
payments'. 42 Yet, Wilson knew that participation in 1969 was unlikely to
prove a viable solution. Trend's paper on agriculture admitted as much,
specifically stating that the French would never allow British entry before
1969. This point was also made to the Cabinet. 43 It would, however, seem that
Wilson deliberately allowed the Cabinet to believe that 1969 could provide a
solution. The idea that Britain could solve the difficulties created by the levy
arrangements by entry before 1969 certainly entered Cabinet consciousness. In
his private notes on the Cabinet meetings, Tony Crosland recorded: 'Miss
crucial 1969: higher and higher price to pay'. 1969 thus became a means by
4°PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)21', 18 Apr. 1967
ibid.; Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., p.308, 18 Apr. 1967
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and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967
LSE, Anthony Crosland Papers, Crosland 4 9, Personal Notes on Europe, 1967
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which Wilson could insist on safeguards for a domestic audience without
having to spell out exactly what Britain would seek for the purposes of a short-
term bid. In this way, he could circumvent one of the major difficulties of
membership.
There is no alternative, 20 April 1967
Aware that continual discussions on the conditions of membership focused
ministers' minds on the negative implications of membership, Wilson turned
to the political case for entry. Turning to the political arguments was a shift
from the tactics employed since the previous November and was the result of
the advice of Burke Trend. Trend calculated that Wilson would have to
separate those ministers who were opposed in principle from those who were
opposed at the moment:
expose the duality. . .between those who would
prefer not to enter in any circumstances we can
foresee (the 'nevers') and those who think we
should eventually become members but that it
would be premature for us to seek membership
in the next year to two, or even perhaps so long
as General de Gaulle remains in power (the 'not
yets').45
Specifically, Trend's argument was designed to meet the case put by Healey
that there was no point applying because of the certainty that de Gaulle would
veto; no point in 'playing for a rebuff'.46 At least half the Cabinet were still
opposed or wavering. Healey's argument that the application was bound to
fail could therefore provide an easy way to oppose the decision without
PRO PREM13 1479, Trend to Wilson, 19 Apr. 1967
Castle, Diaries, op.cit., pp.123-4, 20 Apr. 1967
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opposing the principle and so could swing the balance against. To fend it off,
Wilson aimed to show that it was irrelevant whether the application failed.
The Cabinet had no alternative, if they were to stay in power, than to state that
they accepted European membership on the reduced terms they would be
likely to get.47
Trend established the economic case for membership, attaching a cover
note to Thomas Balogh's paper 'Alternatives to Common Market
membership'. Balogh opposed European membership on the grounds that it
would precipitate a devaluation of sterling. Balogh believed that the likelihood
of devaluation if Britain joined the EEC would provide political support from
the United States for an Atlantic Free Trade Area. This, Trend argued, was not
the case. Unless there was a complete breakdown in relations between the
USA and the EEC over the Kennedy Round, there was no reason for the USA
to sign a free trade agreement with Britain. Mainly for political reasons, US
policy was to support Britain's membership of the EEC. Trend also ruled out
the possibility of 'Going it Alone', reconfigured as 'Abstention'. Technically
it would be possible to sustain Britain's economy alone, but it would entail a
massive specialisation and limitation of production. Without the benefits of
access to the EEC market, having to rationalise the economy in this way
would be less appealing than doing so within the framework of membership of
the EEC. In an expression of the bottom line economic case for British entry,
Trend showed that 'in form we might be more free [outside], but it would be a
freedom to submit to disagreeable necessities'.
PRO PREM13 1479, Trend to Wilson, 19 Apr. 1967
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In addition to the implications for Britain's economy, Trend argued
that in world trade, Britain needed to be a member of a larger grouping. Other
countries were forming trading agreements, such as the American—Canadian
agreement for cars or the Australian New Zealand free trade arrangement.
Outside these developments, Britain would command little bargaining power
and be able to find only limited export markets. Deciding irrevocably against
membership would cast Britain adrift from the main developments in politics
and trade. Finally, Trend argued that if the French did veto, the UK should
continue with current economic and trading policies, but should continue to
hope, with US support, that 'at a later stage a more favourable opportunity
might occur'.48
Wilson adopted Trend's arguments, but added a more overtly political
case for going into the EEC. Staying out would confine the role the UK could
play in the world, handing over Britain's relationship with the USA to the
Germans and watching as the Germans dominated in Europe. Inside Europe, it
would be possible to influence the development of the Community. Both the
US and the USSR wanted Britain inside Europe in order to act as a
counterweight to a resurgent Germany, enabling Britain to play a role in
détente.49 This political view still represented Wilson's, and Brown's, belief
that Britain could lead in Europe: 'he still thought that our political influence
in Europe if we joined would be great. If we couldn't dominate that lot, there
wasn't much to be said for us'.5°
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The Cabinet furiously rejected Trend's suggestion that in the event of a
veto Britain should 'stand on the threshold in a stance of eager expectation'.5'
But Wilson did not let this pass, making clear that if Britain was kept out,
there would be little choice but to seek membership in the longer term: 'if
rebuffed, we should not rule out the possibility of joining Europe later'.52
Wilson's arguments did have immediate effect. Healey, the key target of the
tactics, was annoyed. His case that he supported the bid because 'the General
will save us from our folly' reflected his irritation but masked the deeper
realisation that the Cabinet was backed into a corner. He argued that Wilson
had brought them to the point where they had no choice but to accept the
application. 53 Or as Wilson saw it, Healey had given himself the option of
supporting the application, but also would be able to say 'I told you so' if it
failed. 54 As Crossman suggested: 'Jay wants postponement. But my
impression is that most of the Cabinet now realise that whether we like it or
not we must make a serious effort to get in as soon as possible'. 55 By
illustrating that Britain had no alternative but membership in the long as well
as the short-term, Wilson induced a resigned acceptance of the inevitability of
the European application. While he did address the political case for
membership, he did so in terms that served to frustrate ministers who
remained unconvinced of the arguments for Europe on their merits.
51 Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., pp.320-321, 20 Apr. 1967
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The Commonwealth, 24 and 27 April 1967
Commonwealth trade had formed the bulk of Britain's difficulties during the
first attempt to accede in 19613.56 The Commonwealth had significant
political importance for the British public and political class: membership of
the EEC thus raised difficult questions about Britain's future political role. 57 In
1961, the British had originally hoped to continue Commonwealth preferences
in Britain's market. African and Caribbean countries' problems could be met
by association with the EEC. India, Pakistan and Ceylon could seek
arrangements for the specific commodities of tea and textiles. The most
pressing difficulties arose over the position of the wealthier Old Dominions of
Canada, Australia and New Zealand.58
It was rapidly established that the Six could not agree to continue
preferential access for Commonwealth produce. In particular, exports of
temperate zone agricultural produce from Australia, New Zealand and Canada
were in direct competition with the Six's own. In August 1962, Heath and
the negotiators of the Six reached a verbal compromise position that they
would consult with the Commonwealth on long-term arrangements for all
cereals and that New Zealand deserved special treatment. Commonwealth
exports would otherwise have to adjust to the imposition of the common
external tariff in Britain over a transitional period which would gradually
Ludlow, Dealing, op cit., pp.79-99; Stewart Ward, 'Anglo-Commonwealth Relations and
EEC Membership: The Problem of the Old Dominions', Wilkes (ed), Britain's Failure,
pp.93-105; Paul L. Robertson and John Singleton, 'Britain, the Dominions and the EEC',
Deighton and Milward (eds), Widening, op.cit., pp.1 07-122
Ward, ibid., p.1 05; Tratt, Macmillan, op.cit., pp.1 19-123; Eilison, Threatening, op.cit.,
pp.37-63
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phase out Commonwealth preferences. 6° The British Cabinet's rejection of the
proposal, combined with French concerns over Britain's acceptance of the
agricultural levy system, meant that no final agreement was concluded.6'
Robinson's position on the Old Dominions marked a revolution from
Britain's opening stance in 1961. Essentially, Robinson accepted the principle
of the common external tariff, making specific amendments for key products.
Furthermore, Robinson suggested that Britain should not consult with the
Commonwealth before and during talks with the Community, as they had in
the Brussels negotiations. Rather, the UK should inform and discuss a position
with Commonwealth countries, but refuse to enter any formal consultation and
avoid giving any commitments. There was no question of Commonwealth
involvement in any negotiation.62
Robinson's conclusions were a pragmatic response to the difficulties
created during the Brussels negotiations by the government's desire to get an
agreement satisfactory to the Commonwealth. Officials in the EURO
Committee resolved that flexibility would be important in future negotiations.
Sir Arthur Snelling of the Commonwealth Relations Office argued that it was
better to avoid specific commitments and particularly to avoid any mention of
permanent derogation. Discussions with New Zealand should make no
commitments and deal with New Zealand's problems in a purely exploratory
way.63 Similar accord was reached about consultation with industry. As
supporters of European integration, industry should be notified, not
60 ibid., pp.144-151
61 ibid., pp.152-154
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consulted. The Industrial Consultative Committee had been set to provide an
outlet, not to take any decisions or give indications as to what the
government's negotiating position might be.65
Politically, the Commonwealth was still important to British identity as
was quite clear in Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden's submission to
the Cabinet:
We speak the same language and we understand
each other - all the more so because we have
largely common systems in administration, the
law, the armed forces, education, British
merchanting and banking traditions and
interests. Oxbridge, Sandhurst, Shakespeare, the
authorised version of the Bible are all genuine
links.. 66
With the Europeans, Britain shared none of these links and none of the 'ties of
history' that had forged the Commonwealth and encouraged its growth as
Britain disbanded from Empire. The multiracial principle was a matter of
some pride. 67 Yet, diplomatic relations with the 'Old' Commonwealth were
weakening. Britain's recent decision to withdraw troops from Singapore and
Malaysia by 1975-76 had engendered strong opposition in Australia, who
considered Britain as reneging on historical commitments.68
Economic ties were also eroding. Australia had annoyed Britain during
the Kennedy Round talks by bargaining away Britain's preference in
Australia's market, a policy also followed less ruthlessly by Canada. 69 Both
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were diversifying their markets. Australia now exported more to Japan than to
Britain - after sugar, only 5% of Australia's trade would be affected - and the
USA supplied far more to the two than Britain did. Australia's reorientation
both commercially and politically towards the Pacific lessened the sympathy
of both Britain and the EEC to her needs. 7° External developments and
Britain's own hopes for agricultural development also contributed to
Robinson's position. Wheat exporters, such as Australia and Canada, could
also expect to secure a rise in their export earnings in the Kennedy Round,
which was likely to increase the price of wheat.7'
Britain's difficulties in moving away from the developing
Commonwealth were made more bearable as the developing Commonwealth
had been exercising its own independence in international forums. As Bowden
put it: 'in a special sense, Commonwealth Prime Minister's meetings in recent
years have contained examples of Britain clutching vipers to her bosom - and
paying for it'. 72 Pressure had been brought to bear most harshly over the
Rhodesia problem, but also over trade and aid policies, a phenomenon also
demonstrated in the wider arena in the UNCTAD. Economically, although the
Commonwealth still counted for a quarter of Britain's exports and a quarter of
imports, the Commonwealth was moving away from Britain.
Multilateralisation in trade also steadily eroded the value of the
Commonwealth preference in Britain's market.73
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In addition, specific changes for certain commodities eased the burden
of reverse preferences the Commonwealth countries would face. The two
difficult products for the countries ineligible to associate were tea and textiles.
Tea represented 87% of Ceylon's exports to Britain and 41% of India's and
the government did not want to face the prospect of rising prices for this
nationally important drink.74 In 1962, the Six had agreed to reduce the
common external tariff on tea to zero, an agreement extended in 1 964. It had
proved more contentious to find agreement for textiles in 1962 as the Six did
not want to subject their own textile industries to low duty, high quality
competition. Agreement had been reached that Britain would gradually adopt
the external tariff subject to remedial action if either the exporters suffered or
the Community became swamped in cheap cotton. 76 On cotton textiles, the
British were keen to share the burden of imports and acknowledged in any
case that the British tariffs were higher than Community ones. 77 For other
tropical products important to the Asian Commonwealth, including
manufactured sports products like cricket bats and polo sticks, Britain would
seek to revive the nil tariff 1962 arrangement. Processed goods important to
other Commonwealth countries not essential to Community markets -
kangaroo meat being the most frequently used example - should also receive a
nil tariff.78
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Arrangements for Britain's dependent territories and for the African
and Caribbean Commonwealth would be easier than in 1961-3. It was
established during the Brussels negotiations that dependent territories, except
Hong Kong, Gibraltar and the three former High Commission Territories in
Southern Africa, would be qualified to associate with the Community under
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.79 For the dependent countries, this arrangement
still stood. 8° Since the collapse of the Brussels negotiations, most of central
and southern Africa had become independent - Kenya, Malawi, Northern
Rhodesia (Zambia), Gambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Guyana - as well as Malta
and the Caribbean island of Barbados. Independence made it more likely that
these countries would accept some kind of association with the EEC. Part IV
association had seemed in 1961-3 rather too much like an extension of neo-
colonial ties, with Ghana's Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah leading the
opposition.8'
By contrast, the Yaoundé Convention, replacing Part IV in 1964,
offered institutional involvement for the participants. It demanded reciprocal
tariff cuts, although associates were allowed to retain tariffs for revenue
purposes or to protect developing industries. 82 An alternative of individual
arrangements was offered by Article 238, under which Nigeria was
negotiating an association agreement. Association therefore appeared less of a
colonial arrangement and the African states were more willing to accept it as a
solution. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had alre&ly begun association talks
Ludlow, Dealing, op cit., p.142
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and Ghana and Sierra Leone were looking into the possibility. Greece and
Turkey were associated under Article 238 and the UK wanted Malta and
Cyprus to seek similar arrangements. For Southern Rhodesia, whose
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 led to the severance of trading
links with the UK, there was no short-term hope of agreement, but
arrangement would be required when the regime returned to legality.83
The Commonwealth in fact posed far less of a problem for the Cabinet
than agriculture or the balance of payments. Bowden argued that the
Commonwealth could not be sustained 'whatever the cost to us might be'. The
economic diversification of the Commonwealth was a major factor in its
lessening importance in the Cabinet's considerations. Although some
ministers highlighted the value of cheap food imports and of the
Commonwealth preferences for Britain's exports, most accepted that the
developing Commonwealth would continue to diversify its markets if Britain
did not turn to Europe. In fact, Britain's membership of the EEC could
strengthen the assistance Britain could provide to the Commonwealth by
bolstering Britain politically and economically. The relative demise of the
Commonwealth as a sticking point was also because the Brussels negotiations
had shown arrangements to be possible for the main problems of New
Zealand's butter and sugar exports from the Caribbean and Austra1ia. Thus,
Britain could hope to find solutions to the most pressing commodities, while
avoiding the political difficulties of definite undertakings to protect the
interests of the Commonwealth countries.
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Britain's world role, April 1967
In April 1967, economic pressure led to a further decision about Britain's
defences, in tandem with the government's EEC discussions. 85 The
reorientation of Britain's world role from a global to a regional power
continued, but the decision to accelerate withdrawal from Singapore and
Malaysia was piecemeal and conducted separately to the decision about
European membership. Further defence cuts were necessitated by low
economic growth, which led to severe Treasury pressure for public
expenditure cuts and so for increased cuts in defence spending as a proportion
of this. Current projections aimed to cut spending by £100-125m by 1970-
1971, but new pressure demanded savings of up to £200-300m. The decision
to withdraw completely from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975-76 was also
because Healey insisted on a firm target date for ultimate retreat. The Ministry
of Defence was unable to operate with the constantly shifting targets and
needed to be able to plan with a firm date in mind. This route would also
enable greater savings to be made after 1971.
Healey's desire to plan coincided with Brown's pressure for a real
change in foreign policy, wanting a withdrawal from the mainland of Asia as
soon as possible. He did not agree with Healey's idea to set 1975-6 as a firm
target, partly because it would be politically difficult and also in case the
opportunity arose to withdraw more quickly. 86 Both men wanted to retain a
force in Australia in order to cushion the blow for Britain's allies, but the OPD
85 Michael Carver, Tightrope Wa1king British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London:
Hutchinson,, 1992), p.80
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Committee took the view that they should review the retention of an
Australian presence during the summer. 87 Keeping a force in Australia meant
this was not a move for complete withdrawal from East of Suez, but
nevertheless Brown argued that it should be presented as 'a major change in
foreign policy'. 88 In the difficult discussions with the Australians, New
Zealanders and the US that followed, all were strongly opposed to presenting
the rundown in the context of an intention to withdraw altogether from
Singapore and Malaysia by the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, the OPD held finn to
their intention to present the decision as a major change in foreign policy,
keeping a force in Australia. 89 The Cabinet reserved full decision until July
and agreed to withhold any public announcement.9°
Within the Cabinet, there was no discussion of any link between the
twin policies of withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia and membership of
the EEC. The only way in which it was mentioned was to stress that it would
heighten the irritation of the Australians to have to cope with the blow of the
reduction in Britain's defence role and the reverse preferences of EEC
membership. In addition, if the EEC application failed, Britain would be left
with nothing.9 ' The coincidence in timing of the two decisions related only to
the economic and domestic political pressure resulting from the July crisis.
Yet the diminution of Britain's world role led to a reduction in Britain's
influence in the United States and so almost by default augmented the
importance of Europe in Britain's international position.
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This was clear as Wilson visited Johnson to discuss Britain's defence
changes. Anglo-American relations were weak, Wilson and Johnson's poor
personal ties added to the dual crises in Asia of Vietnam and Britain's planned
defence cuts.92 Johnson was wholly opposed to Britain's pulling forces out of
the mainland of Asia:
He said that he wondered whether the British
government was 'going crazy' in apparently
wanting to pull out of its position in South East
Asia at a time when its principal allies in the
area were fighting communism in Vietnam. The
Prime Minister said that as the Foreign
Secretary's trip to Washington had made plain,
we fully intended to consult our allies about our
interests, to which the President retorted 'they're
the best damned allies you've got'. . . .The Prime
Minister said.. .he had no doubt that a free vote
in the House of Commons would result in a
massive majority in favour of far more drastic
reductions.. .It was politically unrealistic to
expect the British government not to take
account of this opinion, which was fully
reflected in the country.. .ln any case, he
believed. . .that what the government were
proposing was right. .
Johnson's difficulties were increased by the intensification of the war in
Vietnam. Now, Johnson wanted a British troop commitment to Vietnam,
which Wilson persistently resisted. Agreeing to reconsider Britain's decision
on 2 June, Johnson added:
perhaps by 2 June the British might have agreed
to send two brigades of troops to Vietnam, and if
they did this he could assure the Prime Minister
that all his and Britain's financial worries would
be at an end. The Prime Minister retorted
equally cheerfully that, as he had said to the
President at an earlier meeting, even to suggest
such a possibility was a libel on his own
declared policy and attitude, and any case, if he
92 BIe Special Relationship, op cit., pp.' 12-118
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attempted it, he would have no financial worries
himself, since he would be out of Office and no
doubt doing quite nicely on his memoirs.94
Britain's decision to turn to Europe could serve to augment Britain's
position with the United States. Wilson showed the considerable financial risk
the British were taking to pursue membership with the EEC, helping to
illustrate that economic pressure had not completely thrown Britain from an
international role. Britain could play a useful and constructive part in guiding
Europe out of difficulty, providing a framework for German revival and
keeping the Community oriented towards the Atlantic. Only British leadership
in Europe would ensure Germany did not revert to nationalism after de
Gaulle's departure:
Since the war, one of the main thrusts of
Western policy had been to ensure that Germany
was able to develop a democratic form of
government within the kind of western
framework that would prevent any reversion to
earlier and more dangerous tendencies there. At
present, as the whole pattern of relationships in
Europe, between Europe and America and
between east and west was changing, it was
becoming harder to contain Germany within this
kind of system, as current trends in German
policy tended to demonstrate.... If Britain were
not by then linked with the other European
countries within the tight association provided
by the Community, the latter would be
dominated by a very powerful Germany, about
whose political dispositions confident prediction
was impossible but anxiety seemed only too
justified. The consequences of this would be
extremely dangerous not only for France but for




With the decision in principle virtually assured following the 20 April
discussions, the meeting at Chequers on 30 April that Wilson ordered after his
visit to Washington, was something of an anticiimaxY6 There was, however,
considerable doubt in the economic departments as to the wisdom of
embarking on an application straight away. The first consideration related to
the interplay between an application and the Kennedy Round. On 30 June the
American Trade Expansion Act, providing the government with the authority
to make the sweeping reductions, would expire. Inability to complete by this
time would doom the negotiations to failure. The British and Americans feared
that the French could use the British application to delay the talks. 97 Dean
Rusk urged the British to go ahead on political grounds as the Kennedy Round
was nearly complete in any case, but there was doubt in the US administration
as to the wisdom ofjeopardising the final stages of the talks.98
Anxiety in Britain resulted from the risks of complicating the tactics
for both the European application and the trade talks. In the steel sector, for
example, Britain had been encouraged to make concessions in order to smooth
a path into the CommunityY The lack of co-ordination between the two issues
had been demonstrated in the Cabinet in March, when the Cabinet had realised
that pressing for the greatest reductions in the common external tariff could
work to Britain's disadvantage once Britain was a member of the
Community.'°° Trend had also pointed out the potential confusion of having to
implement the Kennedy Round tariff agreements and adopt the common
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external tariff at the same time. He concluded that Britain would have to press
on protecting her interests in the trade talks regardless of her future position.10'
Similar difficulties of tactics were also noted in international liquidity
discussions. Inability to side with the EEC's position made it easy for the
French to portray Britain as America's Trojan Horse. Recently the Six had met
and suggested adoption of drawing rights rather than a new reserve unit and
persisted in their demand for 85% of the weighted majority vote in the IMP,
effectively providing the EEC with a veto. The need to build support for the
Six created tactical entanglements in directly opposing the EEC's demands,
although the British were not supporters of this particular request.'°2
Secondly, the Treasury and the economic advisers were opposed to an
immediate application for economic reasons. For the Overseas Division of the
Treasury, this was because they were certain it would fail. 103 Commitment to
membership would compel British to adopt policies otherwise contrary to their
interests in order to appease European opinion.' 04 Frank Figgures, Britain's
ambassador to EFTA, argued that the application would circumscribe Britain's
freedom of action, forced to adopt tariff policies to fit in with the EEC without
the assurance of EEC membership.'°5 This could be particularly damaging to
EFTA's interests, as EFTA and the Board of Trade did not want to re-impose
tariffs against EFTA countries if Britain did join the EEC.'°6
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More seriously, the prospect of an application raised again the risk of
precipitating a sterling devaluation as speculators reacted to the quite
widespread expectation that Britain would be unable to enter the Community
without devaluation. The US Treasuiy and Federal Reserve feared that an
application would spur devaluation.' 07 In lie International Economic
Arrangements Committee, dominated by the two economic advisers Balogh
and Kaldor, the case was made again that because of the detrimental effect on
British prices and costs, Britain would have to devalue before entry. 108
The DEA's Derek Mitchell vigorously opposed, arguing that by
focusing on the negative effects of entry, the report ignored the potentially
worse effects of staying out of the Community.'°9 The support of the CBI for
membership and the prospect of increased investment added to the opportunity
for expansion of the UK capital market in Europe were all factors that
smoothed the prospect of British membership."° In contrast to his stated views
the previous October, William Armstrong wrote that a change in the rate of
exchange 'was neither necessary nor appropriate'.. The new economic strategy,
announced in the 11 April Budget, based on unemployment, low growth and
expenditure cuts abroad, would bring the balance of payments surplus
necessary to meet the requirements of membership." By the time Britain
faced the balance of payments cost of entry, Bntain would have paid off the
IMF debt and so could use the surplus previously employed paying off the
107 PRO FCO3O 166, Washington to FO, tel. 1376, 26 Apr. 1967
108 PRO CAB 129 129, C(67)61, The Balance of Payments, Cabmet Secretary, 27 Apr. 1967;
see also Cairncross, Diary, op.cit., p.209, 13 Apr. 1967
'°	 CAB 130 316, Dissenting note by DJ Mitchell, 21 April 1967
"°	 CAB129 129, C(67)61, The Balance of Payments, Cabinet Secretary, 27 Apr. 1967
" Caimcross, Managing, op.cit., pp.159-160
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debt to cope with the strain. 112 Trend also submitted a paper arguing that the
economic measures had been taken to ensure growth and therefore it was
essential to assume that they would work."3
Armstrong and Trend's public stance was a long way from the reality
of official behind-the-scenes thinking. Officials in fact had little choice other
than to endorse publicly the government's economic policies for fear of setting
off the spiral of adverse speculation. 114 In the 'Forever Unmentionable'
Committee, established in 1965 in which Treasury officials secretly made
contingency plans for devaluation, the decision to apply accelerated such
planning. Samuel Brittan recorded that the EEC application was the most
significant feature in precipitating devaluation: 'once devaluation was
thinkable in one context, it was thinkable in another'.115
A paper produced in June revealed that the application altered the
Treasury's contingency planning, as the timing of devaluation (needed
consideration in relation to potential negotiations for membership. Officials'
expectation was overwhelmingly that Britain would be unable to eliter the
EEC without a change in the parity. The paper stated that despite the
optimistic assessments of the papers mentioned above, 'unfortunately these
medium term projections have no compelling evidence to justify them'. 116 The
balance of payments cost of membership, taking into consideration payments
into the agricultural fund and changes to investment patterns was likely to be
112 PRO CAB13O 316, MISCI43(67)5th, 21 April 1967; Cairncross, Diary, op.cit., p.209, 13
May 1967
' PRO CAB 129 129, C(67)6 1, Balance of Payments, Cover Note, Cabmet Secretary, 27 Apr.
1967
Cairncross, Diary, op.cit., p.209, 13 May 1967
115 Brittan, Steering, op.c:t., p.226
116 BOE, 0V44 136, FU(67) 1, Contingency Planning: Entry into Europe, June 1967; these
files have not been found m the Treasury, although RI planning exists from 1965-1966
T312 1398-1401 and 1635-1637
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between £250m and £600m. Adding the import cost of food would increase
this bill by a further £1 50-350m. Avoiding devaluation would be impossible,
as speculators would sell sterling in anticipation. It could even be to Britain's
interests to devalue beforehand, as devaluation would be difficult from the
inside and because the agricultural prices were defmed in units of gold, any
devaluation would increase the domestic price of food and cause
The Committee, chaired by Armstrong, reiterated that contingency planning
did not mean they supported devaluation, yet many in the Treasury did believe
devaluation to be inevitable.' 18 Added to this, the European application was
thought to make devaluation more likely.
The looming prospect of devaluation was evident as a restricted
session of ministers debated devaluation at Chequers, while the Cabinet
prepared to complete their talks on EEC membership. Trend indicated that
Britain would need a stronger economy if Britain were to enter Europe as this
would impose a greater pressure on the balance of payments that could not be
handled by further deflation. Membership would either require deeper cuts in
defence expenditure or in exchange rate policy.' 19 Wilson plainly did not want
to devalue, but argued that if it did transpire to be necessary, it would have to
be discussed in a very small group of ministers in order to maintain secrecy.12°
Keeping devaluation off the public agenda was therefore the government's
priority in thinking about sterling and the application. Yet the application itself
appeared to make a sterling devaluation that much more likely. The Cabinet
" ibid.
118 BOE 0V44 136, FU(67)2, 16 June 1967




were aware of this, Callaghan arguing that he would resign if the government
did devalue.'21
At the Sunday meeting, the last lengthy discussion before the full
Cabinet formally accepted the statement to the Commons at Downing Street
the next Tuesday, 122 both economic and political arguments were expounded
in now familiar terms. Without membership, Britain would not be able to
command any political influence in the world and only British membership
would offer a counterweight to German influence after de Gaulle's departure.
Wilson added, in view of his discussions with Johnson, that failure to join
would condenm Britain to following American policies in South East Asia:
Britain would be forced to join the USA in Vietnam.' 23 This was an indication
of a shift in thinking, reflected also in Britain's decision in February to reject
America's offer of a long-term loan to assist with balance of payments
problems.' 24 Only through membership of the EEC could Britain shore up
international influence and retain political independence. Joining with the
United States in a North Atlantic Free Trade Area would place Britain in a
position of subordination to America's might.'25
Economically, Britain needed to encourage investment and to take
advantage of a larger market and a larger economy. Brown set out a range of
options between not applying, having more discussions and making an
application. Opposition appeared minimal, Gordon-Walker remembering that
only Peart and Marsh held out against an application in principle, although the
121 See Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., pp.335-336, 30 Apr. 1967; Pearce (ed.), Gordon-
Walker Diaries, op cit., p.313, 30 Apr. 1967
1 PRO CAB 128 42, cq67)27th, 2 May 1967
PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)26th, 30 Apr. 1967; 2.45pm
'24 Ponting, Breach, op.cit., pp.56-57
260
addition of Castle, Jay and Scottish Secretary Ross would seem a more
accurate representation of their views.' 26 The other ministers accepted to
varying degrees that Britain would have to make an application. Partly, this
was because they had little choice but to continue to advance the government's
position: 'others expressed the view that this [not applying] was now
politically impractical - although they would have preferred not to apply -
because the government's freedom of action was so circumscribed by
momentum which had built up and stimulated in favour of entry'. At least
Healey, Bowden, and Greenwood favoured postponement.' 27 Only Jay
seriously considered resignation. He decided against on the basis that the
Cabinet had not taken any decisions on the terms under which Britain would
go in: as indicated above, on the CAP, Wilson had pledged that permanent
safeguards would be necessary.128
The remaining ministers in favour numbered thirteen, adding Gordon-
Walker, Callaghan and Cledwyn Hughes to Crossman's list of Wilson.
Stewart, Brown, Jenkins, Crosland, Gardiner, Benn, Gunter, Elwyn Jones, and
Longford.' 29 Not only did they accept that Britain would make an application
for membership, they also agreed that this should be free from mention of
prior safeguards.' 3° The 'conditions' to defend Britain's interests would be
125 PRO CAB 129 129, C(67)52, Alternatives to Membership of the EEC, Cabinet Secretary,
30 Apr. 1967
'26 PearCe (ed.), Gordon-Walker Diaries, op.cit., 30 Apr. 1967, p.3 12; Castle, Diaries, op cit.,
p.126, 30 Apr. 1967; Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., p.336, 1 May 1967
127 Pearce (ed.), ibid.; Crossman, ibid.
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129 Crossman, ibid.; Gordon-Walker includes also himselt which seems therefore to be hkely,
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discussed in a statement to the House at the same time as the application.'3'
Thus, in a mixture of resigned acceptance, bored awareness of Wilson's tactics
and the unreality created by the probability of de Gai.dle's veto was the second
application for membership of the EEC accepted. At the root of it all the
Cabinet were aware that they had no alternative. Particularly with the risks
facing sterling, the planned withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia and the
cooling of the Anglo-American relationship, the British literally had nowhere
else to go.
It would seem, however, that the factor swinging Cabinet's acceptance
of the principle of going in was the government's economic failure. Crossman
made clear the role of economic collapse in ministers' acceptance of the
decision:
The other shift in opinion relates to our own
economy. Those who are in charge... all now
felt that the attempt to have a socialist national
plan for the British Isles keeps us balanced on
such a terribly tight rope that it really has got to
be abandoned and that of course is the main
reason why they favour entry into the Market...
Up to the July freeze it was sf11 possible to
believe that we in the Wilson government would
strip ourselves of the sterling area, withdraw
from East of Suez and take the Swedish line of
socialism. We could have done that a year ago
but now it is felt by almost evetyone that it is
too late.'32
Tony Benn added that the sense of failure, resulting from the collapse of the
National Plan, was the underlying reason for the Cabinet's acceptance, leading
them also to accept the minimal conditions attached to Britain's membership:
Those of us who favoured the application were
not too worried about the conditions because we
131 PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)26th, 30 Apr. 1967, 2.45pm
132 Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., 30 Apr. 1967, p.335
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were a defeated Cabinet. Going back to the war,
we had tried as a Labour Government to solve
the countly's economic problems and we had
left in a balance of payments crisis in 1951. The
Tories had tried and had left in the balance of
payments crisis in 1964. We had tried and had
had to put the brakes on in 1966, and we were
now looking for solutions to our problems from
the outside and somehow we were persuaded
that the Common Market was the way of making
progress.133
Thus, acceptance that there was no alternative resulted only from the collapse
of the government's economic aspirations. It was not the merits of the political
case that brought the Cabinet to agree, but the fact that they had failed to
create the economic base to pursue alternative policies. The decision was not
an economic choice, but an economic and political necessity, forced upon the
Cabinet by economic failure.
'' Benn, Wilderness, op cit., p.496
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6. The Long Haul to Membership, May - December 1967
There can be no serious challenge to the widely-held assumption that Britain's
application failed because of General de Gaulle's political opposition to
British membership.' The British could not convince him to admit Britain
because he sought a Europe free from Atlantic influence and led by the
French, a goal pursued also in his actions against NATO. 2 British attempts to
elicit a change in de Gaulle's bar to accession were two-fold. First, Wilson did
want to negotiate a deal with the General, an objective never likely to succeed.
It derived from his political conception of the Community and was composed
around the creation of technological links between Britain and the EEC.
Second, Brown wanted to show that Britain could accept the Treaty of
Rome, delivering Britain's negotiating position to the WEU on 4 July. Such an
approach, he mistakenly believed, would encourage the Five to stand up to de
Gaulle and so force the General to yield. Brown's policy failed because the
Five were reluctant to evoke a breach in the Community. Each had too much
vested in the continuation of the EEC and in the completion of the 1969
review to risk antagonising de Gaulle to the point of his withdrawal. The
Germans in particular were politically unwilling to pressure de Gaulle and
Britain's economic weakness provided a further justification for delay. Yet,
while German hesitancy facilitated de Gaulle's diplomatic task, after July
1967 heavier German pressure would simply have brought de Gaulle's veto
forward. Similarly, while devaluation of sterling in November 1967 provided
'Young. Britain, op.cit., pp.100-101; Greenwood, European Co-operation, op.cit., p.92;
Reynolds, Britannia, op.cit., p.218
2 Bozo, Two Strategies, op.cit., p.143
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the façade for de Gaulle's decisive verdict, indications were that de Gaulle
was already planning his rejection.
The story of Britain's second application is not just a straight tale of
misperception and failure. While Wilson and particularly Brown did hope to
accede in the short-term, the application also established a long-term case for
entry. In 1963, de Gaulle had been able to legitimise his veto by pointing out
the ways in which the British contributed to their own exclusion. Britain could
not accept the rules of the Community. De Gaulle was therefore able to elude
the repercussions of a political veto, avoiding strong objections from the Five
and from the USA. 3 Rather, de Gaulle was able to show that support for
Britain was opposition to the Community, so equating French actions with the
interests of European Community development.4
In 1967, the British clearly won the long-term war. The Five, the
British, the US and opinion in France knew that Britain would accede to the
European Community once de Gaulle was gone. 5 This was confirmed at the
Council of Ministers on 19 December, when de Gaulle was evidently alone in
his view that negotiations should not start. Furthermore, the Five accepted that
enlargement was the path to wider European unity: de Gaulle could thus no
longer claim that French interests were commensurate with the interests of the
developing Community. De Gaulle's ultimate defeat was replicated in wider
developments in NATO, where the Fourteen were successfully meeting the
challenge of French withdrawal without pushing the French out of the
Alliance. The Harmel Report for a NATO role in East-West détente, the
doctrine of flexible response, the NPG and steps towards non-proliferation
Ludlow, Dealing, op.cit., pp.206-212, 239-240
Ludlow, 'EC Response', op.cit.
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were all signs that NATO would survive without the French. Conversely, they
also showed the limits of the French experiment. 6 Britain's EEC application
could contribute to these wider policy goals, but it was not, as has been
suggested, a necessary part.7 Isolating de Gaulle at the expense of Britain's bid
did not constitute success. The Harmel Report to establish a role for the NATO
in the pursuit of détente and NATO reorganisation were ongoing separately to
Britain's EEC bid and were independently successful in undermining de
Gaulle's European vision.8
The long-term success of Britain's second application has been used to
augment the policy achievements of Harold Wilson. Uwe Kitzinger argued: 'if
Labour had won the 1970 election.. .it would have been for Harold Wilson to
have collected the prizes for European statesmanship... he would have amply
deserved them and for his earlier historic role, deserves them anyway'. 9 It
cannot be denied that the second application laid the foundations for the
third.'° Yet, Wilson's shift to Europe continued to be dispassionate and
reluctant. Cabinet's agreement to persist with the application after de Gaulle's
rebuff was Britain's only option, rushed through the Cabinet with little
discussion.' 1 Britain's turn to Europe in 1966 had been born from defeat: the
consolidation of this tilt emerged from the more complete defeat of
devaluation and the veto.
ibid.
6 Bow Two Strategies, op.cit., pp.187-213
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The Application and the May Press Conference
The Labour Government's application was exactly as the Foreign Office had
advised: simple and uncluttered. In a one-line statement, the government
dispatched a letter to the institutions and governments in the Community
declaring that the UK applies 'for membership under Article 237 of the Treaty
of Rome' and Article 98 of the Treaty of Paris.' 2 Wilson dealt with the
'conditions' of membership in a statement to the House of Commons on 2
May, outlining the problems Britain would face upon accession, but not
promising changes in advance of membership. He stated that it would not be
problematical for Britain to accept the Treaty of Rome. Negotiations 'ought
not to be unnecessarily complicated with lesser issues, many of which can be
best dealt with after entry'.' 3 Nevertheless, there were problems, mainly the
CAP's impact on the cost of living and structure of agriculture.
The only specific safeguards Britain sought in advance were for New
Zealand's agricultural exports and for sugar exports from the countries
protected by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Wilson emphasised that
agricultural levies would 'involve an inequitable sharing of the fmancial cost
and impose on our balance of payments an additional burden which we should
not, in fairness be asked to carry' Yet, he did not expressly state that Britain
would require safeguards in advance. For capital movements and regional
policies, he suggested that adequate provisions would be obtainable.' 5 On
sterling, Wilson hedged. He suggested that there could prove to be unwelcome
12	 FCO3O 91, P0 to Brussels, tel.439, 6 May 1967




short-term economic effects, but asked MPs to 'make up your own mind'. In
the long-term, the creation of a large single market would provide enormous
incentive for British industry.' 6 In The Economist, the bid was presented as
'unconditional'.' 7 The Commons vote recorded a massive 488 in favour with
62 against. The Labour Party's endorsement was far from overwhelming, as
despite the three-line whip, 36 MPs voted against the motion and 50
abstained.' 8 Nevertheless, the decision established a 'critical mass' in favour
of a European future and this was important in giving force to the bid in the
Community.'9
The Five immediately praised the simplicity of the application.
Pescatore, the Secretary-General of the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, echoed widespread opinion in praising the clarity of the application
and arguing this would make it difficult to refuse. 2° Press coverage throughout
the Six commented favourably on the impressive Commons majority
supporting the application. 2 ' Britain's ambassador in Paris, Patrick Reilly,
considered that Britain's 'speed and assurance' had left de Gaulle uneasy.22
The Dutch and Gennan press reported admiration for Wilson's courage, with
the usually hostile Christian Social Union (CSU) paper Munchner Merker
suggesting that Wilson had staked his future on the bid and so it had to be
16 ibid., col.313
The Economist, 'It's a Blank Cheque', 6 May 1967
Anne Deighton, 'The Second Application For Membership of the EEC', Loth (ed.), Crises,
of.cit.. p.396
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taken seriously.23 The problems of British accession did not, however, go
unnoticed. II Graobo, the Italian Conservative financial paper was alarmed at
Britain's uncertainty about agricultural levies and did not want old difficulties
in the Six over agriculture to be reopened. 24 France's La Croix commented
that Wilson was insisting on an unreasonably short interval to decide on
negotiations. Influential officials in the Auswartiges Amt, such as Dr. Harkort,
did not hide their feelings that the most optimistic assessment was a meeting
before the summer break at which the British could state their case.25
Nevertheless, the British considered that they had done enough in issuing a
straightforward application. Brown wanted no follow up action with Couve de
Murville. The facts of the application - that Britain attached no conditions to
accession - could speak for themselves.26
Reilly argued in January that had the government been able to state full
acceptance of the CAP, de Gaulle's job of obstruction would have been
significantly more difficult: 'I could not, however, honestly say that the
government had yet made it impossible for the General to persuade the French
public that the economic obstacles were too great for British entry to be
acceptable... we should be able to say that we accepted the CAP as well as the
Treaty of Rome'. 27 The period immediately after the launch of the application,
when expectations and momentum built on the probe were still high, offered
the best opportunity to force de Gaulle to give way. De Gaulle was able to
instil delay by using Britain's equivocation over the CAP in his 16 May press
23 PRO FCO3O 91, The Hague to FO, tel.181, 12 May 1967; Bonn to FO, tel.767, 12 May
1967
24 PRO FCO3O 91, Rome to FO, tel.415, 12 May 1967
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conference to show that British and EFTA accession would fundamentally
alter the nature of the Community. In so doing, he raised the practical question
as to whether the Six could embark on enlargement before the 1969
agricultural review and the end of the transitional period in 1970. This was
enough to raise fears amongst the Five that France might withdraw from the
Community and forced them to fall into line behind de Gaulle's
procrastination. Wilson may have given de Gaulle opportunity to ensure just
this. His discussion of the problems of accepting the CAP enabled de Gaulle to
rebut the Prime Minister's statement in very similar terms as those used in his
press conference of 14 January 1963.28
Dc Gaulle began by stressing that there was no question of a French
veto. Picking on Wilson's avowal that Britain could accept the Treaty of
Rome, he argued that the Six had added countless regulations to the Treaty,
'involving a minutely determined equilibrium between the various interests of
the member states'. Accession of four new applicants would upset this
equilibrium:
to introduce new and massive factors now in the
midst of those which have been reconciled with
such difficulty would obviously mean bringing
both the structure as a whole and the details
back into question and setting the problem of an
entirely different venture.29
The strength of his case lay in showing that Britain's extra-European interests
made her incompatible with the closely-knit Community system.3° He
emphasised that Britain, an island with ties to the Commonwealth and the
Ludlow, Dealing, op.cit., pp.206-212
De Gaulle's Press Conference, 16 May 1967, Kitzmger, Second, op.cit., p.1 80; PRO
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United States, required an 'exceptional and very long time-limit' to adapt to
the Treaty and wanted essential changes to the Treaty's application.
Acceptance of the agricultural arrangements for the UK would be impossible
as it would 'crush' Britain's balance of payments, because of the levy
payments, and force up the price of food and thus industrial costs in Britain.
Alternatively, admitting Britain without her acceptance of the Six's
agricultural regulations would 'upset completely the balance of the whole
Common Market and rob France of one of her chief reasons for being a
member'. 3 ' The implication was clear: British accession before 1969 could
lead to French withdrawal.
Britain's balance of payments problems provided de Gaulle with an
additional argument that served to emphasise the UK's political and economic
weakness and incompatibility with membership. He highlighted the real
dangers to the balance of payments that Britain would face by accepting the
Community's provisions for capital movements. Exchange controls in Britain
to protect the balance of payments prevented the free flow of capital out of the
country. Isolating the problem of the balance of payments in this way, de
Gaulle linked the immediate economic difficulties of accession to the political
orientation of the United Kingdom. Sterling's role as a reserve currency
heightened Britain's economic difficulties. Not only were the Six's currencies
strong, but the fact of the reserve currency would leave Britain unable to
participate in the spirit of co-operation characterising the Six's approach to
international liquidity talks:
30 See also The Times, 'Gen [sic] de Gaulle says it again: Bntish association conceivable,
fusion of pohcies impossible', p.1, 17 May 1967
'Dc Gaulle's Press Conference, 16 May 1967, Kitzmger, Second, op.cit., p.183
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monetary parity and solidarity are essential rules
and conditions of the Common Market and can
assuredly not be extended to our neighbours
across the Channel unless Sterling presents itself
one day in a new position, with its future value
seemingly secure, freed, like the others, from its
reserve currency role and with the burden of
Great Britain's debit balances inside the Sterling
Area having been eliminated.32
The reserve role of sterling could also stand as the test-case for
Britain's extra-European interests. The Six wanted an entity that was
European in economics and politics. Invoking the notion of a 'European
Europe', de Gaulle emphasised Britain's 'special relations' with the USA,
'privileged relations with the Commonwealth', and 'special commitments'
throughout the world. British accession would irrevocably change the nature
of the Community. Returning to a well-worn theme, de Gaulle suggested that
the Six and the applicants could renegotiate a whole new Treaty, Britain could
associate with the Treaty of Rome or the world could wait until Britain's
evolution to the continent was complete. 'If, one day, Britain reached this
stage, how wholeheartedly France would welcome such a historic
conversion'. 33 Thus, while denying that he was issuing a veto on British
accession, de Gaulle was able to show, as he had in 1963, that Britain
remained insufficiently 'European' to take on the obligations of membership.34
The essential difference between 1963 and 1967 was Britain's
determination to continue in the face of the blatant Gaullist challenge. In 1963,
the British had been unable to sustain the impulse towards membership,
largely because the public shattering of the prospects for ently removed a
32 ibid., p.184
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coherent framework for steps towards the Community.35 In 1967, public
opinion accepted it as reasonable for the British to press on towards
membership regardless of French obstructionism.36 Informed opinion
supported the government in their bid to get into the Community. The Times
commented: 'there can no longer be any faint hope that the walls will fall at
the sound of the trumpet. Indeed, it may well be argued that there is no hope of
moving the General and that the best plan, therefore, is to prepare the ground
for the day when he is no longer at the head of affairs in France'. 37 The
Economist added: 'Curious things have been happening in Europe which
suggest that the tide is running the right way. It certainly will not carry Mr.
Wilson to harbour as long as the general [sic] has his way. But there is a lot
that can be done in the next couple of years while everyone is waiting for the
general to quit the scene' 38
De Gaulle's ability to deliver an immediate rebuff showed his
understanding of the strength of his position in France and in the EEC. 39 This
instilled delay in the consideration of Britain's application that meant de
Gaulle would eventually be able to veto. Yet, the currents of opinion working
against de Gaulle, both inside and outside France, were stronger than they had
been in 1963. In France, Independent Republican Giscard d'Estaing was
leading anti-de Gaulle opinion.40 In NATO, de Gaulle's self-imposed isolation
allowed the Fourteen formally to adopt the doctrine of flexible response on 9
May. The removal of the French from discussions had enabled compromise to
See Ludlow, Dealing. op.cit., pp.226-228
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be reached on the enhancement of conventional defence in the event of a
Soviet attack.41 Dc Gaulle's vision for a 'European Europe' over the longer-
term would not survive.
Britain's response to de Gaulle's rebuke was to return to the tactics
already established, reiterating the strength and simplicity of their underlying
case. Wilson's persistence was stiffened by Palliser, whose words were later
circulated in Whitehall as Wilson's own. Palliser advised Wilson: 'all this is a
war of nerves - to see if your nerve is as strong as the General's. My money is
confidently on yours! My advice is bash on regardless, and I give it because it
is precisely what he does not want you to do'. 42 The Foreign Office issued
guidance to the Community members, stating that Britain accepted the Treaty
of Rome and the principles of the CAP and urging the Six to respond. No state
had said during the tour that British accession would prove impossible.43
Despite the obvious isolation of de Gaulle's opinion on Britain's entry,
the British still failed to elicit early discussions of their membership bid. De
Gaulle's impeccable sense of timing and tactics did help to subdue the
potential will of the Five to push for early negotiations. De Gaulle took
opinion by surprise with his swift and unequivocal response, Reilly indicating
that the press conference was 'more negative than I expected'. Hervé
Aiphand, Secretary General at the Quai d'Orsay, spread the word that de
Gaulle did intend to prevent the opening of negotiations, rather than
procrastinate during Anglo-Six talks. Brown responded that the strength of the
4° The Economist, 'Not Absolutely Like 1963', p.884, 27 May 1967; 'What Will He Say',
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French response was 'very disagreeable'. 45 The indication that de Gaulle
would not permit the opening of negotiations shifted the tone of the Five's
reaction. The German Economics Minister, Sculler stated that the Germans
wanted to play a role of mediation between the British and the French.46
Conrad Ahlers, deputy spokesman for the Federal Government gave a
briefing, reported in the front pages of The Guardian and The Express, to the
effect that the Germans would not promote British entry. 47 In Brussels,
Harmel continued to insist on the opening of negotiations, but stressed that the
Belgians did not want to indulge in 'public polemics' with the General. 48 The
Belgian Ambassador hoped the British would not attempt to drive a wedge
between the French and the Five.49 The Italian press took the view that Italian
ministers would be unwilling to defy 	 de Gaulle's pressure for delay.5°
De Gaulle then turned attention to the Six's scheduled Rome Summit,
meeting Britain's bid by offering progress in the two related areas of
technological and political development. 5 ' April 1967 had seen the first NPG
meeting, formalising West Germany's and Italy's participation in
consultations on nuclear strategy in NATO. 52 The NPG diminished the
attraction of a 'European Europe' based around the French force de frappe,
but the Italians in particular were keen to make advances in technological
collaboration between the Six. They wanted to close the gap between the US
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and the EEC in science-based industries. 53 Clearly, an initiative would dwindle
the significance of Britain's technological community ideas. The Germans
also wanted to strengthen their bargaining hand in moves towards the NPT, as
there was still considerable reluctance to abandon explicit promise of an
eventual 'European' clause.54 On a practical level, the EEC states wanted to
ensure their voice by making EURATOM responsible for monitoring the
safeguards on the civil uses of atomic energy under the NPT. The British and
Americans, spurred by the Soviet Union, wanted to use the International
Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA).55
At the Rome Summit, chaired by the Italian Prime Minister Aldo
Moro, the Italians and Germans proposed three-monthly meetings of the Six's
Foreign Ministers. The Dutch, who had persistently rejected political union in
1961 until Britain was granted accession, again insisted on British
involvement prior to any political arrangements in Europe. 56 De Gaulle raised
the stakes, arguing that if the Five were genuinely interested in a 'European
Europe' then there could be political meetings. For the French, a 'European
Europe' did not stretch as far as The Hague.57 Only the Dutch held out against
de Gaulle, but were helped by the Belgians in arguing that Britain should
present a case for accession to the Six. Others thought Van Den Boeynants had
gone too far, making it too easy for the French to refute the Dutch case.58
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Explicitly linking the political questions attached to a Six-power union
with enlargement, de Gaulle declared that the Community had to 'think
thoroughly and profoundly about where it is going before accepting
approaches from the outside'. 59 He suggested that the Six investigate
enlargement in principle. They should study the effect on the existing
Community of entry of four new members and should research the particular
problems in agriculture and monetary questions raised by British accession.60
This was a procedure certain to cause ample delay. It suggested a similar
approach to the Brussels negotiations whereby the Six agreed a position before
they talked to the British. Not only this, but de Gaulle demanded that the
Community think about its short-term programme, thus embroiling the Six in
discussion of their immediate economic interests. Combined with the
implication of his press conference of French withdrawal if Britain joined
before 1969, the Five faced a choice: pressing for enlargement now could risk
the collapse of the existing Community.
Politically unwilling to see the Rome Summit dissolve into acrimony,
the Six agreed to discuss British membership at the Council of Ministers the
following week. 6 ' At this meeting, in the absence of Couve, Brandt and
Fanfani, representatives agreed again to postpone discussion of British
accession until 26 June. 62 On 26 June, in a highly restricted session the French
continued to insist on the discussion of enlargement in principle, but
concessions were made to the British approach. First, under strong pressure
from the Belgian Foreign Secretary Pierre Harmel, the Council agreed that the
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Commission was to produce an Opinion on the problems of British accession.
This, Harmel argued, was procedure as established in Article 237 of the Treaty
of Rome. Crucially, the Commission could focus exclusively on the British
case and not on the accession of the other applicants, Denmark and the
Republic or Ireland (Norway applied two months after the British).
Concentration on Britain showed the extent to which this was a political
question for the Five. 63 Second, Harmel and Brandt insisted that the British
present their application at the WEU on 4 July.M The French did not explicitly
agree, but nevertheless George Brown took this as the opportunity for
Britain's case to be heard.
An Anglo-French connection? Wilson meets General de Gaulle, 19 June
1967
The priority for Wilson was his visit to General de Gaulle, scheduiled for 19
June. With a majority of one following the March Assembly elections, the
French government was increasingly dependent on the support of the
Independent Republicans under Giscard D'Estaing. 65 Giscard was slowly
developing independence from the Gaullist majority, based partly on a pro-
British European policy. In eighteen months or so he could feel strong enough
to cast adrift from the Gaullists, robbing de Gaulle of a majority and forcing
63 PRO PREM13 1483, Brussels to FO, tel.165, 27 June 1967
64
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new elections, which the Gaullists would probably lose.66 De Gaulle would
therefore be wary of his European policy's impact on public opinion.
Wilson's aim was to convince de Gaulle that Britain was genuinely a
European power. The Arab-Israeli war provided one opportunity to suggest
joint Anglo-French action. The United States, because of Vietnam, were not in
a position to send troops and the Russians had not taken any initiative. Britain
and France could act together to get the 'Great Powers to face up to their
responsibilities' in order to seek a settlement to the crisis on the basis of four-
power agreement. If they did not, local rivalries would merge into great power
conflict. 67 Wilson also wanted to outline Britain's proposals for complete
withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975-6, despite the USA's
opposition.68 This strategy aimed to show that Britain was no longer
dependent on the USA or on a global role and so could work with France to
strengthen Europe.
Wilson's central case was that British membership was the only way of
ensuring that Europe would have the industrial, technological and ultimately
political strength to stand up to the superpowers. Wilson explained in his
memoirs: 'I was presenting him not with a new Nassau but a Nassau in
reverse. Trianon was the opposite of a Rambouillet'. 69 Britain's decision not to
purchase American Poseidon missiles after Polaris meant that when the Polaris
programme was complete, Britain would no longer be dependent on America
for the nuclear capability: 'We should work out our military and political
PRO FCO4 1 37/WC4 11, Steering Brief for Visit to De Gaulle, Foreign Office, 16 June
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destiny; and an important part of that would be in partnership with France, for
example in connection with the production of military aircraft'. 7° In civil and
military aircraft, French firms had strong links to the US, for example in the
production of aero-engines. Collaboration with Britain would enable greater
independence as Britain had the best aero-engines in the world. The Airbus
project could enable French and British industry to compete more equally with
the American company Boeing. Britain could also offer expertise in civil
nuclear technology. British gas-cooled reactors, for example, could be an
alternative to American water-cooled reactors which the Belgians had just
purchased. Britain and France could also conspire in the production of
enriched uranium U235. Currently they had independent plants at Pierrelatte
and Capenhurst and the US had the upper hand. The computer industry was
another example where Europe was failing to stand up to the USA: 'Europe
could only make progress if France and Britain acted together'.7'
One question is the extent to which Wilson's proposals reflected a
genuine will for European collaboration as a solution to the problems of
British industry.72 There is no doubt that Britain's aircraft industry had
problems. Since 1965, the government had faced an apparently irreconcilable
deadlock between the excessive costs of joint projects in aircraft and space
development and the political price of withdrawal. The contentious schemes
were Concord, a bilateral plan with the French for a supersonic aircraft, the
European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) for a rocket launcher
and Airbus, a commercial subsonic aircraft. Britain had aftempted to pull out
° PRO PREM13 1731, Wilson - De Gaulle, 19 June 1967, 4pm
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of both Concord and ELDO, but had returned to collaboration because of
political embarrassment and because of the potential dangers of exclusion. In
the case of ELDO, if the Europeans continued to develop a launcher without
Britain, the British would find themselves dangerously isolated.73
In 1967, the Americans had beaten the British and French in the
production of new aircraft. British European Airways (BEA) had already
placed orders for the American Airbus, unwilling to wait for the production of
the European version. The government was subsequently highly ambivalent
about the continuation of the Airbus project. Although they realised it would
be impossible to pull out; Wilson insisted that Airbus should adopt the aero-
engines of the British firm Rolls-Royce. 74 Wilson's offer to de Gaulle of
British assistance in aero-engines therefore reflected a particular commercial
interest. In this instance, national industrial bias jeopardised the prospect of
European collaboration as de Gaulle responded that the French could not
accept British collaboration in aero-engines as they wished to sustain French
national production.75
Thus, it would appear that Wilson's offer of a European technological
community was genuine insofar as it reflected particular British industrial
interests. There was recognition in the Cabinet that European collaboration did
represent a political choice and an expression of Britain's orientation.76
However, the over-riding principle was that British membership of the EEC
would have to be assured before Britain gave away national technological
know-how. Trend explained the economic rationale behind this approach.
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Technology itself was not a problem in terms of sustaining the industrial
productivity and the quality of life of the population. What was problematical
was the size of the domestic market and the units of production within that
market. British industry needed not an input of technological expertise, but
greater rationalisation and access to a larger market in order to provide a spur
to the economies of scale. Widening the market was an essential part of
improving British industrial production and technological collaboration could
only be encouraged within the context of integration. If it were not, Trend
concluded: 'it would enable Europe to have a wider access to our own
technological expertise in which in many fields we are in the lead, while
giving us no compensating advantage in terms of favourable access to the
European market'. 77 Economically, the British did not want a technological
community unless Britain was inside the EEC.
There was also a further possible angle in Wilson's approach to the
General. Reilly had suggested that as de GauJile did not have access to
thermonuclear technology, Britain could make an offer based on knowledge
sharing to enable him to make use of his nuclear submarine force. 78 John
Thomson, the Head of the Planning Staff in the Foreign Office, certainly felt
that de Gaulle had a strong interest in obtaining thermonuclear knowledge, as
without it, the force de frappe could not be ised. Thomson thought that
without the assurance of a credible force, de Gaulle would not be able to
withdraw completely from the Atlantic Alliance. 79 Pierre Maillard, Minister in
the French Foreign Service, had sounded out the British Embassy in Paris as to
76	 CAB128 42, CC(67)l3th, 16 Mar. 1967
PRO PREM13 1850, Trend to Wilson, 5 Jan. 1967
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282
the possibility of Franco-British co-operation in thermonuclear development.
He had added that this had nothing to do with the Common Market, as
whether co-operating with France or not, Britain's defence policy still
involved too many Atlantic ties.8°
Wilson told Hetherington:
He thought that de Gaulle might offer a defence
community if we would go in on a nuclear
programme with them. He said, however, that
the French were a long way behind and had not
got a thermonuclear weapon yet. He was not
prepared to go in with de Gaulle (although he
was a little ambiguous about the way he put it).8'
Palliser remembered that there were 'hints' of a thermonuclear offer, a vague
suggestion to see if de Gaulle would bite. There were, however, multiple
problems with the possibility, not least that it would require agreement with
the Americans, which of course would turn de Gaulle away from the idea and
that Wilson also would not have had Cabinet authority:
I don't think it was ever more than a sort of a
hint - I think I'd remember - I don't think there
was ever a 'look we have this knowledge, we
have problems with the US with sharing it, but if
we could get over that, we could share it' - but I
think there were hints dropped - whether de
Gaulle reacted I honestly don't remember -
Wilson obviously didn't have Cabinet
authority... I remember that [Maillard's
suggestion] being discussed and mulled over
If Wilson did drop hints, which I vaguely think
he did, they would be extremely wrapped up...
as doing it would have caused really serious
problems with the Americans and others...
Maillard and others may have thought this was a
good idea, but this didn't necessarily mean that
de Gaulle would agree... He would have
concluded that anything that we were offering
him was done in agreement with the United
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States, and in theory it should have been... I
don't think we carried it through as a logical
conclusion, a way of getting over the barrier [of
de Gaulle's veto]'.82
There is no suggestion of such an offer in the record of the meeting.
The meeting failed to elicit a change in de Gaulle's attitude. The
reason for this was that de Gaulle did not believe that Britain was independent
from the USA. Determined to create a real alternative to the American-led
international order, the French President saw American influence as the
destabilising factor in world affairs. 83 In the Middle East, de Gaulle's failure to
bring the Soviet Premier Kosygin to the negotiating table may have been a
factor in his reluctance. Yet, he focused principally on the dangers posed to
global accord by America's policy in Vietnam, arguing it made peace in the
Middle East impossible. While France had clearly stated that America should
withdraw, Britain refused to disassociate from US policy. Dc Gaulle
acknowledged that Britain's policy in the Far East was changing, but stressed
that Britain would side with the USA in times of crisis, while the French
would not:
The French Government understood very well
the importance which the British government
attached to contracting their effort and
expenditure overseas. But as regards the critical
issue of the growing tension between the US and
the USSR, both in the Middle East and the Far
East - where the situation had now been
aggravated by the explosion of the Chinese
thermonuclear weapon - the French government
did not yet see clearly where the UK's real
sympathies lay. Even if Britain would not make
up her mind now, she would be compelled,
sooner or later, to choose between staying with
the US - and therefore siding with them in their
82 Sir Michael Palliser, Interview with author, 5 Nov. 2001
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quarrels - or leaving them.. .The French had
taken their decision. . .United States' disputes
were not their disputes; and if these led the
United States into wars, they would not be
France's wars.84
De Gaulle agreed that Britain and France could participate in civil
nuclear technology, particularly in the supply of enriched uranium and
possibly in aviation and missiles. Britain's political links with the USA in the
larger questions of global security meant, however, that Britain's orientation
was not certain. Wilson argued that Europe was at a turning point. Kept out of
Europe, Britain would be forced to turn to the USA and to create an Atlantic
and eventually Pacific Community that would ultimately overwhelm the
European Community. This was not what Britain wanted, but the French could
give them little choice:
The greatest risk of all was that we should delay
while the rest of the world drifted towards a
disaster which could possibly be averted by a
strong Europe acting independently and without
fear or favour as regards anyone.85
De Gaulle agreed that this was an unfavourable prospect, but argued that
British accession would not safeguard against an Atlantic grouping. Britain's
introduction of Atlantic influence inside the Community would slowly kill
French and 'European' dominance:
Holland was strongly in favour, Belgium equally
to some extent, and Germany would be very
tempted, while the poor Italians, being directly
dependent upon the US, could not hope to
prevent it. British entry therefore would not
enable Europe to avoid such an Atlantic
prospect.86
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Importantly, de Gaulle argued that Britain would take a different stance in
agricultural and commercial policies. He envisaged that Britain would try to
create a free trade area with loose arrangements from inside the Community.
This would water down the economic union of the Six:
If Britain joined the Communities, in two to
three years' time what would her attitude be in
discussions within Europe in regard to the US,
and in such matters as agriculture, food
production, currency questions, capital
movements - all fundamental to the EEC - what
would Britain's attitude be?87
De Gaulle therefore clearly revealed that he wanted to preserve French
and so European influence within the European Community, keeping out the
Atlanticist compulsion in politics and trade that British membership would
encourage. Britain could not come in because this would prevent French
domination and would give strength to opinion in the Five that supported
Atlantic ties. The President acknowledged that ultimately his attempt to create
a 'European Europe' free from Atlantic influence would probably fail:
President de Gaulle said.., he knew that the
Prime Minister was aware of the general French
approach. It was possible that this approach
would be unsuccessful, it was conceivable that
one day the Atlantic concept would submerge
them. But in that case there would be no Europe
- or at least no European Europe and no
specifically European character or personality.
They did not wish this to happen. But they





De Gaulle's pessimism led to Reilly's assessment that he was
'paradoxically encouraged' by the visit. 89 Wilson wrote that de Gaulle was
'obsessed in his fatalistic way by a sense of real impotence (a word he used
twice with me).' 9° It was possible then that de Gaulle would not find the
strength to exclude Britain, aware of the long-term dwindling of his influence.
Yet, for the first time Wilson acknowledged openly that getting around de
Gaulle was unlikely: 'we are past the point of forecasting his actions on the
basis of rational judgement'. 9 ' Thus although the long-term arguments
supporting British accession were not dead, the visit marked a shift in the
Prime Minister's thinking about the European initiative.
Courting the Five: George Brown at the WEU, 4 July 1967
Wilson and Brown were not working together closely on Britain's European
initiative. While the Prime Minister had concentrated on his journey to
Trianon, Brown focused on the delivery of Britain's negotiating position to the
WEU on 4 July. On reading about Brown's plans in the press, Wilson noted to
Palliser: 'could you please check... whether the Press story about WEU
meeting and George's statement thereto is true?' 92 Wilson had established in
the Cabinet Office a European Unit to centralise control of European policy.93
Yet, Wilson's comment shows that Brown took this major initiative without
the Prime Minister's knowledge. The Foreign Office's priority was to
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minimise emphasis on the 'conditions' of membership and they did prefer to
exclude other departments from discussion for this reason. Wilson did ensure
that he kept an eye on Brown's activities via an informant in the Foreign
Office. 94 The Prime Minister's intention, again urged by Palliser, was to allow
Brown to take charge of the 'day-to-day' handling of negotiations. Wilson's
role would be to intervene at 'various points in the negotiations, to force
concentration on the major issues and keep up the vital momentum'. 95 While
Brown would have command of the minutiae, Wilson would exercise political
charge.
Brown developed Britain's negotiating position in the new Ministerial
Committee On the Approach to Europe, EUR(M), of which he was chair and
which had been established to oversee negotiations. 96 Set up at the same time
was the Official Steering Committee on the Approach to Europe, EUR(S),
chaired by the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend. EIJR(S) intended to supervise
EUR(0), the official committee guiding Britain's position towards the
'conditions' of membership since November 1966. In this way, the Cabinet
Office could continue to monitor Brown's activities.
The statement to the WEU established vital advances in Britain's
negotiating stance in contrast to Britain's opening position in 1961. In 1961,
Britain had effectively accepted neither the CAP nor the principle of applying
the common external tariff (CET) to Commonwealth imports, particularly
agricultural imports. 98 The premise of the 1967 push for entry was that Britain
could accept the Treaty of Rome, the CAP and the CET, subject to agreements
PRO PREMI3/1482, Palliser to Wilson, 13 May 1967
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on specific commodities or problems. This statement remained the basis of
Britain's demands when the final push for entry began in 1 970,99 Although the
negotiating position was a monumental shift from 1961, it was reached only
very rapidly and under duress. It left undecided the length of the transitional
period for agriculture; an oversight with potential to unravel the whole basis of
Robinson's negotiating strategy. It also failed to consider Britain's position
towards levy payments, postponing substantive discussions by arguing that
Britain could participate in 1969. The agreement thus reflected the particular
circumstances of the time.
Brown's premise was the need to get a statement as free from
safeguards as possible in order to maximise the pressure the Five were willing
to exert on the French. As Brown told the Cabinet: 'the immediate purpose
must be to assure that negotiation actually began'.'°° Disagreement focused on
the two main areas of agriculture and the Commonwealth. Jay and Peart both
now pressed hard for a transitional period for acceptance of the CAP of a
maximum of ten years and a minimum of seven. 101 The EUR(M) Committee
comprised a mix of supporters, opponents and the uncommitted on the
principle of membership. Brown, Stewart and Jenkins were strongly in favour,
Jay, Peart and Ross strongly against. Commonwealth Secretary Bowden was
opposed, but not fervently so and Callaghan remained ambivalent. EUR(M)
could not decide, feeling that the burden of reconstruction and the balance of
payments merited a transitional period of at least seven years. Faced with the
Foreign Office's case that asking for too much would jeopardise Britain's
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approach as a whole, ministers deferred a final decision until the length for
other products was established.' 02 In the full Cabinet, the government hedged
the question of agriculture. Agricultural levies, which would pose a
considerable burden on Britain's balance of payments, were dealt with by
reference to the 1969 review. The basis of the Cabinet's agreement was that
'once in, we would have more influence at the agricultural review in 1969.103
This was known to be an unrealistic proposition, but it delayed a row on the
specific provisions, so enabling the short-term bid to continue.
There were also differences of opinion as to whether or not Britain
could accept the CET. The President of the Board of Trade continued to raise
vociferous objection to Britain's membership strategy by insisting on the
retention of duty free imports for all cereals, meat and dairy produce. Jay's
insistence on permanent arrangements for agricultural imports led Wilson to
admonish him that his requests were out of line with the Cabinet's decision to
apply. Government policy was not to seek major and substantial changes, but
to accept the principles of the Treaty of Rome. Jay should not therefore
circulate a paper on the subject. 104 Jay's inflexible attitude towards the
Community certainly contributed to his dismissal from the Cabinet in July.105
Wilson's insistence that the Cabinet had accepted the provisions of the Treaty
was the basis of Jay's claim that the Cabinet were inexorably pushed towards
the principle of membership without agreement on the terms.'° 6 Yet, Jay must
have been aware that free entry for all agricultural produce was an impossible
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negotiating demand. Bowden, who wanted to seek some safeguards for some
commodities, told Jay that there was no point in asking for more than even the
New Zealanders requested.107
Dispute over demands for New Zealand was minimal. The Six had
accepted in 1963... that New Zealand, excessively dependent on Britain's
market, was a special case.'° 8 Worth £370m in total, £168m or 45% of New
Zealand's exports came to Britain.' 09 Disagreement focused on whether to ask
for security for New Zealand's lamb and cheese exports as well as for butter
exports. The Board of Trade demanded safeguards for all these products, as
the New Zealanders wanted, but the Foreign Office suggested only specific
arrangements for butter. 11 ° Sugar posed more of a problem. The Foreign
Office wanted to avoid any adjustment at all for Australia's sugar and to agree
only a degressive arrangement for New Zealand. Neither did they want to seek
permanent solutions for the developing countries. Rather, Britain should allow
the Commonwealth Sugar Arrangement to run its course until 1974. After this,
the Commonwealth should be responsible for negotiating their own
compromises.' 1 ' Ministers could not agree whether they should ask for
specific arrangements after 1974. Under Stewart's chairmanship in Brown's
absence, EUR(M) adopted a bargain to seek assurances after 1974 without
setting out what exactly they hoped to preserve."2
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The Board of Trade also wanted to retain the promise of a zero tariff
for some raw materials: wood pulp, softwood plywood, East India kips (cow
hides), lead, lead bullion and aluminium. They also sought duty free quotas for
newsprint, aluminia and zinc. For tropical produce important to the Asian
Commonwealth, including manufactured sports equipment unpopular in
Europe like cricket bats and polo sticks, the Board of Trade also wanted to
revive the zero tariff request. Processed goods important to the
Commonwealth but unimportant to Community markets should also receive a
nil tariff." 3 The Foreign Office, while not disputing the substance of the Board
of Trade's proposals, considered that to ask for such an obtuse list would only
lead to hostility from the Six. Britain's requirements could be met by duty
quotas of the sort that the Netherlands and the Germans had managed to
negotiate under Article 25 of the Treaty of Rome and there was no need to
raise it until after accession.' 14 These demands were considered relatively
unimportant and indeed Brown did not raise the issue of nil tariff requests
from the CET in his WEU statement.
Brown's statement to the WEU was therefore favourable to European
opinion in both tone and substance. He began by stressing that for Britain this
was a 'decisive moment in our history'.' 15 For the European Community,
enlargement was the only way to strengthen its economic and technological
base and so to develop the political strength to stand up to the superpowers.
Strengthening Europe would enable Europe to play a greater role in the pursuit
of détente: 'We see this as a major step towards a reconciliation and a revival
"3 PRO CAB 134 2813, EUR(M)(67)1 9, Negotiating Objectives on Protective Tariffs,
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in that larger Europe which has remained too long divided between East and
West'. 116 In this way, Brown met head on de Gaulle's arguments in favour of
the 'cosy nest': 'There will of course be changes. But they will be changes of
dimension - a larger Community, a more powerful and more influential
Europe... The fundamentals of the Communities will remain unaffected, for
we shall be accepting precisely the same treaty aims and obligations in letter
and spirit as yourselves'.117
Brown then established Britain's negotiating stance. Britain accepted
the Treaties, subject only to adjustments required to provide for the accession
of a new member, such as voting and fmancial agreements. Not only this,
Britain was prepared to evolve with the Community: 'We believe that Europe
can emerge as a Community expressing its own point of view and exercising
influence in world affairs'. 8 Britain would be able to accede to the
Community via a transitional period or periods, following an initial standstill
year to give EFTA time to make arrangements. After twelve months, Britain
would also be able to accede to EURATOM.119
For agriculture, Britain needed some kind of procedure for an annual
review, assurance of an adequate supply of liquid milk and support
arrangements for pigs and eggs, all of which could be established under
Community rules. Britain should participate in the 1969 agricultural review in
order to renegotiate the burden of agricultural levies: 'we shall look forward to
taking part as a full member of the Community in the negotiation of the






would include the question of agricultural support payments. Hill farmers in
particular might need additional aid in order to adjust to the agricultural
distortion.'2°
For the Commonwealth exporters, Britain would require some kind of
arrangement for the Commonwealth sugar producers after the end of 1974, in
line with Community procedures, and abrogation for New Zealand's exports
of butter. African and Caribbean Commonwealth countries could associate
under the Yaoundé Convention and trading arrangements could be arranged
for the Asian countries. Britain would be able to adopt the capital movement
requirements under a transitional period and would be able to accept the
common external tariff after the Kennedy Round reduction from 12 to 8%.121
Brown ended with a plea to European history and culture:
The history and culture of our continent is the
birthright of us all. We have all contributed to it
and we all share in it. Our application flows
from the historical development of our
continent, from the sentiments, which as
Europeans we all share and from the idea we all
have of the part our continent should play in the
world. . . Surely it is in the interests of all our
countries that Britain should make her full
contribution to this unity.'22
The reception of the statement in the Five was very positive. At the
WEU meeting, Luns reiterated that the 'completeness of detail was of the
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which was 'unequivocal and unusually important. A milestone on the road to a
united Europe had been reached'. 124 Harmel's praise was the most fulsome:
against the background of uncertainty elsewhere
in the world [Britain's] application offered a
hope of consolation. [Britain's] application
showed [the British] had reached a new step,
and had passed from exploration to a firm
political and technical position. [The British]
had posed problems before, now [the British]
had begun to sketch solutions, and were seeking
them not only on a national but a Community
basis. He was particularly impressed by
[Britain's] desire not to disturb the treaties or the
decisions taken under them by the six.125
Fanfani added that the chance of political and economic unity in Europe was
to be welcomed. Gregoire stressed that Britain could accept the Treaty and
Luns, in a coup de grace for Brown's position, argued that it would be possible
to solve Britain's difficulties during transitional periods. 126 D'Avignon,
Harmel's Private Secretary, confided later that Britain's negotiating position
was so good that de Gaulle knew negotiations would work. 127 Only the French
representative Bettencourt mentioned any negative points, suggesting that
Britain needed to reconcile its entry with its essential national and
Commonwealth interests and thus that the French government could not yet
give a view. 128
Brown's statement to the WEU succeeded in isolating the French
within the Community. In a further Council meeting on 10 July, de Gaulle's
obstructionism was evident. The Five had shown good support for the opening
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Britain's candidature.' 29 Meeting with Reilly, de Gaulle concentrated on the
Cold War aspects of Britain's bid, arguing that British entry would entrench
the divide in Europe as the Russians feared Atlantic incursion. On the terms,
he argued only that the British would not be able to do what they had
promised.' 3° The political dimension of de Gaulle's opposition was therefore
evident. France's ability in 1963 to equate French interests with Community
interests had been undermined, a significant step indeed in the battle for the
kind of Europe that would develop.131
Thus, in early July 1967, Britain's bid had brought a kind of success.
Further indications of de Gaulle's domestic weakness added to the sense that
the application could outlast the General. The French government faced
Parliamentary difficulty with the budget in deficit and the economy in trouble.
In the wider environment, de Gaulle's condemnation of the Israelis had been
unpopular and recent social legislation led to the possibility of workers'
strikesJ32 There was, Reilly reported, the 'general, though unexplained feeling
here that he is not likely to last very long'.' 33 Palliser added that the decline in
de Gaulle's status meant that he would no longer be able to threaten the Five
with French withdrawal from the EEC.'34
Faced with evidence of de Gaulle's weakening power and aware that
his strategy of a deal with de Gaulle had failed, Wilson suggested tightening
the pressure on the Five. To encourage the Five further, Wilson suggested
'blatant technological co-operation with individual members of the Five or
PRO PREMI3 1483, The Ha, ue to FO, tel.290, 4 July 1967
'	 CAB 128 42, CC(67)46 ; Hannay, O'Neill, op.cit., p.10
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bilateral co-operation'. 135 'Blatant technological co-operation' was also a
response to the signs of France's reservations about the Harmel Report. Since
June, the NATO powers had been discussing Pierre Harrnel's proposals to
increase the role of NATO in pursuing détente, proposals that were supported
but regarded suspiciously by the French.' 36 Signs were also that the French
were considering complete withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance.'37
Enhanced technological co-operation with the Five would increase the risks of
isolation for the French, while sustaining pressure on the Five by evidence of
Britain's goodwill. 138 Thus, in the summer of 1967, there were grounds for
cautious optimism for the short-term prospects of accession.
The problem of enlargement: The Commission's Opinion, September
1967
Progress on Britain's application was now waiting on the completion of the
Commission's Opinion on 29 September 1967. Over the summer months,
British efforts focused on attempts to influence the Opinion with informal
contacts by officials, arranged through Britain's ambassador in Brussels, Sir
James Marjoribanks.' 39 To avoid exacerbating the disputes over the terms of
entry, departments other than the Foreign Office would not be invited as a
matter of course to participate. Discussions were to be kept at a low level to
escape press attention. Indicative of the watchful relationship between Number
LM	 PREM13 1484, Palliser to Wilson, 15 July 1967
PRO PREM13 1484, Wilson's comments on Palliser to Wilson, 15 July 1967; Young,
Britain op cit., p.100
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Ten and the Foreign Office, Wilson insisted that Nield attend alongside
O'Neill. The Prime Minister was concerned to stay within the parameters of
the Cabinet's decisions. Brown's priority was for a flexible approach to
encourage the Commission to support the opening of negotiations.' 4° The
main purpose was to explain Britain's position towards the difficult questions
of the agricultural levies, Commonwealth trade and sterling, for which the
Treasury's Fred Atkinson was present. Despite the good contacts the Foreign
Office had developed with their counterparts in Brussels, the discussions did
not appear decisive in influencing the final shape of the Opinion.'4'
The Commission's Opinion was undeniably enthusiastic both about the
principle of enlargement and the opening of negotiations: 'unquestionably the
Community must accept certain risks where an undertaking of this importance,
ie the achievement of European unification, is to be attempted... negotiations
should be opened in the most appropriate forms with the States who have
applied for membership'.' 42 Oniy recently formed after the fusion of the three
executives and after the battles of the empty chair crisis, the new Commission
under the Belgian Jean Rey was also keen to make its mark in the Community.
The Council of Ministers' inability to decide on Britain's eligibility as a
candidate provided the perfect opportunity for the Commission to take the lead
in welcoming Britain's application.'43
138 Elhson, 'Britam's Place', op.cft.
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The Opinion showed that the Commission had accepted Britain's case
to be fundamentally negotiable. Britain would be able to accept the CAP over
a transitional period." A solution could be sought in negotiations for New
Zealand's butter and exports of Commonwealth sugar, the Opinion
recognising the particular difficulties posed for New Zealand.' 45 Countries
similar to those involved in the Yaoundé Convention, namely the African and
Caribbean Commonwealth, would be able to negotiate association.' 46 It would
be possible to negotiate a deal for British accession.
There were doubts, however, about when Britain and other EFTA
countries should accede. The French Commissioners, Raymond Barre and
Jean-Francois Deniau played on genuine fears of the risks of enlargement to
introduce ambivalence and delay into the Commission's dealing with Britain's
application.' 47 Vice-President Sicco Mansholt noted the dangers of 'excessive
blethering': 'the difficulties of expanding the Community were being used too
much to construct pretexts against considering the British application'.'48
Enlargement to a market of 300m people would change the Six's
arrangements and would necessitate parallel strengthening of the
Community's institutions. Deniau went as far as to suggest that the EFTA
countries excluding Britain should only associate in a free trade area around
the central customs union.'49 Concern for the continued cohesion of the
customs union led to doubts that Britain could accept the future development
' Opinion, paras. 54-77, Kitzinger, Second, op.cit., pp.232-244; see also PRO
PREM13 1484, Brussels to FO, tel.251, 30 Sept. 1967
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of the Community and undermined the impression that negotiations would
succeed:
the first condition of entry - ie acceptance by
new members of the rules and objectives already
decided upon by the Community, subject to
minor adjustments that might have to be made -
is not sufficient to ensure that the talks
remaining to be accomplished will be carried to
a successful conclusion.'50
Doubts as to whether Britain was committed to the future development
of the economic union also served to dispel the force of Britain's technological
contribution to the continent. The Community would welcome access to
Britain's know-how in science and technology and accepted that Britain's
involvement would help the Community to compete with the United States.
Yet, it wanted to ensure that Britain was prepared to merge with Community
efforts: 'The Communities will be able to benefit from Britain's contribution
in these fields only if they are able to establish a common policy in the field of
science and advanced technologies'.151
Fear that Britain's accession would change the nature of the
Community reflected national interests member states were anxious to
preserve. Fusion of the three Communities was set to follow the fusion of the
three executives achieved with much acrimony after the settlement of the
empty chair crisis at Luxembourg. Fusing the Communities offered a way of
revitalising EURATOM, with its remit to develop the civil uses of atomic
energy. It also provided an opportunity to rethink the role of the ECSC and
thus to move to a common energy and transport policy dealing with the central
commodities of coal, steel, oil and gas. On a strictly practical level, Britain's
Opinion, para. 10, Kitzinger, Second, op cit., p.2 ii
'' Opinion, para.l57, ibid., p.281
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nationalised coal board would fall under the Treaty's legislation against
monopolies and Britain would have to lift the ban on coal imports that
protected the NCB.152
The main difficulty was the competition Britain's coal and steel would
pose to German industry and Germany's reluctance to face this challenge. The
Germans wanted to proceed to fusion before Britain joined the Community,
enabling Germany to set the agenda for a common energy and transport policy
without heed to Britain's interests. 153 Lalir was adamant that fusion must
precede enlargement; suggesting the delay-making formula that negotiations
for each could proceed in tandem.' 54 Powerful German economic interests
meant the Germans were reluctant to face enlargement before securing
advantage in the next stage of Community development.
Sterling also played a large part in the Commission's hesitancy.
France's political position was said to have played a major part in the
Opinion's negative treatment of Britain's economic prospects. Marjoribanks
commented that the section on economy and fmance was the 'price paid for
acquiescence in the Opinion of the French Commissioners'.' 55 Brown also
maintained this line in Cabinet.' 56 Yet, the evidence suggests a greater degree
of agreement between the French and the Five on precisely the question of
Britain's economy. The French were able to tap into genuine fears amongst
the Five and indeed in Britain as to the ability of the British economy to cope
with membership. During preliminary meetings with the Commission, the
152 Opmion, para.42, 45, ibid., pp.228-9
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Treasury's Fred Atkinson had explained that the margin of spare capacity
created by deflation would enable Britain to sustain a growth rate of 3% and to
cease the cycle of stop-go. The pound was stronger than it looked, undergoing
a temporary waver after the Middle East crisis, but taking Britain's investment
overseas into account, the UK was a creditor overall.157
The Treasury's defence of Britain's prospects was increasingly
unbelievable. Wilson's search for an economic strategy in July revealed all the
difficulties of reflating the economy while keeping a stable balance of
payments.' 58 The Bank was so concerned at Britain's mounting debts that it no
longer wanted to call on swap arrangements with the central banks because of
over-commitment. 159 The Commission's comments on Britain's economy
therefore reflected a much more widespread malaise about Britain's economic
prospects. The Cabinet noted, 'it was not in our interests to highlight the
prominence given to our economic and financial position. It was of great
importance to avoid anything which might magnify or give credence to
sensational reports in the Press about our economic position'.'6°
The Opinion recorded that the fundamental problems of disequilibrium
in the British economy remained and that reflation therefore had dangerous
consequences for the balance. 16 ' As a result, 'the British authorities, in their
efforts to prepare the economy for integration, might unilaterally adopt certain
measures which could have major repercussions for the Community. It is
therefore important that these measures should be concerted before they are
PRO PREM13 1485, Marjoribanks to FO, tel.247, 30 Sept. 1967
'	 CAB128 42, CC(67)58th, 11 Oct. 1967
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put into effect'.' 62 Nicholas Kaldor, economic adviser in the Treasury, felt that
the Report 'was not written by Barre or even accepted by the others as part of
a bargain with the French but was a unanimous view and the fruit of much re-
ri.'63
The section of the Opinion on the weakness of the British economy
represented a collective anxiety. France's impact was to make explicit links
between the balance of payments and the reserve role of sterling.' TM The
Commission's Opinion denied the Treasury's argument that the sterling
balances were not a major cause of exchange difficulties. It insisted that
although the sterling balances were relatively stable, withdrawals could occur
and that the UK's official liquid assets were less than the total liabilities
represented by the sterling area. 165 The Treasury strenuously resisted this
interpretation, claiming that withdrawals had never exceeded Britain's
drawing capabilities from the IMF.' Assets of the sterling area outweighed
the liabilities and that the sterling holdings were fundamentally stable.' 67 The
Opinion maintained that Britain's undertaking not to use Article 108 was
meaningless and Britain had not been willing to take the lead in discussing a
possible 'European solution'.' 68 Again, the Treasury and the Foreign Office
resisted this argument, claiming that the British were willing to discuss any
161 Opinion, paras.8l-82, 89, Kitzinger, Second, op.cit., pp.248-250
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solutions the Six had in mind, consistent with the position they had in fact
adopted.' 69 Where the French were on sounder ground was in drawing on
Britain's extra-European interests as evinced in the IMF talks. Britain would
be unable to side with the Six in international monetary talks: a suggestion
that, despite the efforts of the Chancellor to show Britain's willingness to
discuss a 'European solution', had been borne out in the IMF discussions.'7°
The French drew exacting conclusions from their observations about
Britain's economy. The Dutch and the Germans felt that although sterling
probably would be a problem if it were still weak when the British were about
to join, the question of sterling should not impinge on the Community's
judgement now. Negotiations could take place alongside the recovery of
economic strength and could in fact serve to stimulate the economy. 171 For the
French, detail of Britain's economic difficulties was used to establish
'preconditions' to British membership. The Opinion stated that Britain's
economy would have to be strengthened before membership, in keeping with
Wilson's own statements that Britain would only enter if the economy were
strong.
It also suggested that the Six would wish to discuss with the British the
'conditions under which the present international role of sterling would be
adjusted with a view to including that currency, together with the currencies of
the other member states, in a Community monetary system'.' 72 For members
of the Five, these discussions could mean simply a trawl through the possible
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solutions. The French, on the other hand, clearly viewed the Opinion as a way
of setting preconditions to British membership. Before membership, Britain's
economy would have to pass certain unspecified tests over which the
Community would have the ultimate say. As Con O'Neill put it: 'according to
this new French doctrine, applicant States must qualify for membership by
reaching certain standards of economic health, and by themselves adapting
their practices to those of the Community. Only when their practices had been
so adapted, according to this doctrine, could negotiations for membership
begin'.173
The French case against British membership did therefore have
serious impact on the formation of the Commission's Opinion. The French
Commissioners were able to tap into deeper fears amongst their colleagues as
to the impact of enlargement on the continuation of economic union. In
particular, the anxieties of German industry as to the fusion of the three
Communities lent a powerful force in favour of delay. French arguments as to
Britain's economic weakness also met with general approval; but the case
against sterling as a reserve currency was more contentious.
The inertia encouraged by the French position meant that while the
Opinion supported Britain's membership in the long-term, it was now certain
that there would be no early negotiations. Jean Rey, eager to avoid a crisis in
the Community, suggested that rather than negotiations, Britain should enter
into 'pre-negotiation' with the Commission alone to hammer out the problems
172	 CAB 134 2822, EUR(0)(67) 123, Analysis of the Commission's Opinion, Secretaries,
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of sterling and the adoption of the common external tariff.' 74 Brown continued
to stress to the Cabinet that the Community were discussing Britain's position:
'our general objective was to maintain the initiative and momentum in pursuit
of our application'. Yet, behind the scenes, as Brown admitted, contingency
planning was underway in case de Gaulle did veto.175
'Something more subtle than flattery" 7' Dealing with Germany, October
1967
Early in October, in a highly unusual move, General de Gaulle summoned
Patrick Reilly to a private meeting. The meeting confirmed de Gaulle's
unwillingness to admit Britain, but showed again that de Gaulle was reluctant
to issue a veto on the opening of negotiations. Reilly recorded de Gaulle's
view that Britain was not ready to enter. Economic problems and the
agricultural levies meant that British accession would change the nature of the
Community. Politically, he noted that Britain was moving away a little from
the United States, but economically, there were grave problems. He
commented: 'no doubt the British believed they could accept the essential
principles of the Community, but the truth was they could not'. 177 Palliser
agreed that the indications were extremely negative, but added that it was still
unclear how de Gaulle intended to deal with the application. The General
seemed to urge Reilly that Britain should drop the whole venture, showing
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Reilly that negotiations could not work and so there was no point in
embarking upon them.178
In the atmosphere of growing recognition that de Gaulle did intend to
veto, but uncertainty as to how he would do so, it was essential to persist in the
objective of making life difficult for the General. If he did veto, it should be
politically odious for him, ensuring that the political nature of his opposition
was exposed and his isolation from the main currents of European and French
political opinion made clear. Yet, the objective of Britain's strategy was not to
force de Gaulle to veto. This option was discussed, but was dismissed in the
Cabinet Office as excessively dangerous. There was no point in pre-empting
Gaullist action which could result in Britain's own isolation in Europe,
particularly when members of the Five wanted to give the General more
time. 179 Furthennore, Palliser felt that if provoked, de Gaulle would not
hesitate to issue a veto, which the British still preferred to avoid. 180 Britain
therefore aimed to strike a balance, persisting in demanding that negotiations
start in case de Gaulle proved reluctant to veto; but ensuring that it was
unfavourable for him if he did.
Central to the strategy of making life difficult for the General was the
attitude of the Germans. Kiesinger disagreed with the French concept of
Europe and France's attitude towards the Atlantic Alliance, but he felt that
Franco-German rapprochement was essential to European unity. Kiesinger
told Sir Frank Roberts that Britain's membership was bound to happen, even
de Gaulle accepted that 'history and the force of events' was on the British
178 PRO PREM13 1485, Reilly to FO, tel.975, 5 Oct. 1967, Palliser to Wilson, 6 Oct. 1967;
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side.' 8 ' With membership ultimately inevitable, there was no reason for the
Germans to stand up to the French now. Kiesinger's position was part self-
justification. The Germans wanted to ensure the survival of the existing
Community and to begin steps to fusion; but could argue that this was not the
right time to provoke a breach if the British would accede anyway. It was also
a tactical consideration. Kiesinger believed he knew the General. Treating the
General too roughly, as the Dutch did, would cause him to break free from the
EEC and from NATO. But 'if handled with the right mixture of firmness and
understanding, he could be brought round'.182
Brandt as well as Kiesinger was unwilling to risk Franco-German
relations by provoking de Gaulle. 183 Brandt in fact told Couve that the
Germans were worried about the British economy and that the Germans felt
there should be further discussions between the Six before involving the
British.' 84 Germany's attitude was significant as the French based their tactical
decision for the 23 October Community Council meeting on the knowledge
that the Germans would not force a breach. The French decided that in the
light of Germany's desire to avoid a crisis, it would not be necessary to issue a
direct veto on the starting of negotiations. Rather, Couve would continue to
prevaricate and delay.' 85 Thus, Germany's attitude enabled the French to slip
between the twin objectives of Britain's tactics: neither forced into saying
'yes' nor exposed by saying 'no'.
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The British were also unsure as to how best to deal with the Germans
as Kiesinger prepared to visit London. Some in the Foreign Office, as well as
the Minister for Disarmament Lord Chalfont, were tempted to take a strong
stance to 'put some backbone into Dr. Kiesinger'. Britain could withdraw
troops from Germany, take no interest in future reunification, and argue that
the opportunity to strengthen Europe's technological base would be lost.'86
Palliser, however, recommended that Britain persist in beating on the door to
ently, as Kiesinger would not change his tactics, a view shared by the British
Embassy in Bonn.' 87 Palliser's advice was reminiscent of his guidance during
the probe that Wilson should aim to play the European statesman, creating
genuine ties of interest with the German leader. Kiesinger, he judged, had like
many Germans been disappointed by Britain's turn away from Europe after
the Second World War. Wilson should aim to play on this aspect of
Kiesinger's complex character, affected also by his unhappy childhood.
Palliser suggested that:
it is over-simplified to say that this means
flattering him: it means something more subtle
than flattery. You will continue the process
begun so skilfully on your last two visits to
Bonn and strengthen both his conviction and his
sense of purpose in a way that a crude approach
would certainly not achieve.'88
The strategy adopted by Wilson did engage in some threat tactics,
particularly following indications from the Council of Ministers on 23 October
that the French intended use Britain's economic weakness to prevent the
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opening of negotiations. In the Council of Ministers, Couve, apparently to
Kiesinger's surprise, took a much more decisive stance against the opening of
negotiations than the Germans had expected.' 89 The French Foreign Minister
argued that the Six could not begin to discuss British entry until Britain could
fulfil certain preconditions. Not only was it necessary for Britain's economy to
have recovered, but also sterling should be divested of its role as a reserve
currency.' 9° Kiesinger admitted to Wilson that Couve's stand looked like a
veto. 191 The British delegation in Brussels considered that France's position
was extremely negative, but pointed out that the Five had stood up well,
forcing France out on a limb.'92
Seeing the French as isolated, the British team stepped up the pressure
on the Germans. Wilson stressed that Britain would 'not take no for an
answer', would continue to press irrevocably for negotiations to begin. He
threatened that the government would have to reconsider various aspects of
policy, 'particularly those which were expensive in terms of our balance of
payments'.' 93 The key issue upon which Britain could exercise some influence
was that of the foreign exchange cost of Britain's troops in Germany. As
Callaghan emphasised: 'If we made the kind of agreement Sir Frank Roberts
had been discussing, the net cost of our forces in Germany would still be about
700m DM a year. We should be much better placed to deal with Couve's
' 89 The suggestion that Kiesinger genuinely believed that the French could be brought to
negotiate eventually was made in PRO PREM13 1527, Mitchell to Wilson, 8 Nov. 1967
PREM13 1486, Marjoribanks to FO, tel.9, 23 Oct. 1967; Maitland to Brown, 24 Oct.
1967
PRO PREM1 3 1527, Wilson - Kiesinger and delegations, 24 Oct. 1967
' PRO PREM13 1486, Maijonbanks to FO, tel.9, 23 Oct. 1967; Maitland to Brown, 24 Oct.
1967
PRO PREM13 1527, Wilson - Kiesinger and delegations, 24 Oct. 1967
310
arguments about the British balance of payments if we did not have a burden
of this order'.'94
Yet, Wilson did take a measured approach to threatening the Germans.
In the ten years since Macmillan had evoked an isolationist Britain if the Free
Trade Area negotiations collapsed, the efficacy of British blackmail had
waned further. 195 The withdrawal of forces from the Far East meant that
Britain was much more reliant on its European role and could not
convincingly argue that Britain would pull out of Europe. As Healey
indicated: 'the government had just taken a decision to base their whole
defence policy on the defence of the European theatre and to reduce forces
outside Europe' 196
Moreover, Kiesinger was able to challenge Britain's aims in moving
towards a non-proliferation treaty. Britain could not afford to jeopardise
German support for the NPT. The NPT was potentially damaging to
Germany's interests and they sought a guarantee against the Soviet use of
political blackmail in dealing with the non-nuclear powers, as well as the use
of EURATOM safeguards. Kiesinger emphasised that he could do no more to
bring the Germans to accept the NPT.' 97 Trading threats was ineffective not
only because of the lack of muscle behind Britain's approach; it was also
dangerous as German support was essential to Britain's other foreign policy
objectives. Kiesinger's visit to London and Couve's hard stance did in any
case seem to have put new rhetorical life into the German Chancellor's
support for the application. In the Bundestag both Kiesinger and Brandt
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emphasised the importance of British entry and the dangers to Europe in its
denial. Brandt declared that the Six could not expect Britain to fulfil more
stringent 'conditions' than the Six had themselves (and particularly the
French) in 1958.198
Thus, Wilson's line was quite different to that chosen by the Minister
for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont, some days later. In what Chalfont took to be
an off-the-record conversation with journalists following an EFTA meeting in
Lausanne, he resorted to a 'fortress Britain' approach.' 99 He told journalists
that if de Gaulle should veto, Britain would reappraise her European policy.
The UK would withdraw completely the BAOR, cut loose from the Four
Power Agreement in Berlin, abandon support for the reunification of Germany
and reduce Britain's political and defence commitment to Western Europe.20°
Chalfont decided unilaterally to make this statement, but it did reflect his
previously declared belief that de Gaulle would be unable to veto and that
British pressure could force him to give way. 201 He presumably thought the
statement would have some impact. It did not: reaction from the continent was
muted.202 The Foreign Office repudiated Chalfont's comments with a side-
swipe at the Minister for Disarmament: 'The Permanent Under Secretary said
the Foreign Office were the true gospel'.203
PRO PREM13 1489, Bonn to FO, tel.1449, 27 Oct. 1967; FCO3O 192, Bonn to FO,
tel.1450, 27 Oct. 1967; Bonn to FO, tel.1444, 26 Oct. 1967; Dean to Gore-Booth, 1 Nov. 1967
'Alun Chalfont, The Shadow of My Hand: A Memoir (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson,
2000), pp.122-123; Wilson, Labour, op cit., p.445
200 Daily Mirror, 'The Rumour that Shook Europe Last Night', 28 Oct. 1967, Kit.zinger,
Second Try, op.cit., p.30!
201 PRO PREM13 1484, Chalfont to Wilson, 19 July 1967
202 PRO FCO3O 192, Bonn to FO, tel. 1455, 29 Oct. 1967
203 PRO FCO3O 192, FO to Bonn, tel.2754, 29 Oct. 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 1455, 29 Oct. 1967
312
Five Minutes to Midnight204 : Devaluation, November 1967
On 18 November, the British were finally forced to devalue the pound. The
Arab-Israeli war and a dock strike in Liverpool were the latest blows that
prevented the improvement in the balance of payments that had been evident
in April 1967. The decision was reached with great reluctance and because
there were no longer any alternatives. Persistent disequilibrium strengthened
the case for devaluation: the longer Britain's economy was weak the harder it
was to show that other economic policies would work. France's attitude to
sterling was one factor ensuring devaluation was at the forefront of European
minds. French obstructionism also played a part in ruling out an acceptable
support package for sterling.205
Sterling devaluation was the most significant feature characterising de
Gaulle's veto on British accession delivered at a press conference on 27
November. Persistent economic weakness had been important in diminishing
the Five's determination to stand up for Britain and was essential to de
Gaulle's steady undermining of Britain's case. Yet, devaluation did not
provide the essential pretext without which de Gaulle would have left well
alone: indications were that regardless of the devaluation de Gaulle was
preparing opinion for a veto. Reilly reported that de Gaulle was fuelling
economic doubts about British accession, such as the competition posed by
Britain's steel exports and from New Zealand's dairy products. The mainstay
of his argument was that sterling's weakness meant Britain would be unable to
204 Comment made by Callaghan, cited m Wilson, Labour, op.cit., p.449
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take on the obligations of membership. 206 Reilly felt that de Gaulle would wait
until early in 1968, when the French Assembly would be in recess until April
and France would have the chair of the EEC Council of Ministers. This would
enable de Gaulle to ride out any unpleasant reaction from public opinion
before he made further moves against the Atlantic Alliance, now intended for
1969.207
It was extremely difficult to refute the French case that Britain's
sterling obligations prevented the British from playing a full part in the EEC.
The Treasury attempted to show that the reserve role of sterling would not
impede Britain's involvement in European projects. In the Chancellor's
Mansion House speech on 26 October, he emphasised that the world's system
of reserve currencies was evolving and over time, Britain's reserve currency
functions would disappear. Although a common currency in the EEC was not
now a reality, Britain's membership would bring British and European
policies closer together. If the Six had any ideas about solutions to the reserve
role of sterling, then Britain was happy to discuss them. Yet, it was unrealistic
to expect that Britain could simply 'end' the reserve role of sterling, not least
because of the many holders of sterling and its global trading role.208
On 13 November, Wilson launched Britain's proposals for a
technological community. He met the criticism in the Commission's Opinion
that Britain would not merge with the continental economies by showing that
the Six and Britain could create a European Institute of Technology to
examine industiy-by-industiy areas for co-operation. Britain also wanted to
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investigate the creation of European companies. 209 As The Times pointed out,
the idea was a catch-all solution. It appealed to opinion in the City after
French stickling over sterling and it revived Wilson's stress on the 'white-hot
technological revolution' that had 'so profoundly excited his own party before
the 1964 general election'.21°
It was clear that technological collaboration could only come after
Britain's admission to the EEC. There had been suggestions from the Cabinet
Office that Britain should start planning for technological links regardless of
the immediate prospects for accession. 211 Pressure from the EEC meant that
Britain had to flesh out the proposal, but the architects of the project, Wilson,
Trend and the government's Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Solly Zuckerman
insisted that EEC membership had to come first. 212 Wilson argued that
exclusion from the Conmiunity would squander the opportunity for links. The
EEC would be unable to stand up to the USA and the Five would lose the
benefits of access to Britain's advanced knowledge. Britain's contribution was
valuable because of Britain's highly developed computer industry, leadership
with Germany in telecommunications and gas-cooled nuclear reactors.213
A well-presented idea, Wilson's launch of the technological
community was undermined by Britain's weak economy. The European press
could not help but comment on the problems of the British economy,
questioning Britain's ability to deliver technological expertise. The Belgian
Independent paper, Le Soir, for example, commented that while there was
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'widespread recognition of the boldness of Wilson's plan', there were
significant economic problems: 'although Britain has a very real technological
contribution to offer, her economy is in a state of stagnation and there is no
visible hope of a solution'. 214 In Britain, The Economist noted that
technological links would be excessively expensive. Britain could ill-afford
'co-operation on an industrial level to sell products to an as yet non-existent
buyer'.215 After devaluation, potential commentary on the technological
community was lost. Wilson wanted to draw attention to the positive reaction
of the European ministers to the technological community idea. He
commented: 'because of sterling our press carried little of European ministers'
and press comments' 216 To rectify this, Wilson suggested planting a question
in the House of Commons: 'Assemble [European press cuttings] and put in
library of House of Commons - with inspired question'.217
France's attitude towards the British application had a part to play in
the eventual devaluation of the pound. By 4 November, Wilson indicated to
the Chancellor that, although he remained unconvinced that the critical point
at which to jump had been reached, there would be no 'political veto' on a
change in parity.218 The French case against sterling, combined with anxiety
amongst the Five as to the ability of the British to hold the rate led to the
inclusion of sterling devaluation on the agenda of the EEC Finance Ministers
meeting in November. Evidence of the Finance Ministers' doubts led to
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adverse speculation in the currency markets. 219 Contingency planning in
Number Ten and the Treasury intensified, with Wilson and Callaghan still
uncertain. If an acceptable international package could be obtained, it would
be better to hold the rate and to act from strength at a more convenient time.
On 13 November, the Central Banks of the Group of Ten met in Basle. 22° The
USA, the Germans and the Italians wanted Britain to hold the rate, but the
French and Belgians thought that Britain would be unable to avoid
devaluation.221
The support package Britain required was a standby from the IMF of
$3bn. France's obstructive attitude was one factor militating against an
acceptable package. In a meeting with the Chancellor, Armstrong and Trend,
the Treasury representative explained:
The US was still pressing on Germany and Italy
to contribute to a major support operation to
prevent devaluation. The main US plan was for
a $1 .4bn standby from the IMF. Fowler still felt
that the IMF should be prepared to allow us a
standby exceeding 200% of our quota. The
general view was, however, that time would be
needed to negotiate this and there was the
possibility that the French would obstruct... The
Chancellor commented that if the French were
going to make the IMF so difficult to work, then
it cast a grave doubt on the value of the IMF
itself.222
There were factors other than French opposition in the failure to secure a
package. The conditions attached would be politically onerous and it was not
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at all clear that the standby would constitute the full amount. An alternative of
support from the IMF and accumulation of guaranteed sterling by the US and
the European Central Banks could be forthcoming, but the prospects for this
were uncertain. 223 The US had offered to purchase $500m of guaranteed
sterling on the condition that the Europeans took up a corresponding
amount.224 The French were opposed to this and the Italians uncertain. 225 Even
if a package did emerge, Trend wondered whether the British should accept
the conditions that would inevitably be attached.226
On 14 November, Trend warned 'it is only sensible to bring our
contingency planning for devaluation to a high state of readiness - we must
make sure, so far as we can, that it is an orderly affair rather than a headlong
rout'.227 The Chancellor felt that it would be difficult to get an adequate
package. Even if support was forthcoming, the subsequent months would be
very tight and Britain's ability to claim support exhausted. The benefits of
attempting to wait for a few more months were therefore unconvincing.228
Surprisingly, Callaghan reported that Brown was now wavering in favour of
holding the rate:
[the Foreign Secretary] now questioned whether
it was wise to take decisions to devalue and to
impose further restraints on the domestic
economy. The latter was, to the Foreign
Secretary's mind, something which would be
difficult for the public to bear in the present
mood of restiveness on many' issues including
Vietnam and unemployment.2 9
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Yet, the government had no choice. On 16 November, Cabinet agreed to
devalue from $2.80 to a new fixed rate of $2.40. Both the Chancellor and the
Prime Minister were now certain that the alternatives to devaluation would be
worse.230 Wilson announced the change on Saturday 18 November.
Devaluation stiffened the imperative that Britain should continue to
demand negotiations. Turning away from the steady drive towards
membership would simply confirm the truth behind France's position,
allowing the French to argue that Britain had again excluded herself. Thus,
Wilson sent an urgent message to each of the heads of government of the Six
that the decision to devalue in no way affected 'our resolve to pursue our
declared European policy' • 23 I Devaluation left the Five in a tactically difficult
position in the Council of Ministers. The Italians, led by Fanfani, and the
Dutch, under Joseph Luns, took the view that devaluation should make no
difference to the Council's discussion of the application. Fanfani suggested
that the Six should help Britain to get the most out of devaluation and Luns
said the Dutch would prefer to press on, leaving economic and financial
questions to await further clarification. Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg
attempted to mediate. Gregoire, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, suggested
the Commission should update the Opinion on Britain's membership and
Brandt, supported by Harmel, urged that Britain should help with the
revision.232
The Five's attempts to sympathise with the British position, reflecting
a tacit acknowledgement that French tactics had gone too far, provoked an
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undesirable reaction from the French. Couve argued that the Five had forged a
conspiracy against the French, implying exactly a Five-One split all had been
keen to avoid. He made clear the French held as preconditions against
accession the recovery of the British economy and the end of the reserve role
of sterling. Unwilling to take on the position of saboteurs, the Five did not
attempt to dispute the substance of Couve's position. The Commission stood
up well, Rey arguing that the Opinion had already dealt with devaluation and
that negotiations should therefore begin. The Council agreed that the
Commission should conduct a supplementary review for consideration at the
end of December and an oral report in mid-December.233 Ostensibly then,
devaluation made little difference to consideration of the British application in
the Council. The Five continued to deal with Britain's application as if
negotiations would begin, the French to present obstacles. Wilson commented
to Brown: 'I expect you will be working out how sterling devaluation could be
turned to account in relation to our application to join the Common Market.
Clearly it ought to help - certainly it undermines part of Couve's stated
position' 234
Despite the Five's support, devaluation did weaken Britain politically
and provided exactly the justification of public opinion de Gaulle needed to
bring forward his veto on the opening of negotiations. Such overt expression
of Britain's economic struggle confirmed the currents of opinion de Gaulle
had been stirring since his press conference in May. His press conference on
27 November caused no surprises. 235 He used the evidence of devaluation to
argue that Britain was unsuitable for membership and had tried to get in too
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soon. Primarily, he concentrated on the fact that British entry would transform
the nature of the Community of the Six: 'the question is whether this could be
done today without tearing apart, without breaking up what already exists'.236
He argued that Britain's application for membership was too early 'with really
extraordinary insistence and haste' and was made in the light of Britain's
realisation of her political weakness and economic failure. 237 He questioned
Britain's ability to accept the provisions of the Community: 'why negotiate
over clauses which one would have accepted entirely in advance?' For Britain
to enter, he continued, the British would need to undergo a 'radical
transformation' 238
The Commission's Opinion, he continued, showed how irreconcilable,
because of the chronic balance of payments weakness, was Britain's economy
with the Common Market. Furthermore, Britain's system of feeding herself
was incompatible with the CAP. Britain would be unable to accept the
Community's agricultural levy system, as it would be a 'crushing burden' on
the British.239 Sterling's weakness, illustrated by devaluation, Britain's debts
to the international community and the international character of the pound
meant that British entry would disturb the financial solidarity of the Six.
Britain's entry would inevitably 'break up a Community that was built and
operates according to rules which do not tolerate such a monumental
exception'. 2 ° Britain, 'owing precisely to its currency, its economy and its







politics, is not at present part of the Europe we have begun to build'.241
Negotiations, de Gaulle argued, would lead to the Community's destruction:
the Six [would have to give] their consent in
advance to all the artifices, delays and make-
believe liable to conceal the destruction of a
structure built up at the cost of so much toil and
amidst so many hopes... in order that Europe
may counterbalance the immense power of the
United States, it must not weaken, but on the
contrary, tighten the bonds and rules of the
Community.242
Denying that this was a veto, de Gaulle reiterated that he strongly wished to
see Britain one day 'make her choice and accomplish the enormous effort that
would transform her'. Britain's exclusion from Europe was her own fault and
not that of France:
Therefore, everything depends, not by any
means on a negotiation which would set the Six
on a course to surrender, thus ringing the knell
of their Community, but indeed on the
determination and action of the great British
people, which could turn them into one of the
pillars of a European Europe.243
In this way, de Gaulle was able again to equate French interests with
the protection of the Commumty and Britain's position with the destruction of
that Community. Delivering the veto when the British were so economically
and politically weak clearly did lessen the potential political repercussions of
his actions. The veto was grounded in the reality of British problems with
sterling about which all the Six had had concerns. Devaluation, however, was
just the confirmation of Britain's economic fragility that was the real root of




opinion for some time and thus there was no shock at the veto. 2 Resigned
acceptance of his rebuff was also the result of de Gaulle's intransigence in the
wider political environment: simply, de Gaulle cared less about the impact of
his actions as he had less to lose than in 1963.
Looking ahead to the longer-term, de Gaulle's veto did not change the
fact that the French vision of European unity appeared outmoded. 'The
General steered his own sovereign, unfaltering solitary prophetic course in
world affairs, contemptuous of public passions and pressures, whether in
praising the immutability, impartiality and universality of gold, emphasising
Israel abandoning conquests, asserting Quebec's freedom or confining Britain
to the limbo of Europe'.245 Nor did it change the Five's view of how to deal
with the application. The Germans reiterated that they intended to maintain
that negotiations should begin. 246 Although Britain's economic predicament
offered de Gaulle an excuse for his already intended veto; the price for this
was the long-term acknowledgement that Britain's part in wider European
unity was secured.
The Veto, 28 Nov 1967-20 Dec 1967
Britain's immediate response to the veto was to reiterate that Britain's
application still stood. Britain had applied to the whole Six, not to the French
and thus could not withdraw the request. 247 As The Guardian put it: 'Mr.
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Wilson told Parliament yesterday: we have slammed our application on the
table and there it is and there it remains'. 248 The swift response to the veto was
followed by a Cabinet decision to encourage the Five to tighten their pressure
on the French in the Council of Ministers. This shift in tactics was
accompanied by the Cabinet's acknowledgement that they had no alternative
other than European membership in the long-term: yet, commitment to this
principle remained lukewarm.
The Cabinet agreed to coerce the French by encouraging the Five to
insist on a date for the opening of negotiations. 249 Primarily, ministers wanted
to avoid the uncertainty generated by continuing with the current policy.
Failure to take decisive action would nourish the elements of opinion in the
Five that tended to agree with the French verdict. Plans for association
alternatives could gain currency. The British could not allow opinion to
assume that London was contented with the French veto. Continuing to
maintain negotiations were possible in the light of de Gaulle's press
conference no longer appeared credible.25°
Furthermore, Britain's actions would have repercussions in NATO and
in international liquidity talks. France's withdrawal from the gold pooi and
purchases of gold created the risk of crisis as the dollar was under pressure.25'
The NATO countries were preparing to take decisions on the Harmel Report
on 13-14 December, which outlined a role for NATO in pursuing détente.252
Brown believed that if de Gaulle vetoed in the EEC, it could make him more
248 The Guardian, 'Britain's right to be heard', p.!, 29 Nov. 1967
249 PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)69th, 30 Nov. 1967
° PRO CAB 129 134, C(67)187, The Approach to Europe, Foreign Secretary, 28 Nov. 1967;
PRO PREM13 1487, Palliser comments on Crossman to Wilson, 29 Nov. 1967
251 BOE, 0V53 37, Ryrie to Rickett, 28 Nov. 1967
252 BOZO Two Strategies, op.cit., pp.196-197; Ellison, 'Britain's Place', op.cit.
324
likely to veto Harmel. Alternatively, as in 1966, strong pressure in the EEC to
force the breach could make him reluctant to risk twin crises in the EEC and
NATO. Brown argued: 'by facing these various issues in isolation, we allow
de Gaulle to choose his time for piecemeal attacks and so to defeat us in
detail' 253
Cabinet's acquiescence to the tactical shift was relatively
straightforward. Only Tony Crosland, the President of the Board of Trade,
argued that Britain should desist for fear of jeopardising Community
development. He disagreed with Brown's contention that Community progress
would stall and felt that delay would give Britain's economy time to
recover.254 Crosland's reluctance reflected his earlier attempts to promote
'prenegotiation' with the Commission. In October, the new President of the
Board of Trade had wanted to talk with the Commission to find alternatives
for meeting the Board of Trade's demands over safeguards from the common
external tariff. 255 A further view was forwarded at Cabinet that Britain should
simply accept the veto. This aside, there was no opposition to the decision to
compel a definite verdict on the starting of negotiations.256
There were, however, differing interpretations as to what these tactics
meant. Brown argued that the General could be persuaded to yield: 'it is
possible that de Gaulle can be forced to give way'. 257 This was unlikely.
Whether or not Brown genuinely believed it is unclear. He certainly told Dean
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Rusk of his intentions and was met by disbelief.258 Brown's hopes rested also
on the notion that the odium created by the obvious breakdown would
encourage the Five to paralyse Community development until Britain could
join: 'If we are unable to join the Community now, we shall have ensured that
bitterness against France will hold up its progress for what may be a long
time'.259 Such a view reflected Brown's earlier hopes that the Five's
enthusiasm would confound de Gaulle. The press also maintained belief in the
willingness and capacity of the Five to forestall Community development: 'An
open crisis in the Common Market is now inevitable'.260
Others did not share Brown's optimism as to Britain's ability to
influence Community development from the outside. Most notably, Dems
Healey, who in April 1967 had commented that the 'General will save us from
our folly', wholeheartedly supported Britain's shift in tactics now. 261 Heaiey's
support derived surely from his view that heightening British pressure on the
Five would force the veto. He commented: 'do not only push for early
negotiations, but that negotiations be concluded quickly, as we do not want the
humiliation of a long negotiation and a veto'. 262 Once Britain's bid was
removed from the immediate agenda, the British could concentrate on other
policies more likely to reap results. He suggested seeking technological lmks
and studying ways in which Britain could develop wider relations between the
EEC and EFTA. 263 In this way, the Cabinet's endorsement of leaving the
application on the table implied little commitment to the principle of a future
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in Europe. For Healey at least, it was a way of removing the unpopular
application from immediate view.
Cabinet's endorsement given, it was relatively easy to persuade the
Five to increase their pressure on the French. The Dutch Foreign Minister
Joseph Luns argued in favour of stiffening opinion in the Five to discourage
support for association aItematives. 2 With de Gaulle's position so clear, there
was less risk of offending the French, a consideration thought to be important
for the Germans.265 There was, however, also the sense that some in the Five
welcomed the prospect of removing Britain's bid from the immediate agenda
in order to facilitate the next stage of their own development. 'or instance,
Harmel suggested phased accession for the British over a transitional period.
In the first phase, Britain would discuss the technical problems of integrating
Britain's economy to that of the Six and in the second would engage in more
detailed talks on the institutional arrangements required. Crucially, Britain
would not receive voting rights in the Community at the beginning of the
technical discussions. 2 This meant that during the 1969 agricultural review,
Britain would be committed to Community membership at the end of the
transitional period, but unable to influence the shape of the settlament. While
Harmel's proposal constituted a realistic attempt to seek a solution, it also
reflected the fact that it would benefit the Five to be able to settle in 1969
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without having to take account of Britain's considerable interests. Lahr also
argued in favour of phased accession.267
In the Council of Ministers on 19 December, the Five stood up
resolutely to the French. First, led by Brandt, the Five showed their total
disagreement with Couve's assessments on Britain's economic recovery,
arguing that negotiations should start regardless of Britain's economy.
Negotiations would provide a stimulus to Britain's economy and Britain could
recover alongside negotiations. Brandt also agreed with the Treasury
prognosis on the value of the sterling balances. The balances were not, he
maintained, the source of volatility and the UK had indicated willingness to
discuss solutions and had agreed not to draw on Article 108. Luris, Rey and
Harmel affirmed that opening negotiations would help sterling. Fanfani urged
that no one state had the right to prevent negotiations and Gregoire argued that
the UK's economy was fundamentally the same as the Six's except for the
losses incurred during the war. For these losses, the Luxembouirgers were
extremely gratefIii. Couve asked whether it could be possible to reach a
compromise, as everyone agreed that Britain's economy should first recover
and Schiller, the Chair of the Council, supported him. The Five continued to
resist and Couve finally admitted there was no agreement on the question of
the UK's economic recovery and the start of negotiations.268
On the 'conditions' of membership, it was also apparent that the Five
thought that if negotiations started, they would succeed. Brandt maintained
that Britain would have to accept the CAP and could have a transitional
period, although it would help if this were short. Fanfani reiterated that the UK
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had accepted the CAP in principle and with regard to demands for New
Zealand butter and Commonwealth sugar, the UK was not asking for as much
as the French had for their African associates. Luns and Harmel both indicated
their view that Britain's position constituted a satisfactory basis for
negotiations and Gregoire professed that the UK should have the same period
to adapt to the agricultural prices as the Six had required themselves. It was
not in the Community's interest to place too heavy a burden on the UK.
Precise solutions to the difficulties would, it was plain, prove difficult to
reach. Brandt indicated the German view that in the enlarged Community, it
would be necessary for states to hand over 90% of their levy payments to the
FEOGA (Guidance and Guarantee Fund). This would, he admitted, place a
heavy onus on the UK, but felt that the requirement to admit New Zealand
butter and Commonwealth sugar would burden the Community.269
The communiqué issued by the Council left no doubt that only France
opposed the extension of the Communities. It stated first that although no
member state raised objection in principle to enlargement, one member state
believed that enlargement would modify the Community in a 'profound
fashion'. Second, all members thought that Britain's economy needed to
recover first, but 'several' (thought to mean all Five) did not regard complete
recovery as a precondition of membership. Five member states believed that
negotiations could occur alongside economic recovery. One member state
thought that recovery of the British economy should be concluded so that the
UK's economic requirements could be reconsidered. 27° Harmel told the press
that British exclusion thwarted the objectives of the Treaty of Rome:
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without in any way abandoning our structure
and our realisations, we could build an enlarged
Community even more unified and stronger with
a view to attaining fully and quickly the political
and economic objectives of the Treaty of Rome.
This hope has been disappointed today in
conditions which seriously hinder the process of
unification of Europe.27'
Luns agreed that France's obstructionism blocked the development of the
Community and the Commission reiterated that negotiations should open.272
De Gaulle and the French were therefore clearly isolated. The Foreign Office's
guidance telegram stressed that given the support of the Five and public
opinion, Western Europe would inevitably one day find unity. 273 Harmel's
statement that enlargement was the way to unify Europe showed the defeat for
de Gaulle's longer-term vision: a defeat replicated in France's signature to the
Harmel Report confirming NATO's role in the pursuit of East-West peace.
Following the veto, Cabinet agreed that they should seek to 'strengthen
the determination and the position of the Five' against the French. 274 The
tactical choice in favour of making links with the Five equated with a
confirmation of the principle that Britain would have to seek membership of
the Community eventually. Brown told the House that afternoon: 'I reaffirm
that today we continue to believe that the long-term interests of this country
and of Europe require that we should become a member'.275 The reasons for
this decision had not changed. An official paper reiterated the arguments of
April 1967. In the long-run, there existed no satisfactory alternative economic
271 PRO PREM13 1488, Brussels to FO, tel.763, 20 Dec. 1967
272 PRO PREM13 1488, The Hague to FO, tel.573, 21 Dec. 1967; Brussels to FO, tel.429, 21
Dec. 1967
2 3 PRO PREM13 1488, FO statement, 19 Dec. 1967; The Times, 'France votes to bar
Bntain's entry into the Common Market', p.!, 20 Dec. 1967
274 PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)73d, 20 Dec. 1967
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grouping with which Britain could join. To sustain political strength and
influence, Britain needed access to the EEC's large and sophisticated
market.276
Cabinet's acquiescence to the restatement that Britain had nowhere
else to go Europe remained, as it was in April 1967, reluctant and resigned. In
the long-term, there was no alternative, but without the immediate need to take
decisions on the shape and form of the settlement, this was a relatively
meaningless proposition. For Brown, the statement that Britain had no choice
but Europe was clearly a commitment, but for others it was not. Cabinet
agreed because to disagree would hand de Gaulle a victory. Failing to renew
the strength of Britain's case would show de Gaulle to be right in his
judgement that Britain remained a power with extra-European interests.
Crossman commented 'the French veto.. .hadn't been made to look so
depressingly important as I had expected'.277
Furthermore, the Cabinet were not particularly interested in the
application. In the wake of devaluation, the Cabinet were directionless and
defeated. The Cabinet was preoccupied with the ethical issue of arms sales to
apartheid South Africa and alarmed by the new Chancellor's, Roy Jenkins'
revelations that devaluation was not working. There was still a lack of
enthusiasm for the decision to seek EEC membership over the long-term,
shown by the fact that neither Castle nor Benn mention it at all. 278 In the
immediate political environment, Jenkins' accession as Chancellor made a
275 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, vol.756, col. 1268, 20 Dec. 1967
276	 CAB134 2822, EUR(0)(67)132, The Consequences of UK Exclusion from the EEC,
Secretaries, 21 Dec. 1967
277 Crossman, Diaries, vol.2, op.cit., p.612, 20 Dec. 1967; he meant that the problem of South
African arms sales had overshadowed the veto, but the point is this shows the need to mitigate
humiliating defeat.
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difference, as now the three leading ministers - Prime Minister, Foreign
Secretary and Chancellor - all supported a turn to the EEC. Crossman wrote
George... and the Prime Minister wanted to
stand on the doorstep and try and get in at all
costs.. .1 find this policy extremely unattractive
since I take Blankenhorn's [the German
Ambassador in Britain] advice and would like to
launch a British Gaullism as the best method of
selling ourselves to Europe. But that's entirely
out of tune with Harold and George and I
suspect with Roy and it's no good having a
dispute with Roy at this particular time.279
The decision to sustain the application occurred alongside a decision to
accelerate Britain's withdrawal of forces from Singapore and Malaysia,
leaving no special capacity there by 1971 280 Healey argued that Britain had to
continue to reduce defence expenditure in order to keep up with Britain's main
industrial competitors. Furthermore, Britain's future defence interests lay an
Europe with the possible creation of a European defence caucus within the
Atlantic Alliance. 28 ' Yet, there was still no widespread consensus that the
future exercise of Britain's power and Britain's place in the world would be m
Europe. Cabinet's decision in April to apply for membership was born$ frorn
economic defeat. Confirmation of this choice in December stemmed from the
deeper defeats inflicted by devaluation and de Gaulle's veto.
278 Castle, Diaries, op cit., p.170, 20 Dec. 1967; Benn, Wilderness, op.cit., p.515
279 Crossman, Diaries, vol 2, op.cit., p.614,20 Dec. 1967
280 Carver, Tightrope, op.cit., p.84; Pickering, East of Suez, op.cit., ppl52-l71
PRO CAB 134 2822, EUR(0)(67) 132, The Consequences of UK Exclusion from the EEC,
Secretaries, 21 Dec. 1967
332
Conclusions
What disturbed me about your speech on
Saturday was that it had no warmth of feeling
for Europe, no sense of regret that you could not
approve the terms. If that was really your heart
and mind about the matter, was it right to
apply?'
The transition in Britain's foreign policy between 1964 and 1967 has widely
been regarded as inevitable. Writers in the 1970s interpreted the shift from
Empire to Europe in terms of the time-lag between economic realities and
political perceptions. 2 Northedge, for instance, described the 'inescapable
logic of Britain's movement to Europe'. 3 The hard facts about Britain's
external position would inexorably translate into policy choices. In this
analysis, Wilson's turn to the EEC was the result of the experiences of office,
catching up with the Conservatives' reappraisal of 1961. Stewart's note to
Wilson as the Labour Party began to turn away from membership in the early
1 970s, quoted above, further illustrates a widely held assumption. Once the
decision to apply was taken, it was a foregone conclusion that Labour would
accept the terms.
This thesis has rejected the interpretation that Britain's turn to the EEC
was inevitable and continuous. Rather, it has attempted to reconstruct the way
in which policy-makers viewed events at the time. By emphasising the gradual
development of policy, this thesis offers three new interpretations of Britain's
'Churchill College Archive Centre, Michael Stewart Papers, STWT7 1 2; PLP, vote for entry
into Common Market, Michael Stewart to Harold Wilson, undated circa 1971
2 Frankel, Foreign Policy, op.cit.; Northedge, Descent, op.cit.
3 Northedge, ibid., p.347
Reynolds, Britannia, op.cit., p.190; Lieber, Pressure Groups, op.cit., p.261; de Ia Serre, 'La
Position', op.cit., p.890
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relations with the EEC. First, it shows that although the government embarked
on studies of the implications of British membership in January 1966, the
decision to begin an approach to the EEC was the result of the sterling crisis in
July. Secondly, the fragmentary development of the government's position
towards EEC accession meant that Wilson never fully decided which of the
terms of membership the British could accept. Therefore, he did not push a
predetermined settlement onto a reluctant Cabinet. In addition, the Cabinet did
comprehensively debate the issues surrounding membership. Thirdly, despite
the considerable changes in Britain's foreign orientation from 1964 to 1967,
Wilson's EEC bid was not a decisive break with the past. The government's
foreign policy transition was neither inevitable, nor planned. These three sets
of conclusions, addressing the questions posed at the outset of this thesis, will
now be discussed in more depth.
The first set of conclusions seeks to elucidate the complex question of
the reasons for Britain's decision to seek EEC membership and of Harold
Wilson's ambiguous attitude. Why did the British have to consider EEC
membership at all? To assess this, historians have drawn a useful distinction
between economic and diplomatic motivation.5 The reasons for seeking
membership in 1961 were predominantly political and remained so under
Labour's term in office.6 The central case was that without membership, the
British would be unable to wield political influence in the world. Outside,
Britain would find herself side-lined in comparison to the giants of the USA
Elhson, Threatening, op cit., pp.1-10
6 Ellison, 'Acceptmg', Kaiser and Staerck, Contracting, op. cit., pp. 178-182
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and the EEC, relegated to the status of a 'greater Sweden'. 7 British
participation in the EEC would also help to strengthen Atlantic influence
within Europe and to augment Britain's influence with the USA.
Economically, acceptance of European integration was more
complicated. In the long-term, the British did need access to the larger
European market so as not to fall behind European competitors and to
accelerate existing changes to the structures of industry. Membership of the
EEC would also provide access to a sophisticated and larger market to help
encourage development in new technological industries. 8 In the short-term, the
economic case for membership was not decisive and rested principally on the
dangers of exclusion. The strength of the Community meant that the EFTA
countries and the Commonwealth were looking to make association
arrangements with the EEC. As the world divided into regional trading blocs,
Britain could find herself politically weakened and economically isolated.
Membership would strengthen Britain's voice in international trading forums
such as GATT and the UNCTAD, enabling Britain to pursue more effectively
traditional goals of global tariff reductions. 9 The weak state of sterling meant
that it could be a positive jeopardy to express interest in joining the
Community. The prospect of the liberalisation of capital movements and the
fact that Community membership would rule out the kind of economic
controls favoured by Wilson could lead to an anticipatory outflow of capital.'°
Paradoxically, Britain's economy needed to be strong in order to enter; but
CAB 134 2705, E(66)1 1, Bntam and Europe, First Secretary and Foreign Secretary, 18
Oct 1966
8 PRO CAB134 2705, E(66)1 1, Economic Implications, Officials, 20 Oct. 1966
PRO 1312 1011, Pitbiado Report, 11 Sept. 1964; PRO CAB134 1473, CCP(65)31, Report
on the 22 Session of the Contracting Parties of the GATF, 2-26 March, Sir Richard Powell,
10 May 1965
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until the fate of the pound became secure, it was difficult to convince world
opinion of Britain's economic health. Whilst turning to Europe was a way of
bolstering Britain's economic potency, it could also create doubt as to the
immediate prospects for sustaining the parity of sterling.
The central contention of this thesis is that diplomatic and economic
considerations form only a partial explanation of Wilson's policy towards the
EEC. The spur for his decision to embark on a European initiative in October
1966 was in fact primarily a domestic one, a consequence of the crisis
generated by the difficulties of sterling in July. This observation suggests a
different interpretation from that offered by Young's 1993 study. Young
argues that Wilson intended a European initiative from some point during his
first term in office, but cleverly disguised his intentions from his colleagues
for domestic reasons. 11 Evidence would suggest that Wilson certainly
recognised the need to address the long-term case for entry from as early as
1965. Yet, the multiple obstacles to entry meant it was far from certain that he
would choose to instigate an initiative for membership in the short-term. In
fact, studies begun in January 1966 indicated reasons why the government
should desist from an immediate initiative. Sterling could come under threat
because of the changes to rules on capital movements and there appeared no
way around de Gaulle's obstruction.'2
The July 1966 sterling crisis created certain pressures that forced
Wilson's hand in deciding to embark on an initiative for short-term
membership. The destabilisation of the Cabinet made the Prime Minister
'°	 CAB 134 1772, EEP(65)24, Fmancial and Monetary Implications of Membership of
the EEC, Treasury, 6 Apr. 1965; PRO CAB13O 298, M1SC(126)1', 22 Oct. 1966
"Young, Britain, op.czt., pp.88-89
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anxious for the safety of his own position. Moving George Brown to the
Foreign Office in August 1966 was a consequence of this with implications for
the government's turn to the EEC. 13 Wilson also faced pressure from the USA
to show his hand in favour of eventual membership and domestic discontent
from the party, unions and business. 14 Yet, his shift in October was more than
just a capitulation to increased demands for a move. It was the only way in
which the government could hope to show exactly how it intended to restore
economic growth after the failure of the government's flagship policy, the
National Plan. The central argument, as Young shows, was the long-term case
that the government had no alternative. 15 Yet, Wilson only agreed to address
this with ministers after the government's own plans for economic
regeneration had comprehensively failed. Cabinet's acquiescence to the
application for membership in 1967 resulted largely from the collapse of their
economic options after the failure of the Plan.16
The importance of domestic politics to the second application raises
further questions as to the role of European policy in Britain's wider policy
making. Wolfram Kaiser argues that the British used the EEC as a policy tool
with which to secure objectives other than Britain's membership of the EEC.
For example, he sees Britain's first turn to Europe as a means of convincing
the US government to provide Britain with Polaris missiles. 17 He has also
argued that Britain's second application was a means of assuaging domestic
12	 example, PRO CAB 134 2705, E(66)2, Future Relations with Europe, Official Report, 5
May 1966
FO371 1883471M10810 458, How to Get into the Common Market, Brown
comments, 18 Aug. 1966
'4 Ellison, 'Britam's Place', op.czt.; for examples of union, business and party discontent, PRO
PREM 13 859, Wilson - TUC Economic Committee, 26 July 1966; Wilson - CBI, 2 Aug.
1966; Wilson, Labour, op.cit., p.261
' 5 Young, Britain, op.cit., p.95
'6 Be, Wilderness, op.cit., p.496
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opinion and outfianking the Conservative leader Edward Heath 8 While such
considerations were part of Wilson's motivation, this thesis fimdamentally
rejects Kaiser's approach on methodological grounds. Kaiser uses the possible
results of policy to justif' why that policy was made, whereas this thesis
interprets policy decisions as the response to a variety of pressures. Although
Wilson's decision was partly in order to hold the government together in the
wake of the crisis, the need to do so was a reaction to the tensions generated
by the crisis. Essentially, Kaiser makes a monocausal judgement. This thesis
hopes to show that policy was always multi-faceted. As Ellison has noted of
Britain's policy to the creation of the EEC, it 'is a historical question too
complex to lend itself to condemnation or vindication'.19
However, Kaiser does raise some interesting points as he does attempt
to bridge the gap between diplomacy, economics and the domestic political
environment. Some ministers did in fact see the European initiative as a means
of ensuring Labour's continued electoral appeal following the failure of the
Plan. Barbara Castle explicitly argued that it was necessary to turn to Europe
in order to stay in power, but that it would still be possible to pursue 'socialist'
policies in other areas. 2° Callaghan also argued that without the EEC bid, the
government would be unable to guarantee the strength of sterling in the
immediate term. 21 While such motivations were part of the government's
decisions, it was also more than just a rational calculation. For some ministers,
such as Brown and Stewart, the initiative was a genuine attempt to find a role
for Britain. Additionally, once Wilson had taken the decision, he wanted it to
' Kaiser, Using, op.cit., pp.116-173
Kaiser, 'EEC Applications', op.cit., pp.71-72
Ellison, Threatening, op.cit., p.222
20 Castle, Diaries, op.cit., pp.120-12!, 21 Mar. 1967
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work. During the probe, he did not simply seek domestic gains or French
isolation, but aimed to build support for Britain's membership of the EEC over
the longer-term.
The analytical distinction discussed above between diplomatic and
economic motivation arose in part from Alan Milward's work. Milward has
advanced a general theory as to why nations accepted supranational
integration, identifying their need to recreate the basis for social and economic
policies after World War Two. 22 Thus, nations chose supranational integration
not as a political attempt to supersede the problems created by competing
nation states, but to underpin the legitimacy of their economic policies. He
writes: 'If we ask why Europe had to be organized (sic) in this particular way
the answer seems clear. The will of the European nation-state to survive as an
organizational entity depended on the prosperity which sustained the domestic
post-war political compromises everywhere'. 23 This argument begs questions
of how the government viewed supranationality and of the relationship
between economic policies and the EEC bid. In terms of the form of
integration, the British were faced with little choice: the EEC already existed.
Ministers accepted that a clear rejection of supranationality before
membership would be tactically unwise. Indications that the French were able
to get their own way despite the Community's supranational provision may
also have helped to minimise discontent.24
If there was a positive reason for accepting supranationality as opposed
to any other form of integration, then that reason was political. In the Foreign
21 Crossman, Diaries, voL2, op.cit., p.11 7, 9 Nov. 1966
Milward, European Rescue, op.cit., pp.2-12
ibid., p.223
24 PRO CAB 134 2705, E(66)3', 22 Oct. 1966
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Office, officials believed that majority voting inside the EEC could suit
Britain's interests, as Britain would hope to command a blocking majority and
so could defend national objectives from within the Community framework.25
Underlying this was a recognition that the Community would change with the
Cold War. As détente became a reality, so German reunification became a
possibility. It was only with British and French participation in the
supranational framework that German growth could be contained. 26 This was
the basis of the British response to de Gaulle's 'European Europe': that
national independence could not form the basis for the defence of Europe
because Germany would ultimately prove too strong. 27 The days of a possible
Anglo-French-USA political organisation at the head of NATO were over.28
Any arrangement would have to include Germany. France alone could not
contain German strength. Thus, the only positive reasons for accepting
supranationality were political.
Furthermore, while the failure of the National Plan was central to
Britain's acceptance of the initiative, the government did not plan for
supranational integration as a means of meeting their economic difficulties.
There was a recognition that turning to Europe would help to encourage
business confidence and investment, enabling the government to cope with the
crisis in economic policy created by the July deflation. 29 Yet, while Britain
remained outside the EEC and while membership was not assured, it was not
25 PRO F0371 1824001M10836 37G, SC(65)27, British Policy towards developments in the
EEC, Foreign Office Steering Committee, 20 Sept. 1965
26 On France's inability to contain Germany in the long-term, PRO CAB 148 69, OPD(66)9,
The International Consequences of General de Gaulle's Foreign Policy, Foreign Office, 25
Mar. 1966
27 In particular, PRO PREM 13 897, Palliser to Wright, 21 Oct. 1966
28 PRO FO37 117331 6/WP 19, SC(63)20, Policy towards France, Foreign Office Steering
Committee, 3 July 1963
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in Britain's national interests to base economic strategy around membership.
This was evident in Britain's technological community idea. Collaboration
with the EEC to prevent American domination in aircraft, computers and civil
nuclear energy was one objective of policy regardless of EEC membership.
Without the assurance of reciprocal participation in the wider market, it was
not in Britain's interests to allow the EEC access to British knowledge.3°
Moreover, EEC membership did not provide an alternative to taking essential
decisions on a national basis: membership could only ever be a part of the
answer to Britain's economic difficulties. In areas such as reducing the cost to
the Exchequer of deficiency grants to farmers and of securing a limitation to
the quantity of low cost agricultural imports, EEC membership would
obviously help. 31 In other areas, such as changes to the regulations on capital
movements, it could cause unwelcome distortion. Although there were
economic reasons behind the government's choice, EEC membership was not
part of an overarching strategy for economic recovery.
These observations place British policy more in line with Young's
analysis. Young argues that as Britain's national interests changed, so Europe
came to assume a greater importance to the British, but that this did not mean
that all national interests had changed. Thus, an understanding of how the
British viewed their own essential interests can explain both the turn to Europe
and the reasons why the British experience continued to be different to that of
29 PRO CAB 134 2705, E(66) 11, Britain and Europe, First Secretary and Foreign Secretary, 18
Oct. 1966
3° PRO PREM13 1850, Trend to Wilson, 5 Jan. 1967
Kaiser has also made this point, Kaiser, Using, op.cil., p.141
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the Europeans. 32 The importance of domestic politics to the Wilson initiative
means that Young's theory can be taken one stage further.
Essentially, while the Cabinet accepted that Britain had no choice but
Europe in the immediate term because of the failure of the National Plan, they
did not accept that a future in Europe was in Britain's national interests.
Because the long-term compulsion showed that Britain had no choice and
because the government's economic alternatives had failed, Wilson's initiative
implicitly addressed Britain's national identity and future role. Some
commentators have argued that European membership was a decision forced
upon a reluctant Cabinet and ultimately the public by a quasi-conspiracy of
officials and ministers who were not told what European membership would
'mean'. 33 However, it would appear that Wilson's initiative failed to bring
consensus of opinion precisely because it was openly debated in the Cabinet
and ministers were free to discuss Britain's future role. While it is undeniable
that Wilson's tactics did edge ministers into a position where it was difficult to
oppose making the application, it is also clear that ministers were fully aware
that this was a question of Britain's future orientation. For some, European
membership clearly was a solution to Britain's difficulties and a way of
repositioning Britain on the world stage. For others, it quite simply was not.
The multiplicity of opinion meant that there would be as many interpretations
of the future as there were Cabinet ministers. Wilson's application built a
short-term consensus that there was no alternative: but there was never
agreement as to the direction of Britain's national interests and Britain's
identity as a nation.
32 Young, Britain, op.cit., pp.165-183, esp. p.167
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This suggestion leads onto the second set of conclusions, concerning
how Britain approached the Community. The assumption in much of the
literature is that the government's decision to apply in 1967 equated with a
recognition at the top levels of government that it would have to accept all the
terms of entry. Young writes: 'all alternatives to EEC membership were ruled
out... This was highly important because, by implication (and despite
Wilson's repeated stress on the importance of entry terms) it meant that
Britain had to try to get into Europe - whatever the terms'. 34 While the British
had no long-term choice, it is important to note that ministers leading the
application had no overriding plan as to the future shape of the settlement
under which Britain would accede to the Community. As such, Wilson and
Brown themselves did not know what European membership would 'mean'.
The clearest indication of lack of foresight can be found in Wilson's
comments to The Guardian editor Alastair Hetherington. Forced by the
realisation that a conditional bid would bring no support in the EEC, Wilson
understood that Britain's options were extremely limited. He mooted issuing
an unconditional bid, but clung to the idea that Britain would be able to pull
back from accepting all the terms at the last minute. 35 At each step Wilson did
what he could to deliver a realistic and workable initiative, but this did not
imply commitment in the future. Furthermore, Brown pushed Britain's
negotiating position through the Cabinet not with an end settlement in mind,
Wallace, Domestic Policy, op.cit., pp.345-348; Jay, Change, op cit., pp.366-389; Evans,
While Britain Slept, op.cit., pp.1 1-12, 68; Tratt, Macmillan, op.cit., pp.191-196' Young, Britain, op.cit., p.99
LSE, Hetherington Papers, 13 21, Meeting with Wilson, I Mar. 1967
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but with the express aim of getting negotiations started. 36 Policy evolved in
reaction to a specific set of circumstances. Britain's acquiescence to the tenns
of entry was not a once-for-all shift. Agreement now was to meet the specific
circumstances of the time and did not necessarily mean endorsement at any
future date.
It is clear that Britain's handling of the economic conditions of
membership was as good as could be expected. Ludlow has argued about the
first application that:
had Macmillan been able to.. .apply for
membership unconditionally, working out the
arrangements for the Commonwealth and EFTA
from within the EEC, the Six would have been
confronted in 1961 with a clear political choice.
In these circumstances de Gaulle would almost
certainly have been unable to oppose
enlargement' ?
The second initiative was designed to meet these concerns. During the probe
of the countries of the Six, Wilson and Brown progressively played down the
'conditions' that would require safeguards before accession. The application
itself attached no prior conditions and Wilson stated also that Britain would be
able to adopt the Treaty of Rome. 38 Britain's approach was entirely different
to the first attempt. Rather than aiming for sweeping safeguards to the general
issues of the CAP and the CET, the British sought to identify specific
problems that would require special treatment. Furthermore, the probe was
flexible. As it involved no decision in principle, Wilson and Brown were able
to meet points as they were raised by the Six, without first consulting the
Cabinet. The leeway granted allowed Wilson to say that Britain would not
36 PRO CAB128 42, CC(67)44, 3 July 1967
Ludlow, Dealing, op.cit., p.246
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want changes to the CAP in advance of membership and to imply that Britain
would be able to join in the future development of economic and monetary
union.39 The government did not confer with the Commonwealth, removing
one of the principal obstacles to a flexible approach during the Brussels
negotiations. Economic interest groups such as industry and the unions, as
well as EFTA, were also only to be informed, not consulted. 4° During the
period of the application, the British persisted in setting out the fact that their
case was sound.
The flexible approach owed largely to the changed attitudes within the
Foreign Office. In contrast to Britain's reactive policy towards European
integration since 1950, the Foreign Office's policy formulation was now much
more proactive.4 ' Robinson and O'Neill in particular fronted an approach that
sought to maximise Britain's negotiating position by joining the Community
and making safeguards from the inside. 42 They were able to set the agenda, as
Robinson authored the paper 'Negotiating Objectives' that formed the starting
point for interdepartmental discussions. 43 The role played by Burke Trend and
Michael Palliser in shaping the initiative and encouraging Wilson to continue
was also important. The changing relationship between Britain and the
Commonwealth made it yet easier for the Prime Minister to accept the terms,
as Commonwealth trade was diversifying and Britain's relations with the Old
38 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol.746, cols.31 1-3 14, 2 May 1967
On the CAP, PRO PREM13 1478, Wilson - Werner and delegations, 8 Mar. 1967; on
economic and monetary union, PRO PREM13 1476, Wilson - Van den Boeynants and
delegations, 1 Feb. 1967, 4pm
4° PRO CAB128 41, CC(66)53, 1 Nov. 1966; 54th, 3 Nov. 1966; 55th, Nov. 1966
" Young, Blessed, op.cit., pp.172-197; Ellison, 'Accepting', op.cit., pp.184-185
42 Haunay O'Neill, op.czt., p.356; PRO T312 1011, O'Neill Despatch no.6,23 July 1964
4° PRO PREM13 1479, Negotiating Objectives, Robinson, 20 Mar. 1967
345
Dominions weakethng. The simple application also indicated Wilson's tacit
recognition that there was no choice if Britain wished to build support
amongst European opinion. Conversely, the Foreign Office's proactive
attempts to circumvent the French veto meant that Britain's uncluttered
initiative was not intended as a sign of weakness. The British did not wish to
approach the Community tout nu. Rather, Britain's scaled down bid was the
best way of preserving Britain's strength. Only by appealing to European
opinion would Britain hope to overcome Gaullist opposition and thus preserve
goodwill and negotiating advantage once Britain was eventually inside the
EEC.
These observations suggest further comments about the relationship
between the economic conditions of membership and the short-term failure of
Britain's bid. Macmillan's conditional negotiating stance in 1961-3 has been
criticised by historians for over-estimating Britain's bargaining power with the
Six and for failing to take sufficient account of European opinion. 45 Wilson
went as far as he could within domestic constraints to show that Britain did
accept the provisions of the Community. The most important reason militating
against an unambiguous commitment to the agricultural levies was concern for
sterling. The Community's system would impose such a burden on Britain's
balance of payments that the prospect of acceptance could precipitate
speculation against the pound. Furthermore, Wilson hoped to sustain some
negotiating advantage. Immediate surrender would place Britain in an
PRO CAB 134 2804, EUR(M)(67) 18, Commonwealth Negotiating Brief, Secretanes, 30
June 1967; PRO CAB129 129, C(67)59, The Value of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth
Secretary, 24 Apr. 1967
' Deighton and Ludlow, 'Conditional op .c it., pp.121-122
PRO CAB 129 128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 Apr.
1967
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embarrassing diplomatic position, particularly if the French continued to resist
British entry anyway.
It does not seem that a less 'conditional' approach would have brought
more support from the Five or made it more difficult for de Gaulle to veto. De
Gaulle's press conference on 16 May did argue that Britain would be unable to
accept the CAP. 47 In this sense, Wilson's unwillingness to accept
wholeheartedly the agricultural levy system appeared to play into his hands.
However, de Gaulle's justification was not that Britain refused to submit to the
rules of the EEC, but that Britain's economic weakness meant Britain would
be unable to accept the obligations of Community membership. Even if
Wilson had stated unequivocally that Britain wanted to adapt all the provisions
of the CAP, de Gaulle would still have been able to argue that the uncertain
position of the pound meant that Britain's promise was worthless. Throughout
the course of the application, the Five maintained that Britain's case was
negotiable, a view vindicated by the Commission's Opinion in September.48
Although the British had learnt how to present themselves as a European
nation, itself a sign of the strength of their approach, Wilson's case was
undermined by economic and consequent political weakness.
The question as to why the British failed to secure diplomatic
advantage despite the widespread support for their application takes on a
different complexion. It was less what the British did, than the fact that they
were in a position of excruciating fragility that led to the failure of the bid.
This is not to suggest that Britain's diplomacy was flawless. Brown and
De Gaulle's Press Conference, 16 May 1967, Kitzinger, Second, op.cit., p.183
48 For example, PRO PREM13 1483, The Hague to FO, tel.290, 4 July 1967; Commission's
Opinion, 29 Sept. 1967, paras. 8, 194, Kilzinger, Second, op.cit., p.210, 299; PRO
PREM13 1488, Brussels to FO, tel.421, 19 Dec. 1967
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Wilson did continue to harbour misperceptions about the Community. Brown
in particular displayed a political conception of what the Community was and
consequently overestimated the willingness of members of the Five to pressure
the French decisively. It was clear by early 1967, for instance, that neither the
Germans nor the Italians intended to provoke a breach with de Gaulle, yet
Brown persisted in believing that de Gaulle could be forced to give way. 49 He
both overestimated Britain's capacity to influence and underestimated the
importance of the existing Community to each of the member states. Even
after the veto, Brown expected the Five to paralyse Community development
in Britain's interests. Wilson mistakenly believed that he would be able to
convince de Gaulle to admit Britain in the short-term, displaying little
understanding of the extent of the General's obstinacy.50 However,
misperceptions were more important in leading the British to lodge the bid in
the first place. Thinking that the bid could work was a signal of desperation
generated by the July crisis, but it also showed overestimation of Britain's
influence in the EEC.
Why then, did the application fail to secure negotiations in the short-
term? Politically, de Gaulle wanted to exclude Britain from the EEC to keep
out Atlantic influence. Yet, de Gaulle's wishes were less important than his
ability to carry them out. He was able to dominate the EEC and was tactically
shrewd enough to prevaricate by playing on genuine doubts and fears within
the Community. He adopted the well-used tactic of intimating French
withdrawal from the Community, suggesting that British accession before
' PRO FCO3O 186, Brussels to FO, tel. 14, 19 Jan. 1967; Young, Britain, op cit., p.98; PRO
PREM13 909, Brown— Luns, 2 Nov. 1966; PRO PREM13 1475, Brown— Fanfani, 3 Jan.
1967
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1969 would push France out. 51 This, coupled with his stress on Britain's
economic weakness, nourished doubts amongst the Five as to the wisdom of
early enlargement. The Germans feared Britain would be able to call on
Article 108 of the Treaty and wanted to begin to fuse the
Communitsebefore Britain joined. 52 The Italians and Belgians were anxious to
complete the Community's transitional period. British entry before 1969
would complicate the 1969 review, reopening the questions of agricultural
financing and third country association that had proved problematical between
the Six. 53 For these reasons, the Five accepted French delaying tactics, worried
that the challenge of enlargement could upset the consolidation of the
Community.
De Gaulle was undeniably reluctant to issue a second veto because of
the potential impact on domestic opinion. However, despite the poor showing
of the Gaullists in the 1967 Assembly elections, de Gaulle was in a stronger
domestic position than he had been in 1961-3 and appeared impervious to
either domestic or international opinion. 54 As Wilson noted after his talks with
de Gaulle in June, de Gaulle's actions could not be predicted 'on the basis of
rational judgement'.55 Delay also allowed opinion to expect a veto, softening
its eventual impact.56 From July onwards, it would appear that de Gaulle was
waiting for the right moment to deliver his veto. Indications in October were
5°LSE, Hethenngton Papers, 13 22, Meeting with Wilson, 19 Feb. 1967; 13 25, Meeting with
Wilson, 12 Jan. 1967
De Gaulle's Press Conference, 16 May 1967, Kitzinger, Second, op.cit., p.183
52	 FCO3O 187, German Ministry of Finance Note on Monetary Implications, 31 Jan.
1967
PRO PREM13 1475, Wilson - Moro, 17 Jan. 1967, lOam PRO PREMI3 1476, Wilson -
Van Den Boeynants, 1 Feb. 1967
s Sir Michael Palliser, Interview with author, 18 Sept. 1999
PRO PREMI3 1484, Wilson comments on Chalfont to Wilson, 19 July 1967
PRO PREM13 1486, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 26 Oct. 1967; The Times, 'De Gaulle rules out
early negotiations with Britam', Charles Hargrove, p.1, 28 Nov. 1967
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that he was planning to do so early in 1968. Devaluation provided a useful
pretext, but simply brought forward the verdict. Britain's economic weakness
enabled de Gaulle to justify his veto in terms that were understandable to
European opinion, as problems with sterling had formed a major doubt in the
Commission's Opinion. 58 Although de Gaulle's objections were clearly
political, he was able to elude major repercussions of an unjustifiable
expulsion.
Simply, the British were acting alone in hoping for the early opening
of negotiations. In practical terms, if de Gaulle was insensitive to currents of
opinion, there was little the Five could or would do to bring pressure to bear.
There was no decisive reason why the Five should initiate a breach with the
French for the sake of short-term accession. In fact, a Franco-German rupture
over British accession could undermine European security and jeopardise the
intention to keep the Atlantic Alliance together despite French actions. The
Germans feared that pressuring de Gaulle too hard would cause him to leave
the Alliance. 59 In this way, the Germans were able to play a double-game of
moving towards American aims in NATO and in non-proliferation, while
sustaining strong Franco-German links. Furthermore, the Americans did
nothing to help Britain secure the opening of negotiations in the short-term.
Although the US had pressured for Britain to show her hand in favour of
accession in the summer of 1966, the US also wanted to avoid cleavage in the
PREM13 1486, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 26 Oct. 1967
58 Commission's Opinion, 29 Sept. 1967, paras 8 1-82, 99, 95, Kitzmger, Second, op.cit.,
pp.248-250
5 PRO PREM13 1477, Wilson— Kiesmger, 15 Feb. 1967; PRO PREM13 1527, Wilson-
Kiesinger, 23 Oct. 1967
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Community. 6° Despite de Gaulle's reluctance to veto decisively, this thesis
suggests that Britain's second application was never going to bring short-term
success. This does not mean that the British knew this, as Wilson and Brown
almost certainly thought there were prospects for accession. Treatment of the
conditions of membership was extremely good and bilateral diplomacy
reasonable. Britain's economic and political weakness was the main reason,
ironically, for both the launch and the failure of the initiative.
Following his press conference, de Gaulle was decisively isolated
amongst the Six. It was quite clear in the Council of Ministers on 19
December that only de Gaulle opposed the opening of negotiations. 61 The Five
maintained that European unity was realisable only through enlargement, itself
indicative of the shift in thinking about the potentials for East-West détente.62
Thus, in the long-term, there was little doubt that Britain would join after de
Gaulle's departure. Britain's bid had success in building support for eventual
accession and in encouraging the prevalence of Atlanticist conceptions of
Europe's organisation.63 Work on Britain's negotiating objectives also formed
the basis of the subsequent, successful entry bid.M However, Wilson's
application was not a success. Britain's objectives at the turning point of July
1966 were to preserve the parity of the pound and to seek membership of the
EEC. By December 1967, both had failed. Furthermore, Cabinet's decision in
December that Britain must persist with membership was reluctant.65
Agreement reached in the wake of devaluation and the veto in December did
60	 Western European Region, 1964-1968, vol.xui, no.280, Rusk to State Department,
13 Dec. 1967
61 PRO PREM13 1488, Brussels to FO, tel.421, 19 Dec. 1967
62	 PREM13 1488, Brussels to FO, teL763, 20 Dec. 1967
63 Ludlow, 'EC Response', op.cit.
Hannay, O'Neill, op cit., p.10
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not imply a whole-hearted endorsement of Britain's future membership of the
EEC.
The third and final set of conclusions seeks to elucidate the place of
European membership in Britain's foreign policy and consequently in
Britain's continued disengagement from the former bases of her power. Did
Britain lose an Empire and fmd a role? Was Britain's choice of Europe a
revolution in policy, as Reynolds has argued, or a shift in tactics designed to
secure traditional goals?66 Part of this problem is clearly the debate as to why
Britain withdrew forces from the Far and Middle East, to which this study has
not explicitly sought to contribute.67 Yet, it does add to the general
appreciation of the significant problems involved in extrication from a world
role.
The Labour government wanted to stay in the Far and Middle East and
aimed to preserve the parity of sterling and sterling's role as a reserve
currency. It is less clear that these goals represented a delusion of Britain's
grandeur. 68 Rather, the British sought to reap the influence bought by these
extra-European policies for as long as possible and hoped to control the
circumstances of ultimate withdrawal. There were also practical reasons for
delaying the end of a world role. In the Far East, Confrontation and the war in
Vietnam hardened the reasons for staying, while the risk of Chinese incursion
augmented the importance of avoiding a hasty dismissal. 69 Desire to avoid
devaluation resulted in part from the prestige associated with the value of the
65 PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)69th, 30 Nov. 1967; CC(67)73", 20 Dec. 1967
Reynolds, Britannia, op.cit., p.21 7; Young, Britain, op.cit., pp.1 65-183
67 On this debate, Pickering, East of Suez, op.cit., pp.1-17
For an example of this school of thought, Reynolds, Britannia, op.cit., p.190,213
352
pound, but it was also a plausible objective to avoid the political weakness that
devaluation would bring. 70 The French attempts to encourage the end of
sterling's role as a reserve currency through wrecking tactics in international
liquidity talks, added to the French challenge in NATO, gave a strategic
concern to avoiding devaluation. The British were also amenable to
suggestions as to how to run down the sterling balances, but could find no
acceptable alternative to guarantee the holders of sterling their money. The
end of Britain's global role was therefore more complex than failure or refusal
to understand rapidly enough the new economic realities of Britain's power.7'
The British did understand that economic decline would bring the end of
Britain's world role, but sought to control that end and recognised the
significant practical problems of speedy withhawal.
Turning to Europe was part of these general shifts, but it was not an
integral part. Labour's policy towards the Community and towards Britain's
role in the world can be arranged into four broad phases, creating the
impression of a disjointed policy transition. Central to each was economic
failure. There are two main points: policy reorientation was not inevitable, nor
was it planned. On taking office in 1964, the government clearly anticipated
that it would be impossible to sustain all of its current defence roles, but left
open the decision as to which would be cut. 72 The Foreign Office recognised
that the future exercise of Britain's military role would have to be in Europe,
but wanted to sustain Britain's defence commitments in the Far East for as
long as this brought political influence to Britain. The essential balance was
69 PRO CAB 148 17, OPD(64)1O, Policy in South East Asia, Foreign Secretary, 11 Nov. 1964
70 PRO PREM13 854, Trend to Wilson, 19 July 1966
71 For example, Northedge, Descent, op.cit., pp.328-352
72 PRO CAB 128 39, CC(64)l 1th, 26 Nov. 1964
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between staying too long and withdrawing too fast. 73 The government was
committed to promoting growth through the National Plan and through the
regeneration of ties with the Conmionwealth. By the election in March 1966,
Rhodesia and the economic difficulties of promoting links with the
Commonwealth meant that this aspect had lesser importance in the
government's thinking. 74 The first steps towards a reconsideration of Britain's
policy to the EEC had been taken, but the meaning of this decision was far
from certain.
Secondly, the July 1966 sterling crisis brought to an end the
government's aspirations under the National Plan. In order to sustain the parity
of the pound, the government opted for a stringent deflation that would mean
low growth, undermining public confidence in planning. 75 The European
initiative was born from this crisis for the reasons explained above, but this
was no policy revolution. The decision was grounded in the defence of sterling
and was followed by a decision against complete withdrawal of Britains
commitments East of Suez. Despite reductions in troops going beyond the
February defence review, Britain would sustain the principle of a role in the
Far and Middle East.76
Third, in April 1967 continued pressure of resources, added to the
Defence Secretary's anger at the repeated changes of direction, led to a
decision to accelerate the withdrawal of Britain's forces from Singapore and
Malaysia. This was still not a decision in principle to withdraw commitments
as the British wanted to retain a force in Australia, but the effect was to reduce
PRO CAB 148 10, DO(0)(S)(64)42, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, Report of the
Long Term Study Group, 23 Oct. 1964
PREM13 904, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 10 Dec. 1965
" PRO CAB 128 46, CC(66)37th, 19 July 1966
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significantly the Far East as a central part of Britain's foreign policy role.77
The Australians, Singaporeans and Malaysians were unhappy at Britain's
decision, as W the USA.78 As a result, Britain's turn to Europe came to
assume greater importance in Britain's foreign policy. The government had
not systematically planned this transition: the two decisions were both separate
responses to the pressures generated by the sterling crisis. The increased
importance of Europe was evident in the Cabinet's discussions as Wilson
emphasised that continued reliance on the USA would result in Britain's
subordination to American policy in Vietnam.79
Fourth, devaluation and confirmation of the veto brought Cabinet
recognition that Britain would seek European membership in the longer-
term. 80 Crossman recorded that the decision was uncontroversial, with nobody
willing to challenge the new Chancellor Jenkins. 81 It did not therefore
represent a collective and positive endorsement of a European future, even as
Britain's options narrowed after devaluation. Deciding to pursue EEC
membership was followed by further acceleration of the timetable for
retrenchment early in 1968.82 Each of the decisions was reached within its
own specific context and did not represent a planned, nor an inevitable,
transition. Thus, Britain's policy towards the European Community from
1964-1967 was no deliberate revolution, but a reluctant and disconnected
response to economic crisis and resultant domestic political pressure. By the
76 PRO CAB13O 301, MISC129(66)l't, 22 Oct. 1966
PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)23M, 27 Apr. 1967
78 PRO PREMI3 1480, Wilson - Johnson, 25 Apr. 1967
PRO CAB 128 42, CC(67)26th, 30 Apr. 1967
80 PRO CAB 128 42, Cq67)73, 20 Dec. 1967
81 Crossman, Diaries, vol 2, op.cit., p.614,20 Dec. 1967
82 On this, Pickering, East of Suez, op.cit., pp.1 65-171
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end of it, and largely because of changes in other areas of policy, Europe had
come to assume much greater significance in Britain's overseas role.
These observations bring this study back to Young's interpretation of
Britain's policy and to Stewart's question posed at the beginning of these
conclusions. The main reason for Wilson's initiative was domestic and this of
course raises the multiplicity of questions about Britain's future role. As
Young shows, European membership was not alone enough to solve the
problems of the changing position of Britain in the world. Even if Britain had
wholeheartedly and unanimously entered the EEC in 1967, the problems of
post-war British policy would not have been solved. EEC membership was
only one part of the solution to a much larger problem.
The disjointed foreign policy reorientation does indicate that there was
no overarching strategy to Britain's shifting world role. However, this thesis
suggests that the British should not be unduly criticised for the lack of
direction to their policies. The fact that Britain's future role was a central part
of current decisions meant that policy makers had multiple opposing views of
the path that Britain should take. It was precisely because the EEC
membership decision involved open discussion about Britain's identity and
future that genuine consensus could not be reached.
In fact, this thesis shows that Britain's policy in the late 1960s was as
good as could be expected given that Britain had been forcibly excluded from
the EEC. The initiative built and kept support, sounded sympathetic to
European opinion and helped to narrow de Gaulle's options in his anti-
Atlantic policies. This does not suggest that Britain's policy was always an
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entirely rational expression of Britain's national interest. It was not: the whole
initiative was not entirely rational as it was widely acknowledged that de
Gaulle was likely to veto. This also does not suggest that Britain's policy was
successful. Clearly, it was not: the British failed to control the withdrawal
from Empire, failed to sustain the parity of sterling and failed in the short-term
to get into the EEC. But the very nature of the decision enmeshed the
problems of diplomacy and economics with the problems of domestic politics
and this in turn marked a transition in the history of Britain's relations with the
EEC. For national political parties, how could the EEC replace the post-war
international settlement as the base for the future exercise of Britain's policies
and power? How should Britain's identity now be expressed? Wilson had to
make the application, but the fact that his heart and mind was not fully
committed has come to assume real significance in the continued management
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